Krystal K. Hachey
Tamir Libel
Waylon H. Dean *Editors*

Rethinking Military Professionalism for the Changing Armed Forces

Springer

Rethinking Military Professionalism
for the Changing Armed Forces

Krystal K. Hachey · Tamir Libel ·
Waylon H. Dean

Editors

Rethinking Military Professionalism for the Changing Armed Forces

Editors
Krystal K. Hachey
Director General Military Personnel
Research and Analysis (DGMPRA)
Department of National Defence
Government of Canada
Ottawa, ON, Canada

Waylon H. Dean
Director General Military Personnel
Research and Analysis (DGMPRA)
Department of National Defence
Government of Canada
Ottawa, ON, Canada

Tamir Libel
Postdoctoral Researcher
Chair of Comparative Politics
University of Bamberg
Bamberg, Bavaria, Germany

The chapters in this book are published with kind permission of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.

Foreword

I can't help but think of uniforms when I think about the military profession. The military uniform is a symbol that binds and bonds individuals into a whole, rendering the collective visible to others and reminding members of their fidelity to the profession of arms. The uniform also symbolizes the organization's values. In the coming year, the U.S. Army will transition to a new uniform, army greens, colloquially referred to as "pinks and greens." This uniform is a throwback to that worn by the so-called Greatest Generation who fought in World War II, serving as a symbolic reminder of a time when the Army was at its professional apex. Meanwhile, conversations abound about possible alterations of various standards to enhance recruitment and retention of a new kind of military professional, one who might engage in cyber-defense and cyber-warfare, the piloting of remote vehicles, and other new specialties around emerging technology. These new specialists may or may not need to even meet current fitness standards or wear the uniform, testing the definitional boundaries of the military profession.

These simple examples about uniforms in a very small way reflect the growing tensions and dilemmas facing the military profession at the close of the second decade in the twenty-first century. New threats and missions are pulling modern militaries away from their traditional areas of expertise, leading to strain at the seams of the military profession. Modern militaries must embrace new and varied kinds of missions that stretch them beyond their expertise in the management of violence. Emerging areas of threat in cyberspace are demanding the rapid acquisition of new expertise in a military tasked with organizing and executing a national defense. The military's claim to a monopoly over national cyber-defense is weak, given that academia and industry likely hold equal or greater expertise in cyber-security and defense.

The consistent growth in private military contractors and their working with military professionals in combat theaters further erodes claims to jurisdictional control by the military profession. These corporate warriors are operating in the same combat theaters, often alongside and in coordination with military personnel. They are sharing in the burdens of warfighting, with more civilian contractors dying in Afghanistan than American troops. New areas of expertise and growing numbers

of contractors are testing the boundaries defining who is and might be considered a military professional, and what it means to be a member of the military profession.

The expansion of the military profession into new domains throws into sharp relief what it may mean to lose monopoly control over the management of violence on behalf of the state. The U.S. Army's own words convey the message that the continuation of a historical legacy of excellence is important by returning to a legacy uniform design:

> The Army is a profession. By wearing the uniform of the U.S. Army, Soldiers follow the legacy of those who served before them. Our uniforms embody the professionalism and commitment to the Army Values—loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. The uniform is a symbol of honor and tradition, esprit de corps and morale, and personal excellence and pride (U.S. Army 2019).

This short message conveys the continuing importance of the concept of a military profession and the continuity of the profession's values over time. If only a change of clothes were all it would take for the modern military profession to resolve the tensions it faces.

The U.S. Army is not alone. Other NATO countries are experiencing similar dilemmas of how to define the boundaries of the military profession, who can serve as a military professional, and what military professionalism means today. Jurisdictional encroachments abound, with increased competition for defining expertise over military affairs coming from civilian specialists and experts in defense and security around the globe. The very notion of professions as bodies of experts holding special access to knowledge is in decline. Many professions beyond the military are facing challenges from "lay experts" who hold some claim to expertise without being formally recognized as experts by the profession.

The military profession also faces increased scrutiny over its level of professionalism. The growing number of scandals and ethical lapses by military professionals undermine public trust and have placed military professionals under greater public scrutiny. In the past, the profession was entrusted to monitor and enforce its own ethical standards and, in exchange, it established the boundaries for membership in the profession. Today's lapses of judgement by military professionals threaten the autonomy the military profession has held over enforcement of its own ethical standards when it appears they are failing to do so repeatedly. Perhaps even worse than these ethical scandals, military professionals seem less competent overall, failing to achieve decisive victories or to succeed in dissuading civilian leaders from entering unwinnable conflicts.

The canonical models and theories guiding the understanding of the military profession from the 1950s and 1960s remain the touchpoints for most military leaders and many researchers. Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957), more than 60 years old, remains the model for how military professionals understand their own expertise and their role in advising civilian leaders on military and security issues. Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960) offers the sociological complement to Huntington's political science model. Social scientific theorizing about all professions culminated in Andrew Abbott's *The System of*

Professions (1988), published more than 30 years ago. It remains the definitive sociological treatment of professions. But the utility of these foundational works for understanding and managing the modern military profession may be in decline.

The chapters in this volume collectively grapple with understanding the modern military profession across several nations. They assess the challenges facing the military profession today, and how and why we must rethink our approach to it. This book offers arguably the most comprehensive look at the changing military profession since Huntington and Janowitz published their foundational works in the 50s and 60s. Many chapters grapple with the decline of the role of professions more generally, tackling new ideas and the implications for the professions that regulate who is an expert. While these chapters may raise as many questions as they answer, these are precisely the questions military experts must answer to successfully confront the new and emerging security threats facing modern militaries and move beyond merely symbolic change.

