

What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization

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Abstract

This article addresses a gap in the scholarly literature. Students of militarism do not link the propensity to use force to the broader issue of what type of civilian control may restrain the use of force. Similarly, even students of civilian control who acknowledge that civilian control and military restraint do not necessarily go hand in hand have not questioned the extent to which we should decouple the two different processes as different *modes* of control rather than different *effects* of control. A revised conceptualization of civilian control is therefore offered that distinguishes between two modes of civilian control over military affairs: *control of the military*, which concerns itself primarily with the military organization, and *control of militarization*, which draws on the political discourse in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role aimed at subjecting the decision to use force to a deliberative process that addresses its legitimacy.

Keywords

civilian control, deliberative decision making, militarization

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Introduction

What is controlled by civilian *control of the military*? One might think that effective civilian control restrains the use of force. However, that is not always the case. On the contrary, a glance at developments in civil–military relations during the post–Cold War period shows that while civilian control has been tightened in many democracies, militarization also increased. Militarism is defined as an approach that regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity.¹ Militarization is therefore a process through which militarism increases while demilitarization signifies a decline in this propensity.

As an illustration, in the United States, as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate, militarization with an increased propensity to use force² thrived in an era of increased political scrutiny of the military.³ In Israel, civilian control has been enhanced since the 1970s, leading to an overly subordinate military whose professional autonomy has been impaired,⁴ while the government has enjoyed more legitimacy to launch offensive campaigns in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.⁵ In Russia, during Putin's rule, the military's subversive behavior toward elected politicians has been moderated and its freedom of action restricted,⁶ however, militarization in terms of patriotic education,⁷ and the inflation of external threats⁸ has flourished.

Thus, increased civilian control of the military may be coupled with militarization, although not necessarily. This case raises the need for two scholarly investigations. The first, which I will leave unexplored, is the extent to which there is a causal link between civilian control and militarization. The second, and the focus of this article, is the extent to which control of the military should be distinguished from the mechanisms controlling the use of force, an underdeveloped aspect in the study of civil–military relations, as I explain in greater detail subsequently.

I argue that a distinction should be made between two modes of civilian control over military affairs: *control of the military* and *control of militarization*. Control of the military, the main focus of students of civilian control, concerns itself primarily with the military organization, particularly the operational aspects of the military's performance (doctrine, deployment, resources, etc.) and their expected political implications. In contrast, the *control of militarization* deals with controlling the mechanisms that legitimize the use of force, first and foremost military force. It draws on political discourse, seeking to guarantee that the use of force follows a thorough, open, and deliberative process of decision making in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role in addressing the legitimacy to use. The encounter between the modes of control yields several possible results.

It follows that this article is an analytically motivated study rather an empirically motivated one. My aim is to develop a theory that distinguishes between the control of the military and the control of militarization and propositions regarding the encounter between the two modes of control. These propositions can be viewed as hypotheses that set the stage for future empirical inquiry.⁹

The first section presents the gap in the literature, leading, in the second section, to a revised conceptualization of civilian control. In the third section, I analyze the relationship between the modes of control.

The Theoretical Gap

Scholars disagree whether civilian control of the armed forces is positively correlated with the reduction in the use of force. Lasswell argued for such a positive correlation. In his classic “garrison state” theme, he expressed concern that the empowerment of the military establishment in reaction to an external threat would undermine civil–military relations by letting the officers, as “specialists in violence,” run the state and impose their warlike inclinations on politics.¹⁰ Choi and James validated this concern statistically by concluding that as the influence of the military increases, the likelihood that the state will be involved in a military dispute becomes greater.¹¹ Similarly, Snyder echoed the Lasswellian view by claiming that the offensive bias is exacerbated when civilian control is weak, and this bias grows more extreme when the military leverages the operational doctrine to improve its position in civil–military disputes.¹² Sechser linked civilian control with the use of force by suggesting that the cautious nature of military officers may be a consequence of strong civilian control.¹³ Officers are concerned that a strong civilian leadership will punish them for botched military adventures. Mills went even further by arguing that there is no prospect for peace without a monopolistic control of violence, an approach that strongly links control with the restraint of force.¹⁴

In a different manner, students of militarism such as Bacevich,¹⁵ Mann,¹⁶ and Shaw¹⁷ implicitly recognized that the restraint of the military may take place within a militaristic mind-set. At the extreme, as Mann asserted with regard to the post–Cold War expansionist trends of the United States, “the notion of civilian control of the military became meaningless, since civilians were the leading militarists”.¹⁸ It follows that civilian control may not reduce the proclivity to use force.

