Article

Armed Forces & Society
1-21

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X15613580
afs.sagepub.com

Toward a Classification of Managing Religious Diversity in the Ranks: The Case of the Turkish and Israeli Armed Forces

Elisheva Rosman[1]

Abstract

Military establishments view religious soldiers with mixed feelings and must contend with the specific dilemmas these soldiers present. This article suggests what might influence the managing of religious diversity in the ranks, using the idea of dimensions of isolation. The more removed a military is from society, the more likely it is to utilize internal mechanisms when dealing with religious soldiers. The less removed it is from society, the more likely it will be to turn to external mediating mechanisms in this regard. Using three dimensions of isolation (physical, temporal, and psychological), this article discusses the treatment of religious troops in the Israeli and Turkish cases. After exploring what can be learned from these cases regarding the accommodation of religious soldiers, the article concludes with some suggestions for future research.

Keywords

religion, Israel, dimensions of isolation, civil–military relations, Turkey

[1] Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

Corresponding Author:
Elisheva Rosman, Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel.
Email: elisheva.rosman-stollman@biu.ac.il

Religious soldiers in the ranks raise many general questions. Aside from deliberating the military pros and cons of these soldiers beliefs, militaries must deal with them on a practical level (such as accommodating—or not—religious commandments, i.e., wearing clothing conforming to religious requirements, observing dietary laws). While not all of these questions can be answered, the problems they raise become more acute particularly in military systems that conscript religious soldiers.

This article suggests a possible theoretical construct regarding what might influence the managing of religious diversity in the ranks. It posits that the more removed a military is from society, the more likely it is to utilize internal mechanisms when dealing with religious soldiers. The less removed it is from society, the more likely it will be to turn to external—even civilian—mediating mechanisms in this regard. Hybrid cases will have more complex modes of treatment.[1]

After putting forward the basics of this construct, the article will discuss it using the civil–military relations in the Israeli and Turkish cases. Both these militaries are conscription-based militaries with a substantial presence of religious soldiers in the ranks. Likewise, their dynamic religion–state relations influence the relationship between the military and the religion and make them interesting cases for discussing the proposed construct. After exploring what can be learned from these cases regarding the treatment of religious soldiers, the article will conclude with some suggestions for future research.

Religion, Armed Forces, Societies, and Boundaries: A Review of the Literature

Multiethnic armed forces have been the focus of much scholarship (e.g., Elron, Shamir, & Ben-Ari, 1999; Enloe, 1980; Levy-Schreiber & Ben-Ari, 2000; Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 2013; Peled, 1998; Zirker, Danopoulos, & Simpson, 2008). Far less has been written about managing diversity within multireligious forces or forces where religion is an important component in interunit relations.[2] Nevertheless, religious diversity is only increasing as a military issue (Hassner, 2014).

As demonstrated by Berger and Neuhaus (1996) and in later studies (such as Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2010), mediating structures stand between individuals and the greater structures of society to which they belong. They are able, to a certain extent, to regulate conflicting pressures and can serve as a coping mechanism for individuals who belong simultaneously to more than one framework (such as religious soldiers, working mothers, etc.).

However, mediating structures are affected by the nature of boundaries between the civil and the military spheres. When boundaries between the military and the civilian spheres are more integral, to use Luckham's typology (1971)[3]—not allowing unregulated contact between the two spheres—it is more difficult to construct such mediators. When they are more fragmented—at times enabling unregulated contact—mediation is more of a possibility.

While past scholarship tended to observe integral and fragmented boundaries as fixed points, seeing civil–military boundaries as one or the other, it seems more

useful to describe these concepts as continuums: Civil–military boundaries can be more or less integral and more or less fragmented. If we employ these concepts as relative, they may serve us better when trying to understand civil–military relations. Thus, we can compare civil–military boundaries in different countries as well as within a specific country over time. However, boundaries are not a sufficient explanation when examining the nature of religious accommodation in the military.

Stephen P. Rosen (1995) has suggested a link between military effectiveness and social structure. While in his thoughtful article, Rosen focused on strategic capabilities, his observations on society-strategy linkage might have broader implications. Rosen posits that the more isolated a military is (physically, temporally, and psychologically), from its society, the more occupational (vs. institutional)[4] it is, the less it is likely to reflect the structure of the society it serves and vice versa (Rosen, 1995, p. 29). If we combine both ideas, it serves to follow that if a military enforces integral boundaries between itself and society (Luckham, 1971), and upholds its character as a professional force with all that this entails, it is less likely to mirror the society it serves and more likely to have its own specific culture, values, and particular social structure. The opposite also holds: The more an armed force is part of society, with boundaries between civil and military spheres more fragmented (Luckham, 1971), the more it will be a people's army, mirroring the values and culture of the society it serves.

Viewing Luckham's boundaries as relative, and using Rosen's indicators, we can construct the following: The more boundaries between a given armed force and its society are integral, not allowing unregulated interaction, the more it will be isolated from society. Such isolation can present itself in three dimensions: physical (being physically removed from society),[5] temporal (detaching soldiers from general society through long terms of service), and psychologically (by inculcating a military-based value system in its members, rather than a civilian one). Some militaries may focus on only one aspect of isolation. Other armed forces may adopt more aspects or none at all. Aspects of isolation are also not fixed points but rather relative (more or less isolated).

These dimensions can be broadened even further. The psychological dimension may also include a professional ethos. Soldiers who view themselves more as professional—as opposed to more institutional— are less likely to see themselves as part of the civilian sphere and more likely to detach themselves from it. Physical removal may include cutting off unregulated communication with the civilian sphere (e.g., regulating Internet access through various filters).

Further to this, detachment from society has practical implications as far as the way a military treats its religious soldiers, constructing a better theory of religio-military relations. The more an armed force is removed from society, the less likely it is to relate to religious soldiers using external mediating structures. Since it enforces isolation, it will balk at involving external civilian agents within its parameter and prefer internal mechanisms. For example, such a military will be more likely to employ chaplains and give them internal responsibilities. It will prefer to

rely on military traditions, rather than on religious ones, in order to bolster troop cohesion and ensure loyalty. Likewise, it will discourage the establishment of civilian mediators and will cooperate only minimally with them.

Conversely, the more an armed force mirrors society and is not removed from it, with boundaries between the spheres more fragmented, the more it is likely to use mediating (external and civilian) structures in its accommodation of religious soldiers. For example, it will be willing to accept civilian mediators such as religious study programs for preservice soldiers or civilians dictating religious requirements to the military system.[6] Such a military will also be more open to the use of religious traditions for the purpose of motivating troops and ensuring loyalty, but only to the extent this mirrors practiced traditions within civilian spheres.

