International Politics
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00210-2

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Theorizing the domestic legitimacy of using force

Yagil Levy[1]

Abstract
The question of what constitutes the legitimacy of using force against an external adversary has become especially relevant since the wars that followed 9/11, and post-Cold War interventions in human crises. This article is conceptually motivated to bridging some of the scholarly gaps, mainly by developing a systematic methodological approach to analyzing how democratic governments try to establish domestic legitimacy for using force, defining that legitimacy and operationalizing it. Thereafter, it analyzes the two components of this legitimacy—the ingrained and the dynamic—and the interrelationships between them, thereby developing a framework for an empirical analysis of specific cases.

Keywords Collective action · Deliberative democracy · Militarization · Public opinion

Introduction

The question of what constitutes the legitimacy of using force against an external adversary has become especially relevant since the wars that followed 9/11 (e.g., the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan by the USA), and post-Cold War interventions in human crises (e.g., Kosovo). Debates on such issues have re-contextualized the dramatic post-World War II international legal shifts, with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 at the center. This issue is most often discussed within the context of international relations, with a focus on the conditions under which the international community grants legitimacy to the use of force (Clark 2005; Bjola 2009; Finnemore 2005). However, less space is devoted to exploring the domestic legitimacy, among the political community, whose leadership initiates the use of force or shares the burden of doing so with other states (Geis and Müller 2013).

✉ Yagil Levy
yagille@openu.ac.il; yagil.levy@gmail.com

[1] Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication, The Open University of Israel, P.O. Box 808, 43107 Raanana, Israel

Published online: 16 January 2020

We can identify several scholarly gaps in theorizing the domestic legitimacy. Scholars focusing on the dynamic political process to explain legitimation confuse legitimacy with supportive public opinion (e.g., Everts 2001; Sohnius 2013) and with justification (e.g., Finnemore 2005; Geis and Müller 2013; more below). This creates several problems. First, it often ignores the culturally ingrained support for, or opposition to, the use of force. Second, these perspectives (especially those centered on public opinion) ignore other factors, such as global constraints, dissent within the military, and the role of NGOs that affect the freedom of policymakers to use force. Third, they overemphasize attempts by leaders to mobilize legitimacy for their policies (e.g., Krebs 2015), while overlooking the socially constructed political culture and the bottom-up mechanism of legitimation springing from society. Fourth, indicators of legitimacy other than public opinion are not evaluated, particularly those related to collective action (Gilley 2006, p. 505) supporting or opposing the use of force. Thus, the only tools we find for operationalizing various levels of legitimation are those of public opinion. Finally, even in the analysis of other tools that state leaders use dynamically to increase the legitimacy of using force within the boundaries of the polity (more below), the focus is often on specific tools (e.g., legal). Links between these and the broader concept of legitimacy, as well as a systematic methodological approach to analyzing how governments try to establish legitimacy for using force, are still lacking.

Some of the lacunae in studies of dynamic legitimation are filled by others who have focused on the more static component of this legitimacy, but in doing so, have created other gaps. For example, scholars of militarism have analyzed the extent to which political culture is imbued with militaristic values (Bacevich 2005; Mann 2005). However, this perspective leaves little opportunity for exploring how legitimation (or delegitimation) is constructed dynamically within the previously shaped domestic political culture, to support or oppose the use of force. A similarly static perspective characterizes studies focused on the normative perception that "examines the ethical value of the rules, norms or principles involved in various definitions of legitimacy" of using force (Bjola 2008, p. 628). However, legitimation of using force is a political process resulting in acceptance of policies, regardless of their ethical or normative value, even though using force is often morally justified (Finnemore 2005).

The conceptual motivation underpinning this article is to bridge some of these gaps, mainly by developing a systematic methodological approach to analyzing how democratic governments try to establish domestic legitimacy for using force. (In non-democracies this process is less complicated.) Legitimacy is two-sided with an inward and an outward interrelated dimension (Clark 2005, p. 5). To recall, the outward dimension, focused on the international society in which legitimacy is socially bestowed by states on states, is the more developed dimension, while this article focuses on the less developed, domestic legitimacy.

Domestic legitimacy affects international legitimacy produced in the interstate system by: (1) constituting the state's membership (ibid.); (2) creating linkages between domestic political culture and international order (Bukovansky 2007); and (3) affecting the compatibility between the state's identity and interests and international norms (Reus-Smit 2007). However, it is equally significant that in the public

sphere of the state, various actors negotiate the legitimacy of using force in the face of policymakers' efforts to legitimize their actions. The polity is the crucial arena, even if its domestic actors are influenced by external ones. For example, public opinion among European NATO members matters for decision-making in the USA (Everts 2001). However, decisions are initially made within the polity, even if not autonomously. As Bjola (2008, p. 632) put it, "an exogenous factor cannot really influence actor's understanding of the legitimacy of an action unless it becomes endogenous to the case through interpretation." Domestic players are arbiters of multilateral legitimacy (Finnemore 2005, p. 205), and the polity is the arena where internationally accepted legitimacy is contested and challenged by, for example, collective actors or even dissent within the ranks (e.g., the Iraq War). Only in extreme cases are policies externally coerced, as in the case of NATO airstrikes that led to Yugoslavia's withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999. Based on domestic initial decisions, states can negotiate among themselves to reach mutually agreed policies. Such processes occurred when, for example, NATO members tried to reach consensus about their shared missions. In turn, interstate consensus or debate impacts the polity of every member. Sometimes these effects lead to legitimacy-based policy changes, such as some NATO members' decisions to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in 2010 (Hoehn and Harting 2010, pp. 53–66). Moreover, the international community provides enough space for autonomous action by single states where domestic legitimacy is paramount (e.g., Israel's operations against Gaza).