Recognizing that militaristic pressures can come from civilian origins, other scholars even assume that officers may be less war-prone than politicians. Huntington famously contended that the military is more conservative than civilians regarding the propensity to use force, largely due to organizational cautiousness.¹⁹ Similarly, Betts concluded that military leaders rarely recommend the use of force, and their advice is more influential when counseling against military intervention.²⁰ Along these lines, Feaver and Gelpi showed that militarily inexperienced leaders in the United States, more than militarily experienced ones, extended the use of force to deal with interstate conflicts that did not present a substantial threat to national security.²¹ Desch acknowledged that, “the most prevalent civil-military relations problem of the post-Vietnam era has not been keeping the dogs of war on the leash, but rather getting them off of it”.²² In other words, civilians may be more war-prone than the military.²³

It follows that civilian control may even promote the use of force when war-prone civilians successfully mobilize the society for war and even push the reluctant military to battle.²⁴ Therefore, effective civilian control can rein in the military but not the use of force.

Here, therefore, is the gap in the literature. Students of militarism do not link the propensity to use force to the broader issue of what type of civilian control may restrain the use of force, aside from the cultural process of demilitarization. Furthermore, students of militarism have not extended the theme of civilian control from controlling the military to controlling the civilian institutions that legitimize the use of force. Similarly, even students of civilian control who acknowledge that civilian control and military restraint do not necessarily go hand in hand have not questioned the extent to which we should decouple the two different processes as different *modes* of control rather than different *effects* of control. In other words, they have not scrutinized the mechanisms legitimizing the use of force decoupled from the mechanisms monitoring the armed forces. Given this gap in the literature, in the following section I present a revised conceptualization of civilian control by introducing the distinction between *control of the military* and *control of militarization*.

Two Modes of Control

Control of the Military

A distinction should be made between control of the military and control of militarization. *Control of the military* refers to the extent to which the citizenry, through civilian state institutions, sets limits on the freedom of action of the military in the areas of activity that have political implications, such as military doctrine and policies, operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment, and promotion of officers. Such limits correspond with political objectives and the resources required to attain those goals that civilians (in a democracy, popularly elected civilians) shape autonomously. These goals are regarded as expressing the will of society as a whole. The military, in turn, abides by these civilian directives.²⁵ To a large extent, relations of exchange are formed, in which the military subordinates itself to civilian rulers in exchange for the resources (material and symbolic) that the state possesses and provides to the military.²⁶

It follows that control of the military should be broadly conceptualized and should not be limited to the relations between elected civilians and generals. Viewed in this vein, although authoritarian regimes effectively control their militaries (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are good examples), control of the military is deficient without the engagement of the citizenry.

Control over the military operates mainly through institutional mechanisms that have an effect on the manner in which policy makers activate the military. In addition to the monitoring of the military by elected civilians, collective actors working outside the formal institutions, mainly social movements and interest groups, often

affect institutional policy making through lobbying, protests, court appeals, and the media. Ultimately, what is important is not whether the troops are deployed to fight or remain in their barracks but the political process that leads to the decision about the deployment, pertaining to the broader political implication of military activity as presented earlier.

As a highly developed theme, control of the military is not the focus of this article but control of militarization and its relationship with the control of the military is.

Control of Militarization

While the control of the military is aimed at controlling the organization and its supervisors, the control of militarization is concerned with controlling the mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force. Drawing on Burk's "way of war,"²⁷ Johnston's "strategic culture,"²⁸ Mann's "militarism,"²⁹ and Beetham's "political legitimacy,"³⁰ the legitimacy to use force relates to the extent to which the state's legal mode of using armed force against an external adversary is socially accepted as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference. Such legitimacy encompasses social beliefs about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of the use of force.

Legitimacy can be evaluated along a spectrum whose most extreme pole at one end is pacifism. Pacifism opposes the use of force to resolve international disputes. In the middle of the spectrum, the use of force is legitimized when it is instrumental in defending what is perceived as the nation's security. The other extreme pole is militarism, meaning that the legitimacy for using force is unquestionable or barely questionable. Militarism ranges from regarding the use of force and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity,³¹ an approach that typifies many industrialized democracies (and therefore is the definition used in this article), to an irrational value system that espouses war as a goal in itself.³² The degree of this legitimacy can be determined by monitoring public opinion and political debates. However, public and elite opinion and rhetoric can be more deeply analyzed as a multilayered structure, which reflects deeper cultural constructs that are less easily detectable.

Focusing on the level of legitimacy for using force moves beyond the narrow focus on the military's institutions, influence, and resources, and the attitude toward the use of force to address militarized political cultures that are often generated outside of the military. Assuming that militarism is a socially and politically driven phenomenon, the military is not necessarily the most salient part of the political culture nurturing militarism. When it is more restrained than warmongering politicians, the influence of the military does not result in militarization. Hence, an exclusive focus on the military may be misleading.