Previous studies have tested this model on cases where an armed force practices isolation in all three dimensions, such as India (Rosman-Stollman, 2015). This article will examine it in the context of Israel and Turkey. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) maintains relatively integral civil–military boundaries, it does not practice isolation in all three dimensions. In the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), fragmented civil–military boundaries prevent the practice of isolation to a large extent. Both militaries contend with religious soldiers in their ranks and there is tension between the military and its religious troops. Likewise, the last decade has demonstrated just how rocky the relationship between religion and the state in these countries influences religio-military relations. Nevertheless, despite similarities, each military deals with its religious soldiers differently. In Israel, religious accommodation is more structured than in Turkey. Can the construct presented here explain the differences between these cases?

In order to explore this question, we will begin with a review of the structural differences between the IDF and the TAF using the model presented above. This will allow us to categorize the boundaries between the civilian and the military spheres as well as the three dimensions of isolation (physical, temporal, and psychological).[7] Following the classification resulting from this analysis, the article will then describe how each of these armed forces treats religious soldiers within its ranks (internal vs. external mechanisms), comparing the theoretical model to reality.

The TAF and the IDF: Boundaries and Three Dimensions of Isolation

Comparisons between Israel and Turkey can be found in various scholarly fields (such as Kamrava, 2000; Nachmani, 2005; Sezgin, 2003; Tepe, 2008). Discussion usually focuses on the military and political relations between these two countries. While both countries have a history of intricate relationships and cooperation in both the geopolitical and military spheres, another point they have in common is the complicated attitude both have toward the majority religion—Judaism and Islam, respectively. Additionally, the relationship between state and religion in both countries has been influenced by the legacy left by the Ottoman Empire (see, e.g., Cagaptay, 2006; Kucukcan, 2003; Sezgin, 2010; Tepe, 2008).[8]

Interestingly, in both countries, the military enjoys a high level of trust. Surveys show that Israelis and Turks see their respective militaries as the most credible and trustworthy institution in the state (Hadar, 2009; Örs, 2010; Sarigil, 2009).

Regarding civil–military boundaries, in his original work, Luckham (1971) classified the Turkish case as one with integral boundaries and the Israeli case as one with fragmented ones. Further scholarship has largely continued this observation.[9]

Both countries have been classified as "military democracies" by Kamrava (2000), who has also demonstrated how retired high-level military officials enter politics with relative ease, building upon their military record and popularity. Both have a majority religion and see a national dimension within it (Cagaptay, 2006, pp. 11–15; Liebman & Don-Yiḥya, 1983; Örs, 2010, p. 607). In other words, the category of "Turk" includes a religious dimension (Islam) and the category of "Israeli" includes a religious dimension (Judaism), although minority religions are accepted within these categories to some extent. Islam and Judaism in this context mean more than a religion: They are also a culture and sets of values and mores. Both are also constantly going through changes regarding the relationship between religion and the state as well as between the military and the religion. It is therefore not surprising that the many similarities, as well as differences, between these countries have inspired a substantial body of scholarly discussion. However, most comparisons do not address the civil–military angle and fewer still have addressed the issue of civil–military–religion relations in both countries.

The scope of the present article does not permit a comprehensive discussion of both of these countries in all of the various contexts of identity, religion, attitudes toward the military, and so on. Naturally, the different points of departure of each military—as well as culture, specific religious characteristics, and history—influence the physical, temporal, and psychological dimensions of the isolation of soldiers. Since this essay seeks to examine both militaries within the specific context of the construct presented previously, the following sections will focus on the issues pertinent to discussing these three dimensions in both armed forces in the present context.[10]

Physical and Temporal Isolation

The modern TAF is based on universal conscription for men. While in the past, the Ottoman army conscripted only Muslims, during the 19th century, the need for more manpower obliged the Ottomans to revise this policy.[11] The entrance of non-Muslim troops affected unit structure. Christian troops requested homogeneous service in Christian units with Christian officers. In addition, non-Muslim (mainly Christian and Jewish) soldiers did not bear arms and served exclusively in support roles (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014, pp. 210–211).

In modern Turkey, conscription includes all male Turkish citizens, regardless of religion or ethnicity. Women may volunteer for service as officers. Conscription

age begins at 20, but deferments are granted (such as for university studies) and can continue for some time. Men who do not continue on to higher education serve for 15 months. Those who achieve a university degree may serve a shorter period as conscripts or 12 months as officers.[12] Universal conscription seems to still be accepted by the population and regarded as an experience to be looked forward to (Shankland, 1999, pp. 40–42).[13] Conscientious objection is not an option. That said, from time to time over the past two decades, the government has allowed citizens to buy out of military service, depending on age.[14] The fact that citizens wish to do so despite the steep price says something about social commitment to conscription.

One of the problems with a conscription-based military is that the military system is expected to accept soldiers it would rather not recruit, given the option. For example, graduates of the İmam Hatip vocational schools, who have received a primarily religious-based education, are also conscripted. The military has always been wary of these students and considers İmam Hatip schools hotbeds for Islamism. Conscription obligates the military to accept religious individuals into its ranks, with all that this may entail. On the other hand, the TAF is not obligated to accept these individuals as officers, as discussed below.

While service for conscripts is not lengthy, making temporal isolation minor for conscripts, physical isolation is practiced by the TAF. Conscripts do not receive frequent leave and are purposely stationed in a region other than their own, apparently in order to ensure they cannot go home easily without official leave (United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees Directorate, 2001, pp. 19–20).

While it seems that the TAF practices physical isolation and only some temporal isolation for conscripts, it attempts to enforce both in the officers' corps. Officers are recruited mainly from the five military high schools in Turkey, with the remainder recruited from civilian institutions.[15] Officers in Turkey do not come up through the ranks, as they do in Israel, but volunteer with the intention of building a military career. Officers are well respected in society, especially those with senior rank. They consider themselves an elite, and civilian society generally concurs with this sentiment. This can translate into a second career in the private sector for senior officers after retirement (Jenkins, 2013, pp. 21–27). That said, most officers are first generation and there is no "officer caste" in Turkey (Jenkins, 2013, p. 23). Additionally, the fact that officers in the army (as opposed to the navy and air force) move around frequently between postings makes it impossible to create identification with a specific region or army unit (Jenkins, 2013, pp. 23–25), discouraging the creation of cohesive groups of officers within the army.