The article begins by defining the concept of the domestic legitimacy of using force and operationalizing it. ("Legitimacy" hereinafter refers to its domestic dimension.) It then analyzes the two components of this legitimacy—the ingrained and the dynamic—and the interrelationships between them, thus developing a framework for an empirical analysis of specific cases.

Definition

Drawing on Burk's (2013, pp. 2–3) "way of war," Johnston's (1996, pp. 222–223) "strategic culture," and Mann's (1987) "militarism," the legitimacy of using force refers to a socially constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs held by the national community of citizens, that accepts or rejects the state's formal mode of using armed force against an external adversary as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference. Such legitimacy encompasses social beliefs about the role of the use of force in human affairs, its efficacy, and the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (Levy 2016, p. 79).

The term "use of force" relates to any state-controlled use of violent force against an external, non-domestic, adversary, either a state or a non-state actor (whose civilians are entitled to noncombatant immunity even if this actor, as a political entity, may have less entitlements than a state). This term applies to any violent actions employed, either by the military or another state agency (e.g., the CIA-led drone warfare in Pakistan), and as such relates to a state's action and authority and hence its *political* legitimacy. As Weber (1964) argued, "the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it" (p.

156). Force can be used either for offensive or defensive goals, such as peace operations in which the adversary is interfering with the policing mission of a peacekeeping force (e.g., the radical Serbs in northern Kosovo). Furthermore, legitimacy is applied to all three phases: the initiation of the use of force, the extension of deployment following initiation, and the level and mode of force used in specific operations.

A high level of legitimacy of using force leads to an offensive approach, a strategy aimed at disarming an adversary. In contrast, a low level of legitimacy encourages a defensive approach, aimed at denying the adversary's objectives (Posen 1984, p. 14), and doing only what is necessary to repel an external attack. Nevertheless, since the contemporary uses of force, including humanitarian interventions, are often fought in urban areas, the legitimacy of using force also focuses on whether weapons might harm enemy noncombatants. The use of force may be perfectly legitimate but not when used against noncombatants. Thus, in this context, a high level of legitimacy of using force leads to fire policies that expose enemy noncombatants to a high level of risk, either intentionally or with minimal restrictions against harming them.

The chosen definition of domestic legitimacy encompasses several concepts. First, legitimacy is not conceptualized as a normative judgment. It rests "on a *belief* in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)" (Weber 1964, p. 328, emphasis added). This empirical, or descriptive, approach asks how beliefs about legitimacy influence decision-making rather than examining legitimacy in normative terms, according to which "[a]n entity has political legitimacy if and only if it is morally justified in exercising political power" (Buchanan 2004, p. 145). A distinction has thus been offered between the Weberian subjective approach, which investigates whether the citizens believe that the authority is acting in a legitimate manner, and an objective approach, which examines the extent to which the authority has established the minimum moral requirements for its rule, regardless of the citizens' beliefs (Hurd 2007). As Hurd put it,

> The differences between the objective and subjective approaches [are] evident in their different answers to the question of whether the Nazi government was legitimate or not. To answer that, the subjective approach would need to know whether the citizens in question believed that the government was legitimate: did they believe that it had the right to rule? If so, then the social consequences of legitimacy (i.e., voluntary compliance, lower enforcement costs, etc.) would presumably be present. The objective approach would answer the question by referring to the failure of that government to satisfy the minimum moral requirements it establishes for a government, and so would decide that it was not legitimate regardless of how some people felt about it (p. 2).

In other words, policies are *subjectively* "considered as the fulfillment of recognized norms" (Habermas 1992, p. 101), "socially recognized as rightful" (Reus-Smit 2007, p. 160), and as having moral authority (Barker 1990, p. 11). I prefer the subjective, empirical approach of "perceived legitimacy" to the normative one, to the extent that my main goal in analyzing the legitimacy of using force is to explain

policies—how the community of citizens is mobilized for using force—rather than to assess policies normatively. In the end, norms "must be explained in terms of their meaning to the actors within a given 'meaning context' rather than in terms of some set of universally identifiable interests" (Schmidt 2010, pp. 7–8). Therefore, politics matter.

Second, the definition is in line with Weber's (1964) classic perception that legitimacy is not a circumstantial view but reflects deeper values. It encompasses normative, legal, traditional, and cultural values that determine society's acceptance of regimes and institutions, and the actions derived from them. Legitimacy, as accordingly defined by Suchman (1995), "is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (p. 574).

Therefore, the legitimacy of using force is a multilayered concept, manifested (1) in the political discourse and public opinion that support (or oppose) the approach taken by policymakers; (2) in the intensity of collective action; and (3) in the way the troops themselves adhere to the mission. In a democracy, all forms provide evidence of consent, rather than of coerced obedience (Beetham 1991, p. 41). Note that public opinion and collective action are interrelated. The likelihood of collective antiwar actors successfully mobilizing is largely derived from their ability to gain legitimacy from other societal actors (Marullo and Meyer 2004, pp. 660–661; Meyer and Minkoff 2004, p. 1475). At the same time, collective action may not only spring from public opinion, but actually alter it (Marullo and Meyer 2004, p. 641).

Third, legitimacy is not synonymous with public opinion. Public opinion is an indicator of legitimacy, but public support (or lack thereof) reflects socially accepted values. Reservations about policies, moreover, do not necessarily undermine legitimacy (Suchman 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy reflects embedded values to the degree that citizens behave in a manner that is not always consistent with their short-term self-interests (Tyler 1990, p. 29), which are socially constructed and not simply the agents' preferences (Isaac 1987, p. 26). It is the political culture that creates the climate that sets the boundaries of legitimate actions and debate (Williams 2004) that eventually affect public opinion.