The control of militarization involves the political discourse in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role. This discourse aimed at subjecting the elected civilians' use of force to a deliberative process that takes place within the

public and political arenas and addresses the legitimacy to use force. Several conditions promote this deliberative process:

1. Relative slowness in decision making to guarantee that decisions are made through argumentation in which everyone's opinion is in principle equally valuable and equally fallible. As Huysmans held, such deliberation takes time and can always be questioned again. Thus, speedy decision making in response to a perceived threat thwarts this principle, strengthens the executive branch of government, and suppresses dissent.³³
2. Debates should not be confined to the operational aspects of military policies but should extend to the broader logic behind and rightness of such policies. In other words, the debates should focus on the very legitimacy for using force and its utility in promoting the public good.³⁴ Thus, the focus is on affecting the political cultures legitimizing the use of force, rather than taking this legitimacy for granted. Therefore, during the debates there should be a thorough consideration of nonlethal or less belligerent policy alternatives.
3. Access to information is not obstructed by manipulation, such as threat inflation.³⁵
4. Relatedly, debates should be conducted through an open discourse in which the dominant discourse does not hinder the political opposition from challenging decision makers.³⁶ Such a dominant discourse often takes the form of asserting the need for unity in times of crisis, thereby muting dissenting voices.³⁷ By extension, challenging the decision makers should also challenge the power relations in society that affect the legitimacy of using force and may create barriers to deliberation. In general, deliberation alone does not necessarily ensure a more democratic outcome unless actors have other power resources as well, such as the ability to mobilize to overcome entrenched interests.³⁸ This is why free and fair elections, along with constitutional mechanisms such as checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law and impartial courts, are preconditions for the deliberative process.³⁹

However, unless these four conditions are met in the electoral debates, free and fair elections alone are not sufficient for sustaining the conditions for the effective control of militarization. Democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the highest level of control of militarization. Many debates pertinent to the use of force are conducted in democratic societies in a manner that does not meet the requirements outlined earlier. In contrast, even when authoritarian regimes delegitimize the use of force, the fact that this decision is made unilaterally without a broad-based, deliberative process indicates a low level of control of militarization.

At the same time, the deliberative process concerning the legitimacy to use force does not take place entirely within sovereign states. Decisions often require approval by intergovernmental institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁴⁰ The need to legitimate military moves in intergovernmental institutions

may even affect domestic processes of decision making and, as explained later, even impair deliberation. However, a decision within the demos is, in general, a precondition for a transitional deployment, and hence the focus on the state level is crucial.

If the conceptualization of the control of militarization seems abstract, particularly in contrast to the readily observable process of asserting civilian control over the military, the operationalization of this type of control is even more complex. While the former is tangible and evident through observed organizational conduct, the latter is shrouded in abstract and even tentative policies. However, the control of militarization operates through several forms of public debates that affect the political culture and thereby the degree of legitimacy it awards to the use of force. Following are those debates.

Debates on manpower. Manpower policies affect the power needed to access arms and consequently vary in the degree to which they constrain leaders from dispatching troops on military missions,⁴¹ or the propensity or ability of the armed forces to forcefully intervene in domestic politics.⁴² A high level of control of militarization is reflected when debates are held about this relationship.⁴³ However, such debates have not necessarily been the practice in most of the countries that phased out the draft. There, the debates were dominated by practical, operational, economic, or moral considerations, thus reflecting a lower degree of control of militarization.

Debates on the essence of the use of force. In general, the more the use of force is wrapped in symbols, the less likely it is that there will be an open debate in which everyone can participate actively and openly. As Vagts suggested from his experience of the collapse of the Weimar Republic, the lowest level of the control of militarization is created in a highly militarized polity, where the legitimacy for using force culminates in an irrational value system that espouses war as a goal in itself.⁴⁴ Political disputes (if any) are confined to issues of performance or resources rather than the justification for using force. Members of the political community must surmount a high cultural threshold, denying them the opportunity to participate in a substantial, open discussion of the use of force.

Historically, indeed, the more that war is portrayed as glorious and honorable (as in the seventeenth century), the less resistance policy makers encounter. However, this level of resistance increases when war becomes a necessary evil and a last resort and, hence, more circumscribed.⁴⁵ Powerful symbols generally set the boundaries of legitimate debate within which movements seeking to challenge the policies must make their claims,⁴⁶ functioning as “rhetorical coercion.”⁴⁷ Furthermore, they not only constrain the issues that can be discussed but also establish a hierarchy of speakers. Those granted the right to speak may make such claims based on their military contribution or other criteria. Thus, some speakers are authorized and others excluded.⁴⁸

Debates on the nature of the threat. Such debates concern the nature of the threat and the associated national interests and define the conditions under which the country will go to war. Nevertheless, as the level of militarization rises, the external threat

that the use of force is designed to eliminate is portrayed less in instrumental terms and more in symbolic and metaphorical terms. Again, such a characterization may narrow the space for debate over foreign policy and mute potential opponents.

Likewise, securitization, a term that Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde introduced,⁴⁹ implies identifying a problem as a security threat and matching the use of extraordinary measures to deal with it. Securitization can be a form of modern, civilian militarization. Securitization frames the threat as urgent and a national security issue. Therefore, it cannot be subjected to the normal haggling of politics. In contrast, desecuritization entails a deliberative process in which the threat is contested. This process also involves a better understanding of the political dynamics of successful securitization in an attempt to influence its course⁵⁰ and challenge the institutional authority and power relations establishing securitization as a “true” discourse.⁵¹

Debates on domestic interests. Militarization is not only a state of mind but also serves the state’s mechanisms of control. As Walter Benjamin maintained, militarism is the compulsory, universal use of violence as a means to the ends of the state, a law-preserving function of violence.⁵² Social arrangements, moreover, can generate or curb militarization in domains such as gender relations, the structure of the labor market, and the reward system for those bearing the brunt of war, such as soldiers and their families. It follows that exposing the interests that lead key social and political actors to advance militaristic values is vital to upholding the control of militarization. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning about the dangers of “the military–industrial complex” in his inspiring farewell speech in 1961 is one example that highlights the need for such exposure.

