Udi Lebel, "From Domination to Competition: The Yom Kippur War (1973) and the Formation of a New Grief Community," in Udi Lebel and Eyal Lewin eds., *The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping of Israeli Civil-Military Relations* (Lanham, MD: Lexicon, 2015): 55-80.

Introduction

Janoff-Bolman's distinction between a "settled culture" and an "unsettled culture" has become a common place in the field of cultural research. While in the former the behavior of the cultural agents corresponds to the social-institutional expectations of them, in the latter – the exclusivity of truth is opened to competition as the behavioral repertoire expands: modes of thought, processing, behavior, and new expressions penetrate the cultural sphere. These behavioral repertoires disseminate what could turn into either a momentary relapse from the norm or a legitimate cultural alternative (Janoff-Bolman, 1992). This mainly takes place in groups that have directly suffered from trauma, whether unemployment, exile, injury, or loss as a result of war (Wilkinson, 1971). PWC (Post War Culture) genera has been diagnosed as a signifier for a subculture, and is found in cultural manifestations such as poetry, literature, film, or architecture (Richard & Lipsitz, 1990) to psycho-political contexts such as processing loss, decisions related to relationships, family planning and sexual identity, fashioning political and ideological positions, and lifestyle (Hill & O'Connor, 1996). It is no accident that war, as Fackenheim defined it, is a definitive event with the greatest potential to influence the length and breadth of society, from personal to collective identity. Sewell conceptualized war as a "historical event that leads to the transformation of structures," and specifically the structure of military-social relations (Sewell, 1996).

This chapter will outline the repercussions of the Yom Kippur War (1973) in its relations to the modes of processing the military loss by the grieving families. The chapter will explore the manner in which war has led grieving family, and mainly the families belonging to the Israeli social elite, to deviate from the hegemonic behavioral modes of grief [what will be called the "National Grief Regime"], towards alternative modes, which constituted the beginning of a new subculture that later became a central legitimate and available alternative to the hegemonic norm. Moreover, this subculture dramatically influenced even the social-military relations in Israel, as it articulated policy constraints, which the decision makers were forced to adopt. As this article will demonstrate, to this day, epistemic loss communities exist side by side and compete and negotiate amongst themselves over the modes of representing military grief in the public sphere.

Research Claims

In all that is related to the behavior and expression of the grieving families, the Yom Kippur War is the beginning of abandoning the national grief regime, of an oppositional decoding in the language Hall, which led to the formation of a new subculture of loss and a new epistemic grief community. The term "new" is deliberately used here in the same sense that the new social movement school uses it, as a challenge to the social order (Muller-Rommel, 1985: 41-54): "the military victimological community" (which victimizes grief) or alternatively "the political grief community" (which politicizes grief).

With time, the new subculture of loss transferred from the margins to the center and was incorporated as a legitimate and normative community. This community constitutes an alternative to the hegemonic "grief family", which proposes a processing trajectory with substantial psycho-political implications.

Since the Yom Kippur War to these days, there has been constant negotiation between the advocates of the hegemonic grief community's pro-institutional discourse and behavioral patterns, and the advocates and members of the new loss community. This negotiation enfolds within itself different positions regarding issues of citizenship, identity, mass culture, and a strategic culture. Thus, corresponding with the familiar rifts: conservatism vs. postmodernism, as well as republicanism versus neoliberalism.

These two communities of loss implicate the chosen security policy. While the hegemonic community provides a 'green light' to the decision makers to operate the army without rigid civil surveillance even in the face of suffering casualties, the latter, the one on which this research focuses has lead to what is called in the literature casualty phobia, casualty panic, or casualty aversion (Lebel, 2010), which dramatically affected the war doctrine and its goals.

Both communities of loss, the hegemonic and the political one, which began to form after the Yom Kippur War, hinge on a republican logic and cultural militarism, while also preserving within the Israeli discourse the unique status of the families of the soldiers in general and the families of the fallen soldiers in particular. The new grief community performs this while employing what I will call a victimological militaristic discourse, whereas its predecessor performs this while employing a heroic militarism.

Methodology

The chapter is based on the analysis of community behaviors and common discourse in order to study the formation of groups and new subcultures— in the business, academic, cultural, or political space (Alan, 1995). It follows the expressions and actions taken by the key figures who were publically accepted to act as the representatives of the grief community identified with them. Figures, which can be grasped as what discourse researcher Wellman calls "As If", represent all the participants of this discursive community (Wellman, 1988: 19). In phenomenological terms, they are the founders of the "discourse community", who work to transfer their views and interpretation of reality to the public discourse, who are conceived as the "authentic representative voice" of the community (Fraser, 1990), in this case, the military grief community. These values, expectations, positions, and behavior alongside their community's cultural (literature, poetry, etc.) and military (strategies to promote positions, political initiative, etc.) repertoire will be employed in order to learn about the psycho-political and socio-political conditions of the analyzed bereavement communities, as customary in the research of the discourse of new social movements (Benfod & Snow 2000).

Theoretical Framework: Epistemic Communities and Subculture

Unlike the researchers of public policy or urban behavior, who focus on activism for social change, Hass and his peers, who founded the school for the research of epistemic communities, focused on the question that was raised even before by Marcher and Olson: "Where do expectations come from?" (March & Olsen, 1984), since expectation precede actions and behaviors. The existence of epistemic communities in various fields produces conceptualizations. These conceptualizations are rooted into society as activities promoting them take place around them. Thus, the community is turned into a source for social changes, as "expectations and values injected by epistemic communities into the policy process" (Emanuel & Haas, 1992). In the language of Foucault, an epistemic community is a formalization territory for the "regime of truth" that promotes collective meaning (Weir, 2008). Adler, demonstrated, in Hass' footsteps,

how these communities are the source for what will later become the institutionalization of these expectations and their penetration into the political game (Adler, 1992). We may claim that this conceptualization is a certain way of answering Putnam's uncertainty, who after writing that "our access to the world is through discourse and the role that discourse plays in our lives", stated that the source for this discourse is nothing other than a "mysterious act" (Putnam, 1990: 121).