Fourth, legitimacy is not synonymous with the justification of specific policies. In general, the use of force is morally justified, often to mobilize public opinion (Finnemore 2005), but justification refers to the question of whether the policy is morally sound, as distinct from the legitimate process that produced it (Miller 2000, p. 387). Similarly, and in accordance with the general approach described above, "[L]egitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future" (Arendt 1972, p. 151).

Fifth and lastly, legitimacy is distinct from legality as "not all legal acts are necessarily legitimate and not all legitimate acts are necessarily legal" (Hurd 2007, p. 1); "legality can never be more than *one* of the elements of which legitimacy is composed" (Clark 2005, p. 208, emphasis in original). Therefore, as morality has a subjective dimension, tension may be created between illegal acts and perceived morality, as was the case with NATO's airstrikes in Kosovo (1999), which were not legally authorized by the UN. Thus, an independent commission initiated after the war concluded that this campaign was "illegal but legitimate" (Independent

International Commission on Kosovo 2000, p. 4). Legitimacy in this case was based on the perceived moral values shared by the international community (Clark 2005, pp. 211–213; Morris and Wheeler 2007, p. 222).

How legitimacy can be observed is a theoretical problem of identifying how legitimacy explains behavior, independently of how actors explain their attitudes and the other motivations that drive them to adhere to the order. Identification of this kind is problematic in cases where free choice plays a major role in the government's efforts to regulate citizens' behavior (for example, resistance to racial desegregation in the USA), or when the government aggressively coerces behavior (Hyde 1983, pp. 391–397). Mobilization for using force is somewhere in the middle.

However, what matters most for empirical and analytical purposes are the policymakers' *subjective* assessments. Such assessments concern the extent to which their policies (or the intention to reshape them) are regarded as legitimate (actually or potentially) as reflected in public opinion and political discourse, the profile of collective action, and troop conduct. Although leaders usually rely on public opinion as a good proxy for legitimacy, this is only one indicator. And while it can be a valid proxy in the initiation stage, collective action and troop conduct are better proxies for the extension of deployment. For example, even when British political elites could not maintain majority support for continuing the deployment in Afghanistan, the leaders could leverage elite consensus to bypass public opinion (Bennett 2014, p. 511)—consensus that could stifle collective action. In any case, such real or false assessments affect policymakers' freedom of action and motivation to mobilize support.

To operationalize the legitimacy of using force, as it applies to the three phases presented above, a high degree of legitimacy, to which policymakers, in practice, direct their efforts, occurs under the following conditions: (1) Policymakers believe that public opinion unequivocally supports the use of force to counter a significant threat that cannot be removed peacefully and, therefore, they are able to mobilize multi-partisan support. Such support signals embedded beliefs reflected in the political discourse (whether arising from active deliberation or not, as elaborated below) and is therefore expected to endure typical challenges arising during military campaigns, such as failed incidents. Often, support is reinforced or signaled by elections, especially those held during the lead-up to war. (2) There are no effective antiwar movements, and groups are even organized to voice support for the use of force. (3) Manageable global restraints and the state's limited obligations to enemy noncombatants allow freedom of action. (4) The troops unequivocally and faithfully adhere to the mission. This operationalization takes a substitutive (effect) rather than a constitutive (cause) approach (Gilley 2006, pp. 503–504).

The ingrained and dynamic components of legitimacy

The legitimacy of using force is comprised of two components: the socially constructed, ingrained component, and the dynamic component.

Policymakers' choices are often constrained by a given political culture that determines the level of legitimacy of using force. This given culture represents

the ingrained component, "the constitutive effect" of legitimacy, defining the cultural and social conditions for the use of force (Bjola 2009, pp. 604–610). It is a type of cognitive legitimacy (Suchman 1995, p. 582) that regards the use of force as based on assumed cultural values, where cognition (and often emotions; Lebow 2005) rather than interests or evaluations play a pivotal role. Such a situation signifies the level of militarization, in which the use of force is instilled in the citizens' mind-set as the normal, and even preferred, mode of action (Mann 1987).

This component, however, is not static. The fundamentals of this legitimacy have been historically transformed and are determined by several optional factors, some of which are listed below:

1. A country's historical heritage. For example, Britain's imperial tradition played a pivotal role in shaping the state's commitment to taking on international roles. In contrast, Sweden's imperial heritage promoted its neutrality and focused resources on home defense (Berndtsson et al. 2015).
2. Historical memories, such as in the Netherlands where memories of the sacrifices and violence of the Indonesian war of 1945–1949 informed the debate about the Netherlands' engagement in Afghanistan (Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005). Similarly, in Israel the memory of the Holocaust often justifies military aggressiveness in response to external threats (Lustick 2008).
3. Trajectories of state-building, such as the interlinking impacts of capitalism and military technological revolution on the militarization of Europe since their rise in the eighteenth century (Mann 1993; Tilly 1992).
4. Military failures, which can reshape the nation's heritage, leading to demilitarization, such as the impact of the break with the Fascist past in Italy (Ruffa 2018, pp. 39–46). A similar dwindling willingness to fight resulted from the war experiences in Germany and Japan (Inglehart et al. 2015).
5. Political culture. In the USA, for example, it is precisely the liberal tradition that legitimizes aggressiveness against those enemies identified as non-liberal (Desch 2010). Democratic identity plays a key role in shaping the collective understanding of who poses a potential threat in the international system (Hayes 2013, pp. 146–148).
6. Global norms. For example, while war was considered legitimate for protecting religious faith in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ever since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it has become a legitimate tool for promoting the state's power. Since World War II, normative beliefs about war have begun to play a more important role (Bjola 2009, pp. 451–459).