<div align="right">

Meredith Kleykamp
Associate Professor of Sociology
at the University of Maryland and Director
of the Center for Research
on Military Organization

Center for Research on Military Organization
University of Maryland
College Park
MD
USA

</div>

References

Abbott, A. (1988). *The system of professions: An essay on the expert division of labor*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*. Glencoe, SL: The Free Press.

U.S. Army (2019). Army uniforms. Retrieved from https://www.army.mil/uniforms/

Contents

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Krystal K. Hachey is a defense scientist with Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA) within Canada's Department of National Defence, where she leads the Leadership, Culture, and Ethics Team. She holds an M.Ed. in educational psychology from the University of Saskatchewan and a Ph.D. in measurement and evaluation from the University of Ottawa. Dr. Hachey conducts scientific research examining the relationships between culture, ethos, professionalism, performance, and leadership effectiveness in the Canadian Armed Forces. Her work has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as *Res Militaris*, *Military Behavioural Health*, and the *Journal of Military, Family, and Veteran Health* and has chapters published in military books on physical fitness and performance measurement through the Canadian Defence Academy.

Dr. Tamir Libel is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Chair of Comparative Politics at the University Of Bamberg, Germany. Previously, he was a former Beatriu de Pinós research fellow at the Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI), and a Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIRE) at UCD. His work was published in peer-reviewed journals such as *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *RUSI Journal, Defense & Security Analysis*, and *Defence Studies*. His book *European Military Culture and Security Governance: Soldiers, Scholars and National Defence Universities* was published by Routledge in 2016.

Waylon H. Dean is an editor and consultant with Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA) within Canada's Department of National Defence.

Contributors

Morten Brænder Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus C, Denmark

Vanessa Brown Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security, Department of National Defence, Toronto, ON, Canada

Thomas Crosbie Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, Denmark

Laurence Frank Air Force Academy Research Center, Salon de Provence, France

Sara Greco Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada

Krystal K. Hachey Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Rita Hawkshaw United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Andover, UK

Vilhelm Stefan Holsting Royal Danish Defence College, Institute for Leadership and Organisation, ILO, København Ø, Denmark

Meredith Kleykamp Center for Research on Military Organization, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Tamir Libel Postdoctoral Researcher, Chair of Comparative Politics, University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Bavaria, Germany

Frida Linehagen Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden

Clodia N. O'Neil United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Andover, UK

Al Okros Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security, Department of National Defence, Toronto, ON, Canada

Zack Partington Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Glen Segell Ezri Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies, University of Haifa, Akko, Israel

Stéfanie von Hlatky Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada

Yantsislav Yanakiev Bulgarian Defence Institute, Sofia, Bulgaria

Abbreviations

AI	Artificial intelligence
ALDP	Army Leadership Development and Development Programme
ASA	Attraction, selection, and attrition
B/P	bureaucratization/professionalization
BAF	Bulgarian Armed Forces
Bi-SC 40-1	NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CEAM	Centre d'expertise aérienne militaire
CIMIC	Civil–military cooperation
CKSE	Core knowledge, skills, and experience
CO	Commissioned officer
CPD	Continuing professional development
DF	Republic of Ireland Defense Force
DGM	Designated group member
DITB	Defence Industrial and Technological Base
DND	Department of National Defence
EE	Employment equity
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
F2T2EA	Find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess
GBA+	Gender-Based Analysis Plus
HFM	Human Factors and Medicine
HMI	Human-machine interface
I/O	Institutional/occupational
ICC	International Criminal Court
IP	Intellectual property
ISAF	NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JCSP	Joint Command and Staff Programme

KFOR	NATO-led Kosovo Force
KSE-B	Knowledge, skills, and experience—behaviors
LGBTA	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Allies Network
LGBTQ	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer
MOA	Ministry of Armies
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NAP	National action plans
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCGP	NATO Committee on Gender Perspective
NCM	Non-commissioned member
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NTM–I	NATO Training Mission–Iraq
OAE	Operation Active Endeavour
PESTEL	Historical and current military political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legal
PME	Professional military education
P–O fit	Person–organization fit
PSOs	Peace support operations
R&D	Research and development
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RE	Royal Engineer
RMP	Revolution in military professionalism
RTG	Research task group
SAME	Survey of American Military Experts
SEE	South Eastern Europe
SEEBRIG	South-East European Brigade
SFIR	Stabilization Force in Iraq
SFOR	NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
STO	Science and Technology Organization
TISS	Triangle Institute for Security Studies
TRIP	Teaching, Research, and International Politics
U.S.	United States
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicles
UK	United Kingdom
UNMIK	UN Peacekeeping Operation in Kosovo
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1
Rethinking Military Professionalism: Considering Culture and Gender

Krystal K. Hachey

Abstract Theories of military professionalism have not been developed to account for aspects of gender and diversity, such as the underlying socio-cultural aspects of the dominant male-oriented warrior framework, cross-cultural applications, civil-military and international relations, and how leadership and socialization play a role in member conduct and shaping military identity. Based on this gap, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exploratory team and subsequent research task group (RTG) was established to examine military professionalism. The following chapter provides an overview of the reasons for establishing the RTG, the goals of the panel in considering gender and diversity in the conceptualization of military professionalism, and a summary of what can be expected in this edited book.

Keywords Military professionalism · North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) · Culture · Gender · Framework · Models

Background

The military profession contains unique expectations (National Defence 2003; Sarkesian 1981), such as duty, loyalty, integrity, courage (National Defence 2003), and honor (Janowitz 1960), and encompasses the society, military institution, and the individual soldier (Sarkesian 1981). Various cultural aspects of the military, such as discipline, ceremonial displays and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps (Burke 2002; English 2004), are part of the military's professional ethos, while others derive from the military's relationship with civil society (English 2004). Like members of any organization, moreover, military members will internalize the rules of conduct, impetuses, and norms from the ethos and doctrine formally espoused by the organization (English 2004). As a result, prescriptive frameworks of professionalism will play an important role in shaping the profession and the conduct of military members.