It is possible that without knowing, the pioneer of epistemic communities was non-other than Thomas Kuhn, who showed how a scientific community exists around the concept of the paradigm. This community, Kuhn states, has the power to form a "scientific regime": it is clear that from the moment researchers entering the scientific arena wish to examine certain issues, they must adopt certain axioms, existing methodologies, and draw from necessary linguistic bodies (Kuhn, 1962). When a "crisis" occurs, what Kuhn calls a paradigmatic shift, it accelerates the formation of alternative scientific communities, who, from the margins of the scientific community, from the non-legitimacy, the pseudo-scientific, will begin to pose an alternative body of knowledge and will inject into the scientific arena the legitimization to examine these issues from an alternative position, while abandoning dominant axioms and adopting behaviors that seemingly transgress what the hegemonic community defines as "scientific". Kuhn did not examine the behavior of scientists in everyday life, but rather the sources of these behaviors, which he nominated "paradigms". The epistemic community is the designer of behavioral and discursive paradigms in the fields of culture and security, and as this article will demonstrate – in the psychosocial and psycho-political realms as well. Naturally, this outline may clarify to the reader that, in this article, I adopt the political psychological conceptualization that our behaviors, even the ones conceived as intimate, individual, and spontaneous, are influenced and mediated by institutions, what Jameson called a society's "political unconscious" (Jameson, 1982). In the context of cultural analysis, Stuart Hall, himself a member of the epistemic community (Birmingham school) adopted these conceptualizations and has chosen to focus on the source of the formation of the modes and manners of cultural behavior. Hall coined the phrase sub-culture, while distinguishing three ways in which decoding processes manifest in society (Hall, 1973).

Dominant Hegemonic Decoding – an Interpretation According to the Dominant Position

Items belonging to this possibility receive, whether consciously or unconsciously, the hegemonic ideological message and turn, de facto, into cultural agents in service of the cultural hegemony. In Foucault's terms we can say that the elements belonging to the hegemonic decoding possibility testify to the effectively of the institution's governmentality (Taylor, 1985).

Negotiated Decoding – a decoding that holds a primal nucleolus of criticism, but in such a way that it would not cancel or undermine the hegemonic option. I would like to mark that, in my view, locating this kind of decoding is usually restricted to the research of rhetoric and discourse. Since the moment doubt exists the private space, and seeps over beyond the publicists' pages (in the form of political behavior), it already becomes a decoding, which consciously resists and undermines the hegemony (see the next section).

Oppositional Decoding – This Is the Option of Resistance

This form of decoding undermines the hegemonic definition of reality and acts to promote an alternative, a reading of the situation and behavior, which are not dictated by the institution. This article will examine the occurrence of this possibility in the Israeli grief arena. This possibility is in fact what was later called a culture of differentiation (Luhmann, 1982) or of recognition

(Martineau, Nasar & Thompson, 2012) which, as was stated, is usually accelerated by historical, and even more so, traumatic events. In his time Ben-Eliezer articulated an accurate definition to this possibility; he regarded groups in a civil society that uphold an alternative to the behaviors expected by the institution and defined them as "an attempt to save civic life from the state's administrative and regulative invasions" (Ben-Eliezer, 1999: 88).

As the thinkers of the Birmingham school have shown in their various of studies in the collection "Resistance Through Rituals" (Hall & Jefferson, 1993) – which mostly refers to subcultures in post-war Britain, the subculture of resistance to hegemonic decoding is enacted through communities that emphasize public behavior and popular culture: dress, music, language, and an assortment of components that lead to life patterns, fashions, habits, and responses to political events. It is precisely in these behaviors, that is, in the sociology of the every day, that there is a strategic, symbolic resistance to the subservience to the mechanisms of the state (Hebdige, 1979: 167). This is not only a disturbance or deviation from the social order, it is not a momentary "noise", but rather a phenomenon that should be examined as an ideological subversion involving individuals who are forming rituals, dress codes, a language, pastime sites, a communication, and a legitimization to withdraw from the hegemony. This is in fact one of the most significant insights made by the Birmingham school – the claim that the subculture, the same community that decided to withdraw from the institution's expectations and adopt an alternative view of reality, may at first lead many agents, who will consider it as a destruction of the moral and social order, a to a moral panic against its existence, but with time – incorporation mechanisms will be activated that will lead to its inclusion as a legitimate option in the cultural repertoire. Thus, in the field of punk and rock, and thus, as this article will show, in the field of reference to a private loss on a national backdrop. It is what Hermoni and Lebel identified as a constant mechanism of internalizing subversive representations by the hegemony, which would, on the one hand, weaken the hegemonic conception, but, on the other hand, we add – lead the cooperation option to these subversive magnitudes (Hermoni & Lebel 2012).

The Bereaved Family – the Hegemonic Grief Community

After the War of Independence (1948), an epistemic grief community began to form in Israel. This community even received a unique name ('the bereaved family') and a formal status as a political category with an ethical and moral dimension. The salient position of this community and its dominance in all that is related to fashioning the Israeli grief culture has brought about the existence of clear expectations from the new members of the Israeli grief arena. They learned that in order gain respect for their fallen family member, they themselves should be conceived as "governmental". In order for their loved ones to be granted a public commemoration they must take part in the "hegemonic grief regime". This regime enfolded within itself a constant regulation of emotions and an engineering of culture, whose main purpose was to keep the grieving families as close as possible, in all things related to their performance in the public sphere, to the discourse and behavior of restraint and a repression of emotions; legitimizing the death of the son and marking his death as productive and meaningful; depoliticizing the grief and the loss. It is a de-victimization of grief and bearing it in a heroic fashion, not as victims but as the heroes of the national episteme (Lebel, 2013).