Indeed, the legitimacy of using force has been a challenge to liberal democracies since the Vietnam War. First and foremost, it is restrained by norms and values that favor peaceful conflict resolution, and by concerns about the human and material costs of war (Geis and Müller 2013, p. 5). This has been especially true since the end of World War II as democracies fight wars of choice—non-existential conflicts in which direct threats to immediate national interests are not

involved, leaving sufficient scope for internal debates about their success, alternatives, risks, and costs (Smith 2005a). Furthermore, domestic constraints on using force are derived from the democratic imperatives demanding respect for noncombatant immunity along with the commitment to tolerance and nonviolence (Valentino et al. 2004, pp. 382–383). A sharp distinction is made between the norms that governed warfare during World War II, when the bombing of civilians was allowed, and new imperatives that forbid the intentional killing of noncombatants (Zehfuss 2011, pp. 545–546).

Democratic imperatives are backed by the impact of global restraints, including international humanitarian law (IHL), and the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 that reinforced it. The enhanced accountability mechanisms subject governmental bodies to scrutiny by global institutional networks that include international legal bodies as well as the global media and NGOs (Shaw 2005, pp. 60–61, 75–76). Once force is used (jus in bello), moreover, the "just war" theory, which is steeped in the liberal tradition, extends the immunity of noncombatants from the prohibition of intentional harm to the requirement that "[c]ivilians have a right to something more. And if saving civilian lives means risking soldiers' lives, the risk must be accepted" (Walzer 2015, p. 156).

Nevertheless, several mutually related variables are critical for increasing or decreasing the ingrained, socially constructed level of this legitimacy, and these can be circumstantially and contextually used by leaders to mobilize support. All of these variables constitute the *dynamic* component of the legitimacy of using force. Below I indicate the literature that analyzes these variables, which can be grouped into three categories (including combinations), each functioning in a different domain.

Legal and policy variables

Generally, a precondition for obtaining legitimacy is that the use of force be legally initiated by the rightful source of authority (Beetham 2004, p. 110); the debate around this brought about constitutional provisions (Carter 1984; Peters and Wagner 2011, pp. 180, 185–186). Therefore, exhausting the legal tools for building legitimacy may be the leaders' initial step. Furthermore, internationally legalizing the use of force as a means of enhancing legitimacy domestically encouraged the USA, as the main initiator of military interventions, to secure approval from the UN and NATO, while also relying on multilateral principles in order to act according to a mutually agreed set of rules (Finnemore 2005).

Nonetheless, legality is usually necessary, but not sufficient and other mechanisms may also play a role. Among them are the normative justifications for fighting, regardless of the real motivations and results (Geis and Müller 2013), for example to disseminate democracy worldwide (Ish-Shalom 2006); or the moral responsibility of the international community to protect populations suffering from the state's action or its inability to protect its people (Welsh 2004, pp. 76–84).

Furthermore, in order to cope with imperatives prescribing noncombatant immunity, democracies pursue legal and ethical avenues, mainly by using flexible

interpretations of IHL (Dill 2015) to legitimize policies that may harm civilians when risking their own soldiers is less legitimate. Against this background, "lawfare" becomes paramount as the "strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective" (Dunlap 2008, p. 146).

Cultural-discursive variables

To legitimize mobilization for war, leaders leverage and sometimes even exaggerate and inflate the level of the external threat to encourage public consent for mobilizing the monetary and human resources needed to thwart it (Lake 1992; Smith 2005b, p. 27). The discursive process constructs the threat as jeopardizing vital interests (Everts 2002), and even securitizes non-military threats (Buzan et al. 1998), while nonviolent options to eliminate it are either unavailable or less favorable.

Importantly, the belief in using force to remove a threat should be associated with the effort to convince the public that using force is morally justified, and the goal is attainable and will benefit the community at a reasonable cost (Dauber 1998; Finnemore 2005, p. 201). Legitimacy in this case is a type of *exchange legitimacy* (Suchman 1995, p. 578): Citizens support military policies in exchange for security provided by the state, or at least the expectation of it. It follows that trust can be regarded as a component of legitimacy, and the absence of trust may create a "legitimacy deficit" in situations where the government is chronically unable to meet what the citizens believe are its basic responsibilities (Beetham 2004, p. 110). In terms of using force, citizens believe primarily in the principle of using force and then trust the government to implement this principle in a trustworthy manner. Therefore, trust-building measures, such as improving the military's capabilities, may also increase the legitimacy to deploy troops.

Dehumanization of the enemy adds a cultural and symbolic layer to inflating risks. This can be produced by strong public emotions vis-à-vis an external threat or fear (Mercer 2014, pp. 529–530) and by identifying the enemy as evil. Dehumanization helps to release accountability for harming those presented as evil (Geis and Hobson 2014, p. 420), and as criminals (such as the Serbs during the Kosovo War), who undermine the post-Cold War moral world order (Douzinas 2003), and those to whom human moral principles are inapplicable (Malešević 2010, p. 142). Their deaths are therefore considered "ungrievable" (Butler 2009). Portraying wars as religious battles against those worshipping a different, "false" God (such as the Taliban) vis-à-vis one's own "true" God (Toros and Mavelli 2014) adds a complementary layer to dehumanization.