K. K. Hachey (✉)

Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, 101 Colonel by Drive, K1A 0K2, Ottawa, ON, Canada
e-mail: krystal.hachey@forces.gc.ca

Although theories of military professionalism have a long history (e.g., Abbott 1988; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Sarkesian 1981), none of the existing models account for gender and diversity, such as the underlying socio-cultural aspects of the dominant male-oriented warrior framework (Pinch 2004), cross-cultural applications, civil-military and international relations, and how leadership and socialization (Bannerjee et al. 2011; Shamir et al. 2000) shape military identity. The following chapter reviews the concepts of military professionalism, unprofessionalism, and military culture examined during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) research task group (RTG), which was stood up to rethink military professionalism in light of gender and diversity.

Military Professionalism and Unprofessionalism

A lot of research has been conducted into the concepts and constructs of medical professionalism (Butler and Budgell 2015; e.g., Ainswork and Szauter 2006; Creuss and Cruess 2008; Hilton and Slotnik 2005; Jha et al. 2007; Wilkonson et al. 2009), but there has also been some influential work examining the military as a profession (e.g., Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960). As Table 1.1 shows, Butler and Budgell (2015) examined the four seminal theories of military professionalism by Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), Sarkesian (1981), and Abbott (1988), analyzing them into three

Table 1.1 Theories of military professionalism

Conceptualization of military professionalism	Huntington (1957)	Janowitz (1960)	Sarkesian (1981)	Abbot (1988)
Foundational elements of military professionalism	Expertise responsibility corporateness	Expertise group identity education/training ethics/loyalty self-administration	Military/Technical Ethical political	Expertise legitimacy jurisdiction
Level of analysis	Individual	Individual environmental	Individual institutional societal	Individual institutional societal
Professional membership	Restricted to the officer corps—male, commissioned officers, often from "gentlemen" or elite backgrounds	Focuses on officer corps, but more inclusive model than Huntington	Focuses on officer corps	All members of the military

Adapted from Butler and Budgell 2015, p. 21

components: foundational elements of military professionalism, level of analysis, and professional membership. Butler and Budgell (2015) found several elements central to military professionalism:

1. Expertise, or the knowledge and skills required for that profession (Snider 2003). For example, military members receive specialized training (Butler and Budgell 2015).
2. Legitimacy, or the trust of the public in that profession having authority and autonomy over a specific area (Friedson 1986). Therefore, the military as a profession requires the trust of the public to be a valid profession (Butler and Budgell 2015).
3. Jurisdiction, or the boundary work specific to the profession (Burke 1999). In the case of the military, members often require solutions to situations not seen in other professions (Butler and Budgell 2015; Snider 2003).
4. Identity, which is a self-concept made up of attributes, beliefs, values, motives, and experiences (Butler and Budgell 2015; Ibarra 1999; Slay and Smith 2011).
5. Culture, which is a set of shared values and beliefs within an organization (Ewles et al. 2017; Fiol 1991; Korabik 2006; Ravasi and Schultz 2006; Soeters et al. 2006).

As one would expect, unprofessionalism or poor professionalism mirrors the highly differentiated character of professionalism (Butler and Budgell 2015). Unprofessionalism, including misconduct, has myriad causes: external limitations (e.g., under-staffing; Butler and Budgell 2015; Martimianakis et al. 2009), ineffective training, unfamiliarity with proper responses to threats, command failures, group influencers, lack of discipline (Butler and Budgell 2015; Rowe 2008) and may range in severity (e.g., from rule-breaking to crimes; Butler and Budgell 2015; Westmarland 2005). Unprofessionalism can be understood simply as the absence of one or more elements of professionalism. The causes of unprofessional behavior, however, are many, and the willingness to understand its causes and consequences—even when this analysis points to the culture of the profession—is important to maintaining the integrity of the profession.

The recent external review of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the CAF provides a case in point of such a challenge to the professional military culture (Deschamps 2015). The External Review Authority pointed to "an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGTBQ members, and conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault" (Deschamps, 2015, p. i). As a result, the integration of gender and diversity has become a salient concern for the military profession, even though gender and diversity were not concerns in traditional theories of military professionalism.

The Study of Military Professionalism

Butler and Budgell (2015) and Ewles et al. (2017) observe that the touchstones of military professionalism are military ethics (Alagappa 2001; National Defence 2009), discipline (Arvey and Jones 1985), socialization (Van Maanen and Schein 1977), leadership (Brown and Treviño 2006), and the military culture more broadly. Each of these can be seen as key elements in the study of military professionalism because they have a certain stability across all theories.

The military ethos can be understood as the distinctly military component of military professionalism (Alagappa 2001; Butler and Budgell 2015). In the CAF's conception of military professionalism, for example, identity, expertise, and responsibility constitute the military ethos (Butler and Budgell 2015; National Defence 2009). The CAF identity is understood as the uniquely Canadian military history and organization, while expertise refers to the proficiency in armed conflict—whether warfighting or humanitarian missions—and responsibility is the obligation to defend the people of Canada and their interests (National Defence 2009). The Canadian military ethos is also understood to include beliefs and expectations about military service, Canadian military values, and Canadian values—all of which shape a specifically Canadian military profession (National Defence 2009).

