Eyal Lewin, "The 1973 War as a Stimulator in the Reshaping of Israeli National Ethos," in Udi Lebel and Eyal Lewin eds., *The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping of Israeli Civil-Military Relations* (Lanham, MD: Lexicon, 2015): 147-178.

The Query of the Peace Concessions
Seldom do historians or scholars of political science make any account of the balance of the Israeli concessions at the 1978 Camp David agreement that formed the framework for the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. The title and the terminology of the negotiations between the parties were those of peace, with Begin and Sadat's famous call: No more wars, no more bloodshed, no more tears (Stein, 1999). Yet within the framework of political realism, the result for Israel can be seen rather as the German stand at the 1918 *Armistice of Compiègne*. From strictly a realistic strategic point of view, the Israeli concessions can surely be viewed as political suicide: in exchange for its southern neighbor's promise to end the state of war, Israel was about to lose some crucial strategic assets (Kumaraswamy, 2006; Reich, 2005; Stein, 1999):

(1) The Sinai Peninsula formed an enormous buffer zone that just a few years earlier enabled Israel to survive the 1973 sudden Egyptian attack. With its 60,000 square kilometers, the Sinai desert represented 90% of the territory acquired by Israel during the 1967 war, and was three times the size of the whole country. *De-facto*, Israel surrendered to its neighbor 75% of its land.

(2) Israel evacuated and dismantled hundreds of highly important military installations as well as dozens of strategic defense locations.

(3) Israel agreed that its largest rival in the region, Egypt, would be militarily modernized. Beyond huge economic American grants to Egypt, the United States supplied the Egyptian army with quantities of Abrams tanks, Apache helicopters and F-16 fighter jets, just to mention the highlights of the large military aid packages.

(4) Israel turned over the Alma oil field, which it discovered and developed. By doing so, Israel gave up its only chance to become energy-independent: this oil field was Israel's largest single source of energy that supplied over 50% of the country's energy needs and was planned to be developed and to enable full self-sufficiency in energy in an era when the whole world was struck with an oil crisis. Beyond the strategic advantage, the untapped reserves in the commercially productive Alma oil field were estimated at 100 billion USD.

(5) Israel evacuated thousands of Jews who had built their homes in the desert, blowing up an entire city (Yamit) into rubbles. By doing so, an important unprecedented standard was created in the Middle East: in any future arrangement between Israel and any of its neighbors, Jewish settlements are bound to be destroyed.

These territorial, strategic and political deep concessions fall in total contrast with the 1973 war's military results, where Israel crushed the Egyptians. In spite of the fact that the war started with the IDF overwhelmingly caught by surprise and vastly outnumbered, it ended with a clear Israeli victory. By October 25, 1973, after 19 days of fighting, Israel proved to be as unbeatable as ever: Israeli forces that had crossed the Suez Canal advanced to positions some 100 kilometers from Cairo, totally cutting the Cairo-Suez road; the bulk of Egypt's Third Army was trapped and

besieged, tens of thousands of Egyptian soldiers encircled, and the Egyptians and their Soviet patrons urging for ceasefire (Herzog, 2003).

One explanation for the puzzling contrast between the deep Israeli concessions and the victorious results of the 1973 war could be that Israeli policymakers were, in a Wilsonianistic manner, idealistic ones. Political scientist Hedley Bull defined idealistic idealism in international relations as the belief in progress, and particularly as the conviction that the system that had given rise to war was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally peaceful and just one (Bull, 1977). Indeed, proponents of the late Menachem Begin refer to the Israeli Prime Minister as a leader driven by deep humanistic ideological attitudes and as the chief advocate of liberal attitudes of peace and justice (Avner, 2010; Haber, 1978; Naor, 1993).

Yet an idealistic portrayal of Israel's leadership falls short of explaining the vast majority that supported the peace terms in the Knesset as well as within the population at large. Moreover, such description totally contradicts the more common evaluation of Israeli decision-makers who are more often counted to be rather realistic leaders. Efraim Inbar, a political scientist and a former member of the Political Strategic Committee of the National Planning Council, put it very clearly:

> Israeli policy-makers have been keenly aware of the pervasive threat to the integrity of national borders in the international system and have assumed that over the long run, no state can ever be certain of its security. Israel's foreign policy elite has always perceived the anarchical nature of international politics […].
> Most Israeli leaders have realized that in the real world, threats to national security are omnipresent and that all states attempt to widen their margins of security, even at the expense of their neighbors […]. Thus, within the Israeli political elite, political Realism became the dominant conceptual framework for understanding regional and international politics (Inbar 1999: 54).

Inbar also quotes Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who in the early 1970s defined Israel's existence as a state of dormant war, waking up every few years and turning into an active violent confrontation. The Thomas Hobbes view of Middle Eastern geopolitics, held by Israelis throughout decades, was supported by a history of Israel's constant warfare with its Arab neighbors who from its very foundation in May 1948 were determined to destroy it. Because Israel had to encounter repeated rounds of warfare, it had to produce each time a retaliating reputation of intolerance to Arab attacks and to force its Arab neighbors to accept it as unchallengeable (Brooks, 1997; Sachar, 1981; 1996).

If such was the case, then, the puzzle remains: how come a fragile state in a hostile neighborhood willingly hands out its major strategic and economic assets? How come the people who have experienced existential threats just few years earlier, were now willing to generously yield most of the country's territorial advantages, earned not so long ago by blood and tears? One possible answer is the changing tides between two rival forms of ethos within the Israeli society: the ethos of conflict and the peace ethos.

In this chapter, the ethos clash is defined and the two forms of ethos are portrayed through extracts from hundreds of testimonies of soldiers who fought the 1973 war and citizens who experienced it. Understanding the competing forms of ethos within Israeli society, and the heights that the clash between them reached relating to the 1973 war will enable us to understand not only Israeli concessions in the 1978 Camp-David agreement but also the Israeli public support for the Oslo

accords, and most importantly – an Israeli possible wide consensus over further future concessions, even those that might strategically endanger Israel's very existence.

Ethos Clash in Israeli Society
Ethos is widely defined as the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide particular orientation to a society. It combines dominant societal beliefs in a particular structure, and lends meaning to a specific group's societal life (Bar-Tal, 2000). The national ethos of a country is the array of particularistic shared values and traditions from which a people's images of its future and its past are envisioned. The ethos integrates the community into a unit believing in a common mutual destiny, and forms the foundation for its unique identity as a distinctive social group. The integrative ethos is also the moral source for the national community's informal social controls; it enforces commitments upon society and drives its members into a largely voluntary social order. Thus, the ethos of a nation holds in fact one of the most important keys to a people's ability to unite into a cohesive society (Etzioni, 2009).

The use of the expression in political science goes back to the German romanticism of the late 18th century with philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder introducing the term *Zeitgeist*, which translates into "the spirit of the age." Inspired by philosopher Friedrich Hegel's concept of mind and moral fiber, Herder spoke of the cultural, ethical and political climate in which a nation evolves and crystallizes (Barnard, 2003). These ideas project a strong association between the ethos of a nation and representations of the long history that the nation claims to have. The features of a community, some scholars claim, originated in the historical stages when the mental maps of the people, their prevailing culture, norms and ideas had first been cultivated (Rothstein, 2000).

This attitude corresponds also with the writings of sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, considered to have been the first to use the concept of collective memory. Building upon the ideas of philosopher Henri Bergson, who distinguished between a memory of a specific event and a memory of enduring attitudes, and on the socio-cultural accounts of sociologist Emile Durkheim who had indicated the manners in which Australian Aborigines had preserved the sacred values and rituals in their communities, Halbwachs spoke of a group memory that was shared by its members, passed on, and constructed by the social group (Halbwachs, [1952] 1992).

According to the advocates of collective remembrance who have followed Halbwachs, among them historians Marc Bloch and Aby Warburg, a social group's common recollection is a contested ideological terrain, where different actors try to establish their particular interpretation of the past as the only way in which their particular group should comprehend its history. Society's collective remembrance is an ongoing process that unites the group according to the ideological perceptions and the common ethics that are derived from its told and retold history (Durkheim 1995; Halbwachs, 1992; Rothstein, 2000; Russell, 2007).