A variety of persons even become the leaders of the community since they befitted the "typecast" of the ideal bereaved parent and carried out the demands of the role impeccably. For example, Rivka Guber, whose two sons were killed in the war of independence. After their deaths she continued promote national interests, mainly by hers and her husband's contribution

to the assimilation of new immigrants ("Olim", New Arrivals) and education. Ben-Gurion called her "the mother of sons" and she became a public-educative figure, an ideal type for the grieving Israeli mother. Her books were defined as educative poems and won her many awards, she herself received the Israel Prize and for many years functioned as the head of the representative commemoration organization "Yad La Banim" (a memorial for the sons). She was close to the leaders of the institutions – prime ministers and presidents, and regularly attended the myriad decision rooms in which the contents of the commemorations and memorials, immigration and assimilation, education and culture were fashioned. Rivka Guber was trusted with the heroic grief discourse – which never doubts the necessity of the sons' deaths, encourages many to follow in their footsteps, and does not raise any doubts regarding the decision makers' judgment. Guber and her peers' position as role models who fashion an epistemic community of bereaved families constituted a meaningful resource for the institution. The place they occupied reproduced the militarist-republican civic hierarchy and guaranteed a free range of action in the security and foreign affairs with the blessing of the bereaved families, who provided legitimization for the various decisions, including those whose price was blood (Lebel, 2014 (b)).

The Yom Kippur War and the Beginning of the Oppositional Decoding of Loss up to the Formation of the Political Grief Community

Within the history of Israel, the Yom Kippur War, as Carmel notes, is the "fault line" (Carmel, 2001: 676). During this war 2,569 soldiers were killed, 7,500 were injured, and 301 were captured by enemy forces (Ibid). The war broke out during a political stalemate and due to a severe intelligence failure. Israel was surprised and caught off-guard after blindly trusting erroneous conceptions. The war led to a breach of faith in the political and military leadership, damaged the public moral, and kick started a political culture of awareness and criticism regarding the captains, both civic and military. In relation to the processing the public loss, cultural agents, mainly bereaved parents but also widows and brothers, began to deviate from the behavioral and discursive expectations of the "bereaved family" and began to formalize a new subculture of loss, which constituted, in its entirety, an opposition to the hegemonic grief culture. In the following sections I will demonstrate these nonstandard expressions.

Making Grief Present

The Israeli leadership has always sought to minimize the public's exposure to the "price" of the victory celebrations. As early as the copious debates regarding the existence of the day of remembrance for the fallen soldiers of Israel in which the parents wished to make this day official. David Ben-Gurion agreed only on the condition that this day will not overshadow the Independence Day celebrations, and that it will be a day of memory and not of loss; that is –a day marking the legacy of the fallen and not focusing on the trauma of the bereaved families. Paradoxically, the bereaved families were expected to contribute to remove the grief from the discourse (Lebel, 2013). Without any relation to the designers of culture, The Yom Kippur war connected every citizen to the grief. Hundreds of soldiers were killed on its very first days, and thousands were later buried. As the chairman of "Yad La Banim" testified: "in a period spanning over six weeks, these people have stood… in daily funerals… over a hundred funerals a day" (Yahel, 1974). It was no longer possible to ignore death in its real concrete significance of loss, especially in those elite communities with more representation among the fighting forces. Thus, for example, a bereaved father wrote about the Kibbutzim movement: "if the kibbutz society usually ignored and turned its back to the problem of grief, the circumstances of the damage

inflicted upon us by this war have changed things… the settlement of the Kibbutz was injured five times more than the rest of the population in the state" (Dimenstein, 1974: 31). Another Kibbutz member wrote: "we did not know these phenomena until then… there was Rivka Guber, the "mother of sons" from the war of Independence. But Here? With us?" (Lebel, 2014 (b), 75). To demonstrate the impossibility to negate the scope of the loss – we will mark that when it was published, the Yom Kippur tract of fallen and missing, became a bestseller. More than twenty thousand copies of it were circulated and it was later updated and reprinted in a number of editions.

An Invitation to Cry – Opposition to Restrained Emotions

Since the War of Independence the members of the "bereaved families" were directed to remain "enfolded in their grief" and leave it in the public sphere. The hurt, the pain, the depression, and the weakness had no place in time and space – neither in the formal ceremonies (the memorial days) nor the formal sights (the military cemeteries). But this emotional management seemed to have collapsed in one single stroke after the Yom Kippur War. Only the "Yad La Banim" journal, which came out after the war, began to contain deviations from this motif: "I will write my songs with a baited tear, choking my throat with grief – the vast lament within me is etched with no way out – in grief", as a bereaved father wrote. A bereaved mother, under the title "sadness", testified to the difficulty to remain loyal to the motif and publicly confesses that her behavior is nothing but pretense and is not authentic, while also demonstrating what takes place backstage: "pretending to the whole world that I am a strong heroic mother… but the heart will not obey me, it is tearing into pieces deep within… I am crying with a burning heart like a wounded animal in the desert, alone with no help in the world, fading into its own pain till the end of her days." For the first time they speak of the pain, of the difficulty to cope with it, of the emotions. No more restrained heroes. Even in the Kibbutzim, the birthplace of the hegemonic grief behavior, the changes began to leave their marks.

Ora Sphengental, a widow who lost her husband in the Six Day war, remembers the grief pattern that preceded the Yom Kippur war in Kibbutz Mizra and the changes the Yom Kippur War created: "we did not cry, did not shout, nothing. On Yom Kippur people cried… Yom Kippur broke through this entire thing." She also testifies about herself that after the Yom Kippur war she unleashed her emotions and began to "lose my senses […] when they buried the soldiers here it was actually the first time I broke into tears […] do you know what it is like to cry in public? You cry in your bed. Into the pillow […] now there is no problem to cry in public […] on Yom Kippur it was one of the only times that people in the Kibbutz cried."

The text that enfolds within itself most of the changes in relation to the Kibbutzim's culture of restraint and emotion management is "An Invitation to Weeping". The text was written by Amnon Lapid, a member of kibbutz Givat Haim Meuhad, and even led to a public debate (upon which I will later elaborate) regarding the legitimization to weep in public: "I want to send you an invitation to weep. The day and the hour are not important, but the evening plan, I promise, will be rich: weeping. We will weep for hours. I will weep over my dead: Avraham'le, Ilan, Amiti, Dodo, Ozer, Yair, and my son – and you will weep over yours. And together we will weep for the dreams we have awoken from. For the gods that have let us down. We will weep for the new bereaved. Oh, how much we will weep, a wailing weep we will weep. A hear breaking weep. A huge weep. A psychedelic weep. We will weep full benches…. We will weep rivers. We will weep oceans. But always – in a month, in two months, in a year – you are welcome to

come again. The door is open. The invitation stands, from here on onwards, in my place, you can always weep" (Lapid, 1974).