Discipline, socialization, and leadership also play essential roles in developing and maintaining military professionalism. Discipline is the means of maintaining the high standard of the military as a profession (Arvey and Jones 1985; Butler and Budgell 2015). Discipline includes the adherence to dress, deportment, and drill, which help control behaviors through cues as to what is acceptable, a sense of a shared identity, and group structures and relations (Arvey and Jones 1985; Butler and Budgell 2015; National Defence 2009). Socialization, especially the early and intense socialization practiced by militaries (Guimond 2000), molds the members of the profession. Research has shown that group socialization, such as in Basic Military Qualification in the CAF (National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2016), influences intergroup perceptions, such that attitudes and beliefs can change during the training (Guimond 2000). Leadership and leaders play a central role in exemplifying the core ethics, helping shape identity, supporting cohesion, and relaying customs and traditions of the military profession (Butler and Budgell 2015; National Defence 2009).

Numerous researchers over the years have examined organizational culture (e.g., Alagappa 2001; Burke 1999; Butler et al. 2014; Capstick 2003; Harries-Jenkins 1990; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Peirce 2004; Sarkesian 1981; Snider 2003; Snider et al. 1999; Snider and Watkins 2002; Sørensen 1994; Swain 2010; Winslow 2004; Libel 2013). Military culture, as defined by Burke (1999), comprises discipline, professional ethos, ceremonies and etiquette, and esprit de corps and cohesion. Other researchers (e.g., Abbott 1988; Greenwood 1957; Libel 2016; Sarkesian 1981) see culture as the means for transmitting the understanding of the profession. Thus, military culture becomes an integral part in the study of military professionalism. The conduct of members, the "set of normative understandings" (Burke 1999; p. 450)

defined by the corporate identity, code of conduct, and social worth (Burke 1999), as well as customs, traditions, rituals, ceremonies, and displays of etiquette are all imbedded in the understanding of military culture (Burke 1999).

Professions are socially constructed concepts (Ewles et al. 2017; Rudvin 2007) and defined by the social biases of the dominant culture, whether masculine or feminine (Davies 1996). The theories presented in Table 1.1 demonstrate the inter-relationship between the concept of professionalism and the surrounding culture. Traditionally, military culture is situated in the combat, masculine-warrior image (Dunivin 1994; Soeters et al. 2006), which emphasizes combat-related activities, such as battle groups containing the fighting force and a male-dominated institution (Dunivin 1994). Due to this image, those who do not fit will have to modify their behaviors, values, and attitudes to be part of the profession (Carlan and Lewis 2009; Davis 2013; Thurman and Giacomazzi 2004).

Despite the continuity in key concepts, theories of military professionalism have shifted with changes in the culture, which is evident in the differences between the theories of Huntington and Janowitz, who wrote in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the theories of Sarkesian and Abbot who both wrote in the 1980s. The earlier studies of military professionalism had relied on understanding the concept from the perspective of the individual, for example, with less emphasis on the impact of the external environment. More recent theories of military professionalism, in contrast, have been more strongly influenced by institutional requirements and community expectations (Sarkesian 1981), cementing the importance of military culture in the understanding of military professionalism. Research on military professionalism now faces new culture changes in adapting to gender and diversity.

Diversity and Gender

Although it has been shown that increases in diversity have benefits for organizations (Pinch 2004), diversity has been an ongoing challenge for the military, including the CAF (Reuben 2004; Winslow et al. 2006). Diversity in an organization has been defined as ensuring the workforce reflects the society from which it was drawn (Reuben 2004; Winslow et al. 2006), with a high reliance on the balance of numbers (Keengwe 2017). One way to address gender and diversity issues is to challenge how gender is seen in order to account for the experiences of diverse men and women. Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) is an analytical approach, which goes beyond aspects of gender (e.g., identity, age, culture, etc.) to examine the differential impacts that programs, policies, research, and services have on diverse men and women (Status of Women Canada 2016). GBA+ is one tool that can be used in rethinking the model of military professionalism.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Given that there is no recent inclusive model of military professionalism addressing gender and diversity, a NATO exploratory team was established with members from Bulgaria, Canada, and the United Kingdom, which led to a research task group (RTG) being stood up in the fall of 2016. The NATO RTG, which now also included members from France, Sweden, and the United States, was tasked with examining the following:

1. Theoretical, conceptual, and methodological research approaches for understanding military professionalism.
2. The relationship between military professionalism throughout the military career (from recruitment to transition to civilian life) and at different levels.

   a. Individual,
   b. Group/team,
   c. Organizational, and
   d. Societal.

3. The cross-cultural context (e.g., historical and current military political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legal—PESTEL) of military professionalism.
4. The influence of military socialization and the impact on member conduct.
5. Ensuring diversity and inclusion in the study and measurement of military professionalism (e.g., GBA+).
6. Appropriate methodologies for monitoring, measuring, and assessing military professionalism.

Once the RTG concluded its work, a group of RTG members decided to expand their contributions and invite other experts to participate in the present volume.

Chapter Summaries

Research has shown that military professionalism is associated with, influenced by, and that it impacts numerous aspects of member conduct. Yet existing frameworks offer limited insight into how military professionalism may be monitored, measured, and adapted to inevitable changes in domestic, international, and operational environments. The contributors to this volume discuss the conceptual and practical challenges that one faces when developing a model of military professionalism that will be more robust against evolving needs.

Tamir Libel opens the book (Chap. 2) with a sociological analysis of military professionalism as security expertise. Libel draws on Eyol and Pok's (2015) alternative framework of military professionalism and Libel's (2019) adaptation of it to the military domain.