Brooding over a century of bloodshed, late twentieth century scholars have added critical insights to the comprehension of collective memory, particularly in its national contexts. Historians Eric Hobsbaum and Terence Ranger have gathered studies where some of the traditions which we tend to refer to as very ancient ones are examined; it seems that various European traditions did not originate through centuries of practice but were rather invented comparatively recently. The creation of Welsh and Scottish national culture, for example, does not necessarily date back earlier than the nineteenth century; neither do British royal rituals of the twentieth century. The very name of Hobsbaum and Ranger's edited book leads to the idea of

the artificiality of social cultures: *The Invention of Traditions*. The major thread of thought in the book is how constructed versions of the past, and of the continuity between past and present, form a mechanism with which modern societies establish social cohesion, legitimize authority and socialize populations into a common culture. In fact, Hobsbaum refers to a politics of memory, analyzing how national ethos is institutionalized through the exercise of social engineering (Hobsbaum, 1983).

Other scholars too claimed that statist ideologies involve a manipulation of space and time in order to legitimate a monopoly on administrative control. National history, according to this point of view, is based on nothing more than false unity designed through an elite's conquest of historical awareness. These scholars also point out how national states all over the world exploit professional historical research and shift their peoples' center of collective memory from the temple and its priests to the university and its professors, from a religious set of myths to a political narrative, relying on a subjective interpretation of history at best (Duara, 1995; Levi-Strauss, 1979; Smith, 1986).

Whether judging the phenomenon as a positive one or as a destructive aspect of our society, it seems that decades after Halbwachs, scholars have examined and reexamined his terminology, arriving again and again at the same concept. The basic understanding is that a social remembrance shapes images of the past and draws, by doing so, the lines of political cultural profiles (Fentress & Wickham, 1992; Olick & Levy, 1997).

In its national context, the idea of a collective memory resides deep in international studies theorist Benedict Anderson's comprehension of the nation as an imagined community. The national identity, according to Anderson, has a symbolic and constructed nature, and by utilizing the communications media it is capable of reaching dispersed populations (Anderson, 1983). The collective identity of a nation as a unique combination of a public that shares mutual values and beliefs that lie in its common narratives -- that is, its constructed collective memory -- and of the united role that its members believe fate has destined for them in this world. This is the national ethos, containing the foundation of the collective identity through both a sense of a certain duty that the nation is obligated to fulfill and a set of common goals that is intended for the people as a united entity to achieve (Lewin, 2012).

That being said, one should constantly bear in mind that the term "ethos," particularly national ethos, carries with it more than just the accumulated and interpreted collective remembrance. It encompasses also the enduring shared beliefs that characterize a society. These beliefs are organized around leading themes, myths, values, ideologies, concerns, and the group's self image; they form necessary conditions for the performance of social systems, functioning as lenses through which each member comprehends the spirit of his social group (Bar-Tal, 2000; Giddens, 1984; Somers & Gibson, 1994).

Reality is subjectively interpreted by rival political forces; state formations, parties, movements, and numerous other social agents are all involved in constructing versions of national past, national ethos and national identity that originate from them. In particular, the politics of war remembrance reveal the struggle of various groups to articulate certain narratives and to gain recognition for differing identity structures (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, 2000).

When examining a country's national resilience during war, a national ethos that corresponds with warfare proves to be an essential factor promoting the chances for victory and survival. Yet beyond the mere existence of such ethos, an examination of its content is needed in order to comprehend its capacities. Inquiring into the nature

of different occurrences of national ethos reveals two distinct forms: a national *ethos of conflict* and a national *peace ethos*. Whereas the former inspires fighting forces and struggling populations, the latter promotes deep beliefs in appeasement, reconciliation and pacification.

The significance of a national ethos of conflict for national resilience during war is immense. A thorough historical research relying on the events of World War II has proved that an ethos of conflict can stimulate mobilization of people into defending their country and serve as an inspiring instrument that will encourage them to bravely protect their national assets. The overwhelming social power of the ethos of conflict makes it an essential condition for a country to win its struggles against violent enemies (Lewin, 2012).

A peace ethos, on the other hand, can hardly tunnel collective energies into tasks where fierce fighting is needed. For instance, as opposed to other case studies of the World War II theater, the national ethos of the Norwegian people was shaped in the form of a peace ethos. The Norwegians viewed themselves to be not only highly democratic, but also to be the carriers of the message of democracy throughout the world. Much of the inspiration and spirit of international peace that laid the foundations of the League of Nations had come, certainly by no coincidence, from the policies and through the active involvement of the Norwegian leadership.

Since national ethos as well as the belief in a national cause had always been very strong within 20th century Norwegian culture, in the midst of its outstanding social and economic development, Norway refrained from adequately developing its army. The result was devastating: on April 9, 1940, no more than 15,000 German soldiers took control over the ports of Norway, whose coastal defenses proved impotent because its armament was meager and its people psychologically unprepared for a brutally abrupt transition from peace to war. In the course of several hours, most of the ports were taken and major Norwegian ships were torpedoed, with hundreds of sailors losing their lives. The ethos of a peaceful small country that was destined to inspire large world forces through international political mechanisms had become the foundation of Norwegian politics. However, the winds of war were covering the skies with the dark clouds of aggressive forces; in a world where international rules were no longer honored, where even an invasion into a neighboring country could now be implemented without any declaration of war, the neutral pacifistic international law-abiding ethos proved to be ruinous (Derry, 1957, 1973; Larsen, 1948; Lewin, 2012).

Within the Israeli society, an ongoing arm-wrestling match takes place, where a national ethos of conflict and a national peace ethos are constantly competing in an effort to shape the ideals of the nation and consequently – to influence its future on some of the prominent issues that need a collective decision making. At the beginning of the 21st century a clear competition can be delineated between two rival forms of Israeli national ethos: the ethos of conflict, deeply embedded in the traditional Zionist attitudes; and the peace ethos, led primarily by followers of post-Zionist concepts. Some of the topics in dispute, that shape these competing forms of ethos, can clearly be drawn from Israel's fundamental document – the May 14, 1948 proclamation of the state. Other disputed topics have been discerned more recently by scholars of Israeli studies, in particular by political psychologist Danny Bar-Tal (Bar-Tal, 2000). The themes within the various topics are intertwined; they each cause and are caused by one another at the same time.

The ethos of conflict was shaped and carved into the writings and opinions of various Zionist leaders throughout the 20th century. Consolidated through decades of political and physical struggle, some of its values have eventually become the very

principles of the State of Israel. Its core belief is the Zionist ideology and the particular doctrines that derive from it: the moral justification of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel, where all the Jews will gather and sustain their eternal historic continuity as a national community. Parallel doctrines consist of the denial of others' rights to settle the country, particularly the Palestinians, and of viewing their aspirations to do so as proof of vicious intentions to harass the Jewish people. Led by the ethos of conflict, Israeli culture and the Israeli education system established a national identity that was based on the concept that the State of Israel was under a constant and everlasting threat of extinction. In spite of the collective threat, according to the Israeli ethos of conflict, inherent Jewish strength enabled the nation to overcome its enemies by virtue of courage, diligence, ingenuity, and above all – moral superiority (Oren, 2009).

The peace ethos has its roots in a post-Zionist attitude. During the 1980s a group of scholars known as *the new historians* cast doubt on the most basic Zionist ideology that provided the essential justification for Israel's very right to exist. Some of these scholars were more extreme and others were less so, but altogether they drew a new historic picture, furnishing an alternative interpretation of the state's past, viewing the Zionist movement as a militant colonialist endeavor, based on the exploitation, subjugation and uprooting of the Arab population of the country. Sociologist Baruch Kimmerling was perhaps the first to point out how the Jewish state had been built on the ruins of an Arab society that supposedly existed on this territory for hundreds of years. The Jews, following the new historic paradigm, took the 1948 war as an opportunity to violently inherit the country. The formation of Israeli society and the settlement of the land were based on incursion into a populated country and replacing its local indigenous inhabitants (Kimmerling, 1983; Pappe, 1992).

The new historians claim that their novel approach is no more than the natural evolution of political thought once Israeli society experienced a transition from the nation-building phase into an institutionalized phase, transferring its efforts from what had been conceptualized as a struggle for survival into striving to become a mature liberal state. The basic goals of Zionism had long been accomplished, following the post-Zionist concept, and now the time has come for cultural normalization (Ram, 2005).