This is still conducive to physical and temporal isolation, since officers stay within the military sphere and are generally removed from civilian society. Officer contracts are for 15 years, and typically officers live on base rather than within the civilian population. In this respect, they are removed from society for the duration of their service. Consequently, it seems that the TAF is able to isolate officers physically and temporally from civil society, at least to a certain extent.

Such a reality differs sharply from that in the Israeli military. Contrary to the Turkish military, the Israeli military has two characteristics that do not allow for physical or temporal isolation. As it is a small country geographically, Israeli soldiers will always serve relatively close to home. It is impossible to isolate an Israeli soldier from his or her social context in this regard. While a native of south-eastern Turkey may be stationed away from his province with little trouble, even an Israeli soldier from the very north of the country stationed in the south is only a commuting distance from home (Kaplan, 2003).[16]

Secondly, most officers in the Israeli military do not become career officers or serve for long terms of service. Compulsory military service for men concludes after approximately 3 years. However, soldiers go home for a weekend at least once a month (and usually more often) and are in constant contact with their homes and families. This is obviously not significant temporal isolation. Service as reservists until the age of 40 or 45 causes civilians to move in and out of the military sphere constantly, further undermining the attempt to enforce physical and temporal isolation (Lomsky-Feder, Gazit, & Ben-Ari, 2008).[17]

Like the TAF, conscription does not allow for the picking and choosing of soldiers in the IDF.[18] Men and women are conscripted at the age of 18 and in principle deferments are only granted on religious grounds. There is no option to "buy out" of service, and it is extremely difficult to be released due to conscientious objection or pacifist grounds. Age cohorts are therefore usually drafted together.

Due to conscription, not only does the IDF accept soldiers it does not necessarily wish to have in its ranks, but the Israeli military was constructed from its onset in such a way as to promote social integration. These characteristics all indicate that the IDF does not even attempt to employ physical or temporal isolation. Rather, its entire structure encourages soldiers to remain integrated within society, whether as standing troops, officers, or reservists, and to maintain their social connections and contexts.

Psychological Isolation

As demonstrated, the TAF employs physical and temporal isolation to some extent in its troops and to a greater extent in the officers' corps. On the other hand, the IDF finds it impossible to employ both these dimensions of isolation. What of the psychological dimension of isolation? Does each of these militaries have its own value system based on a military system and detached from the civilian one?

The Turkish military and its ethos are very much a part of Turkish identity (Jenkins, 2013). At the same time, the TAF does have its own value system and prides itself on its professionalism. This is especially true for the officers' corps.[19] During training, identification with the military system is stressed as is military hierarchy. Cadets are taught to identify with the principles of Kemalism and the officer corps in particular and the TAF in general (Jenkins, 2013, pp. 30–31). The military would like to see Turkish society accept Kemalism as it does, as an all-encompassing way of life.

As a continuation of these sentiments, the TAF sees itself as the protector of secular identity of Turkey (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014).[20] As past coups indicate, it has not balked at intervening in Turkish politics when it felt that identity was being threatened. However, despite a past of active interference in Turkish civilian politics over the years, the Turkish military has accepted civilian supremacy (Heper, 2006; Heper & Güney, 1996). It does not involve itself in issues that are not part of security, such as economic policy, for example (Jenkins, 2013, pp. 6–8). This does not mean that it does not still wish Turkish society to continue to embody the principles of Kemalism. Since the TAF is the institution most respected by the civilian population (Örs, 2010), it is not unreasonable to assume some of these sentiments spill over into society, even in Erdogan's Turkey. Kemalism is also embedded in the Turkish constitution and considered an important part of civilian life in Turkey (Jenkins, 2013).

One example of the way the TAF wishes to influence civilian values is its treatment of İmam Hatip schools (*İmam Hatip Liseleri*). These schools were originally founded as vocational schools for preachers and prayer leaders. In the past, graduates of the İmam Hatip system could not become officers or continue on to prominent universities. This in itself is a message to Turkish society: If you would like your children to be accepted to the prestigious officers' course, or to continue on to university degrees, you will do better to strengthen their secular education. In the past decade, Islamists have claimed İmam Hatip graduates are discriminated against when competing for slots in higher education. This brought about a reform in these schools' curriculum in order to enable their graduates to qualify for university studies and not just religious posts (Toprak, 2006). The military opposed the move (Heper, 2006), probably due to the fact that the TAF is apprehensive about allowing these students into the ranks as officers, fearing they will become a fifth column. Another possible reason for the TAF's opposition to the move is that it encourages religious studies rather than secular ones (which are supported by traditional Kemalism).

This example also indicates that while it would like to influence society, the TAF is wary of society influencing it: Accepting İmam Hatip graduates as officers might affect its secular identity and it is unwilling to risk such a possibility. Another example of this apprehension was the tendency of the TAF to distrust officers suspected of Islamist tendencies and its dismissal of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) suspected of Islamist tendencies (Toprak, 2006).

Between the years 1990 and 2001, 1,418 officers and NCOs were dismissed by the Supreme Military Council due to their perceived ideological agenda (most often Islamist; Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014). This number dropped sharply in the first decade of the 21st century, with only 125 officers dismissed for "reactionary behavior" (usually the euphemism for suspected Islamist tendencies) between the years 2002 and 2009. None were dismissed during 2010–2011 (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014).

Officially, the reason given for discharge was "insubordination," considered grounds for dishonorable discharge. This meant that the dismissed officer or NCO received no pension or compensation and his chances of finding suitable employment in the civilian sector were substantially lowered. Consequently, many dismissed personnel appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to force the military to allow them to appeal the decision to release them from service. None of these petitions were granted and the ECHR ruled them all inadmissible (e.g., ECHR, 2002, 2003).

In some occurrences, petitions cited the fact that the wives of the plaintiffs were not allowed to enter the military base they lived on because they wore headscarves in their ID photos (ECHR, 2003). In 2012, a resolution passed in the Turkish Grand Assembly ruled that the behavior of military spouses cannot be taken into consideration when evaluating military personnel. This was understood as permitting the promotion of officers whose wives wear traditional Muslim headcoverings and dress (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014, pp. 220–221). In other words, the suspicion toward religious officers has abated, at least to some extent. This does not imply that the TAF is willing to accept breaches in its psychological isolation but may signal that it is less antagonistic toward religious civilian norms, as will be explored further below.