The next few papers present case studies critically examining aspects of military professionalism from different countries, including Bulgaria, Canada, France, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yantsislav Yanakiev (Chap. 3) presents the results from a survey of Bulgarian Armed Forces members' perspectives on the military profession, including their views on ethnic, cultural, and gender diversity, while Krystal Hachey (Chap. 4) presents results from a qualitative study of diverse CAF members' perspectives on military professionalism.

Using interviews with French Air Force members, Laurence Frank (Chap. 5) examines the organization's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments. Glen Segell (Chap. 6) examines what has been done in Ireland's military to address United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (NATO 2009). Frida Linehagen (Chap. 7) draws on interviews with personnel from Sweden's Armed Forces to provide a deeper understanding of the experience female military personnel bring to the organization and their abilities to identify and use power resources in order to be accepted by the military organization. Rita Hawkshaw and Clodia O'Neil (Chap. 8) provide an initial conceptualization of the tenets associated with the profession of arms in the British Army. Finally, Thomas Crosbie and Meredith Kleykamp (Chap. 9) will present findings on the first phase of the Survey of U.S. Military Experts, a biannual survey of about 250 experts on American military affairs who look at how military organizations navigate their increasingly complex global and domestic responsibilities.

The third set of chapters in this book re-examine specific aspects of military professionalism. Vanessa Brown and Al Okros (Chap. 10) present two issues concerning integrating gender perspectives and addressing sexual harassment in the CAF. The primary recommendation offered is that leaders be encouraged to reconsider the social construction of professionalism, particularly regarding power, social privilege, and the reproduction of the identity, norms, values, and beliefs that underpin the military ethos. Vilhelm Holsting and Morten Brænder (Chap. 11) examine whether new cadets share the values of the modern military. Sara Greco and Stéfani von Hlatky (Chap. 12) outline what the CAF has done until now to update its concept of military professionalism and the societal norms that have propelled such change. Importantly, this chapter also highlights prospective approaches to reimagining the concept moving forward, with an emphasis on gender diversity at the leadership level. Finally, Krystal Hachey, Tamir Libel, and Zackory Partington (Chap. 13) explore the impact of artificial intelligence on the military profession, professionalism, and professionalization and the extent to which it has and will have in redefining what it means to be a professional.

Chapter 14 by Tamir Libel and Krystal Hachey summarizes the research presented in this volume and discusses the usefulness of common theoretical frameworks and future directions in the study of military professionalism. In the Afterword, Yantsislav Yanakiev proposes some future directions for the research discussed here.

Conclusion

Since they were first proposed, theories of military professionalism (e.g., Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960) have been shaped by the cultures in which the militaries were embedded (Davies 1996). Until very recent times, little emphasis has been placed on how gender and diversity fit into these theories. In response, a NATO RTG was established to develop a culture and gender inclusive model of military professionalism, taking into account key aspects which influence professionalism (e.g., military ethos, socialization), as well as additional aspects such as the relationship of military professionalism throughout the career and at different levels (e.g., individual, organizational). Given the different cultures of the military (e.g., English 2004), this book will make a first contribution to identifying the gaps in current practices and provide an updated discussion on professionalism that is reflective of changing requirements, culture, and demographics of contemporary militaries.

References

Abbott, A. (1988). *The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Ainsworth, M. A., & Szauter, K. M. (2006). Medical student professionalism: Are we measuring the right behaviors? A comparison of professional lapses by students and physicians. *Academic Medicine, 81*(10), S83–S86.

Alagappa, M. (2001). Military professionalism: A conceptual perspective. In M. Alagappa (Ed.), *Military professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and empirical perspectives*. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center.

Arvey, R. D., & Jones, A. P. (1985). The use of discipline in organizational settings: A framework for future research. *Research in Organizational Behavior, 7,* 367–408.

Bannerjee, S., Jedwab, J., Thomas, T., & Soroka, S. (2011). *Cultural intelligence and identity development: Concepts, measures and relationship to Canadian Forces Professional Development*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Burke, J. (1999). Military culture. In L. R. Kurtz & J. E. Turpin (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of violence, peace and conflict* (pp. 447–462). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Butler, A., & Budgell, G. (2015). *Study on army professionalism*. Contract Report, DRDC-RDDC-2015-C180, Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada, Human Resource Systems Group, Ltd.

Butler, A., Eren, E., & Budgell, G. (2014). *Literature review: Theories, concepts and measures of professional, organizational, and military identity*. Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada, Human Resource Systems Group Ltd.

Brown, M. E., & Treviño, L. K. (2006). Ethical leadership: A review and future directions. *Leadership Quarterly, 17,* 595–616. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2006.10.004.

Burke, J. (2002). Expertise, jurisdiction, and legitimacy in the military profession. In D. M. Snider & G. L. Watkins (Eds.), *The future of the army profession* (pp. 19–38). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Capstick, M. D. (2003). Defining the culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st century. *Canadian Military Journal*, 47–53.

Carlan, P. E., & Lewis, J. A. (2009). Dissecting police professionalism: A comparison of predictors within five professionalism subsets. *Police Quarterly, 12*(4), 370–387. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611109348469.

Cruess, R. L., & Cruess, S. R. (2008). Expectations and obligations: Professionalism and medicine's social contract with society. *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 51*(4), 579–98. https://doi.org/10.1353/pbm.0.0045.

Davies, C. (1996). The sociology of professions and the profession of gender. *Sociology, 30*(4), 661–678. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038596030004003.

Davis, K. D. (2013). *Negotiating gender in the Canadian Forces, 1970–1999*. Unpublished doctoral thesis.

Deschamps, M. (2015). *External review into sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the Canadian armed forces*. Retrieved from http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/caf-community-support-services-harassment/era-final-report-(april-20–2015)-eng.pdf.