Debates on costs. Costs and the political monitoring of the armed forces are strongly linked in the sense that the higher the cost of protection that the state “sells” to its citizens, the greater the citizens’ motivation to monitor its performance and acquire information about the strategies the state pursues, the real costs of protection, and the level of external threats.⁵³ Thus, heavy costs in terms of lives and money and concerns as to whether the goals have been achieved may encourage collective actors to question the cause that demands these sacrifices, rather than focusing on the costs themselves.⁵⁴ Democracy creates better conditions for considering cost externalities,⁵⁵ such as defense costs, than do nondemocratic regimes.

This is how the control of militarization operates. In short, the broader the scope of the debates on military affairs in terms of the issues on the agenda, the slow thoughtfulness with which the debates are conducted, the degree of openness in discussing all of the issues with limited barriers to influencing decision makers, the availability of information, and the range of speakers, the greater the control of militarization. Thus, a heavily monitored military acting on behalf of its political supervisors but carrying out an unquestionable militarized policy signifies a *high* level of civilian control of the military but a *low* level of control of militarization.

As the focal point of these debates is the legitimacy of military policies rather than technical issues, the agents of control are almost exclusively collective actors, intellectuals, journalists, and politicians mainly outside the executive branch of government. The judiciary is not involved directly, although court rulings may have an indirect impact on the control of militarization, mainly by provoking policy debates.

Similar to the argument about the control of the military, what is important is the deliberative process rather than the nature of the decision made and the military action itself that results from this decision. The goal is subordinating military policies to this process rather than to any ideological imperative. Therefore, it is important to note that the control of militarization is not a synonym for pacifism or any other form of refraining from using force. Indeed, a low level of the control of militarization might result in such restraint, not necessarily the opposite, due to the same process that leads to militarization.

The debates listed earlier do not constitute a hierarchy of requirements for a high level of control of militarization, but they do have different impacts. Debates on manpower may affect the infrastructure for the breadth of other debates because they determine the stakeholders in war and peace. Debates on the use of force, threats, and interests initially shape the profile of war preparations. Debates on cost may affect decision making once preparation for war is in high gear.

In the end, controlling the legitimacy to use force is the core of the democratic requisite that the citizenry control the violent means of the state. Without such control, the goals of using force are determined without the citizenry's active role. Normatively, Clausewitz's dictum that "War is a continuation of politics by other means" indicates that war is an act of policy aimed at achieving political goals, hence, the role of the citizenry in directing their representatives as to how these goals should be determined. "Goals" do not necessarily mean the visible, often formal, and operative ones, such as the goal of a specific deployment. Rather, goals in this context refer to the process described earlier through which the very logic behind the shaping of operative goals and the means to attain them is debated. It is not about how to determine the goals of deploying to Iraq and the amount of force needed there and the fire policy they employ, rather the deliberative process set earlier is crucial in tackling the very threats and interests motivating the deployment and the alternative to threat elimination by force. A high level of control of militarization requires that the cultural infrastructure in which operative decisions, such as the ultimate decision to go to war or to prepare for it, or to pursue nonlethal solutions, are made be put in place through the process described here long before the moment of operative decision making. Such decision making then reflects the cumulative impact of the debates determining the legitimacy of using force.

To a large extent, it is doubtful that the conditions of deliberative process posited here could exist anywhere. However, the "ideal" requirements help us measure the extent to which any specific decision making signifies a high or low level of control of militarization. It is a matter of degree. Not every deviation from the deliberative ideal would lead us to classify the exercise of military power as militaristic.

Seemingly, the deliberative process on which the control of militarization is premised cannot be conducted when a state is attacked and confronting choices about whether and how to respond. However, a high level of control of militarization may require that (1) the moves escalating the attack (for which the state is accountable) are made under a high level of control of militarization; (2) the reaction conforms with previous decisions and political agreements as much as possible, such as the definition of the war's goals; and (3) the immediate reaction is limited to what is judged necessary for self-defense and subsequent moves are the result of deliberative decision making.