The TAF's reaction to who it will and will not accept to its officers' corps stresses that the TAF views itself as having a specific value system that is not identical to the civilian value system. It would like to export these values to the civilian sphere and to protect itself from civilian influence it deems unsuitable to its own ethos. This can be seen as a form of psychological isolation.

In Israel, on the other hand, the IDF views itself as a people's army and is not interested in constructing a military identity detached from civilian ones. The IDF's "Code of Ethics" states it derives from civilian as well as military sources and cites "the traditions of the Jewish People" as one of these (IDF Code of Ethics, 2000). Officers are encouraged to be well versed in Israeli and Jewish history in general and to feel a connection to a more general Israeli identity than to a specific military one.[21] The IDF is expected to reflect Israeli society in all respects: ethnically, gender wise, and so on. In other words, where the TAF sees itself as the source of Turkish identity which should project onto the civilian Turkish identity, the IDF sees civilian Israeli identity as the source for its own. It therefore seems that the IDF does not emphasize psychological isolation but rather sees itself as mirroring the civilian value system and as playing a part in shaping this same value system.

However, when addressing religious soldiers and norms, it seems that both armed forces take a slightly different stand. The Israeli military accommodates religious soldiers in its ranks, while the Turkish military does not do so overtly. Both militaries treat religious convictions with ambivalence, as discussed in the following section.

Religious Accommodation: Treatment of Religious Soldiers as Part of the Psychological Dimension

Following the model presented above, when examining the psychological dimension of isolation, we should expect to see some reference to religious beliefs. If the psychological dimension includes an attempt to inculcate troops with a unique, military, value system, it seems safe to assume that armed forces that enforce psychological isolation will attempt to curb religious practices and beliefs. This is an important aspect of psychological (rather than physical) isolation. Similarly, armed forces that do not enforce psychological isolation are therefore more willing to accept religious soldiers and their beliefs, just as they accept other civilian values within their own military value system. Is this also the case when examining the Turkish and Israeli militaries?

The relationship between the military and the religion in Turkey is complicated, to say the least. As noted above, the TAF has positioned itself as the power opposing Islamism in the state (Toprak, 2006, pp. 36–37). This does not mean it is anti-Islam. Surveys indicate most Turks are religious to some extent—if only culturally[22] so—and also favor religious tolerance. It is therefore not surprising that in the Turkish case, it appears that the military utilizes religion as a way of increasing morale and *esprit de corps* (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014, pp. 220–221).

In the past, the TAF has utilized Islam as a unifying force and to battle Communism as well as to lend legitimacy to coups in the past (Shankland, 1999, pp. 8–11; 41–44). In other words, it is perfectly prepared to use Islam—in its moderate form—as a tool to further its goals while retaining its secular ethos. At the same time, it also has never had issues with soldiers who were personally pious, so long as such convictions were kept within the personal sphere and not given public, extremist, expression. It did react to soldiers who were perceived as Islamist or publicly fundamentalist (Shankland, 1999, pp. 9–10), as demonstrated above regarding officers regarded as Islamist.

Up until the 1990s, it seems that moderate religious soldiers were accommodated in the TAF as far as prayers were concerned. This changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and seems to have also been affected to some extent by the Islamic revolution in Iran (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014). In the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, until the ascent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the military was suspicious of Islamists—as described above—and responded aggressively to anything it perceived as reactionary and threatening the secular nature of the state. Since the ascent of the AKP to power, it seemed relations between the TAF and religion have become less tense. The military has adopted a more tolerant tone concerning religion, providing it remains in the private sphere and does not adopt a more central role in the public sphere (Heper, 2006).

As noted, to some extent, the TAF is a continuation of the Ottoman military, and some of its traditions rely on religious symbols, similarly to its predecessor. For example, during the time of the revolution in Turkey (1919–1923), religion was

utilized in order to rally troops. Religious leaders encouraged soldiers to fight for independence and mosques served as recruitment centers (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014).

Although in the decades since, the TAF has adopted a secular nature, it still uses concepts from its more Islamic past. For example, soldiers are referred to as *Mehmetçik* (Little Muhammad), to be killed on the battlefield is to be a martyr (*şehid*), and a war veteran is an Islamic veteran (*gazi*; Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014). Navy ships carry a copy of the Quran, and the crew cries "bismillah" (in the name of God) before firing (Jenkins, 2013). A general prayer is recited before meals in the mess. However, it substitutes a more Turkish word, Tanrı, for the name of God in Islam, Allah.[23]

Despite these Islamic concepts, the Turkish military schedule does not allocate time for prayer. Soldiers may pray on their own time, without affecting military duties. In other words, it is possible to find time for three prayers (in the morning, during lunch time, and before bed), utilizing personal free time, but not five, as prescribed by Islam. On Fridays and holidays, there is time for prayer.

Contrary to the Ottoman army, there are no permanent or official chaplains in the TAF. Rather, these are rank-and-file soldiers who either serve as prayer leaders on a volunteer basis or as ad hoc chaplains during times of combat (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014). Religious studies are taught at the military academy, but these are minimal.

A number of other rules and regulations affect soldiers' ability to maintain a religious lifestyle. It is not possible to grow a beard or moustache in the Turkish military. There are no official provisions made for fasting soldiers, not even during the month-long fast of Ramadan. Despite the official position, it seems that in the field, officers can make certain decisions in order to accommodate their soldiers if they so wish. For example, an officer who is sympathetic toward his fasting conscripts can change the training scheduling around so that classes can be held during the fast rather than actual maneuvers. However, when this is done, it is an independent initiative of commanders in the field and not sanctioned by the system itself. Various interviews conducted in previous studies indicate that in the 1990s and 2000s, soldiers were told that serving in the military was important enough to exempt them from fasting (Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014, pp. 219–220; Rosman-Stollman, 2014, chapter. 2). This is contrary to the 1980s, where fasting soldiers were not discouraged, if not necessarily encouraged, to fast.

On the other hand, where the Turkish military views religious observances as primarily cultural (not religious) observances,[24] allowances are made. As mentioned above, Friday prayers are held publicly for those interested. Pork is not served, for cultural reasons. Holidays are observed. Since most Turks are Muslim, these holidays are celebrated on the national level and not as purely religious observances. It is natural for soldiers to be granted a day off in honor of the festivities.

Although fasting during Ramadan is not encouraged in the TAF, meal times for breakfast and dinner are changed during Ramadan to accommodate fasters. Breakfast is held earlier in order to accommodate those who wish to observe it as *suhoor* (the meal before the fast begins), and dinner is held to correspond with *iftar* (the meal breaking the fast every evening; Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, 2014, pp. 219–220;

Rosman-Stollman, 2014, chapter 2). These meals are also considered cultural, and especially *iftar* is observed by secular Turks as well, including those who do not fast.