Dunivin, K. O. (1994). Military culture: Change and continuity. *Armed Forces & Society, 20*(4), 531–547. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9402000403.

English, A. D. (2004). *Understanding military culture: A Canadian perspective*. Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Ewles, G., van der Wef, D., & Butler, A. (2017). *Literature review—Sexual misconduct: GBA+ and the concept of professionalism*. Contract Report, Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada, Human Resource Systems Group, Ltd.

Eyal, G., & Pok, G. (2015). What is security expertise: from the sociology of professions to the analysis of networks of expertise. In T. V. Berling & C. Bueger (Eds.), *Security expertise: Practice, power and responsibility* (pp. 37–58). Oxen, UK: Routledge.

Fiol, C. M. (1991). Managing culture as a competitive resource: An identity-based view of sustainable competitive advantage. *Journal of Management, 17*(1), 191–211.

Freidson, E. (1986). *Professional powers: A study of the institutionalization of knowledge*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Greenwood, E. (1957). Attributes of a profession. *Social Work, 2*(3), 45–55. https://doi.org/10.1093/sw/2.3.45.

Guimond, S. (2000). Group socialization and prejudice: The social transmission of intergroup attitudes and beliefs. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 30,* 335–354. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(200005/06).

Harries-Jenkins, G. (1990). The concept of military professionalism. *Defense Analysis, 6*(2), 117–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/07430179008405441.

Hilton, S. R., & Slotnick, H. B. (2005). Proto-professionalism: How professionalism occurs across the continuum of medical education. *Medical Education, 39*(1), 58–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2929.2004.02033.x.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Boston, MA: Harvard U. P.

Ibarra, H. (1999). Provisional selves: Experimenting with image and identity in professional adaptation. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 44*(4), 764–791. https://doi.org/10.2307/2667055.

Jha, V., Bekker, H. L., Duffy, S. R., & Roberts, T. E. (2007). A systematic review of studies assessing and facilitating attitudes towards professionalism in medicine. *Medical Education, 41*(8), 822–829. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2923.2007.02804.x.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Keengwe, J. (2017). *Handbook of research promoting cross-cultural competence and social justice in teacher education*. Retrieved from www.books.google.ca.

Korabik, K. (2006). *Leadership and diversity in the Canadian Forces: A conceptual model and research agenda* (Report No. CR 2006-135). Toronto, ON: Defence R&D Canada.

Libel, T. (2013). From the people's army to the Jewish people's army: The IDF's force structure between professionalization and militarization. *Defence & Security Analysis, 29*(4), 280–292. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2013.842708.

Libel, T. (2016). *European military culture and security governance: Soldiers, scholars and National Defence universities*. London, UK: Routledge.

Libel, T. (2019). From the sociology of the (military) profession to the sociology of (security) expertise: The case of European national defence universities. *Defence Studies, 19*(1), 62–84.

Martimianakis, M. A., Mariate, J. M., & Hodges, B. D. (2009). Sociological interpretations of professionals. *Medical Education, 43*(9), 829–837. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2923.2009.03408.x.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Force. (2003). *Summary of* duty with honour: The profession of arms in Canada. Retrieved from http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2009). *Duty with honour: The profession of arms in Canada*. Retrieved from www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/cfli-ilfc/index-eng.asp.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2016). *Joining instructions—basic military qualification and basic military officer qualification*. Retrieved from www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-estabishment/recruit-scholl-joining-instructions.page.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. (2009). *BI-SCD 40-1 Bi-SC directive September 2009 integrating SCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the NATO command structure*. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_09/20090924_Bi-SC_DIRECTIVE_40-1.pdf.

Pierce, J. G. (2004). *Organizational culture and professionalism: An assessment of the professional culture of the US Army senior level Officer Corps*. Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Pennsylvania State University.

Pinch, F. C. (2004). An introduction to challenge and change in the military: Gender and diversity issues. In F. C. Pinch, A. T. MacIntyre, P. Browne, & A. C. Okros (Eds.), *Challenge and change in the military: Gender and diversity issues* (pp. 1–26). Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Defence Academy Press.

Ravasi, D., & Schultz, M. (2006). Responding to organizational identity threats: Exploring the role of organizational culture. *The Academy of Management Journal, 49*(3), 433–458.

Reuben, A. F. (2004). *Recruiting visible minorities: A matter of survival*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Forces College.

Rowe, P. (2008). Military misconduct during international armed operations: "Bad Apples" or systemic failure? *Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 13*(2), 165–189. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krn024..

Rudvin, M. (2007). Professionalism and ethics in community interpreting: The impact of individualist versus collective group identity. *Interpreting, 9*(1), 47–69. https://doi.org/10.1075/intp.9.1.04rud.

Sarkesian, S. C. (1981). *Beyond the battlefield: The new military professionalism*. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press.

Shamir, B., Zakay, E., Brainin, E., & Popper, M. (2000). Leadership and social identification in military units: direct and indirect relationships. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30*(3), 612–640. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2000.tb02499.x..

Slay, H. S., & Smith, D. A. (2011). Professional identity construction: Using narrative to understand the negotiation of professional and stigmatized cultural identities. *Human Relations, 64*(1), 85–107. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726710384290.

Snider, D. M. (2003). *Jointness, defense transformation, and the need for a new joint warfare profession*. New York, NY: Military Academy, West Point.

Snider, D. M., Nagl, J. A., & Pfaff, T. (1999). *Army professionalism, the military ethic, and officership in the 21st century*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barrack.

Snider, D. M., & Watkins, G. L. (2002). Introduction. In D. M. Snider & G. L. Watkins (Eds.), *The future of the army profession*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing.