The rival forms of ethos totally contradict one another, they collide with each other, and they outline one of the deepest ideological cleavages that separates Israeli society – at times even tears it up. No comprehension of the dynamics of Israeli politics can be fully achieved without a fundamental understanding of the clash between these different forms of ethos; no sociological analysis of Israeli society can be complete without an inquiry into these two contradictory doctrinal sets of values and beliefs that split the nation.

As mentioned before, though deep roots for ethos clash can be found in the very early days of modern Zionism, it was the 1973 that gave ethos clash its boost within Israeli society. Peace Now movement, perhaps the ultimate train engine of the peace ethos in Israeli society, was formed in 1978, at a time when the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks seemed to be collapsing. Reserve officers from some IDF top combat units published an open letter to Prime Minister Begin in which they warned that the historic opportunity for peace might be missed lest Israel conclude the negotiations and lead to an agreement. Following the publication of this letter, tens of thousands of Israelis signed petitions in support of the letter, and the Peace Now movement was thus practically established. Tzali Reshef, founder of the movement, claimed that the

1973 war experience shaped the movement leaders' world-view into a liberal one (Reshef, 1996). This theme is also evident in the works and books of other major activists, who connect their political attitudes with their war experiences. Such is the case of author and scriptwriter Benny Barabash, who, as an infantry officer, sustained serious injuries in the 1973 war and several years later would join the Peace Now movement leadership (Barabash, 1994). Yuval Neria, another chief organizer of Peace Now, was awarded the Medal of Valor, the highest decoration for combat bravery in Israel, due to his part in the battles in the Sinai Peninsula. He testified clearly that (Gvirtz, 1993: 5): "[…] the letter was a direct result of our part in the war. We had witnessed hell and [now] we had to warn against it".

Each ethos has its reasoning, its inherent logic, its historic origins, and theories of social science that can explain the background for its development. The basic themes of the rival forms of ethos are located both in the predominant document of Zionist existence -- namely, the proclamation of the state -- as well as in studies by political psychologists researching Israel. In all, there are 5 basic topics of national ethos: (1) Jewish attachment to the country; (2) siege mentality; (3) images of the enemy; (4) collective self-identity; (5) patriotism.

The Five Themes of Ethos Clash
(1) Jewish Attachment to the Country
According to the ethos of conflict, the link between the Jewish people and the country is first of all the bond of the descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and the Promised Land. The attachment was so strong, that for 2,000 years, ever since their 70 AD expulsion from Palestine by the Romans, Jews have striven continuously to reestablish their bond with the Land of Israel. The fact that during most of the time most of the Jews did not manage to live in Israel is a result of physical barriers laid by foes of the Jewish people. Although it is hard to deny that many chose of their free will to remain in exile, the neglect of the land by successive conquests over the ages and the hazards of travel turned repatriation into a precarious project.

Aside from the fact that in some locations in Israel Jewish families lived uninterruptedly for 2 millennia, such as in the village of Peki'in in Upper Galilee, throughout the centuries the Jewish presence in Israel was renewed again and again (Ashkenazi, 2012). In spite of the conquest of the Holy Land and of the fact that most historical periods were threatening ones for the Jews, each persecution and expulsion in the Diaspora brought a new influx of Jews to the country (Dimont, 1994; Johnson, 1987; Lupovitch, 2010).

When Jews came to the land, in growing numbers as of 1882, they quickly found out that arable land was scarce. The little of it that they could cultivate was almost impossible to purchase, since its Arab owners were landlords who leased the land to local peasants. Eventually, Jewish pioneers had to build their settlements mainly on drained swamp land and on desert land.

The Jewish national awakening of the late 19th century focused on the vision of a Jewish civilization that would maintain full, meaningful Jewish life and insure Jewish physical existence. Its major goal was to form a Jewish center in Palestine, universally acknowledged by Jews and non-Jews. Thus, the essence of modern Zionism is based on two predominant premises: (a) Jewish society is a national entity that has an exclusive culture that ought to be developed and preserved; (b) surviving as a national entity can take place only in the land of Israel, where a Jewish homeland has to be rebuilt.

Overall, then, the primary task of Zionism and the common denominator of all the currents of Zionist ideology was belief in the gathering of all the Jews in Israel, because only in this specific location could Jewish continuity thrive. Life in Diaspora, according to the Zionist belief, was physically dangerous and morally degrading; nobody could be a proud Jew outside the boundaries of the land of Israel. It was only here, in the Holy Land, that Jews could develop either as individuals or as a society; it was only here that a viable Jewish society could be established and thrive; it was only in that piece of land in the Mediterranean that the vision of Jewish civilization could be implemented (Avineri, 1981; Eisenstadt, 1986; Laqueur, 2003).

This is the background of the ethos of conflict, according to which the land of Israel belonged historically to the Jews, who had never disconnected themselves from the country even through the 2000 years of exile. According to the ethos of conflict, this historic connection still exists and forms the basic right of Jews to claim national ownership of the territory.

According to the peace ethos, on the other hand, Zionism was *de facto* a colonial project, of a Jewish European society that eventually supplanted the Palestinian native population of the country. Proponents of the peace ethos claim that the Jews were not any different than the British settlers in Africa, Asia and India or the French settlers who colonized Algeria, claiming an emotional link to the North African soil. Resembling the Protestant missionaries who penetrated Africa, backed by a supportive infrastructure supplied by Britain, believing that they were cultivating the wildlife of the ignorant inferior local residents, Jewish Zionists were, in their own eyes, the representatives of Britain – the country that would be there for them in the crucial formative years. In fact, in their speeches and writings some of the Zionist leaders even took the English colonies in Egypt as an example to learn from. The Jews, just like the Europeans in various locations around the globe, became an imperialist community that was meant to serve itself and the imperialist powers (Pappe, 2008).

When Theodor Herzl, the founding father of modern Zionism, wrote his vision of a future Jewish state, he expressed it in the following manner: "[…] We should […] form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism (Hertzberg, 1982: 222)."

The Zionists in Palestine, then, were no more than settler colonialists of the Orient; Zionism and European imperialism have epistemologically, historically and politically been intertwined in their view of the Orient as inferior. Sociologist Gershon Shafir, one of the leading proponents of this point of view, claimed that during the last 20 years of the 19th century the Zionists created an ethnic plantation colony, by purchasing land and employing local labor; they later adopted a different model, one of pure settlement, where they preferred to exclude the local native workers (Shafir, 1989; 1996).

Moreover, according to the peace ethos believers, the extent to which the Zionist movement spoke of itself in the ideological terms of a Jewish liberation movement, or a national one, never exceeded the instrumental social constructs that enabled an effective implementation of such settler colonialism (Said, 1979; 1992).

Viewing the country as an instrument is typical for many of the soldiers who have experienced the dreads of the 1973 war. Shortly after the 1973 war, journalist Yair Kotler published a book titled "The Shock", containing testimonies of anonymous soldiers of all ranks as well as civilians who had gone through the war. A reserves infantry captain, for example, told him (Kotler, 1974: 61):

> Reaching peace is something that depends first of all on us. […] It could very well be that the Egyptians are really afraid from our territorial pretences, [so] what we have to do is to pull out; we should plan a peace initiative. I am willing to give up large portions of the land it that what it takes to reach peace!

(2) Siege Mentality

Political psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal devoted decades of research to fully comprehend the phenomenon of national siege mentality. He inquired into several examples, taken from current history, of nations in a state of siege mentality: Japan during the 1960s, the Soviet Union until the 1980s, Albania of the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa until the elimination of apartheid, and Iraq of the 1990s. At present, North Korea and Iran are considered to be countries where siege mentality dominates politics (Bar-Tal, 2004).

The ethos of conflict views Israel as still struggling, due to outbreaks of war from time to time, for its safety. Issues of national security are therefore naturally dominant, in line with the way in which perceptions of citizenship and people's political standpoints are formed within this ethos. The more dangerous the situation is perceived to be, the more reality is viewed as a condition of siege under which the whole country is put by its ruthless enemies – the more Israelis identify themselves with the larger national group and the more they are willing to take action even at a price that demands personal sacrifices (Horowitz, 1982; Arian, 1995; Canetti-Nisim, Zaidise & Pedhazur, 2005; Maoz & McCauley, 2008).