"Father Was Killed – Why?" Opposition to the Productivity in Grief

Two weeks after Motti Ashkenazi's solo demonstration, which took place on February 17th 1974 and jumpstarted the mass public protest (see, in this book, Chapter 2: The Combatants' Protest after the Yom Kippur War and the Transformation of the Protest Culture in Israel by Eithan Orkibi). The first demonstration of the protest movement took place in front of the cabinet meeting. Between the myriad of the signs lifted there, two children were holding a sign stating: "father was killed – why?" (Ashkenazi, 2004: 177), as if marking the crisis in signification for the families of the fallen, who could no longer find solace in the death of their sons and teach about its legitimization. For the first time, hundreds of bereaved families embarked on a journey to search and endow meaning to the trauma that was imposed to them. They searched for a meaning that would not be a common place ("in their death they commanded life"), but that must be actively fashioned so that the names of their sons could actually generate a dramatic change in the life of the nation. "Someplace the thought appears-- might we have sacrificed for nothing? Were they not the same sons who fell dumb to give their life in vain?" wrote a bereaved father (*Ma'ariv*, 14 September, 1975). And another bereaved father explained to President Ephraim Katzir that "the special bitterness, which characterizes the feelings of the parents of the soldiers who have fallen in the Yom Kippur War, must be understood [...] they are haunted by the horrific suspicion that the sacrifice was not inevitable. This suspicion expands into vast dimensions given the accounts about the devastating oversight" (Shmuel, 1974).

The lack of meaning only augmented the anger, which the bereaved families no longer wished to suppress at any account. This anger remained the central characteristic of their relationship with the state, and found its expression in the copious demonstrations and media reports: "this week marks three years to the Yom Kippur War [...] Which exposed an entire system in which the lack of morality and integrity reign high [...] we are recently witnessing a planned campaign, in which the individuals responsible for the oversights of this horrible war are attempting to expunge their part and their responsibility of the situation [...] Moshe Dayan rewrites history, in the media and in his book, for his own comfort and justification. He blames others and distorts facts [...] On the eve of Yom Kippur, Shmuel Gonen is invited to speak on television and participates in a debate about concepts of 'crime and punishment', is this not blatant mockery? Major Zeira [...] was sent for training in the United-States. This situation indicated the continuation of a moral atrophy that we will be unable to uproot unless the individuals responsible for the war's devastating oversights will completely step down from the public stage. We, the bereaved families, will not forget and will not forget. For the future of the state of Israel we demand a trial of justice". In the name of 120 bereaved families whose names are kept in confidence by the newspaper (*Ma'ariv*, October 6, 1976). A bereaved brother from the Yom Kippur War writes:

> I swear from above this paper page in the blood of my dear brother [...] and in the blood of all the dear IDF soldiers, who are lying still in their fresh graves, to carry their hideous screams and the heartbreaks of the mothers and fathers who have lost their dear children [...] I take this heavy burden upon myself [...] the results of October 73 that have rained a horrible holocaust upon us… To bring this to every Jewish citizen wherever he may be, so that they will witness and know for generations to come!!!"

The brother testifies that he has toiled on publishing a book that will describe the chain of events in the war (Donevitz, 1974).

"The Minister of Defense is a Murderer" – Opposition to De-Politicization and De-Victimazation of the Grief

Motti Ashkenazi, a reserve captain who returned from the war and began his single protest, carried alone, carried a sign that wrote: "grandmother, failing Defense Minister = 3,000 dead grandchildren." It is possible that this sealed the number 3,000 in public consciousness (Lorde, 2013: 272). This number marks not only the number of the fallen but also but those who have fallen in vain, those whose death could have been prevented. On October 18th, a few days after her son Yosef was killed, Tikva Sarid from Kibbutz Beit Hashita demanded the resignation of minister of defense Moshe Dayan. Under the title "Dayan must go," she claimed: "The IDF was not prepared and ready on the arrival of the judgment day. The Defense Minister is responsible for not informing the government about the severity of the situation. [He] is responsible for the most severe oversights" (*Ma'ariv*, November 29, 1973). Eleven official protest movements, led by the bereaved parents, began to operate after the Yom Kippur War. They demanded a governmental system "that will be under constant inspection. That will not let stagnation set, that will constantly scrutinize itself, which will examine each question a thousand times over" (*Ha'aretz*, October 4, 1974).

The identity of the victim, such as the identity of the bereaved families, requires by definition the location of the identity of an aggressor, someone responsible for the condition of the victim, and after the war, most of the anger was directed toward Dayan and Meir, who were seen as those aggressors responsible for the death of the boys. A planned act of protest, which received widespread media coverage, as it clearly intended, took place during Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's lecture at Bar Ilan University. The lecture was originally planned for 18:00, but a few minutes earlier, a large group of bereaved parents stormed into the auditorium to prevent it from taking place. They were armed with posters: "Shame on you, you are here to listen to a killer". Earlier that year, protesters called Golda Meir a "Killer" during protests on the day marking one year to the end of the war (*Ma'ariv*, December 19, 1974).

This event was just one of many: A conference attended by 100 bereaved families, who also formed as a protest group, was held in Tel Aviv. In order to officiate the activity, they selected a representative to approach the Defense Minister and ask him to remove General Shmuel Gonen from his military duties in order "to restore the feeling that there is fundamental reward and punishment underlying our lives". The families even decided to serve the public by "preventing those individuals and organizations from expressing their non-objective opinions, as they do not have the authority and the right to express them publicly and to interpret the Agranat Commission's clear conclusions" (*Ma'ariv*, December 2, 1975). Another course of action was carried out by mothers of fallen soldiers, who expressed their objection to the possibility that Golda Meir win the Israel Prize, due to her part in the oversight. They wrote to the Prime Minister a petition signed by the bereaved families of the Yom Kippur War, saying that (*Ma'ariv*, March 28, 1975):

> We were shocked to hear that the jury intends to give you the Israel Prize 1974 for your contribution to society and the state. The feeling shared by many families bereaved by the Yom Kippur War leads us to contact you asking that you refrain from accepting the prize

> offered to you. As someone who headed the government in the period preceding the terrible oversight [...] you cannot ignore your responsibility [...] it is time that all those responsible for the failure recognize their responsibility, be more modest and disappear from the public spotlight. Unfortunately these people tend to behave as though nothing has happened in Israel. We see the Judges' decision to award you the prize as part of the negative phenomenon of attempting to overlook and obscure the personal responsibility of those who led the country toward the failures of the Yom Kippur War.