It seems that when it comes to the religious dimension of psychological isolation, the TAF accepts that it is part of an Islamic context but would like to control that context and decide what is included within it. It therefore practices a form of psychological isolation not only within its officers' corps but in general in the context of religion. It does not promise that religious soldiers will be able to practice their religious obligations in full and does not see itself as an Islamic force but rather a Turkish force that has a cultural and national Islamic dimension. The TAF makes an effort, even today, to enforce its own interpretation of what this means exactly.[25] In its opinion, its interpretation of Islam, the needs and rights of religious soldiers, and the Islamic dimension of Turkish identity are completely acceptable and nonnegotiable. This is especially true for officers.

This stance is particularly interesting when considering the fact that religious conscripts have no option other than to conform to this interpretation. Due to the integral civil–military boundaries between the TAF and Turkish society, there are no mediators able to assist these soldiers in dealings with the military system and they can't truly avoid service due to conscription. In this sense, the TAF's treatment of religious soldiers can be paraphrased as "my way or the court-martial way," which is true of many armed forces in all contexts of behavior.

Conversely, the Israeli military overtly accommodates religious soldiers and utilizes mediators in doing so. The IDF understands conscription as obliging it to accommodate all soldiers. Military orders were formulated, so that religious soldiers from all religions[26] receive time to pray and are exempt from physical activity on fast days, holidays, and their religion's weekly day of rest.[27] There is consideration for dietary requirements, growing beards, and/or sidelocks and dress restrictions.[28] In order to accommodate the needs of religious soldiers on subjects of modesty and relations between the sexes, the "Proper Integration" (*HaShiluv HaRau'i*) document was drafted to maintain gender separation and modesty, thereby allowing religious soldiers to serve in accordance with their faith. Some religious soldiers complain the Proper Integration is not strict enough in its separation. Likewise, other issues of gender separation have risen in the past years from time to time and received much media attention.[29]

This is less of a problem in the TAF as women are not conscripted. Following its *modus opperandi* of integrating civilian values within the military system, the IDF also incorporates Jewish characteristics within its own value system. The IDF's Code of Ethics notes it is based (among other sources) on Jewish traditions. Religious texts are quoted during official ceremonies, such as biblical passages read during swearing-in ceremonies. While these characteristics have a national quality to them, they do maintain a religious aspect as well.

To provide religious services to soldiers, the IDF established the Military Rabbinate, which to a certain extent corresponds to the Chaplain Corps in western armed forces. The Military Rabbinate sees to the religious needs of all soldiers, by organizing prayer services, supplying religious articles, upholding dietary restrictions, and

so forth. During various periods, the Military Rabbinate expanded the scope of its activity to more active roles, such as shaping the Jewish fighting spirit and devising educational content. These shifts in mission definition hinge to a large extent on the personality of the Chief Military Rabbi and how he views the role of the Military Rabbinate (Kampinsky, 2012).

Besides these modes of accommodation, external civilian frameworks also support religious soldiers during their service (S. A. Cohen, 1997).[30] The Hesder program (combining advanced Talmudic study with IDF service) and religious prearmy preparatory seminaries (*mekhinot*) accompany their students throughout their service and assist them (to varying degrees) in their dealings with life as religious individuals within the military system (Rosman-Stollmen, 2005). If a religious soldier comes across a serious religious (halakhic) problem during his service and turns to his civilian study program, in certain cases, the program will intervene on his behalf. Study programs also take upon themselves to contact the military establishment to rectify the situation when they feel a general issue affecting all Jewish religious soldiers has arisen.[31]

In this respect, the programs are supposed to neutralize conflicting claims by student–soldiers and regulate the pressure exerted on them by their social sector, on one hand, and the military establishment, on the other. Thus, for example, some of the programs tried to assist their students in coping with the subject of refusing orders that arose during the Disengagement (2005).[32] A young religious man who enlists in the IDF through these programs expects to be able to turn to them when necessary and receive help in getting through his military service without having to compromise on the commandments of his religion (Rosman-Stollman, 2014).[33] Therefore, contrary to the reality in the TAF, there is more room for negotiation.

Nevertheless, despite what seems to be broad accommodation of religious practices and values, it seems that the IDF does utilize a form of psychological isolation regarding religious beliefs. It does not accept other denominations of Judaism, and only Orthodox Jewish interpretation of religious obligations is recognized. It deems that its regulations regarding religious observations are sufficient (such as regarding dietary restrictions and the separation of sexes). Soldiers who disagree—such as soldiers who refused to serve under the command of a female course commander for religious reasons—are court martialed.[34]

It seems the IDF, in a way somewhat similar to that of the TAF, would like to impose its own version of religious values on all of its soldiers—religious and secular—and all must conform to it. Since it considers itself a Jewish military, the religious values it incorporates should be sufficient: Soldiers can pray, dress, eat and observe holidays, and fast according to their religion. It includes religious values in its Code of Ethics. Therefore, soldiers must accept the interpretation the military adopts concerning separation between sexes, the religious boundaries of the state, and so on. Contrary to the TAF, there is room for negotiation, and religious soldiers can use civilian advocates to further their cause. However, like the TAF, once a decision is made, they are required to conform and any other form of behavior is unacceptable.[35]

Comparisons and Conclusions

After observing attitudes toward religious soldiers in both armed forces, we may return to the original question in this article: What influences the manner in which militaries treat religious soldiers? Can noting boundaries together with dimensions of isolation tell us something about the sort of religious accommodation we will find in the ranks?

The Turkish military utilizes its relatively integral (to use Luckham's term) civil–military boundaries to remove soldiers (and more so—officers) from their usual social context. It would like to instill its own version of Turkish identity in its soldiers and officers. While it has a connection with Turkish society, it sees itself as the guardian of "correct" Turkishness and not as mirroring society and its values. In this regard, it practices psychological, physical and some temporal isolation, and more so within the officers' corps than among its conscripts.

This tendency is continued in the religious dimension of psychological isolation. Religion is included within the value system of the TAF, although it is given a strong cultural and national emphasis, rather than a purely religious one. In this dimension, too, the TAF would like to dictate what the correct form of religiousness for a Turkish soldier is. While it is not oblivious to civilian cues on the matter, it still sees itself as having the final word in religious matters. In such a reality, it is impossible to create any form of mediation for religious soldiers and no negotiation can take place.