Furthermore, a distinction should be made between situations in which marginal constabulary or technical duties are carried out and register little in the public consciousness (such as the deployment of a few soldiers for auxiliary missions abroad), and situations in which the use of force is a significant issue (usually the initiation of a military attack). While the former may not deserve extensive deliberation, in the latter case, the lack of public interest is a clear symptom of a low level of the control of militarization. In other words, the leadership has effectively bypassed society, and the lack of public interest leads to an absence of active, countervailing pressures.⁵⁶

Demilitarization, through which traditional symbols and truths are effectively questioned and challenged, often enhances the control of militarization by encouraging debates over previously entrenched beliefs. The revision of the recruitment model as Germany did following World War II is a typical response. Nonetheless, a distinction should be made between political and cultural demilitarization. Thus, the control of militarization may increase by raising political objections to the use of force, even if such delegitimization does not target cultural militarism, such as the glorification of war, entirely.⁵⁷ Therefore, it is possible for the use of military force to be regarded as normal and desirable and even a goal in itself, but not necessarily the first choice in specific circumstances, allowing other instruments of power such as economic ones to be prioritized. Such an approach implies a certain degree of demilitarization even if just temporarily.

Comparing the Modes of Control

In both modes, the citizenry controls the manner through which elected civilians activate the military. This control is more direct and explicit when the focus is on the military organization, and less so when the focus is on militarization, in other words, on the legitimacy of using force.

The two modes of control may overlap. We do not always talk about two different discourses. Instead, we often talk about one discourse that signifies the dual level of control. For example, the same technical debate over how many troops should be sent on a mission to achieve a previously unquestioned political goal signifies a high level of control of the military together with a low level of control of militarization. In contrast, a value-driven, abstract debate defining national interests promotes the control of militarization alone.

It follows that control of the military deals with concrete, observable behavior and with decisions (and the avoidance of them) made by the military and its political supervisors as the agents of control. Such decisions correspond with the first and second dimensions of power in Lukes' well-known argument.⁵⁸ On the other hand, control over militarization is largely concerned with the third dimension of power. This is the manner in which actors can challenge the deeply ingrained ideological perceptions, attitudes, and social arrangements that sustain them and that may change the role of the people as carriers and maintainers of militaristic values in the existing order. Insofar as social arrangements create militarization, the level of militarization in society can be affected by raising people's awareness of it. However, precisely because the control of militarization is related to this dimension of power, we can expect the control of militarization to be the outcome of subtle group processes, different from the institutional, visible system of control of the military.

Another useful tool for delineating the difference between the modes of control is Cox's distinction between the *critical approach* and the *problem-solving approach*. The critical approach stands apart from the prevailing world order and asks how that order came about, without taking existing institutions and power relations as given. It is directed toward the social and political complex as a whole and seeks change by comparing alternative orders.⁵⁹ The control of militarization is often located in the critical approach, challenging the order that established militarism. On the other hand, control of the military takes this order for granted and, like the problem-solving approach, focuses on how to improve the politically controlled performance of the armed forces within the existing order.

Table 1 presents the distinction between the modes of control.

Table 1. Comparing the Modes of Control.

	Control of the Military	Control of Militarization
The focus	Focus on military organization: the operational aspects of the organization's performance, mainly with regard to expected political implications	Focus on political culture, i.e., targeting the legitimization of the use of force
The goal	Limiting the civilians' autonomy to activate the military	Subjecting the elected civilians' use of force to a deliberative process that addresses the legitimacy of using force
How it works	Institutional mechanisms that affect policy making and collective actors who seek to affect these mechanisms	Public debates affecting the political culture and the level of legitimacy it awards to the use of force, promoted by collective actors, the media, and politicians
Dimension of power	Mainly first and second dimensions: the observable dimension of institutional action	The third dimension, political discourse that questions and shapes the social power relations affecting the legitimacy of using force

The Relationship between the Modes of Control

As the following matrix illustrates, the encounter between the modes of control yields four results, as an interaction of two mutually reinforcing variables. Note that these results should be read as a process through which the modes of control increase or decrease, rather than as final outcomes.

Control of the military	High	A militarized democracy	B demilitarization-cum-democratization
	Low	C authoritarian regime, weak state, garrison state	D unstable democratization
		Low	High
		Control of militarization	

Figure 1. Matrix of control.

Cell A is the most interesting situation: a high level of civilian control of the military is coupled with a low level of control of militarization. It is a common situation in industrial democracies, especially in the post–Cold War period when militaries became more monitored politically but were still prepared and even deployed to use force. Here, an increase in civilian control is coupled with a decrease in the control over militarization.

To a large extent, this combination is inherent in the nature of civilian control in industrialized democracies. As Huntington asserted, the military person should accept the superior political wisdom of the statesman as a fact. Obedience to the political leaders is a professional duty, and political engagement is beyond the scope of military competence. The participation of officers in politics undermines their professionalism.⁶⁰ Moreover, one of the imperatives of the control of the military in democracies is that the military “functions as a representative of the whole society, acting in the best interest of the entire nation [and hence its subordination] must be to the entire governmental structure, not simply to the incumbent president or prime minister.”⁶¹ Thus, the institutional arrangements of control cement the universal image of the armed forces and the legitimacy of the government deploying it as serving the best interests of the entire nation, rather than the regime’s interests in retaining its power.