The dominant perception of Zionist leaders who maintain the ethos of conflict is that Arab terror and warfare are a continuation of the long history of efforts to destroy the Jewish people. This attitude is echoed in numerous surveys that point out how most Israelis feel that the security of the state and its citizens is under constant threat, and are therefore very concerned with the conditions in which their survival could be guaranteed (Bar-Tal, Jacobson & Klieman, 1998; Stein & Brecher, 1976; Stone, 1982). As a result of these views, security considerations became decisive in the formulation of any Israeli policy; some scholars of Israeli politics even referred to the topic of safekeeping of the state as a supreme cultural symbol in Israel, a culture of security (Ben-Meir, 1995; Horowitz, 1984; Kimmerling, 1985; Lissak, 1993; Peri, 1983).

The sources of the Israeli siege mentality may be found deep in the roots of Jewish tradition. In the Book of Numbers chapter 23 Bil'am speaks of the uniqueness and separateness of Israel among the nations, using the psalm: "the nation shall dwell alone, and not be reckoned among the nations." These words have been comprehended throughout the ages as the formative statement of the relationship between Israel and the nations of the world. The centuries long anti-Semitism all over the globe, as well as Israel's international isolation ever since the establishment of the state, has been taken as proof that it was Jewish destiny to stand apart from all other nations. The notion that Israel is a nation that dwells alone is embedded not only in the long history of pogroms, destruction, and deportations; its key historical origins lie in the memory of the Holocaust. The fact that when millions of Jews were murdered the world remained indifferent has left its mark on future generations. Auschwitz became a symbol and a metaphor for the long -- and eventually, tragic -- Jewish residence in countries of other nationalities in general and in Europe in particular.

Yet the Holocaust, according to the ethos of conflict, was not the last historic experience of a nation that dwells alone. The chronicles of the Jewish-Arab conflict

contributed to the development of a victimized self-perception and have been viewed as the direct continuation of the persecution of the Jewish people; accordingly, all of Israel's military activities have been perceived as acts of self-defense (Harkabi, 1968; Zafran & Bar-Tal, 2003). The silence and even cooperation of the rest of the world in the face of Arab violence towards Jews is evidence of the continuation of basic attitudes towards Jews throughout history. The outside world is comprehended as inherently unsympathetic towards Jews; it is a hostile territory where anti-Semitism often dictates hate and resentment. The attempts to drive Israel to concessions with its neighboring countries are a trap designed to isolate Israel politically and weaken it militarily. Negotiating the country's security assets, according to the ethos of conflict, can lead nowhere, because all the Arabs want is an opportunity to crush the Jewish state; as for the rest of the world – there is nothing that the State of Israel could do, other than committing national suicide that would satisfy it (Steinberg, 1994).

Things look totally different from the peace ethos point of view; its basic claim is that its rival, the ethos of conflict, has built into the Israeli political culture a threat perception that leads extensively to militarism. Extreme emergencies, during which the very existence of a state is threatened from the outside, draw attention away from lesser domestic disputes and thus contribute to the consolidation of the political community (Evrigenis, 2008). Thus, a fairly cynical, though not necessarily unrealistic, viewpoint leads to the claim, on these grounds, that political leadership had better do its best to keep some of the threats active so that society constantly practices a rally-round-the-flag syndrome (Mueller, 1973).

The Israeli case may not necessarily diverge from that viewpoint, particularly in the eyes of peace ethos advocates. For example, social cleavages concerning internal threats, such as those between pious and secular Jews or between Ashkenazi originated and Sephardic Jews are considered to be often used as tools to manipulate voters (Gordon, 1992). Henry Kissinger is reputed to have said on this matter: "Israel has no foreign policy, only a domestic political system."

The peace ethos views suspiciously the declared existential risks for the State of Israel. Until 1967 the newly founded state was geopolitically fragile, and lacked an appropriate strategic depth; however, over more than four decades things have changed completely, turning defensive existential wars into mostly calculated ones, where the IDF goes into fighting with some important strategic advantages (Cohen, 2008; Handel, 2008).

The concept of a no-choice war, applied mainly to the 1948 war, has been replaced by the claim, held by peace ethos proponents, that Israel has almost always chosen its wars. The retaliatory raids initiated by Israel following the 1948 war are a good example of that. The Israeli leadership planned these raids into Arab territory to act as blows against potential terrorists who planned to infiltrate Israel as well as to provide a deterrent mechanism designed to encourage neighboring Arab countries to prevent border infiltrations. The major Israeli idea was that damage to Arab property and population would be expensive, and would consequently reduce terror attacks (Parker, 1996). However, an escalation in the frequency and scope of Israeli retaliatory raids produced a vicious circle. The Arab side was not deterred, and chose rather to increase the attacks against Israel; Israel, in turn, had to further accelerate the number and effect of the raids. Eventually, the policy of Israeli retaliation prompted the Arabs to continue their attacks as fiercely as they could, and ended up propelling the rounds of violence, concluding with the 1956 war (Khouri, 1985; Morris, 1993).

Even the defensive campaign of 1967, following some peace ethos believers, was not only the reaction against aggressive Arab forces threatening to tear the small

country apart, but rather a sequence of quarrelsome Israeli policies. It was the Israeli nuclear breakthrough that convinced Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to attack before a full manufacturing of an atomic bomb was completed (Aronson, 1992); the frequent use of Israeli air power against the Syrians drove them to what eventually became a violent confrontation (Cohen, 1992), not to mention the fact that capturing the Golan Heights was totally an Israeli initiative unnecessary for the termination of the 1967 war. Also, Israeli economy, and not existential threat, was considered to be the real cause for the 1967 war. With a severe economic crisis and an unemployment rate going as high as 20%, and with manpower draining out as emigration exceeded immigration, Israel simply needed a victorious war in order to completely change its material environment (Hirst, 1984).

Following the 1973 war, one can find more than one testimony yearning to break the siege. A 26-old truck driver who crossed the desert with an ammunition truck and was hit by Egyptian aircraft admits (Kotler, 1974):

> I have been through three wars now and I need a rest. I want to go to Germany, Switzerland or Austria. Italy is also an option. All I need is to breathe freely; that's what we all need now.

(3) Images of the Enemy
To a large extent, the ethos of conflict de-legitimizes the Arabs. However, even objective spectators of historical events would find it hard to deny that as far as the image of the Arab as a brutal and barbarian enemy goes, the Arab opponent indeed made this stigmatization an easy job. In thousands of cases, Jews have been brutally murdered ever since they first arrived in 19th century Palestine. In fact, one can almost comprehend the history of Zionism as the history of the Jews' murderous encounter with the country's Arab inhabitants.
The many local incidents throughout the centuries add to larger ones, like the 1929 Hebron massacre where suddenly an Arab mob attacked the Jewish community; 67 Jews – men, women, and youngsters – were killed in one day and their homes and synagogues were ransacked (Segev, 2000). During the week following the United Nations' November 29, 1947 resolution on the partition plan, 62 Jews were murdered by Arabs. Arab militias, gangs, and terrorists as well as armies assaulted almost every Jewish village in the country. In mixed cities, like Haifa or Jerusalem's old city, Jewish neighborhoods came under lethal attack. By May 14, 1948, when Ben-Gurion announced that the state was established, a total of 1,256 Jews had been killed, most of them civilians (Franzman, 2007).

Winning the war and signing the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbors, supposedly ending hostilities, marked no end to the continuous Arab homicidal campaign. In fact, the scope of Arab terrorism only expanded in frontier settlements as well as in urban population centers, where the targets of atrocious assaults were mainly innocent civilians – men, women and children of all ages alike; anyone who was Jewish was a potential victim of brutality. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Israelis who hold the ethos of conflict portray Arabs as being eternally bent on destroying Israel and the Jewish people (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 1988; Cohen, 1985; Domb, 1982; Harkabi, 1977; Landau, 1971; Segev, 1984).