In addition, with the restraining impact of liberal values and global monitoring, states seek ways to relax their responsibility for the eventual consequences of harming civilians. They employ a mix of legal and policy mechanisms, as well as cultural and discursive ones, including: (1) dismissal of the roots of enmity between one's own side and one's rival (for example, Butler 2004, p. 3), thus legitimizing aggression as an indispensable response; (2) releasing accountability for a hostile civilian population by transforming its status from quasi-members of the polity to that of

peripheral regions beyond the state's legal zone of influence and, by implication, prone to acts of violence (Ron 2003), for example Israel's 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip (Winter 2016); (3) using the rhetoric of "accidents" to legitimize collateral killing of enemy civilians as "unfortunate events for which liberal states cannot properly be held to account" (Owens 2003, p. 600); and (4) using multiple methodologies to reduce the reported number of civilian casualties and other war costs (Benini and Moulton 2004; Shaw 2005, pp. 88–89, 93–94).

Another mechanism is legitimation by technology, relying on the promise of precision weapons to reduce the number of unintended noncombatant casualties (Shaw 2005, p. 84; Zehfuss 2011, pp. 543–545). This increases public confidence in the efforts made by their armed forces to avoid casualties among enemy civilians (Larson and Savych 2007, XXI).

Casualty sensitivity can also be leveraged to reduce domestic sensitivity to the immunity of enemy civilians, thus transferring risk from one's own soldiers to enemy civilians (Shaw 2005), especially when the public's greatest concern is for military casualties, and civilian casualties become a secondary issue (see Larson and Savych 2007, pp. 169–170 on the case of the US public regarding Iraq). Even ethical justifications for relaxing such constraints have appeared, arguing that the duty to protect one's own soldiers relaxes the duty to spare enemy noncombatants (Kasher and Yadlin 2005, pp. 17–18) and, by implication, to increase the legitimacy of using force.

In democracies, the use of force by elected civilians is (or should be) subject to a deliberative process that addresses the legitimacy of using muscle. During these deliberations, the camps favoring or opposing the use of force may debate values and norms as well as policies. The public sphere is the most important arena for the contestation of discourses (Dryzek 2001). In the military domain, deliberation is based on: broad-based debates about military policies (Dauber 1998); slow thoughtfulness with which the debates are conducted (Huysmans 2004); openness in discussing the issues (Krebs and Lobasz 2007); available information (Kaufmann 2004); equality among the participants (Dryzek 2001); and their interest in using argumentative reasoning for reaching an understanding on the issues (Bjola 2008, p. 639).

However, leaders pursue discursive methods that limit deliberation in order to overcome resistance to mobilization for using force. When deliberation is limited, the popular will may stagnate, and the military's autonomy, and that of its political supervisors, to interpret this will may increase (Kohn 1997). Therefore, the legitimacy of using force can arise from *active* deliberation or the stagnation of deliberation through which the use of force is socially, but *passively*, accepted (Levy 2016).

There are several mechanisms which limit deliberation, though it may be impacted by the variables listed thus far (such as threat and dehumanization). For example, depoliticization of the armed forces by enhancing civilian control reinforces the universalist image of the military, thus enhancing its ability to influence decision-making and merchandizing policies by capitalizing on its prestige and technical expertise (Huntington 1957, pp. 374–379). Another mechanism is elite consensus which avoids stressing alternative policies (Zaller 1994; Berinsky 2007; Kriner and Wilson 2016).

Structural variables

In general, structural variables are more consequential than intentional, in that intentional policies may have unintended, although desirable, consequences that change power relations. Most important is the structural weakening of deliberation by reforming the militaries. With the transition to a volunteer, technology-intensive military during the post-Cold War era, which reduced the level of mobilization for war, governments could reduce the high political threshold for initiating wars (Starr 2010, p. 65; Vennesson 2011).

Instrumental factors in achieving this goal are not only the number of troops recruited by the military, but also the impact of recruitment policies on power relations. Conscription is more likely than an all-volunteer force to encourage deliberation on military policies by encouraging a more critical tone. This is accomplished by: (1) enlisting more elite members of society (Horowitz and Levendusky 2011) not only with power, but also greater ability to adopt a critical attitude (Levy 2017, pp. 199–200); (2) coercing service on the willing and unwilling alike (Vasquez 2009, pp. 87–88); and (3) encouraging voice for sacrifice (Levy 2017, pp. 199–202), especially as the option of "exit" is not easy (to use the conceptualization of Hirschman 1970). Thus, when voluntarism governs and powerful groups less affected by service have little motivation to seek information and openly challenge policies, deliberation about war is limited, and the use of force may encounter less resistance (Levy 2016). The legitimacy of using force then arises, not from active deliberation, but from the stagnation of deliberation—a kind of passive legitimation.

Furthermore, the same mode of recruitment-produced impact that increases deliberation also increases the likelihood that the troops themselves will delegitimize policies by multiple forms of resistance, such as whistle-blowing and refusal to deploy, thereby promoting deliberation. A conscripted military is thus more likely than a volunteer army to provoke challenges to the legitimacy of using force (Levy 2017). Also instrumental in limiting deliberation are technologization, which detaches combatants from their victims (Malešević 2010, pp. 227–229), and the deployment of contractors (Cusumano 2016).

What follows from this analysis is that legitimacy is a multilayered concept, reflected in multiple arenas simultaneously and affected in the public sphere by numerous actors bottom-up (such as troops and NGOs) and by policymakers top-down.

The following are four notes on these dynamic variables. First, they do not function simultaneously, or at the same level of intensity and, of course, do not have equal weight. The weight of each variable is circumstantially and contextually changed. For example, since 2010, the importance of legalization increased in Israel in its warfare against the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip following international criticism of fire policies that had harmed enemy civilians (Craig 2013, pp. 200–203). Another example is the congressional testimony of the commander of the multinational force in Iraq, Major General David Petraeus, on the progress of the surge in Iraq (September 2007), which significantly helped legitimize this disputed deployment by muting criticism (Feaver 2011, p. 88). A discursive weakening of

deliberation was at work. In short, legal and policy variables create the infrastructure to which cultural, discursive, and structural layers are added.