Conversely, due to its fragmented civil–military boundaries, the Israeli military utilizes both internal and external mediators. Its internal mediator—the Military Rabbinate—is not a strong entity. External, civilian, mediators—preservice religious study programs—are much stronger and more capable of voicing needs and demands of religious soldiers. Its fragmented civil–military boundaries allow for a working relationship with these external mediators, with varying degrees of success.

Regarding the dimensions of isolation, the Israeli military is incapable of enforcing physical or temporal isolation. The size of the state, together with the man power makeup and the mode of conscription, do not allow for long terms of service or for removal of soldiers from their social ties. Additionally, ideologically, the IDF does not see itself as holding a separate identity or ethos from Israeli society. Since it views itself as a people's army, mirroring society, psychological isolation is also impossible.

At the same time, in dealing with its religious soldiers, it appears that the IDF does attempt some psychological isolation by requiring that its members conform to the military's interpretation of Orthodox Judaism. The IDF does not accept that religious values may differ from the decided-upon policy, such as regarding separation between the sexes. The IDF sees the Proper Integration as an adequate solution to the issue of mixed-gender service and once it is enforced is unwilling to hear civilian voices on the matter.[36] Soldiers who disagree and act upon this disagreement are considered insubordinate and treated accordingly. In other words, in all other matters, the IDF deems that being a people's army, it cannot instill a true military

culture, isolated from civilian values and norms, in its members. Yet regarding religious values, it attempts to practice some form of psychological isolation. Its view of what Judaism means is the only one it will accept. The fact that its civil–military boundaries are fragmented makes this difficult.

The TAF was never intended to be a Muslim military. It has always concentrated on being a professional, Turkish, military establishment. However, it does not employ all three dimensions of isolation completely (certainly not when dealing with conscripts), although it does uphold its integral boundaries versus the civil sphere. This in turn affects the religious dimension of psychological isolation. The TAF attempts to influence Turkish identity in the religious aspect of the psychological dimension, seeing it as an important part of its secular, Kemalist, ethos. Consequently, it does not allow any sort of mediators when dealing with religious soldiers, not even employing permanent chaplains to assist religious soldiers. This is also a direct result of its integral boundaries which do not allow for the use of external mediators.

In summary, following the theoretical suggestion at the beginning of this article and testing it through the Israeli and Turkish cases, some conclusions can be reached. Both Luckham and Rosen's terms, combined with the construct suggested here, indicate that both the nature of boundaries and dimension of isolation are needed in order to construct a framework for analysis regarding civil–military–religion relations. Relatively integral civil–military boundaries allow an armed force more autonomy when dealing with religious soldiers in its midst. It does not need to contend with civilian pressure to the extent it would have to were boundaries fragmented. However, with a conscription-based force, this is more difficult than a volunteer-based one.

Relatively fragmented boundaries, with less isolation from the civilian sphere, encourage the use of external mediating structures when accommodating religious troops. Since armed forces with these characteristics maintain a close relationship with the civilian sphere, it is harder for them to disconnect the accommodation of religious soldiers from more general civilian norms and more natural to rely on external structures.

The Turkish and Israeli cases highlight that although this model is a possible starting point for civil–military–religion theoretical discussions concerning accommodation, it is far from a finished product. While the present structure addressed only two of Luckham's boundary classifications (integral and fragmented), it does not delve into the possibility of relatively permeable boundaries: the case when no true boundaries exist between the military and civilian spheres. Such cases exist and no doubt have implication for the accommodation of religious soldiers.

Likewise, the fact that religious norms are not always addressed in the same way as other psychological aspects of isolation also demands further inquiry. While the scope of the present article does not allow for further development of this model, it can serve as a basis for discussion and, hopefully, for a broadening of the theoretical constructs within the field of religion and the military.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Csaba Nikolenyi, Amikam Nachmani, and Yuksel Sezgin, as well as the three anonymous readers, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. The present article does not attempt to offer a comprehensive comparison between these militaries. Nor does it discuss the conduct of religious individuals in the ranks. The cases presented aim to demonstrate the viability of the theoretical idea presented here and does so within its specific context.
2. For a detailed description of the scholarship and the lack of theoretical research on religion in the military, see Hassner (2014, p. 1–8). Noted exceptions are Joanne Benham Rennick, Stuart A. Cohen, and Hillel Frisch as well as a recent volume edited by Ron Hassner on religion in the military and Kim Phillip Hansen's comprehensive study of chaplains in the U.S. Navy.
3. While Luckham's typology may be somewhat dated, in connection with Israel and Turkey, in my opinion, his classification is still useful.
4. For a more detailed explanation of these terms, see Moskos (1977).
5. Rosen attributes this to war or deployment, but I would suggest that ensuring the military is isolated in barracks, removed physically from society, has the same effect.
6. As demonstrated below in the Israeli case.
7. This article presupposes to existence of a civilian sector and a military sector. While it accepts that these are not always completely separate, that they influence each other, and that the boundaries between the two systems are not always clear cut, following other civil–military relations scholars (such as Luckham, Lissak, and S. A. Cohen, to name but a few), it holds that these sectors exist as separate entities to a certain extent at the very least and cannot be seen as a single entity or network. For an opposing view, see Sheffer and Barak (2013).
8. Despite similarities, there are also many differences between these two militaries. Religion, identity, and nationalism are entwined differently in both countries. Both Islam and Judaism have definite conceptions of the public/private split (as well as of war, violence, patriotism, etc.), that are important when understanding the relationship between religion and the state. Sadly, the scope of the present article does not permit me to address these issues in depth. Since the focus of this article is the proposal of a specific theoretical construct, only some of these characteristics can be discussed, with hope future studies will

highlight how these elements affect religio-military relations in these countries in other theoretical contexts.