Proponents of the peace ethos, however, reject stereotyping Arabs as more brutal than others. They find how historical accounts of the Moslems' attitude toward Jews prove that most of the time tolerance prevailed. Islam disputed both Judaism

and Christianity, but Muhammad demonstrated remarkable respect for each of them, proclaiming freedom of conscience for what he called "the people of the book." The Koranic injunction of *jihad*, the holy war, is reserved rather for the Arab idolaters who refused to accept the theocratic order of the prophet for his people. Towards Jews, Islam had always proved to be a religion of patience and acceptance. Jews throughout history received rather the best treatment from Moslems, who regarded them generously as fellow believers and refrained from allowing religious differences to ruin their good relations (Cohen, 1994; Parkes, 1966; Poliakov, 1975).

Neither do peace ethos proponents find any empiric proof for the claim that Arabs are war mongers or that they have a peculiar tendency toward violence. War, they claim, has been an important component in the formation and existence of peoples throughout the entire history of mankind; nations have readily resorted to violence throughout history and the preparation for conflict has always been a major feature characterizing even the most civilized of societies (House, 2008; O'Sullivan, 1986). Attributing aggression specifically to Arabs overlooks the fact that the entire human species is considered to have long been addicted to war, favoring it over more civilized modes of conflict resolution (Hedges, 2003).

The Arabs, according to the peace ethos, have been known in more than one instance throughout the chronology of the conflict to prove their willingness to put an end to arms. In recent decades, with the opening of diplomatic archives and the exposure of thousands of documents, it seems that Arab quests for peace were perpetually refused by Israel's leaders. An extreme example is the May 1949 peace initiative of the Syrian leader Husni al-Zaim, who offered not an armistice but a full-fledged peace treaty. In spite of the fact that al-Zaim's suggestions, reaching Ben-Gurion's desk directly and indirectly, indicated sincere peace intentions, negotiations with Syria in order to achieve comprehensive peace never took place. Knowing that in order to achieve a peace treaty concessions had to be made, Israel preferred to drag matters out until in due course al-Zaim's reign was ended with a *coup d'etat,* and the old belief that there was nobody for Israel to negotiate with could prevail once again within Israeli society (Rabinovich, 1991; Shlaim, 1986).

Perhaps a leader whose good relations with the Zionist leadership were more famous was Abdullah I, King of Jordan, whose connections with the Jewish Agency started during the 1930s. Until as late as 1950 he initiated peace programs that were secretly negotiated with Israel, but the Israeli government suspended any decision, domestic Palestinian pressure on the king together with Syrian and Egyptian criticism made the signing of a peace treaty difficult, and the negotiations eventually collapsed. The opportunity had been missed; a year later King Abdullah was assassinated, and 17 years afterwards the two countries were back at war. Retrospectively, therefore, peace ethos proponents claim that responsibility for the lost chance cannot be solely laid on the Arab side; rather, they maintain that the Israeli government could have fostered the Jordanian peace initiative and already made a breakthrough in 1950 (Rabinovich, 1991).

Even Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's first attempts to achieve peace, according to peace ethos believers, were rejected by an aggressive and somewhat arrogant Israeli leadership, and the chronicles of the years preceding the peace treaty can retrospectively be interpreted as the conjuncture of Egyptian frustration and Israeli indifference towards any option other than eternal war with its neighbor. Confidently counting on the superiority of the Israeli army in any upcoming warfare, Prime Minister Golda Meir represented the Israeli hard-line political mainstream that

was unwilling to enter any negotiations that would essentially lead to deep territorial concessions (Bar-Joseph, 2006; Stork, 1978).

Corresponding with the peace ethos, some observe that overlooking Arab quests for peace hardly occurred only in distant history. Following this observation, King Hussein of Jordan thought along the same lines as Sadat, but preferred to keep such thoughts suppressed because of the regional opposition; even Syria and the PLO reached the point attained by Sadat, and were willing to take the same course over two decades following the Camp David accords (Rubin, 1994).

On March 28, 2007, the Arab Summit Conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, called for a comprehensive peace with Israel. In return for withdrawal from the territories, Israel would be recognized by all 22 Arab countries, and full normalization would be implemented. This announcement was merely a repetition of an identical previous resolution, shaped by the same leadership of the Arab world some five years earlier. According to peace ethos believers, as in numerous instances before, the Israeli leadership hesitated and refused to embrace any such opportunity; once again an Arab inspiration for a comprehensive peace was strangled to death by Israeli disregard and political apathy (Dajani Daoudi, 2009).

A bereaved mother whose son, the commander of a tank company in Sinai, was killed on the second day of the 1973 war, said (Kotler, 1974: 186-187):

> [As long as] this land is bleeding, we cannot build it. […] We must reach an agreement at all costs. Israel cannot build itself on the ruins of other peoples. […] We ignored them, we thought that we were so much better than them; [but] now that we were struck, perhaps we shall see things differently, perhaps we shall be willing to give peace a chance.
> […] Call them terrorists, call them killers. [But] they are, after all, the people whom we expelled from their homes and from their country. […] There are [Arab] extremists, but there have always been also progressive [Arabs] who were willing to accept Israel as a fact, particularly after World War II.

(4) Collective Self Identity
The Israeli collective self-esteem, deeply embedded in the ethos of conflict, springs from the invention of the *Sabra*, the Hebrew word for an Israeli-born Jew, as an archetype of a collective figure to be adored and imitated. From its initial stages, Zionist discourse focused on the construction of a new Jew, totally different from the one that inhabited the European surroundings where he was counted to be in exile. Somewhat ironically, the proud leaders of early Zionism adopted the anti-Semitic stereotype of their original group, and viewed the Jew in exile to be uprooted, cowardly, manipulative, old and sickly, helpless and defenseless in the face of pogroms and persecutions. The *Sabra*, the new Jew of the land of Israel, was intended to be the total opposite of this negative perception (Shapira, 1999).

Sociologist Oz Almog indicated that the *Sabras* who led the formation of the Jewish state were born in the 1930s and 1940s, they grew up in pioneering settlements, and they were socialized and educated in light of the communal and national ideals of the Zionist labor movement. Though forming a small minority within the total Jewish population, their cultural influence was tremendous, particularly due to their role in state building. They became *Palmach* commanders, soldiers in the Jewish Brigade of the British army, and, later, officers in the IDF. Their love of the land, their recreational habits of lighting bonfires and collective singing, their bluntness and straightforwardness, together with a puritanical attitude,

signified to a large extent the cultural fulfillment of a utopian ideal of the new Jew (Almog, 2000).

From an objective point of view, the *Sabra* was actually a fictive hegemonic identity that reflected the culture, values and collective aspirations of a small minority within the founding group of the Jewish settlement in Israel. In reality, this image stood detached from the diversity of the Jewish immigrant society and represented only a minority of young people who in most cases were the descendents of the first Zionist European pioneers (Rubinstein, 2000). However, detached as it may have been, this was the myth that formed the ideal that would shape, throughout decades, the collective Israeli character that possessed all the positive traits of the people: deep attachment to the land, physical virtues alongside moral qualities of bravery, cleverness -- and above all, honesty and high integrity (Shapira, 1996).

The ethos of conflict does not stop with Jewish morality as is, but also envelops the concept, springing from the words of the biblical prophet Isaiah, of being a light for all nations. This phrase, *a light for all nations*, expresses in the collective identity of Israelis the notion that on top of being highly moral, their universal designation is to serve as a mentor for spiritual and ethical guidance for the entire world. Jewish culture is viewed as the cradle of Western civilization and as representing a supreme morality (Hazani, 1993). It is in this context that the code of purity of arms, *Tohar Haneshek*, ought to be comprehended not only as the official military doctrine of ethics adopted by the IDF, but as an inherent set of values within Israeli consciousness.

Inherently, war bears a natural tension between the realm of morality and the realm of battlefields, deriving from the desire to survive, on one hand, and to adhere to principles of justice on the other. Hence moral dilemmas in warfare are not exclusive to Judaism; societies have been debating the ethics of war all over the world (Holmes, 1989; Norman, 1995; Walzer, 1978; 1992; 2001). At all times, the basic concept of the ethos of conflict is that the *Sabra* fights clean-handedly a morally justified war and that Jewish combatants are ever better than any of their opponents. Indeed, the collective self-image, that has developed into one of the foremost themes addressed in the Israeli educational system, portrays an Israeli soldier who would rather spare an Arab's life than kill innocents. This has become one of the utmost manifestations of collective self-esteem in the ethos of conflict: not only fighting just wars, *jus ad bellum*, but also fighting them justly – *jus in bello*.