Second, each variable can play a different role in each of the underlying three phases. So, while legal variables are crucial in the initiation of the use of force, elite consensus may help legitimize the extension of deployment after initiation (see Kriner and Wilson 2016 on the UK's deployment in Afghanistan), and leveraging casualty sensitivity is instrumental in legitimizing the level of force used to transfer risks onto noncombatants.

Third, the variables may move in opposite directions. For example, the CIA-led drone warfare in Pakistan was successfully legitimized as a tool for removing an external threat, if judged by the supportive public opinion (Pew Research Center 2013). At the same time, concerns about the legality of this warfare and the high number of Pakistani noncombatants killed were raised by the public and by Congress, and prompted the administration to change policies (Crawford 2013, pp. 77, 121–122, 403–404). To balance these countervailing trends, the administration continued the warfare, but modified its conduct (ibid.). Thus, policymakers try to maneuver between conflicting legitimacy concerns.

Fourth, the variables are mutually interrelated. For example, while respecting the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is a general obligation (a legal variable), its implementation may be affected by the image of enemy noncombatants as "enemies" versus "noncombatants" (the variables of threat and dehumanization). Similarly, legitimation by technology helps relax accountability in cases of accidents and also increases trust in the troops' ability to accomplish their mission (part of the variable of threat and its removal).

Interrelationships between dynamic and ingrained components

The dynamic variables work within the confines of the previously shaped political culture with basic legitimacy accorded to the use of force. The infrastructure created by this ingrained component determines the extent to which policymakers can effectively use the dynamic tools to increase the level of legitimacy. First and foremost, as a democratic social structure establishes the boundary conditions for defining an external threat, it also shapes the repertoire of options policymakers can apply (Hayes 2013, pp. 146–316). Political culture largely inspires strategic culture, in that it provides a repertoire of symbols that establish strategic preferences by formulating concepts about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (Johnston 1996, pp. 222–223). As mentioned earlier, the Holocaust and the liberal legacy have shaped the perceptions of threats in Israel and the USA, respectively, and have also been leveraged to legitimize aggressiveness. Also, the repertoire of symbols used to dehumanize the enemy is inspired by that political culture and heritage. Likewise, the extent of a society's militarization determines the barriers to protests that challenge the legitimacy of military policies and the human costs of war, as well as encouraging or discouraging resistance within the ranks. Militarization thus limits deliberation, regardless of the model of recruitment (see Giroux 2014).

At the same time, societies vary in their thresholds for tempering the requirement of noncombatant immunity. These levels depend on the extent to which this requirement is rooted in political culture. For example, this immunity was respected more by Britain's culture than by America's (Aylwin-Foster 2005). The more this immunity is culturally rooted, the stronger the effort to legitimize the shift of risk from own soldiers onto enemy civilians.

It follows that being bound by the ingrained component, the strategically sophisticated use of dynamic tools cannot necessarily always produce legitimacy. Nevertheless, the more the ingrained infrastructure is rigid and restrictive, the more efforts policymakers are encouraged to make to legitimize the use of force, such as threat inflation in the case of the Iraq War.

In turn, the dynamic tools affect what has already been ingrained in the culture. For example, a high degree of legitimation that leads to military failures or overly costly deployments slowly affects the ingrained component, which may lead to demilitarization (Ruffa 2018). Similarly, global norms—also an ingrained component—can be reframed by new discursive mechanisms justifying the removal of threats. This was the case in the peace democracy thesis that reshaped norms by reframing the menu of acceptable policies (Ish-Shalom 2006). Finally, norms may be an essential part of a political culture. However, a limited deliberation may even relax the imperative to deal with norms. It is one thing to convince the public rhetorically about the rightness of using force, and another to do so by using methods that limit deliberation. Legitimation can also work without cultural militarization and, in turn, weaken the power of norms.

Conclusions

I set out to fill gaps in the scholarly literature by proposing a definition of the domestic legitimacy of using force, operationalizing it, and analyzing its two components—the ingrained and the dynamic—offering an integrated analysis that is lacking in the literature. The framework developed offers a systematic methodological approach to analyzing how governments try to establish legitimacy for using force, thus setting the stage for empirical analysis of specific cases.

It was beyond the scope of this article to empirically test, for example, how effective each of the dynamic factors is in generating legitimacy, or the conditions under which elites choose different strategies for constructing legitimacy for war—all of which should be studied in specific cases. In order to understand how deployment can be legitimized in each case, the proposed framework suggests starting with an analysis of the ingrained component of the legitimacy and its status prior to deployment. This will lead to an analysis of the dynamic situation on the eve of, and during, each operation throughout the three phases specified above. In turn, we can examine the extent to which the shaped legitimacy does or does not transform the ingrained component, setting new constructs to subsequent rounds of using force (see Levy 2019). Finally, by developing the study of domestic legitimacy, this article sets the stage for further study of the interplay between the domestic and international facets of legitimacy.

In closing, in addressing the question of how leaders mobilize support for using force, I relied on the subjective perspective of legitimacy, which focuses on the belief that the authority acts legitimately, rather than on the objective, normative approach. Nevertheless, by analyzing how leaders limit deliberation and leverage other mechanisms in order to rally support, this study shows how immoral policies may be sanctioned, while limited deliberation obstructs the moral judgment of policies.

Acknowledgements This article was first presented at the meeting of the Research Committee on Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association. I am grateful to the participants for their feedbacks. I would like to thank Bashir Bashir, Chiara Ruffa, David Rudin, Jennifer Welsh, Lars Christie, Martin Shaw, and the anonymous reviewer of International Politics for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I gratefully acknowledge permission from *Stanford University Press* to reproduce material published in my book *Whose Life Is Worth More? Hierarchies of Risk and Death in Contemporary Wars* (2019).