In turn, the more the military is portrayed as a universal entity, the greater its ability to influence decision making. While acceptance of the principle of civilian authority is the supreme professional norm regulating civil–military relations, other norms prescribe the officers’ professional responsibility to provide expert advice to civilians. At the same time, the challenge is to limit participation in politics to the military advisory role.⁶² Nevertheless, even when this limit is reached, and military thought is then depicted as professional advice devoid of political bias, it can be used politically. As Mills explained, politicians use the advice of the military to back their support for or opposition to specific policies, or even to shirk their duty to scrutinize the administration’s decisions. Politicians use professional advice to legitimate policies. Making careful use of it often makes it possible to lift policies “above politics,” which is to say, above political debate.⁶³ In this way, the military profession gains ascendancy. Mills implied that such ascendancy might signify a low level of control of militarization, especially when the military’s stance is utilized to legitimize the use of force.

Civilian control thus shapes the standing of the military in society, allowing the military to claim neutrality and depoliticization. That is why formal, and hence also visible, rules of control matter. Constrained by this structure, politicians and officers who are frustrated by formal routines tend to utilize informal channels of dialog and influence rather than engaging in rule-breaking behaviors.⁶⁴ Ultimately, there are more impediments to the resistance to militarization, meaning, there is a lower level of civilian control of militarization.

In contrast, when the military fails to blur its partisan identity, its professional opinion is more suspect. An example is the military’s argument with President Bill Clinton over policies such as intervening in the Balkans, which was interpreted as arising from the military’s bias toward the Republican Party.⁶⁵ Likewise, the observable politicization of the military in democratized Russia (before Putin) has been accompanied by the broadening of public debates over military policies, opposition to the war in Chechnya and cultural demilitarization.⁶⁶

Civilian control and militarization are linked within the democratic order in another manner as well. To the extent that the state builds up its military power through the direct wresting of military means from its own subject population, the state subordinates the military to civilian control. Under such conditions, a military buildup increases the military’s dependence on civilian institutions for the extraction of the resources the military needs. In turn, this extraction of resources also increases the bargaining between the state and its citizens over the extracted resources. To extract these resources, the state allocates rights in exchange for collecting taxes or recruiting manpower. Historically, this process extended the public’s right to monitor the military, thereby subjecting the military to the popular will.⁶⁷ In turn, the more the popular will governs military policies, the greater the state rulers’ efforts to legitimize the mobilization for war, either by justifying it or by bypassing the popular will. Paradoxically, the same structural conditions that subordinate the military to civilian control also promote militarization. Only militarization can

legitimize the rising levels of sacrifice for war in monetary and human terms by contextualizing and leveraging the level of the threat (even exaggerating it if need be) and demonstrating the determination to remove it by force.⁶⁸

In post-Cold War industrialized democracies, the reluctance to make military sacrifices, human, and material, increased. This increased reluctance was translated into enhanced civilian control by expanding citizens' involvement in monitoring the military's human and material resources. For example, casualty sensitivity, a clear reflection of this reluctance, means more attempts by the public to influence the deployment of troops and more attention on the part of politicians to the public's grievances. Collective antiwar actions and the political responses to them illustrate this point quite well. Consequently, militarization has become a crucial tool for legitimizing sacrifice.

A typical form of militarization is the setting of ambitious war goals. Framing the threat more in apocalyptic and less in instrumental terms has become "the most effective at generating and legitimating massive society-wide sacrifice and are today the only narrative form that can sustain war as culturally acceptable."⁶⁹ Less ambitious goals are less appealing and may provoke political defiance. Part of this process involves dehumanizing the enemy. This phenomenon became more blatant in the twentieth century as a means of justifying inflicting casualties on the opponent as the combatants moved increasingly further away from the battlefield. The process is also necessary in order to overcome ingrained values inculcated through long-term socialization that cherish human life and view all human beings of equal moral worth.⁷⁰ For democratic leaders, then, the effort to dehumanize an opponent sufficiently is essential to overcome the normative and social prohibitions against killing. Even when there is no direct danger to one's society, dehumanization often resonates widely.⁷¹ Therefore, domestic political challengers have a clear political motive for disrupting this effort when it is feasible.⁷²

It follows that when control of the military involves more monitoring by the public and this monitoring is conducted in a skeptical climate, the level of militarization grows to balance out the impact of civilian control. Ironically, less involvement by the public may reduce militarization. Thus, militarization as legitimation is not a symptom of the failure to control militarization but actually its cause. Barriers are thereby created to deliberative decision making. The more ambitious the war goals to remove a perceived existential threat, and the more dehumanized the enemy, the fewer the debates that can be conducted through an open discourse challenging the dominant frames. Unity of opinion is portrayed as critical, and speedy decision making is deemed to be crucial. Finally, militarization and civilian control may be exchangeable, as when the political elite indulges the military by allowing its autonomy and militaristic spirit to go unchecked in return for distancing it from domestic politics.⁷³

Cell A is typical of democracies. Although authoritarian regimes also effectively control their military and concurrently experience militarization, the role of a high level of control of the military in reducing the control of militarization applies

mainly to democracies. In nondemocracies, with the limited influence of antiwar opposition, the control of the military is not a major component of the effort to legitimize the use of force.