9. With the noted exception of Sheffer and Barak who posit that civil–military boundaries are nearly nonexistent and that the military sphere dominates the civil one almost completely (see Sheffer & Barak, 2013). However, as explained above, this article follows the position of other scholars, such as S. A. Cohen (2008) and Moshe Lissak, (1991), who hold that it is entirely possible to consider two separate spheres within the civil–military context in Israel.
10. In its present format, this article cannot offer a comprehensive discussion of the issue of ultra-Orthodox (*Haredi*) conscription. Should the future see a fundamental change in the conscription of this sector, perhaps the model will require renewed thought.
11. For a detailed account, see N.A. *Notes on the Turkish Army* (1915).
12. Turks studying or working abroad may pay a fee and buy exemptions, see "Those Over 29 to Pay 30 K for Paid Military Service," *Today's Zaman*, November 22, 2011.
13. For a different view, see Sak (2014).
14. The opportunity to buy out of service is also not new, see N.A. *Notes on the Turkish Army* (1915, pp. 3–5).
15. In the past, graduates of religious vocational high schools (İmam Hatip) were not eligible to apply to the officers' corps.
16. The only exception to this rule is the air force, since Israeli air force personnel, specifically pilots, do live on base, and serve for relatively longer periods of time.
17. Officers are usually officially discharged at the age of 45, while rank-and-file soldiers are discharged the year after they turn 40.
18. While conscription in Israel does allow for some discretion on the part of the military system in rejecting potential soldiers, legally, all 18-year-old Jewish males are conscripted.
19. See the Officers' Training School (Kara Harp Okulu) site.
20. While this has changed to some extent since the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP party), it seems that this is still largely the case.
21. See, for example, the evolution of the curriculum of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Officers' Training School in Libel (2014).
22. In both Israel and Turkey, due to the linkage between religion, identity, and nationality, some religious observances have acquired a cultural dimension. Meaning, that secular citizens sometimes observe what might be seen as religious practices but do not attach religious significance to them. Rather the emphasis is on tradition and local culture. For example, many Israelis do not drive or eat in public on the holiday of Yom Kippur and conduct a Seder meal on Passover, and many Turks do not eat pork in general and observe the Iftar meal during the month of Ramadan (although they do not fast during the month). This is explained as part of tradition and culture and not necessarily due to religious belief or even a general belief in god.
23. The full blessing is Tanrımız hamdolsun, milletimiz var olsun, afiyet olsun (Blessed is our Lord, long live our country, and bon appetite). I am grateful to Özgül Erdemli for the translation of the Turkish.
24. See Note 20.

25. Although AKP rule has obviously changed some of the rules—especially regarding religious officers—it seems that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) can still choose what it accepts from the civilian sphere and how it chooses to accept it.
26. The IDF is also seen as a Jewish military. Since Judaism has a national element as well as a religious one, it is not always possible to separate policy meant to preserve a national element from one that tries to maintain a religious character. The limited scope of this article proscribes an in-depth discussion of this subject.
27. Soldiers who wish to rest on a day other than Saturday (e.g., Friday or Sunday) cannot rest on Saturday as well.
28. Such as the prohibition against wearing leather shoes (the standard IDF footwear) on Yom Kippur and Tisha B'Av, against shaving during the Counting of the Omer, and so forth. For instructions regarding non-Jewish soldiers, see General Staff Order 34. 0310 (2006).
29. For two views on the issue of gender separation in the IDF, see A. Cohen & Susser (2014) and Sasson-Levy (2014).
30. Parallel programs also exist for religious women soldiers; see Rosman-Stollman (2009).
31. Such intervention may vary from program to program.
32. During the summer of 2005, Israel withdrew from the Gaza strip and parts of northern Samaria. The IDF conducted the evacuation of civilians from the communities in this area in an operation termed "the Disengagement."
33. This relationship is not free of tension. During the Disengagement in 2005, some claimed that religious soldiers constituted a fifth column in the IDF ranks.
34. Such a case occurred in the past. During what is sometimes referred to as the Har Bracha Yeshiva affair in 2009–2010, three soldiers refused orders to serve under the command of female instructors, exacerbated tensions regarding the "Proper Integration" and the integration of women in the ranks (Rosman-Stollman, 2014).
35. These examples of tension notwithstanding, the small number of severe conflicts proves that the relationship is usually smooth and satisfactory to both sides. Despite the sometimes complex situation, to date the IDF has never petitioned to disallow religious soldiers from enlisting nor does Israeli society seem to support such a move. In this respect, it is understood that sometimes there is a tendency to mix up halakhic difficulties with difficulties stemming from a political or moral stance.
36. Another example is the memorial Yikor prayer. The IDF ruled it would use the version of the prayer beginning "Yizkor Yisrael (The people of Israel remember)" rather than "Yikor Elohim (God remembers)," despite religious groups' protest.

References

Berger, P. L., & Neuhaus, R. J. (1996). *To empower people: From state to civil society*. Washington, DC: AEI Press.

Cohen, S. A. (1997). *The sword or the scroll?* Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Harwood.

Cohen, S. A. (2008). *Israel and its army: From cohesion to confusion*. London, England: Routledge.

Cohen, A., & Susser, B. (2014). Women singing, cadets leaving. The extreme case syndrome in religion-army relationships. In E Rosman-Stollman & A. Kampinsky (Eds.), *Civil-military relations in Israel: Essays in honor of Stuart A. Cohen* (pp. 127–145). London, England: Lexington Books.

Cagaptay, S. (2006). *Islam, secularism, and nationalism in modern Turkey*. New York, NY: Routledge.

ECHR (European Court of Human Rights). (2002, October 3). *Third section, partial decision as to the admissibility of application no. 45824/99 by Ziya Çelikates and Others against Turkey*. Retrieved from http://www.echr.coe.int/

ECHR (European Court of Human Rights). (2003, July 8). *Third section, final decision as to the admissibility of application no. 45824/99 by Sedat Şen and Others against Turkey*. Retrieved http://www.echr.coe.int/

Enloe, C. H. (1980). *Ethnic soldiers: State security in divided societies*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Elron, E., Shamir, B., & Ben-Ari, E. (1999). Why don't they fight each other? Cultural diversity and operational unity in multinational forces. *Armed Forces & Society*, *26*, 73–97.

General Staff Order 34.0310, Religion Services for Members of Non-Jewish Communities. (March 2006).

Hadar, Y. (2009). Israeli public trust levels in public institutions: The first decade of the 21st century. *Parliament 63*. Israel: Israel Democracy Institute. Retrieved from www.idi.org.il

Hassner, R. (2014). Introduction. In Ron E. Hassner (Ed.)., *Religion in the military worldwide* (pp. 1–19). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Heper, M. (2006). The justice and development party government and the military in Turkey. In A. Çarkoğlu & B. Rubin (Eds.), *Religion and politics in Turkey* (pp. 73–89). London, England: Routledge.

Heper, M., & Güney, A. (1996). The military and democracy in the third Turkish Republic. *Armed Forces & Society*, *22*, 619–642.