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

References

Arendt, Hannah. 1972. *Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience on Violence, Thoughts on Politics, and Revolution*. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace.

Aylwin-Foster, Nigel. 2005. Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations. *Military Review* 85 (6): 2–15.

Bacevich, Andrew J. 2005. *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Barker, Rodney. 1990. *Political Legitimacy and the State*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Beetham, David. 1991. Max Weber and the Legitimacy of the Modern State. *Analyse & Kritik* 13 (1): 34–45.

Beetham, David. 2004. Political Legitimacy. In *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*, ed. Kate Nash and Alan Scott, 107–116. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Benini, Aldo A., and Lawrence H. Moulton. 2004. Afghanistan Civilian Victims in an Asymmetrical Conflict: Operation Enduring Freedom. *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (4): 403–422.

Bennett, Huw. 2014. Enmeshed in Insurgency: Britain's Protracted Retreats from Iraq and Afghanistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25 (3): 501–521.

Berinsky, Adam J. 2007. Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict. *Journal of Politics* 69 (4): 975–997.

Berndtsson, Joakim, Christopher Dandeker, and Karl Ydén. 2015. Swedish and British Public Opinion of the Armed Forces after a Decade of War. *Armed Forces & Society* 41 (2): 307–328.

Bjola, Corneliu. 2008. Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Bridging the Analytical-Normative Divide. *Review of International Studies* 34 (4): 627–644.

Bjola, Corneliu. 2009. *Legitimising the Use of Force in International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics of Intervention*. London: Routledge. Kindle.

Buchanan, Allen. 2004. *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law*. New York: Oxford University Press. Oxford Scholarship Online.

Bukovansky, Mlada. 2007. Liberal States, International Order, and Legitimacy: An Appeal for Persuasion over Prescription. *International Politics* 44 (2–3): 175–193.

Burk, James. 2013. Introduction. In *How 9/11 Changed Our Ways of War*, ed. James Burk, 1–10. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Butler, Judith. 2004. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. New York: Verso.

Butler, Judith. 2009. *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?*. London: Verso.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security—A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.
Carter, Stephen L. 1984. The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. *Virginia Law Review* 70 (1): 101–134.
Clark, Ian. 2005. *Legitimacy in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craig, Alan. 2013. *International Legitimacy and the Politics of Security: The Strategic Deployment of Lawyers in the Israeli Military*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Crawford, Neta C. 2013. *Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America's Post-9/11 Wars*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cusumano, Eugenio. 2016. Bridging the Gap: Mobilisation Constraints and Contractor Support to US and UK Military Operations. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39 (1): 94–119.
Dauber, Cori. 1998. The Practice of Argument: Reading the Condition of Civil-Military Relations. *Armed Forces & Society* 24 (3): 435–446.
Desch, Michael C. 2010. The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Liberal Tradition and Obama's Counterterrorism Policy. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 43 (3): 425–429.
Dill, Janina. 2015. *Legitimate Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Douzinas, Costas. 2003. Humanity, Military Humanism and the New Moral Order. *Economy and Society* 32 (2): 159–183.
Dryzek, John S. 2001. Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy. *Political Theory* 29 (5): 651–669.
Dunlap, Charles J. 2008. Lawfare Today: A Perspective. *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 3: 146–154.
Everts, Philip. 2001. War Without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo. In *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*, ed. Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, 222–252. London: Routledge.
Everts, Philip. 2002. *Democracy and Military Force*. New York: Palgrave.
Feaver, Peter D. 2011. The Right to be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision. *International Security* 35 (4): 87–125.
Finnemore, Martha. 2005. Fights about Rules: The Role of Efficacy and Power in Changing Multilateralism. *Review of International Studies* 31 (1): 187–206.
Geis, Anna, and Christopher Hobson. 2014. The Existence and Use of 'Evil' in International Politics. *International Politics* 51 (4): 417–423.
Geis, Anna, and Harald Müller. 2013. Investigating 'Democratic Wars' as the Flipside of 'Democratic Peace'. In *The Militant Face of Democracy: Liberal Forces for Good*, ed. Anna Geis, Harald Müller, and Niklas Schörnig, 3–23. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gilley, Bruce. 2006. The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries. *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (3): 499–525.
Giroux, Henry A. 2014. *The Violence of Organized Forgetting: Thinking Beyond America's Disimagination Machine*. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Publishers. Kindle.
Habermas, Jurgen. 1992. *Legitimation Crisis*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hayes, Jarrod. 2013. *Constructing National Security: U.S. Relations with India and China*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kindle.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hoehn, Andrew R., and Sarah Harting. 2010. *Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Horowitz, Michael C., and Matt S. Levendusky. 2011. Drafting Support for War: Conscription and Mass Support for Warfare. *Journal of Politics* 73 (2): 524–534.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. New York: Vintage Books.
Hurd, Ian. 2007. Legitimacy. *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination.* New Jersey: Princeton University. http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/255. Accessed 9 Jan 2020.
Huysmans, Jef. 2004. Minding Exceptions: The Politics of Insecurity and Liberal Democracy. *Contemporary Political Theory* 3 (3): 321–341.
Hyde, Alan. 1983. The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law. *Wisconsin Law Review* 1983: 379–426.