Soeters, J. L., Winslow, D. J., & Weibull, A. (2006). Military culture. In G. Caforio (Ed.), *Handbook of the sociology of the military* (pp. 237–254). New York, NY: Springer.

Sørensen, H. (1994). New perspectives on the military profession: The I/O model and esprit de corps re-evaluated. *Armed Forces & Society, 20*(4), 599–617. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9402000407.

Status of Women Canada. (2016). *What is GBA+?*. Retrieved from http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/gba-acs/index-en.html.

Swain, R. (2010). *The obligations of military professionalism: Service unsullied by partisanship*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership.

Thurman, Q. C., & Giacomazzi, A. (2004). *Controversies in policing*. Menands, NY: Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.

Van Maanen, J., & Schein, E. H. (1977). *Toward a theory of organizational socialization*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Retrieved from https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/1934/?sequence=1.

Westmarland, L. (2005). Police ethics and integrity: Breaking the blue code of silence. *Policing and Society, 15*(2), 145–165. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439460500071721.

Wilkinson, T. J., Wade, W. B., & Knock, L. D. (2009). A blueprint to assess professionalism: Results of a systematic review. *Academic Medicine, 84*(5), 551–558. https://doi.org/10.1097/ACM.0b013e31819fbaa2.

Winslow, D. (2004). Misplaced loyalties: The role of military culture in the breakdown of discipline in two peace operations. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 6*(3), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-618X.1998.tb00727.x.

Winslow, D. J., Heinecken, L., & Soeters, J. L. (2006). Diversity in the armed forces. In G. Caforio (Ed.), *Handbook of the sociology of the military* (pp. 299–310). New York, NY: Springer.

Chapter 2
The Rise and Fall of the Study of the Military Profession: From the Sociology of the Military Profession to the Sociology of Security Expertise

Tamir Libel

Abstract Since Huntington (1957), the understanding of the officer corps and the relationship between the armed forces and society has drawn upon the wider theoretical literature of professions. Over time, however, both theoretical advances (e.g., development of more conflictual theoretical models) and societal changes (e.g., declining autonomy of professions from the state and markets, competition over jurisdictional domains with other types of vocations) have impacted the explanatory power and suitability of employing the theoretical concept of professions to the study of contemporary militaries. Recently, Eyal and Pok (2015) have provided a review of the literature on professions and its pitfalls as well as an alternative conceptual framework. Although they have demonstrated its utility in the study of the security domain, their research discussed neither the military nor the officer corps. This paper draws on Eyal and Pok's review of the evolution of the concept of professions and adapts their alternative framework to the military profession.

Keywords Sociology · Military professionalism · Professionalism · Military profession · Professions

Introduction

Few would disagree that Western armed forces have experienced dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War. Much of the recent discussion of these changes has referred to the concept of professionalism (Libel 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019, Libel and Gal 2015). This is understandable as the concepts of military professionalism

T. Libel (✉)

Postdoctoral Researcher, Chair of Comparative Politics, University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstr. 21, 96045 Bamberg, Bavaria, Germany
e-mail: tamirlibelphd@gmail.com

and the military profession constitute the foundation for much of the literature on civil-military relations and military sociology (Burk 2002b; Nielsen 2012), which originated in the classic works by Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960). However, this approach became outdated as professions in post-industrialist societies entered a state of crisis as a result of growing competition from a variety of competitors—for example, vocations, firms, and even non-governmental organizations (Burk 2002a; Heinecken 2014; Crosbie and Kleykamp 2018).

While some authors (e.g., Snider and Watkins 2002; Heinecken 2014) have observed that the military profession is experiencing this crisis too, they have failed to suggest an alternative approach, such as the one introduced outside of the civil-military relations literature by Eyal and Pok (2015), who observed that the crisis of professions resulted from an "historical transformation in the social organization of knowledge production," necessitating an "analytical move from professions to 'expertise'" (p. 39). The present study adopts this approach and argues for replacing the sociology of military profession with that of security expertise.

The theoretical objective of this study is to demonstrate that the traditional conceptualization of military organizations is an adaptation of the sociology of professions to a military setting (i.e., the sociology of the military profession), but that external and internal changes in the military organization have rendered this approach outdated. The study introduces the sociology of expertise as an alternative, adapting it to the military context (i.e., the sociology of security expertise). The comparison of the two is based on their foundational commonality—each is based on a specific form of expert knowledge. The "transformation in the social organization of knowledge production" (Eyal and Pok 2015, p. 39) leads to a comprehensive change in the relations between experts and the societies they serve.

From Profession to Expertise?

What distinguishes a profession from an occupation is the existence of a theoretical body of knowledge that serves as the foundation for the practical skills of the professional. Laypersons will find it difficult to acquire the knowledge and skills unique to the profession, creating an effective monopoly. Professional communities seek to maintain their monopolies through a variety of measures (e.g., control of recruitment and selection of members and the establishment of criteria for promotion). Nevertheless, professions are not cartels. The state allows them to have a degree of autonomy because they provide services the free market finds difficult to provide (Downes 1985, p. 148).

Eyal and Pok (2015, p. 37) proposed that the sociology of professions is too narrow to account effectively for the diverse phenomena of expertise. The focus on professions should be substituted with expertise because "the term 'expertise' permits to bring into view a much wider field than what is offered by the sociology of professions" (p. 39). This wider point of view is necessary with regard to armed forces because the end of the Cold War brought about tremendous change in armed forces and their relations with their parent societies. First and foremost, the pace of

the transition from conscription to volunteer forces, a trend that began in the 1970s, significantly eroded the traditional isolation of armed forces from societies (Sorensen 2000; Van der Meulen and Manigart 1997; Dandeker 1994). Combined with pressure for quick peace dividends, armed forces experienced dramatic downsizing and reduced budgets.