The Israeli collective self-image that stems from the peace ethos is totally different. If the enemy is no war-monger and the Israeli collective identity is the mirror-image of the enemy, then once it is accepted that Arabs are just as peace loving as any other people, it follows that Jews are just as capable as others of war atrocities. This equation is in fact part and parcel of the whole peace ethos, and by definition calls for severe self-criticism, often turning into excessive disapproval, verging on obsessive self-hatred.

One of the first critics of the ethos of conflict, if not the very first one, was probably Yizhar Smilansky (pen name, S. Yizhar), an Israeli-born writer who as early as 1948 wrote a novella titled *the Story of Khirbet Khizeh*. This piece of literature has been part of the Israeli high school curriculum since 1964 and a matriculation elective. It tells the story of the expulsion of inhabitants from an imaginary Arab village at the end of the 1948 war, by an IDF unit acting under orders.

By the time the narrator starts his account, most of the residents have already fled; only women, children and the elderly remain. The young soldiers are cold and insensitive, even somewhat bored – neither particularly brutal nor expressly

compassionate. They have been ordered to blow up the houses, to load the people on trucks, and to drive them away – an order that the IDF soldiers carry out to the letter. The villagers are submissive, though here and there a proud protest can be noticed. The eviction is carried out with humiliation: the Arabs are forced to trudge through a puddle *en route* to the waiting vehicles and to abandon all of their belongings, even blankets.

Khirbet Khizeh, translated into "the ruins of the village Khizeh," was not the name of an actual place. The author picked an imaginary locale in order to symbolize the land being emptied of its Arab inhabitants in the wake of the war. S. Yizhar has been acclaimed since the late 1930s as the most talented prose writer of the *Sabra* generation. The fact that he situated the tragedy in an undefined fictional location must have made it easier for his readers, perhaps even for himself, to cope with the scenario of Israeli soldiers committing atrocities; it certainly paved the way for this story, and the ideas that it stands for, to penetrate deep into Israeli culture and to become one of its classics (Shapira, 2000).

However, according to the peace ethos, even during its first decades the Israeli public did not need imaginary scenes in order to realize that atrocities were taking place, and that moral failures were simply being systematically swept under the carpet.

During the early 1950s numerous murderous cross-border raids by Palestinian infiltrators were held along the country's borders. Since these incidents became frequent and the numbers of casualties mounted, the Israeli leadership decided upon a policy of retaliation. The strategy was based on an "eye for an eye" attitude, and its guiding principles were mixed ideas of punishment, revenge, and deterrence. For example, on October 1953, in response to a homicidal attack on the Jewish town of Yehud, east of Tel Aviv, where a mother and her two children were savagely slaughtered, Israel launch a strike on the Arab city of Qibya, where IDF units moved from house to house, blowing entrance doors, throwing grenades through the windows, and gunning down inhabitants who attempted to escape. About forty-five houses were demolished and over sixty Arabs, most of them women and children were killed. The Israeli forces suffered no casualties.

It was only due to the wave of international public condemnation that Israel eventually switched its policy and from then on preferred to attack military and police targets. The Qibya raid had actually ended a four-year period of IDF lethal assaults almost exclusively directed against civilian populations (Caplan, 2010; Morris, 1993).

During the years after the 1967 war, reports of military malpractice in the territories appeared in the media, focusing mainly on destruction of property during the suppression of Arab villages in Judea and Samaria or refugee camps in the Gaza strip; but such incidents were usually excused on the grounds of operational needs and would most likely be dismissed as aberrations (Cohen, 2008). The 1982 war, the first military campaign after 1973, marked a turning point. Although domestic opposition to the 1982 War started very early in Israel, it was not until September 1982 that social disapproval of the activity of the IDF on moral grounds reached its peak with the Sabra and Shatila massacre, in which Palestinians were executed in their refugee camps by Christian Lebanese Phalangists, Israel's allies, revenging the assassination of Lebanon's admired president, Bachir Gemayel. The massacre took place in parts of Beirut that were under Israeli control, and once it was exposed, a public roar followed. As the news spread around the world and more details and pictures were revealed, public unrest in Israel grew. About 10% of the Jewish population participated in one of the largest protests ever to have been organized in the country,

the *four-hundred-thousand protest*, demanding an inquiry into who was to be blamed for the slaughter.

Under public pressure, the Israeli government resolved to establish the Kahan Commission, an inquiry commission led by former Supreme Court Justice Yitzhak Kahan. The commission's report, after several months, concluded that there was no direct involvement of any IDF units in the massacre; nonetheless, the commission recorded that Israeli military personnel of various command levels were aware of the fact that brutal slaughter was in progress and took no steps to stop it. The commission also noted that information about mass murder was available, in real time, to senior IDF officers. These conclusions led to political turmoil -- but above all, to a discourse about guilt.

During the decades following the 1982 war, the moral issues that led to questioning the role of the IDF about its friction with civilian populations, and the extent to which the army is capable of maintaining codes of decency, have become an integral part of public discourse in Israeli society, with the Sabra and Shatila experience exerting a far-reaching influence. Feelings of guilt and self-accusations, typical of the peace ethos, reached a climax that was reflected by the establishment in 2004 of the organization called Breaking the Silence. Numbering hundreds of members, all of them veteran Israeli soldiers, this organization is determined to record and expose as many testimonies of Israeli soldiers about any inappropriate behavior that they have seen, either by fellow soldiers or by settlers, in the territories. Sponsored by funding from Israel and abroad, their main activity is the initiation of photograph exhibitions and the collection of evidence proving that IDF units are harassing innocent Palestinians at the checkpoints and in the Arab cities.

Following the 2008 Israeli operation in the Gaza strip that was launched in order to stop the massive amount of rocket firing on southern Israeli villages bordering with Gaza, Breaking the Silence sought to publicize many testimonies that were in line with accusations by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations, claiming that the IDF had acted indiscriminately and disproportionately (Breaking the Silence, 2012).

In Israel, as even some of its severe critics may admit, democratic rules allow public inquiry into official policies as well as governmental actions, including military ones. Specific complaints, including personal testimonies, can be filed and dealt with, for that matter, by particular comptrollers in various governmental offices. Thus, any allegation can be subject to thorough legal investigation through the suitable channels. These procedures, however, are beyond the scope of Breaking the Silence and similar organizations. At the very heart of their activity lies the motivation to shape the themes of internal guilt and low self esteem based identity that are inherent in the peace ethos.

In 1999, S. Yizhar, wrote another novel "Discovering Elijah", this time concentrating on his personal memories from 1973, when he went to the frontier in order to learn from first-hand what was going on. In this novel the Jewish soldier is no longer hesitant or confused when confronted with unlawful orders, but rather brutal and vicious. Yizhar's 1973 IDF soldiers are portrayed as villains at best. In one of the scenes he describes how they go around kicking the corpses of Egyptian soldiers in order to loot gold teeth (Yizhar, 1999). Although most of the Egyptian soldiers were originally poor villagers who could never acquire gold teeth or any other dental care, Yizhar insisted that when he went into the desert at the end of the war he saw these things with his own eyes (Berkowitz, 2006).

Generally speaking, it was at the aftermath of the 1973 war that the images of the noble Israeli soldiers who were eager to give water to the 1967 Egyptian POWs were switched to other descriptions of IDF behavior during the war. In one of the testimonies, for example, an Israeli paratrooper tells the story of how Egyptian soldiers are trapped with their truck in a swamp and the IDF soldiers shoot them to death. When one of the survivors, unable to abandon the sinking truck because his wounded legs got stuck, begs for his life, the paratroopers refuse to help him out and they watch him as he is about to drown. The Egyptian survivor prefers a quick death and so eventually he begs to be shot. The paratroopers, instead of saving him, honor his last wish and start to target him; but they fail to hit him, and he dies slowly, suffocating in front of their eyes (Bar-Ilan, 2011: 180-189).