High levels of both modes of control (Cell B) represent the combination of demilitarization and the enhancement of civilian control, usually as part of democratization. Such a process is typical of the situation in which military failures shake the leadership and even lead to regime transformation, sometimes encouraged by an external coercion, given that the responsibility for defeat is almost always attributed to the political and military elites who presided over it.⁷⁴ Such a transition encourages a change in the use of force toward a less belligerent approach. At the same time, democratization inevitably entails more civilian control, which is also aimed at limiting the misuse of the military to intervene in domestic politics.⁷⁵

Nevertheless, defeat combined with external coercion alone cannot bring about a change in political culture. Other conditions are also required such as massive political and cultural intervention and monetary aid, as the cases of post-World War II Japan and Germany attest.⁷⁶ Even with the enacting of such conditions, democratization and stabilization may fail. At the same time, even if democratization takes place following an internal process rather than a military failure, the separation of the military from politics is enhanced, mainly with the establishment of parliamentary regimes,⁷⁷ with potentially similar implications for the control of militarization.

Modes of control may also be mutually reinforcing. Thus, control of militarization in the form of the debates over the conditions under which the country will go to war leads to formal arrangements that limit future troop deployments by reconstructing a decision making hierarchy (control of the military). Such arrangements lay the foundations for cementing the requirement for public debate to shape the popular will prior to the use of force, hence enhancing control of militarization.

An example of this process is the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973 in the United States following the debate over the Vietnam War, a debate signifying demilitarization. This act sought to limit the President's freedom to commit troops to combat zones in the absence of a congressional declaration of war.⁷⁸ In a similar spirit, in several newly democratized post-Communist states, constitutional provisions frequently introduced tight controls on the government by giving the parliament veto power over military deployments. However, such powers were later abolished to ease acceptance into NATO and the European Union.⁷⁹ Thus, institutional arrangements aimed at controlling the military may partly mitigate an existing cultural mind-set favoring the use of force.

Low levels of both modes of control are typical of military coups or other situations in which civilians cannot check the military (Cell C). Lasswell's garrison state is located here. In this cell, both modes are simultaneously and temporarily weakened until civilian control is reinstated.

Authoritarian regimes are also located in this cell. Although such regimes check their military effectively, control of the military is limited for two reasons. First, the military is being controlled without the engagement of the citizenry, so the areas of

control are limited to what the ruling groups perceive as their best interests.⁸⁰ Second, civilians increase their dependence on the military to ensure their political survival. Thus, the military's bargaining power vis-à-vis the politicians increases as well. At the same time, in authoritarian regimes there is less civilian control over militarization as well. Given that citizens are denied the opportunity to debate policies, the opposition to policies may entail a regime transformation and, hence, are less likely to develop.

Again, the two modes are mutually affecting. The military's influence without civilian checks and balances and without the generals' fears of being punished for military adventures increases the propensity to use force. If state institutions are organizationally and financially incapable of waging war, militarization is confined to the domestic order, as was typical of many Latin American countries during the 1960s to 1980s.⁸¹ In turn, the decreasing control of militarization aggrandizes the military's status as promoting the nation's strength.

A similar situation of low scores in both modes of control is evident in the transition to democracy in many so-called "weak states," meaning a state that is on the low end of the spectrum of capabilities.⁸² Democratization there has often coincided with instability and insecurity, leading to internal armed conflicts and political violence. Failure to control the military, not as an organization but as the tool of the monopolistic control of violence, is the result. Such a failure often encourages the intervention of international forces, the outsourcing of military missions, the appearance of independent militias, and the involvement of the armed forces in domestic policing missions. Furthermore, failure to control the military also leads to the creation of more subtle forms of domestic intervention by the military under civilian governments that rely on suppressive military tools.⁸³ The proliferation of arms helps routinize new forms of militarism.⁸⁴

Even the transition to democracy in more stable states may be imperfect with regard to civilian control for two reasons. First, when the transfer of power from the government to the opposition takes place in a gradual and carefully prepared mode, it is less likely that the military will interfere politically. In contrast, when this transfer of power is followed by a breakdown of the old regime, the military is more likely to interfere politically. Comparing the situations in Poland and Hungary with those in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania proves this point.⁸⁵ Hence, at least potentially, the military's influence on policy making may vary depending on the situation. Second, global trends toward parliamentary war powers (as described earlier) are largely absent in new democracies outside Europe such as Thailand or Peru. There concerns about a military coup against the democratic government are more significant than concerns about the misuse of the military by that government for unauthorized missions.⁸⁶

Cell D depicts another situation. The military defeat of an authoritarian regime often leads to regime transformation and cultural demilitarization. However, when this process is not accompanied by effective rebuilding of the state and foreign aid aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the state institutions, or when such capabilities

are impaired, civilians may fail to regiment the military.⁸⁷ Then, a transition from Cell D to Cell C takes place.