The bereaved families' anger toward the establishment felt was also expressed during funerals at military cemeteries. In Kibbutz Beit Hashita, from which 12 soldiers were killed during the war, the national television filmed a funeral during which angry words were spoken in a tirade against the government and the country's leaders. After the first anniversary to the war (1974), parents left the cemeteries in an organized procession of cars toward Moshe Dayan's home "to remind him of his responsibility for the failure [...] and the death of our children". The parents even decided that this demonstration would become an annual protest taking place every year on the anniversary of the war (*Ma'ariv*, October 7, 1976). On the third anniversary, the entire country was filled with public demonstrations organized by the bereaved families, and outside every cemetery the protesters stood with petitions supporting a vote of no confidence in the government (*Ma'ariv*, October 6, 1976).

The anger directed at Moshe Dayan and the commitment to demand delegitimizing his public legitimacy to take part in the government did not yield even after Meir's government was replaced. For example, during the Rabin government, 84 bereaved families whose children were killed during the Yom Kippur War, wrote to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Yigal Alon demanding to return MKs Moshe Dayan and Abba Eban from their U.S. diplomatic trip. The petitioners contended that sending them was a "direct attempt to certify their good character and rehabilitate a group of people who brought disaster on to Israel [...] an attempt to blur and wipe from memory something that was on the public agenda, as if nothing had happened" (*Ma'ariv*, April 7, 1975). They were increasing outraged about Menachem Begin's decision to appoint Moshe Dayan a minister in his government. Their ire is hard to describe. For the first time in history, Beit Yad Labanim in Tel Aviv became a site for political protest. The bereaved families of the Yom Kippur War gathered there carrying signed petitions against Dayan's appointment. The signatories emphasized that do not have a political agenda but that they rather wish that someone responsible for the "oversight" would not be among the ministers the new government. After the public was exposed to the intentions to appoint Dayan, spontaneous demonstrations of bereaved parents occurred sporadically outside Moshe Dayan's home in northern Tel Aviv (*Ma'ariv*, May 29, 1977). Posters were plastered on the walls at Beit Yad Labanim in Tel Aviv saying: "Begin, you've betrayed us, you chose an oversight minister", and "Dayan - the people are tired of you and you are tired of the people. Go sit at home". The families held a protest outside of Yad Labanim. At that time, some of them joined another demonstration in front of Metzudat Ze'ev (the Likud headquarters in Tel Aviv): "We, the bereaved families, will never forget Dayan's skill to bring upon the people of Israel the failure of the Yom Kippur War. No committee can obscure his responsibility for what happened", the chairman of Yad Labanim, Yoseph Lotberg called out during the protest. After this demonstration, the bereaved families headed to Begin's home (*Ma'ariv*, May 30, 1977). "We will not allow our children's' murderer to be a minister in the Israeli cabinet," read the signs. The anger raged and several parents suffered from hysterical fits. Menachem Begin met with three

bereaved parents who had official positions in the bereavement protests: the chairman of Yad Labanim in Tel Aviv, the director of Beit Halochem (house of the combatant) and another bereaved mother (*Ma'ariv*, May 30, 1977).

Parents protested and demanded another meeting with the Prime Minister. Eventually, they got what they wanted. "We made it clear to Mr. Begin that we will not accept Dayan's appointment as a government minister and stated that we will continue to fight against the appointment in every possible way". The families also initiated a petition against Dayan's appointment: "Dayan cannot serve in Public Office [...] [Dayan] will create many unnecessary victims" (*Yedioth Aharonot*, June 5, 1977).

Implementing the Sub-Culture of Political Victimization: From Subculture to Policy Constraints – to the Establishment of a Grief Community Victimology

A host of precedents in the new behavior of the bereaved Yom Kippur War families did not remain extraordinary events that remain in the margins of the discourse of loss and the Israeli collective memory. The "acceptance" of these behaviors, especially among the elites and the shapers of political, media and cultural agendas, seemed to grant them normative status and legitimacy. The new Grief Community created holds on mainly two fronts:

Cultural: In terms of the work of mourning and the public performance of bereavement - as this was a community in which resistance to the hegemonic bereavement culture was rife, and which favored alternative rituals.

Political: With regards to the community's effect on policy - as this was a Grief Community that clarifies to statesmen and military leaders that military related bereavement will be a "social problem" pointing at the failures of those who did not act to prevent it and will therefore deny legitimacy from the adopted policy.

It seems that the first, psycho-cultural element, can be demonstrated by focusing on Manuela Dviri, who, since her son Jonathan fell while serving in Lebanon (on February 26, 1998), gained extensive media and public attention. She, who after the fall of her son, was invited to join an anti-establishment Grief Community without it being considered a transgression or deviation. Quite on the contrary, the elites expected her to do precisely that, as, as the time, the mainstream media discourse opposed holding on to the Security Zone. In fact, it was considered odd to advocate for holding the security zone.

In her writing, Dviri concretized loss and resisted any romanticization that was widespread during the construction of the Israeli nation, as well as keeping its difficult components in the private sphere (Dviri, 2000: 9-10):

> Pain is not romantic or noble. Pain is waking up in the morning with bleary, crazy eyes, with severe nausea and diarrhea, 365 days a year. Pain is a hard and uninterrupted bleeding from the uterus [...] when the agents sent from the town major came to tell me that my son Jonathan was killed in Lebanon, a darkness from hell settled upon me. At once I fell into the world of the dead; a ghost land from hell [...] my womb began to bleed. I felt like a slaughtered sheep. I looked at myself, and I was a stranger to myself: the face - a grim and twisted mask, sore eyes, graying skin, sunken cheeks, and shaggy hair. A terrible nausea filled me. Every cell in my body screamed and burned. I was raw meat - skinless, unprotected. At those moments I felt that a veil had dropped over my old life and I am the living-dead.