(5) Patriotism
Patriotic loyalty is considered to be an unconditional love, a compulsive commitment to the object of admiration, that eventually leads to what some scholars refer to as an obsessive dedication (Tamir, 1997). This point of view reveals a convention that when it comes to matters of war and peace, any personal logic can be rejected in the name of patriotism (Somerville, 1981). In patriotic instances of sacrifice, people forfeit either years of their lives, their health, parts of their bodies, or their very existence for the sake of their country. It therefore seems almost self-evident that patriotism is closer to the ethos of conflict than to its rival the peace ethos, because war grounds create a perfect arena for patriotic sacrifice; it is in battlefields that one has the chance to make fatal decisions that are characterized by a zero-sum game between the profit of the collective and the immediate benefit of the self (Somerville, 1981).

Looking for an example that fully envelopes the attributes of patriotism is an easy task in the Israeli case of ethos of conflict, because contemporary Israeli history is paved with events where people followed the patriotic pattern, forming – each in his own way – a model for others to follow and imitate. Yet the ultimate exemplar, forming in Zionist legacy the archetype of a patriot, is undoubtedly Joseph Trumpeldor; in his life as well as in his death, he demonstrated what loyal devotion and sacrifice.

Trumpeldor was born to a Jewish family, yet in an era of secularization he was brought up as a Russian. In his early twenties he volunteered for the Russian army and participated in the siege of Port Arthur, where during the Russo-Japanese war he lost his left arm in battle and became the most decorated Jewish soldier in Russia and the first Jew in the Russian army to receive an officer's commission.

However, as the years passed he had become more and more affiliated with Zionism. He immigrated to Palestine in order to work in the early Kibbutzim. When World War I broke out, he developed the idea of the Jewish Legion to fight along with the British, an idea that brought about the formation of the Zion Mule Corps. This regiment is considered to have been the first all-Jewish military unit organized in close to two thousand years, and became the ideological first step for the formation of the IDF. Leading the Jewish regiment, Trumpeldor was wounded once again, in his shoulder. After the war he organized groups of Jewish pioneers from Russia and led some of them to Jewish farming villages in Palestine. One such village was Tel Hai, a remote and isolated settlement in the northern part of Israel, dwelling on a loosely defined border between British and French control.

On March 1, 1920, a firefight broke out between hundreds of Shiites from the neighboring Lebanese village and the several defenders of Tel Hai commanded by Trumpeldor. Seven of the Jewish defenders were initially killed, and Trumpeldor

himself was shot in his hand and then in his stomach. A doctor arrived just before that evening, and Trumpeldor died while being evacuated.

On his deathbed, Trumpeldor articulated his monumental exclamation, previously written by him in letters to his comrades, "never mind; it is good to die for our country." Trumpeldor's outstanding figure would from then on light the spirit of Jewish settlement and defense, his last words imprinted on the Zionist heritage, symbolizing the ultimate expression of Israeli love of country throughout ages to come (Segev, 1999; Roshwald, 2006).

Strictly militarily, the whole event at Tel Hai was a total failure. For the Jewish pioneers, having 8 settlers murdered all at once, not to mention the killing of their highly experienced leader, was a hard blow to recover from. However, the story of the battle and the bravery of the defenders of Tel Hai embodied the ideals of settlement and defense, of a willingness to absorb the loss of war and to cope with the high costs of the conflict. Consequently, rising far above the theme of patriotism that lies within the ethos of conflict, Joseph Trumpeldor became an iconic symbol of patriotism through his life -- and even more, his death. The historical event at Tel Hai emerged as the ultimate national myth of the ethos of conflict and Trumpeldor's last famous words stressing the willingness to die for country became a moral legacy (Zerubavel, 1991).

The patriotic themes within the peace ethos, on the other hand, are diminished by other current social trends. The globalization process, which immensely influences the peace ethos, encourages individualism, which in turn jeopardizes the concept of supremacy of the national social group. Globalization, highly corresponding with modern capitalism, is considered to re-cast human behavior from that of a social animal into that of a *homo economicus*. Media, workplace and educational systems instill material self-interest as the leading social norm. Consequently, the more others are perceived as acting from self-interest, the more each citizen is encouraged to respond accordingly with a competitive attitude (Nikelly, 2000).

The distinctions between individualism and collectivism have been conceptualized by some scholars as factors that differentiate cultures; societies are hence categorized as collectivist versus individualist. In a collectivist society the members more strongly identify with the group, therefore its wellbeing takes priority over the individual's desires; in individualist cultures, on the other hand, sharper boundaries are drawn between the self and others. Individualism strives for personal autonomy, placing itself, in relation to collectivism, on the opposite end of a bipolar scale (Hofstede, 2001). Other scholars tend to view one's specific location on the bipolar scale not as emerging only from the social environment to which he or she belongs, but rather as personality traits, modifiable by situational demands. Unlike the collectivist, who suppresses personal goals for the common good and maintains a relationship with the group even when personal costs highly exceed the rewards, the individualist's attitude leads him to focus on independence, self-fulfillment, and personal preferences (Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 2001; Waterman, 1984).

In a society where individualism prevails, whether as an outcome of collective cultural shifts or as a result of personal traits or as a product of all the factors together, very little room is left for a coherent form of patriotism that places the common good over personal wants.

Additionally, the primary assumption of the peace ethos is that peace, rather than traditional national collective goals, is the sacred value for which mankind should strive. This leads inevitably to an inherent contradiction within the logic of the peace ethos relating to patriotic sacrifice: If existential threat no longer exists, and the

enemy at long last is one who has come to terms with a legitimate Israel at his side, what is the justification for sacrifice?

A partial answer that provides some purpose for the lethal costs of war is that those who die do it for the sake of peace; in order to achieve peace some sacrifice ought to be made. This molds the peace ethos into the form of the ethos of conflict: peace activists become soldiers fighting against war instead of soldiers fighting for other causes. Although he definitely did not anticipate the lethal personal price he would eventually pay, nor did he foresee the thousands of Israelis and Arabs yet to be killed, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin phrased it clearly in his address to the United States Congress on July 26, 1994: "I, military I.D. number three-zero-seven-four-three, retired general in the Israeli Defense Forces in the past, consider myself to be a soldier in the army of peace today. [… fighting] the battle for peace." These were the words that inspired *Time Magazine* that used the very same terminology commenting on the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in its November 13, 1995 edition: "The soldier lived to become a man of peace, yet the man of peace met the death of a soldier, his body torn by bullets."

As the events in the Middle East brought about anything but peace, and Israelis were being killed in the streets by terror attacks at rates that the country had never encountered before, a new notion of sacrifice was shaped: a sacrifice for peace. The dead and wounded have become recognized as *the victims of peace*.

A tank commander that participated in 1973 in one of the fierce battles along the Suez Canal claimed (Kotler, 1974: 77-78):

> I ceased to believe in the future of the state. You win once, twice, thrice, four times, five times. [But] in the sixtieth time you [eventually] don't [and then] it's all over. I am in doubts; I no longer plan my future. That is why I support any compromise; a peace agreement might just allow me some extra time to live.
> […] I know; I am not a Zionist. All I want is to live now. That is why I am for concessions. If we give up the land it might take a long while before war starts once again. Meanwhile we could simply live our lives.

Indeed, after all is said and done, the essence of the peace ethos is the value of life. Land, history, and divine promises are no longer worth dying for when life is the alternative. In his March 13, 1995 speech at the Tel-Hai Memorial Day, Yitzhak Rabin rephrased Trumpeldor's last words, "it is good to die for our country", and claiming that death and bereavement are not destined by fate he preached for a reversal of Trumpeldor's heritage, coining a new conceptual sentence: "it is good to live for our country."

It seems, then, that the interpretation of patriotism through the lens of the peace ethos leaves us with merely a shadow of patriotism. At the end of the day, whereas patriotism is in fact the backbone of the ethos of conflict, it is rather alien to the peace ethos.

Discussion

The 1948 war was, perhaps, the peak of the ethos of conflict within Israeli society. As war with the Arabs approached, following the United Nations' confirmation of the partition plan, Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann anticipated the heavy losses that the struggle was about to demand. His warning to the people in Israel was (*Ha'aretz*, December 15, 1947): "A state is not handed to a people on a silver platter." Following

these words, as the first young Jewish men and women were killed in battles, poet Natan Alterman wrote one of his best known verses of that war. The poem became a canonical one, read out publically in memorial ceremonies for decades afterwards (Alterman, 1947):

…and the land was silent. The incarnate sun
Flickered languidly
Above the smoldering borders.
And a nation stood – cloven hearted but breathing…
To receive the miracle.
The one miracle and only…

The nation made ready for the pomp. It rose to the crescent moon
And stood there, at pre-dawn, garbed in festival-and-fear.
– Then out they came
A boy and a girl
Pacing slowly toward the nation.