Independent International Commission on Kosovo. 2000. *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald F., Bi Puranen, and Christian Welzel. 2015. Declining Willingness to Fight for One's Country: The Individual-Level Basis of the Long Peace. *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (4): 418–434.
Isaac, Jeffrey C. 1987. Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique. *Polity* 20 (1): 4–31.
Ish-Shalom, Piki. 2006. Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics of Democratization. *European Journal of International Relations* 12 (4): 565–598.
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1996. Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China. In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 216–268. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kasher, Asa, and Amos Yadlin. 2005. Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective. *Journal of Military Ethics* 4 (1): 3–32.
Kaufmann, Chaim. 2004. Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War. *International Security* 29 (1): 5–48.
Kohn, Richard H. 1997. How Democracies Control the Military. *Journal of Democracy* 8 (4): 140–153.
Krebs, Ronald R. 2015. *Narrative and the Making of US National Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Krebs, Ronald R., and Jennifer K. Lobasz. 2007. Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq. *Security Studies* 16 (3): 409–451.
Kriner, Douglas L., and Graham Wilson. 2016. The Elasticity of Reality and British Support for the War in Afghanistan. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 18 (3): 559–580.
Lake, David. 1992. Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. *American Political Science Review* 86 (1): 24–37.
Larson, Eric V., and Bogdan Savych. 2007. *Misfortunes of War: Press and Public Reactions to Civilian Deaths in Wartime*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Lebow, Richard Ned. 2005. Reason, Emotion and Cooperation. *International Politics* 42 (3): 283–313.
Levy, Yagil. 2016. What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization. *Armed Forces & Society* 42 (1): 75–98.
Levy, Yagil. 2017. Control from Within: How Soldiers Control the Military. *European Journal of International Relations* 23 (1): 192–216.
Levy, Yagil. 2019. *Whose Life is Worth More? Hierarchies of Risk and Death in Contemporary Wars*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Lustick, Ian S. 2008. Abandoning the Iron Wall: Israel and 'the Middle Eastern Muck'. *Middle East Policy* 15 (3): 30–56.
Malešević, Siniša. 2010. *The Sociology of War and Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mann, Michael. 1987. The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism. *New Left Review* 162 (1): 27–55.
Mann, Michael. 1993. *The Sources of Social Power: Vol. II, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mann, Michael. 2005. *Incoherent Empire*. London: Verso.
Marullo, Sam, and David S. Meyer. 2004. Antiwar and Peace Movements. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 641–665. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Mercer, Jonathan. 2014. Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity. *International Theory* 6 (3): 515–535.
Meyer, David S., and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. Conceptualizing Political Opportunity. *Social Forces* 82 (4): 1457–1492.
Miller, Richard B. 2000. Legitimation, Justification, and the Politics of Rescue. In *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*, ed. William Joseph Buckley, 384–398. Grand Rapids, MI: William Eerdmans.
Morris, Justin, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2007. The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force. *International Politics* 44 (2–3): 214–231.
Owens, Patricia. 2003. Accidents Don't Just Happen: The Liberal Politics of High-Technology 'Humanitarian' War. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 32 (3): 595–616.
Peters, Dirk, and Wolfgang Wagner. 2011. Between Military Efficiency and Democratic Legitimacy: Mapping Parliamentary War Powers in Contemporary Democracies, 1989–2004. *Parliamentary Affairs* 64 (1): 175–192.

Posen, Barry R. 1984. *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Ron, James. 2003. *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kindle.
Reus-Smit, Christian. 2007. International Crises of Legitimacy. *International Politics* 44 (2–3): 157–174.
Ruffa, Chiara. 2018. *Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations: Afghanistan and Lebanon*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2010. Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth 'New Institutionalism'. *European Political Science Review* 2 (1): 1–25.
Shaw, Martin. 2005. *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Smith, Hugh. 2005a. What Costs Will Democracies Bear? A Review of Popular Theories of Casualty Aversion. *Armed Forces & Society* 31 (4): 487–512.
Smith, Philip Daniel. 2005b. *Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sohnius, Stephanie. 2013. The United States: The American Way of Leading the World into Democratic Wars. In *The Militant Face of Democracy: Liberal Forces for Good*, ed. Anna Geis, Harald Müller, and Niklas Schörnig, 51–88. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Starr, Paul. 2010. Dodging a Bullet: Democracy's Gains in Modern War. In *In War's Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy*, ed. Elizabeth Kier and Ronald R. Krebs, 50–66. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Suchman, Mark C. 1995. Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. *Academy of Management Review* 20 (3): 571–610.
Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
Toros, Harmonie, and Luca Mavelli. 2014. Collective Evil and Individual Pathology: The Depoliticization of Violence against Afghan Civilians. *International Politics* 51 (4): 508–524.
Tyler, Tom R. 1990. *Why People Obey the Law*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Valentino, Benjamin A., Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay. 2004. 'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare. *International Organization* 58 (2): 375–407.
Van der Meulen, Jan, and Joseph Soeters. 2005. Dutch Courage: The Politics of Acceptable Risks. *Armed Forces & Society* 31 (4): 537–558.
Vasquez, Joseph Paul. 2009. *International Politics by Ordinary Means: Conscription's Constraints on Democracies Waging War*. Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame.
Vennesson, Pascal. 2011. War without the People. In *The Changing Character of War*, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, 241–258. New York: Random House. Oxford University Press.
Walzer, Michael. 2015. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books.
Weber, Max. 1964. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: Free Press. Kindle.
Welsh, Jennifer M. 2004. Introduction. In *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, ed. Jennifer M. Welsh, 57–154. New York: Oxford University Press. Kindle.
Williams, Rhys H. 2004. The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 91–115. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Winter, Yves. 2016. The Siege of Gaza: Spatial Violence, Humanitarian Strategies, and the Biopolitics of Punishment. *Constellations* 23 (2): 308–319.
Zaller, John. 1994. Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War. In *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, ed. W.Lance Bennett and David Paletz, 186–209. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zehfuss, Maja. 2011. Targeting: Precision and the Production of Ethics. *European Journal of International Relations* 17 (3): 543–566.