Dviri even rejected the fixing of the figure of the "bereaved mother", at least in the way she was expected to lead her life in the context of loss, memory and her "public role." As another bereaved mother, Raya Harnick put it (Livne, 1998):

> As a bereaved mother, I am supposed to walk around with blackened shoulders and a bowed head and everyone is supposed to constantly check up on the tear that is supposed to be always hidden in the corner of my eye [...] a bereaved mother's life should be conducted around the grave. And I, since the Shloshim [thirty days of mourning], never went to the grave, even on Memorial Day. I cannot stand memorial days [...] what do I have to do in a cemetery? What is there for me to look for under the headstone? Yoni? What is the connection between the rotting pile of bones and Yoni who lived with me and through me and he smiles and says, "my mother hasn't changed a bit," and he's glad she is that way, as are his brothers.

Regarding the second component, by which the Yom Kippur War was seen as the war that sowed the seeds from which grew a political Grief Community operating to shape policy, we should mention Raya Harnick. Harnick, mother of Goni Harnick who fell in the battle at the Fort Beaufort (June 6, 1982) during Operation Peace for Galilee (The Lebanon War), who became one of the most dominant of all bereaved mothers who operated to end the war and deny its leaders the legitimacy to take part in public life. Harnik's activity was made culturally possible due to, inter alia, the seeds of preparation sowed by bereaved families after the Yom Kippur War, which created the infrastructure and the primary cultural legitimacy for her behavior. There were, of course, other components, mainly political ones, which are not the concern of this article (Lebel, 2014 (a)).

"I will not sacrifice my firstborn", Harnik said during the protest against the war, and in her spirit, other mothers to soldiers explained that "we are becoming 'tiger' mothers, protect the pups'" (*Laisha* magazine, May 30, 1983). Harnik belonged to a community that was branded by the media as "The Beaufort family", and with her, the rest of the parents of the battle's victims clarified that Menachem Begin, Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan are the "murderers of our children" (Ibid, 42). Following their lead, bereavement became present in the discourse of political protest, while, on a daily basis bereaved parents stood in front of Prime Minister Menachem Begin's office with posters on which it was printed: "Sharon - 600 ideal victims for your ideal war" (Posters hoisted by bereaved parents as described in *Koteret Rashit*, August 10, 1987); "the perpetrators of atrocities are comfortable in their armchairs" (an ad published by the bereaved father Jacob Grutman, Personal archive); "what did my son die for?" and "Sharon the killer," "Sharon the child killer" (Yedioth Ahronot, April 3, 1992). Harnik even compared the government to a "gang of murderers" and claimed that she would shoot the Defense Minister dead (Barzilay, 1992: 210).

The model presented by the Grief Community led by Harnik, Dviri and their colleagues, seen as ideal types, generated a new parenting model, not only relevant for parents of soldiers who fell in the war or parents of soldiers, but also for the parents of future recruits. For example, a mother of a soldier serving at the time that the IDF was still in southern Lebanon, said that when she learned that her son was called to serve in Lebanon, she quit her job as a teacher and went to demonstrate in front of the President's and the Prime Minister's homes (*Ha'aretz*, March 15, 2002):

> I said I couldn't bear the thought that he would kill or be killed and I kept writing letters to the Defense Ministry and the military [...] I will act before my son gets killed. Not after. If my son is killed it will be as if I killed him with my own hands [...] I pleaded to him live (on a show on Channel 1) from beyond the television screen and asked: What words do you want written on your tombstone? Should it say "here lies a son who told his mother don't tell me what to do"?

She explained that she was influenced by the movement of "Four Mothers" - a brand that specifies differentiation from the hegemonic bereaved family - which gave her momentum and legitimized her actions: "When my son was in Lebanon I felt like an innocent man was condemned to death [...] my experience of loss was so harsh [...] as if that the loss actually occurred [...] [but] he wasn't dead. I need to fight for his life!?" (Ibid).

Already after the Yom Kippur War, there were those who noticed that Israeli society was developing sensitivity to casualties (Safrai, 2000: 28):

> An Israeli told the Ambassador of Finland that thousands of casualties are a national trauma, because Israel is a nation of three million. The ambassador of Finland answered: "Did you hear about the Winter Campaign in Finland? We aren't three million, we are four million. We had 150,000 fatalities and half a million casualties [...] but we are happy, we have Finland. We maintained our independence. This is for the generations to come [...] so do we walk around depressed? [...] The U.S. representative joined the conversation and told the Israeli General: "I was shocked to see what the Yom Kippur War did to you. If, due to 2,500 fatalities, you got to where you are - get out of this business." "What business?" the Israeli asked and the American replied: "The Business of making war."

Indeed, the period Israel spent in Lebanon stirred among the public in general and among the ranks of decision-makers in particular, what I coined "casualty panic", with dramatic consequences on the shaping of the doctrine of military operations and on the security policy (Lebel, 2010). Undoubtedly, the sense of panic was created as a response to the establishment's observation of the bereaved families' extensive public activity, which consolidated as an epistemic Grief Community with rituals, expectations and role models, such as Raya Harnik or Manuela Dviri, with media coverage and representations in film and theater. A Grief Community that focuses on the parent's trauma and not only on the memory of its sons; which exposes the mind, emotion and does not incarcerate pain and suffering in the private sphere; a victimized community that locates those guilty-responsible for the death of its sons; a community that has a range of activities with psychological and political meanings such as the return war calls and condolence letters to leaders, participating in demonstrations and calls for the establishment of inquiry commissions; activities calling to rename operations and wars and struggles over the designs of the graves and the inscriptions on the tombstones. Particularly - political activity in the name of loss calling to cease military activities as well as immediate implications on military activation policy.

A community that first consolidated after the Yom Kippur War, and ever since, its actions have slowly become more mainstream and turned into actions expected of bereaved families - part of a subculture identified with the secular-peace seeking camp, i.e., the Israeli

elite. A subculture that functioned as a policy maker, as Bruriah Sharon, one of the leaders of "Four Mothers" testified. In her opinion, casualty panic stemmed from the fact that "During the first week [of the Second Lebanon War] the IDF tried to fight an aerial war because they knew that we were not able to handle dead soldiers and in a sense, we, the Four Mothers, have some part in that" (Shavit, 2006).