In a workaday garb and bandoleer, and heavy shod,
Up the path they came
Silently forward.
They did not change their dress, and had not yet washed away
The marks of the arduous day and the night of the fire-line.

Tired, oh so tired, forsworn of rest,
And oozing sap of young Hebrewness –
Silently the two approached
And stood there unmoving.
There was no saying whether they were alive or shot.

Then the nation, tear-rinsed and spellbound, asked,
Saying: who are you? And the two sighed
Their reply: We are the silver platter
On which the Jewish state has been given you.

They spoke. Then enveloped in shadow at the people's feet they fell
The rest will be told in the annals of Israel.

However, whereas for the first few decades Zionism could strive due to the dominance of the ethos of conflict, the 1973 war changed the tides within Israeli society and the peace ethos emerged as the hegemonic set of values that would from then on construct the country's future. If the ethos of conflict praised the young people who were the silver platter of the state, the peace ethos viewed things vice-versa, expecting rather the state to do nothing other than bestow good upon its citizens. Self-proclaimed left-wing playwright Shmuel Hsfari's song *we are the children of winter 1973* was the counter-version for Alterman's 1947 poem *we are the silver platter*. Hsfari's song was first performed on the eve of the 1994 Independence Day by a military band, and soon became one of the leading anthems for proponents of the peace process:

We are the children of winter 1973
You dreamt us first at dawn at the end of the battles
You were tired men that thanked their good luck
You were worried young women and you wanted so much to love
When you conceived us with love in winter 1973
You wanted to fill up with your bodies that what the war finished
And we were born the country was wounded and sad
You looked at us you hugged us you were trying to find comfort
When we were born the elders blessed with tears in their eyes
They said:" we wish those kids will not have to go to the army"
And your faces in the old picture prove
That you said it from the bottom of your hearts
When you promised to do everything for us
To make an enemy into a loved one

You promised a dove,
an olive tree leaf,
you promised peace
You promised spring at home and blossoms
You promised to fulfill promises, you promised a dove

We are the children of winter 1973
We grew up and now in the army
with our weapon and helmet on our heads
We know how to make love to laugh and cry
We are men we are women
and we too dream about babies
This is why we will not pressure you we will demand of you
And we will not threaten you
When we were young you said promises need to be kept
We will give you strength if that is what you need
We will not hold back
We just wanted to whisper
We are the children of that winter in the year 1973

You promised a dove,
an olive tree leaf,
you promised peace
You promised spring at home and blossoms
You promised to fulfill promises, you promised a dove

Within the peace ethos inside out became upside down. The young ones, instead of asking to fight for the country, demand peace from their parents. Whereas the anthem of 1948 reflected a young generation that dedicated its life to giving, the anthem of 1994 reflects a young generation that claims that they deserve to get. The common expectation of followers of the ethos of conflict that their offspring would proudly wear the IDF uniform, in due time was retrospectively substituted with the hope that they would never have to fight wars.

That the song was distributed by an IDF band was no exception in the prevailing peace atmosphere of Israel of the early 1990s. state agencies are where the

great struggle between competing forms of national ethos takes place. Loyal to other themes of the peace ethos, the song switches cause and effect, and reflects the perception that war is not the sole initiative of the Arabs but rather the responsibility of the Jews; the Israeli parents who promised peace could have done so, but alas failed -- to fulfill their promise.

Following the rise of the peace ethos, the great question is, naturally: *quo vadis*? Where does it all take us? Will the Israeli public stubbornly stick patriotically to its country, or should the new social trends lead to Israeli geopolitical compromises that in due time might jeopardize any defense of the Jewish state?

One elusive and ambiguous answer can be found within the testimony of Amnon, a paratrooper, who was interviewed 35 years after the 1973 war in a research about patriotism, for which he was picked since in daily life, during recent years, he had been performing outstanding actions regarding the absorption of young Jewish boys and girls in their first steps as immigrants in Israel. Amnon's testimony proves how moving from one ethos to another is not necessarily a one-way street (Lewin, 2011: 178-180):

[…] I have started to view the state and the authorities in an ambivalent manner throughout the [1973] Yom Kippur War. I love the state and I hate it, I curse the state but I am quite aware of the fact that we do not have an extra one, using [Yitzhak] Rabin's words.

Until the [1973] war I had been patriotism at its best. I volunteered to be a paratrooper. I was very proud of it. I became a combat medic. I was ready to pay any cost it took for the sake of the state without questioning. Today I am willing to pay the price too, but it's different, because today the questions and doubts don't cease to bother me.

I was a combat medic in the paratroopers unit when serving there was only for those who knew that they would be the first ones to go, they should be the front line in every battle; they are bound to jump first into fire. Today every Schmendrik [a Yiddish word for a foolish or contemptible person – E.L.] gets to wear the red beret [worn only by paratroopers – E.L.], but we went there not for prestige but because we knew we would be the living shield of the state. That was the story, to protect our homeland, not as a flowery phrase but for real.

[During the 1973 war] towards the end of the fighting we were sent into the city of Suez. It was terrible. It started as a battle in which we were supposed to defeat the city, and then it turned out to be some sort of lethal hide-and-seek game where Egyptian snipers were simply playing around and shooting us down. We had to evade their bullets but very soon we had wounded soldiers all over. There was this dilemma over and over again, I had to take care of the injured because I was the medic, but I also had to survive. We gave up trying to save the dead bodies of our friends. We had entered the city as conquerors, but we have become fugitives, locked inside the urban area in inferior positions and unable to retreat.

You see your friends, your close friends – not just people that you know, bleeding to death in your arms. And there is nothing you can do about it; all you can do is just concentrate in your own chances to survive.

And then all of a sudden I realized what a horrible mistake it was to send us into that hell from the first place. The IDF high command hadn't bothered to gather intelligence, to analyze the data. They had simply thrown us into the

fire. I have no idea how I managed to make it alive until we were rescued. I cannot think of an experience more horrid than that. I have never gone back there and I never will.

[…] A few months later I left the country and went to study in France. It was an escape. I ran away because I couldn't bear what we had experienced. I kept having flashbacks of the Suez encounter – in fact I still have them today. And I kept thinking how all this could have been avoided, how my best friends could have lived, how our military leadership had morally failed.

You see, I was so angry, that I had made up my mind to run away, I had decided to start a new life elsewhere. But very soon I found out that I couldn't do it. I am attracted to this country, I am a part of it and it is a part of me. I hate so many things that go on around here; I have so much criticism towards so many phenomena in Israel, but I cannot stand the thought of staying abroad. Once I completed my studies at the university in Paris I ran away to Israel because there was no other place on earth where I could live. I am a groupie of this country, this is why I had been a successful emissary in North America several years ago, but I hate so many things that take place here.

Yet Amnon's ambivalence towards the country, although his patriotism seems to prevail at all times, goes beyond the incidents of the 1973 combat of Suez. At the end of the testimony concerning the war, he added something else, illuminating his dual relationship with the state:

My youngest son serves in an elite unit where he is at his best, but our elder son had been mistakenly sent to the wrong unit in the army, where he has experienced sexual abuse until they have finally dismissed him with a handicap. I am proud with both my sons, they are for me the two sides of the coin: The State of Israel we love and for which we volunteer, and the State of Israel that fails to appreciate our good energies and wastes it all for nothing. I had started to view things this way in the cursed streets of Suez, and all through the years whenever a malfunction or a scandal occurred it became more and more vivid to me: Israel is the country of everything that I love and at the same time it is the country of everything that I despise.

Following Amnon's testimony, perhaps the complex answer is that in Israeli society the ongoing clash between the rival forms of ethos is an ongoing contest with no clear winners at any point in time. Although we can indicate clearly that after the 1973 war the peace ethos was propelled and would reach some of its peaks some 20 years later with the Oslo accords, one can hardly guess the exact current trends and how Israeli society will eventually react when either called for substantial territorial concessions or challenged with lethal existential war; Any estimation of which ethos shall prevail is similarly as true as it is false.

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