IDF (Israel Defense Forces). (2000). *Code of ethics*. Retrieved May 21, 2014 from rotter.net/User_files/forum/gil2/4bcf5154183b1757.jpg

Jenkins, G. (2013). Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics, Adelphi Paper 337, (Reprint, 2013).

Kampinsky, R. (2012). The military Rabbinate and its influence on religionization in the IDF. In G. Reuven & T. Libel (Eds.), *Bein HaKipa LaKumta: Dat, Politika VeTzava* (pp. 309–335). Ben Shemen, Isarel: Modan.

Kamrava, M. (2000). Military professionalism and civil-military relations in the Middle East. *Political Science Quarterly*, *115*, 67–92.

Kaplan, D. (2003). *Brothers and others in arms: The making of love and war in Israeli combat units*. New York, NY: Haworth Press.

Komsuoğlu, A., & Eskişar, G. M. K. (2014). Turkey. In R. E. Hassner (Ed.), *Religion in the military worldwide* (pp. 210–211). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Kucukcan, T. (2003). State, Islam, and religious liberty in modern Turkey: Reconfiguration of religion in the public sphere. *Brigham Young University Law Review*, *2003*, 475–506.

Levy-Schreiber, E., & Ben-Ari, E. (2000). Body-building, character-building and nation-building: Gender and military service in Israel. *Studies in Contemporary Judaism*, *16*, 171–190.

Libel, T. (2014). Constructing the ideal officer: Israeli society and the IDF officer school. In E. Rosman-Stollman & A. Kampinsky (Eds.), *Civil-military relations in Israel: Essays in honor of Stuart A. Cohen* (pp. 83–103). London, England: Lexington Books.

Liebman, C. S., & Don-Yiḥya, E. (1983). *Civil religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and political culture in the Jewish state*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lissak, M. (1991). The civilian components of the national defense theory in Israel. *Iyunim BeTkumat Yisrael*, *1*, 191–210.

Lomsky-Feder, E., & Ben-Ari, E. (2013). Managing diversity in context: Unit level dynamics in the Israel defense forces. *Armed Forces & Society*, *39*, 193–212.

Lomsky-Feder, E., Gazit, N., & Ben-Ari, E. (2008). Reserve soldiers as transmigrants: Moving between the civilian and military worlds. *Armed Forces & Society*, *34*, 593–614.

Luckham, A. R. (1971). A comparative typology of civil-military relations. *Government and Opposition*, *6*, 5–35.

Moskos, C. (1977). From institution to occupation trends in military organization. *Armed Forces & Society*, *4*, 41–50.

N.A. (Notes on the Turkish Army). (1915) *Notes on the Turkish army*. Leeds, England: The Naval and Military Press. (Reprinted from original facsimile).

Nachmani, A. (2005). *Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy relations in the East Mediterranean*. London, England: Routledge.

N.A. (Notes on the Turkish Army). (2011, November 22). Those over 29 to pay 30K for paid military service. *Today's Zaman*. Retrieved February 2015, from http://www.todayszaman.com/national_those-over-29-years-old-to-pay-30k-for-paid-military-service_263555.html

Officers' Training School. (Kara Harp Okulu—KHO). Retrieved from http://www.kho.edu.tr/anasayfa.html

Örs, H. B. (2010). The perception of the army by Armenian minorities living in Turkey. *Armed Forces & Society*, *36*, 585–603.

Peled, A. (1998). *A question of loyalty: Military manpower policy in multi-ethnic states*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Rosen, S. P. (1995). Military effectiveness: Why society matters. *International Security*, *19*, 5–31.

Rosman-Stollmen, E. (2005). *Religion and the military as greedy frameworks: Religious Zionism and the Israel defense forces* (PhD dissertation). Bar-Ilan University, Israel.

Rosman-Stollman, E. (2009). Women of valor: The Garin program and the Israel defense forces. *Israel Studies*, *14*, 158–177.

Rosman-Stollman, E. (2014). *For god and country? Religious student-soldiers and the Israel defense forces*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Rosman-Stollman, E. (2015). Religious accommodation as a civil-military looking glass: The case of the Indian and Israeli armed forces. *Journal of Church and State*. doi:10.1093/jcs/csv001

Sak, G. (2014, December 14). Why are Turkish men paying out of their noses to be exempt from military service. *Hurriyet Daily News*. Retrieved February 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/why-are-turkish-men-paying-out-of-their-noses-to-be-exempt-from-military-service.aspx?PageID=238&NID=75270&NewsCatID=403>

Sarigil, Z. (2009). Deconstructing the Turkish military's popularity. *Armed Forces & Society*, *35*, 709–727.

Sasson-Levy, O. (2014). Gender segregation or women's exclusion?: The military as a case study. In E. Rosman-Stollman & A. Kampinsky (Eds.), *Civil-military relations in Israel: Essays in honor of Stuart A. Cohen* (pp. 147–169). London, England: Lexington Books.

Sezgin, Y. (2003). Can the Israeli status quo model help post-February 28 Turkey solve its problems? *Turkish Studies*, *4*, 47–70.

Sezgin, Y. (2010). The Israeli millet system: Examining legal pluralism through lenses of nation-building and human rights. *Israel Law Review*, *43*, 631–654.

Shankland, D. (1999). *Islam and society in Turkey*. Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press.

Sheffer, G., & Oren, B. (2013). *Israel's security networks: A theoretical and comparative perspective*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press..

Tepe, S. (2008). *Beyond sacred and secular: Politics of religion in Israel and Turkey*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Toprak, B. (2006). Islam and democracy in Turkey. In A. Çarkoğlu & B. Rubin (Eds.), *Religion and politics in Turkey* (pp. 32–33). London, England: Routledge.

United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees Directorate for Movements of Persons, Migration and Consular Affairs, Asylum and Migration Division. (2001). *Turkey/military service* (pp. 19–20). Retrieved February 2015, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/467010bd2.pdf

Wald, K. D., & Calhoun-Brown, A. (2010). *Religion and politics in the United States*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Zirker, D., Danopoulos, C. P., & Simpson, A. (2008). The military as a distinct ethnic or quasi-ethnic identity in developing countries. *Armed Forces & Society*, *34*, 314–337.

Author Biography

Elisheva Rosman received her PhD in political science from Bar Ilan University. She is an assistant professor at Bar Ilan University. Her articles have appeared in *Journal of Church and State*, *Armed Forces & Society*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, and *Israel Studies*. Her recent publications include *For God and Country? Religious Student-Soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces* (University of Texas) and *Civil-Military Relations in Israel* (with Aharon Kampinsky; Lexington Books).