Communities Bargaining: The Ongoing Conflict between Valorization and Victimization of Grief and Memory

After the Yom Kippur War, many bereaved parents spoke out against the blunt "deviations" among the new bereaved families. The Community leaders in the "Bereaved Family", alongside essayists and novelists, led the opposition to what was perceived as the secularization of loss and memory. For example, the writer Yemima Avidar Tchernowitz addressed the new bereaved parents, asking them to stop their activities: "Stop this talk which can be interpreted by bereaved mothers whose sons went out to war and never returned that he sacrificed his life in vain" (Hadari, 2002: 217).

A mother who lost two sons in the War of Independence, wrote in an article titled "To the families of victims of the Yom Kippur War" (Israelit, 1974):

> We must accept the disaster in line with the saying: "Baruch Dayan Emet" [...] today more than ever, I am appealing to you, members of the bereaved family: Please do everything to sanctify the blood of your loved ones and try to overcome the grief on an external level. Because you will contribute to raise the morale in the country [...] by so doing, you are continuing the mission for which your loved ones fell.

Some bereaved parents even came to ask Motti Ashkenazi to halt his operations. They claimed (Ashkenazi, 2004, 167):

> […] Your actions are offensive to our sons' memory [...] you are telling the people of Israel that our sons [...] died as fools; that their death in battle was unnecessary, useless and meaningless. [...] you have no right [...] to call them victims of a terrible oversight; […] unnecessary victims of the oversight. Please cease your protest!

Arnon Lapid, who wrote the "Invitation to Cry" which I previously discussed, received many responses to his piece. For example, a member of his Kibbuts, Lotte Aharon, who lost two sons, responded:

> No Arnon, I disagree with you. You know the "Order of the Fallen" by Haim Hefer - there they say, "Sorry, but we had to" [...]. When Israel fell, his uncle yelled at me - mother are not allowed to cry! Paratroopers don't cry. In his last postcard, Dudu wrote to me "not to embarrass the firm"

One of the women called upon to defend the hegemonic bereavement model was Naomi Zoreah, whose two sons were killed in the Golan Heights - one in the Six Day War and the second in the Yom Kippur War. In late October 1973, after her son was killed, she published an open letter in response to a consolation letter she received from her friend (*Yedioth Aharonot*, September 23, 1973):

> What is all the spilled blood for? […] It is unequivocal. We didn't and won't have another choice. The terrible price was worth it [...] a Jewish village educates its sons to be heroes and moral people. When a man rises to kill you with a knife [...] you need to pull out a knife and protect yourself [...]. It is better that their mothers cry than we cry!

The "mother of sons" Rivka Guber was also called upon to protect the bereavement model that was breaking down. She also spoke out against the bereaved parents' new behavior (*Ma'ariv*, December 24, 1974):

> I have no choice, as one of the oldest members of the bereavement family, but to turn to the bereaved parents in the newspaper and say that it would be better if we talked among ourselves [...] the man Moshe Dayan was born in this country and reached the heights of power from standing behind the plow in Nahalal. His personal fulfillment and his service to the country are well known to the Jewish people [...] the vast and terrifying camp of bereaved parents, widows and orphans [...] will be considered an echelon that everyone with a spirit will take into account. We still have a need [...] not for "spontaneous performances" to the delight of our enemies, not to search for scapegoats for our many oversights, but for support of each other and being together.

The debate on modes of representation of the processing of grief remained in the social consciousness from the Yom Kippur War to this day, carried over the years carried by various entrepreneurs and groups. For example, after the Second Lebanon War (2006) and especially following the ten-year anniversary to the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon, began a media and social debate that revolved around, among other things, marking the mothers of IDF soldiers and bereaved mothers belonging to a political community, as responsible for the various constraints that prevented the IDF from defeating the Hamas and Hezbollah. For example, former deputy defense minister, Gen. (ret.) Efraim Sneh, wrote (Sneh, 2010):

> The public opinion, that the sense of mutual responsibility has been lost, was shaped by the "Four Mothers." This movement placed the concern for the son's safety, the most fundamental of human feelings, above all national security considerations, which has become an almost a despised concept […].

Ron Ben-Yishai, a senior military analyst joined Sneh and commented (*Ynet*, May 25, 2010): "I still cringe with shame when I remember that night in May 2000. I can't forget the soldier from the Armored Corpse who shouted into his mobile phone: 'Mom, I'm out.'" When Major General (res.) Elazar Stern, the former head of the IDF Human Resources Branch and current Member of Knesset, was asked about Gilad Shalit, then held captive by Hezbollah, he said: "If we hadn't behaved hysterically during recent years in response to the pressure from mothers, and I don't want to say harsher words, Gilad Shalit would be with us today, he would have already been released" (*Channel 7*, July 4, 2010). Similarly, even after the first Lebanon War there were those who accused the mothers for Israel's failure in war, as they did not heed to the Prime Minister's plea "not to undercut the morale". For example, MK Aryeh Nehamkin stated that at the end of the war, the government responded to "mothers whose feelings are understandable, but they cannot be the basis upon which political decisions are made" (Lebel, 2011: 373).

War and Remembrance

Even the perception of the war, despite or because of the fatalities, began a longstanding conflict regarding the way the Israeli public relates to its wars, whether as a heroic or victimized national history. Already after the Yom Kippur War, Chief of Staff David Elazar complained (Safrai, 2010):

> The sorrow for those lost, for the need to fight, is dominant here. It is the reason we can't be proud and rejoice in our victory. But we must know that all the difficulties we experienced, with all the sorrow and the heavy load our boys carried, we must know we have achieved military accomplishments!