This was the case of the Weimar Republic, where the weakness of the Republic created a dependency on the military's (*Reichswehr*) support for ensuring domestic order, and the middle class even allied with the military to curb Bolshevism.⁸⁸ As for the *Reichswehr*, it resented the Republic. Opposition arose directly from measures taken to limit its freedom of operation and resources. Examples include the imposition of civil courts' jurisdiction over the military,⁸⁹ while the Republic's endorsement of the Treaty of Versailles had already guaranteed military downsizing.

Indirectly, the constitution of the Republic signified an attempt by the new elites to challenge the militaristic symbols of the imperial regime, which, by extension, jeopardized the military's status. Within this framework, the inquiry into the German guilt for World War I moved from blame directed at the old regime to an indictment of the Republic for accepting the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, while the military played a central role in this process.⁹⁰ By magnifying the flaws of Versailles and developing a "ritual of humiliation," conservatives helped mute the repudiation of Germany's authoritarian and militarist traditions,⁹¹ which hitherto had fed Germany's aggression. Remilitarization then helped counter the waves of demilitarization. Soon it became apparent that it was in the military's interest to defeat the new regime in order to protect its own interests. Consequently, the civilians failed to discipline the military, meaning that the control of militarization could be sustained at a high level only temporarily. This result is less likely when demilitarization is embedded in the society. Such was the case in the very early years of the Republic, when the demise of the Kapp Putsch (1920) against the Republic (with partial support of the military) indicated the strength of the coalition of pro-democratic forces who joined together to thwart the Putsch.⁹²

Turkey provides another example. There, the military played a major role in founding the Republic in 1923 and, with the support of Westernized elites, legally assumed the role of guardian of the secular state. Against this background, the military intervened several times in politics and staged coups against the elected governments. Most important for institutionalizing the military's status as the watchdog of civilian governments was the coup of 1960. As Karpas's account of this coup shows, the military was adversely affected by the multiparty experiment that took place between 1945 and 1960, involving the mobilization of the masses against the traditional elites. When the Democratic Party came to power in 1950, the situation became even worse as the government downgraded the military symbols and material resources allocated to the army and encouraged a materialist culture.⁹³ Demilitarization was in force.

Therefore, when the Democratic Party tried to curtail the freedom of the press and assembly in 1959–1960 and used the military to impose internal order against urban communities, the military took advantage of this instability and carried out a coup, largely pushed from below by field grade officers.⁹⁴ Once again, the dependence of civilians on the military impaired the civilian control of the military.

No less important, one of the coup's achievements was the creation of a National Security Council to formalize the military's status in policy making. In this way, civilian leaders were required to take into consideration the views of generals. Security was defined as including threats to the domestic order as well as foreign policy issues, thereby expanding the generals' latitude in expressing their views.⁹⁵ In short, remilitarization took place, decreasing control of militarization, and was combined with attenuating civilian control. However, given the different geopolitical environment, the German scenario of translating militarization into warfare did not happen. As both cases show, moreover, the failure to control the military leads to a transition from Cell D to Cell C, in which both modes of control are low, at least temporarily.

Conclusion

In an article published in 2002, James Burk called our attention to the narrow scope of the study of civilian control. What is studied most, he argued, is the relationship between the government and the military. This approach "reflects a normative belief that civilian political control over the military is preferable to military control of the state; and so it seems that the central problem in civil-military theory is to explain how civilian control over the military is established and maintained."⁹⁶

In the spirit of Burk's call, this article highlighted a gap in the scholarly literature. Students of militarism have not extended the theme of civilian control from controlling the military to controlling the civilian institutions that legitimize the use of force. Similarly, students of civilian control who acknowledge the lack of match between civilian control and military restraint have not decoupled the two different processes as different modes of control rather than different effects of control.

Thus, the contribution of this article is in distinguishing between two modes of control, that is, control of the military versus control of militarization, and the relationship between them. While the former focuses mainly on the armed forces as an institution and how elected civilians supervise them, the latter focuses on the political culture that legitimates the use of force. Controlling the mechanisms of legitimacy subjects the use of military force to a deliberative process of decision making in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role.

Several venues for future study may be suggested. First, as mentioned, the goal of this article has been to develop a theory. Thus, the propositions offered in this article, mainly the interaction between the modes of control, can be seen as hypotheses that set the stage for future empirical inquiry. Second and most importantly, as Figure 1 illustrates, the encounter between the modes of control yields four results, the most interesting of which is Cell A, in which a high level of civilian control is coupled with a low level of control of militarization. Given that this situation has become the most common in this era, it deserves more attention. This article presents the structural conditions allowing this encounter. However, we must take the investigation a step further and identify the conditions under which an increase in the civilian

control of the military may lay the foundations for reducing the control of militarization and actually encourage the use of force.

The significance of the proposed concepts goes beyond the purely scholarly realm. The article should be read as a call to pay more attention to the need to control militarization and reduce the weight attached in the literature to the relationship between generals and civilians. Thus, awareness of the distinction offered in this article between control of the military and control of militarization has political as well as academic merit.

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