More than 30 years after the war, this conflict remains; as if it embodies the Israeli identity politics, and especially the gap between the social elite that hold neoliberal and global beliefs and those who advocate a Republican ethos (Lewin, 2013). It is therefore no coincidence that the main complaints about the victimization of the Yom Kippur War memory was carried out by religious Zionist groups and the Israeli settlements, and most of those who expressed opinions about the issue, i.e. media outlets, belonged, for the most part, to religious Zionism factions and catered to the settlers. For example, Boaz Haetzni, son of Elyakim Haetzni, one of the founders of the Jewish settlement in Hebron, believed that "this loser's dialogue is succeeding to silence and marginalize the best possible scenario for the Yom Kippur War - an overwhelming victory" (Haezni, 2009). Furthermore, a senior officer known in the mainstream Israeli discourse as the man who complained about the excessive panic regarding fatalities among the Israeli leadership, wrote (*Makor Rishon*, August 30, 2013):

> There is no historical example in which a country was surprisingly attacked on two fronts simultaneously by huge armies, compared to its army, and was as successful as in defending itself as Israel [...] after 40 years, we should remember the pain of the Yom Kippur War - but more so, we should be proud. Israelis deserve that.

Israel Harel, former chairman of the Yesha Council, also lamented (*Makor Rishon*, August 30, 2013):

> […] In the history of wars there was no other war that began as a complete surprise and ended 18 days later in a complete and unequivocal victory in favor of the surprised party. In such cases, normal nations are happy and celebrate the victory. But in practice, the Egyptians held the victory celebrations, though we completely destroyed their army.

Forty years after the war, the Israeli conservative wing complained that the war was remembered for its fallen and not for its achievements. This claim is critical of the entire Israeli memorial culture, as Israeli memorial days, as opposed to their instigators' initial intention, David Ben Gurion included, are no longer days of battle heritage but rather days intended to expose the public to the bereaved families' pain; they are not (heroic) memorial days, but days of grief (Victimology). For example, a lieutenant colonel (res.), who served as a company commander in the Yom Kippur War in the southern area, said that he regretted that the Yom Kippur War was etched in the public consciousness as a blunder (*Channel 7*, October 2, 2013):

> […] The war ended and we sat on the land of Egypt, surrounding 30 thousand troops of the Third Army, by sea, air and land. No army in the world over the past century has ever ended a war in such a way [...] we must stop wrapping this war with the veil of political failure, we fought valiantly, our people sacrificed themselves and some of them are to still wounded in body and soul. These are my friends, and they deserve to be decorated for their service.

Another Lieutenant Colonel, heads an organization for victims of terrorism and acts as a counterforce to the pressure from the left exerted on decision makers by bereaved families of fallen soldiers to advance deals for the release of terrorists in exchange for hostages or for territorial withdrawals. On the 40th anniversary to the war, he organized social evenings commemorating the heroes that were meant to serve as "counterweight to the media wave designed to weaken the public spirit by implementing the perception that the war was a failure and ended with loss". These evenings hosted officers and soldiers, including the chairman of Yesha Council (*Channel 7*, September 17, 2013).

Summary

Around the Yom Kippur War, as this chapter has tried to show, appeared first signs of splintering in the "Central Israeli Community" - the Jewish-Zionist faction - into many communities that began functioning as competing subcultures using strategies to promote concepts and define identities that have become part of the civil activism repertoire in Israel. In the ideological-political sense, this was a war that led to the formation of the social movements “Peace Now" and “Gush Emunim.” (Feige, 2009).

After years in which many different public arenas and social agents "rallied around the flag" (Chowanietz, 2007), and cooperated with the security-political complex (Lebel, 2002), Israeli society started to witness processes of differentiation, resignation, analysis and recognition. This article illustrates these processes as they relate to the changes among the bereaved Israeli military families, after years of a stable hegemonic loss regimen, which clarified the social expectations of "newcomers" in the epistemic Grief Community. Among the members of the "bereavement family", many grieving parents ceased to participate in this micromanagement of emotions and cultural engineering, and unconsciously led to the establishment of bereavement and loss subcultures that would later generate a new alternative, legitimate, dominant and normative Grief Community among the social elites and public opinion shapers, relating to both the political and cultural agendas. Out of this "bereavement family" sprouted new groups such as "The Beaufort family" and "Four Mothers". Each one of these groups had a social leadership that served as a role model and was represented in the literature, film and cultural artifacts, public disclosure and moral standings. Across the board, from the margins to the center, "political grief" became a part of the Israeli bereavement culture. Accordingly, the more time that passes from the Yom Kippur War, the more difficult and perhaps impossible it becomes to agree on a consensual version of military remembrance and official commemoration. Different communities advocate different narratives and rituals, and there is no way to consolidate them (Lebel & Drory 2009). except for the use of the symbolic capital that loss provides.

Contrary to this phenomenon, new groups sought to adopt the hegemonic model and serve as an alternative to the bereavement communities, as a Grief Community is not only, as

discussed, a cultural community, but rather a group which affects the shaping of security policy, the military doctrine and political leaders' freedom of action. This article tracked the community which shifted from a position which rejected institutionalization: bereaved parents who promote dovish policy, prefer diplomacy over military action and in fact behave as is expected of elite communities in Western countries in the post-modern era; known in the context of security issues as the civil-military gap (Cohen, 2000). However, as I wrote about in great detail elsewhere, religious Zionism in the current millennium has grabbed the reigns of the "conservative camp" and bargained about cultural-strategical issues with the new community, which, since the Yom Kippur War, gradually became institutionalized. Thus, we now have yet another "nostalgic" Grief Community (Lebel, 2013). A community which, beyond its cultural effects, operated as an epistemic community that injected the political game in Israel with certain expectations that were promoted by institutionalized or semi-institutionalized political actors (Borch, 2005).

I wish to further note that the families of soldiers who were killed in the Yom Kippur War, and those who later followed, did not seek to secularize military bereavement or to civilianize the society. Promoting liberal, dovish and postmodern values became possible only because they reproduced the cultural militarism that provides the parent's and soldiers with a unique moral status within the social discourse. While this is not a heroic, but rather a victimized Grief Community, it refers to what I coined "militarism-victimology". A victim's discourse that does not deconstruct social militaristic logos. The "others" whose loved ones were killed while not wearing uniform, simply wanted to infiltrate the commemoration pantheon and national bereavement - and the speakers of the political Grief Community, who promoted the victimized bereavement discourse, at once highlighted the moral differences between the sons who fell in uniform and those who died as citizens, who were not “brave” and were killed in cafes in the cities (Lebel, 2013). This is also apparently the Yom Kippur War's contribution, which can be seen through the lens of the bereavement and loss culture, as the perception of the Israeli situation and its various heroes becomes more and more chaotic.

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