This shrinkage was partly due to the armed forces' declining social status, which resulted in the elimination of their semi-autonomous standing and immunity to social trends and scrutiny (Dandeker 1994, pp. 648–649). Beginning in the 1990s, Western militaries faced growing demands to accommodate gender equality and ethnic diversity. A major aspect of this accommodation was the subordination of the military to civilian legislation and oversight by civilian courts on matters such as safety regulations. This corresponded with the growing influence of international humanitarian law (Waters 2008).

As a result of their declining size and budget, and facing high operational tempo, Western armed forces had to rely increasingly on private security companies (Heinecken 2014). This unprecedented outsourcing in the military realm was simultaneous with a fundamental change in the nature of Western armed forces' missions. Western armed forces began operating as part of multinational forces in a diverse variety of missions in which they played a secondary, supporting role under strict legal, political, and ethical constraints (Dandeker 1994, pp. 640–641; Luttwak 1995). Being subject to constant media coverage and frequent political intervention and scrutiny, officers were not only pressed to ensure force protection and minimal collateral damage at the expense of accomplishing missions, but also worked closer than ever with governmental and non-governmental local and international organizations (Dandeker 1994). The changing character of military mission was accompanied by a weaving together of military, diplomatic, and economic tools, resulting in a blurring of boundaries between the civil and military spheres and military and non-military actors (Dandeker 1994).

Hence, armed forces had to expand military education to equip officers with expertise beyond the management of violence (Dandeker 1994). Ironically, this focus on security expertise, rather than military professionalism, unintentionally showed that the sociology of professions was too narrow to account effectively for the diverse phenomena of expertise in the military domain. To clarify the difference between these two types of sociologies of knowledge, and the implications of this analytical transition for analysis of military affairs, the following section reviews the literature on military professionalism.

The Rise and Fall of the Sociology of the Military Profession

Eyal and Pok (2015) asserted that:

> the sociology of professions reflected an earlier status quo…when meaningful participation in the policy arena, in the public sphere or in courtroom performances of expertise, was restricted to those experts dully recognized as members of legitimate professions. As long as it was clear who the experts were and how to recognize them, one did not need a word for "expertise" (p. 39).

Although they did not refer directly to the military, this is an accurate description of the discussion of military professionalism within the civil-military relations literature. Huntington (1957, p. 11) was the first to identify officership as a profession, distinguished from other professions in its reliance on a theoretical body of knowledge and a derivative skill set: a monopoly on the knowledge and skills related to the management of violence (Nuciari 1994, p. 7).

The inclination of scholars and practitioners in the 1950s to define the military as a profession reflected the high social status of professions at that time. It also reflected in part the logic of the then-predominant structural-functionalist theory,[1] presenting professionals as public trustees who pursue the common good (Burk 2002a, p. 27). This was reflected in Huntington's (1957) articulation of the military as a profession, which was followed by Janowitz's (1960) conceptualization of military professionalism.[2] Huntington (1957) concluded that the military profession had to be distinguished from civilian society. Similarly, its values, although recognized by the society, are often not in sync with those of the civilian society.

However, the same social processes that reshaped the value orientations of Western societies also influenced their armed forces, eroding the separation of the two (Caforio 1994, p. 35). This led Janowitz (1960) to present his civilianization hypothesis, whereby the armed forces converged increasingly in their orientations to large civilian organizations (Caforio 1994, p. 35). Huntington's and Janowitz's studies, although debating the same issue, used different terminology and conceptualizations, which made reaching common ground much harder than was necessary (Sørensen 1994, p. 600).

Considering their impact on later generations of scholars, "it is striking that Huntington and Janowitz never discussed their different approaches and concepts" (Sørensen 1994, pp. 605–608). The lack of dialogue left several analytical and methodological problems unresolved. First, both had reached their conclusions concerning the nature of the military profession without empirical exploration. Second, rather than looking for a common conceptual understanding, Huntington and Janowitz developed separate terminologies and formulated key concepts differently. Third, both Huntington and Janowitz assumed that if the officer corps felt that its identity, attitudes, and norms were being attacked by the political echelon or civil society, it would refrain from responding and remain passive. This assumption is not only unreasonable given the historical record, but it hinders the potential of their theories to be used for accurate analysis of the two-directional relationships of civil-military relations. Fourth, neither Huntington nor Janowitz explicitly mentions the level of analysis of the armed forces that was the focus of their work. Fifth, and

---

[1]"A basic premise of structural functionalism is that society needs a certain level of social cohesion, solidarity, or integration in order to function, and structural functionalists can be regarded as attempting to identify, and perhaps promote, the sources and forms of social cohesion" (Dew 2014, p. 1).

[2]In contrast to the widely common attribution of the identification of the military as a profession to Huntington, Crosbie and Kleykamp (2018, p. 524) argue that he was preceded by Lasswell (1941) and Charles (1956).

perhaps the most problematic, is that their seminal studies drew upon questionable assumptions concerning causal relations and their directions (Sørensen 1994, p. 608).

Despite these terminological divergences, Caforio (1988) and others argued that the theories were quite similar and mutually supportive. Libel (2010) suggested that Huntington, Janowitz, and most of their followers did not focus on military professionalism itself, but on its social, political, and cultural consequences. In other words, their interest in conceptualizing the officer corps as a military profession was due to the methodological benefits for analyzing the relation between the military and its society. The analytical framework of the relations between a profession and its parent society could be used to define and to understand civil-military relations (i.e., between the officer corps and its parent society). Thus, many, if not most of the scholars who belonged to what could be called the first generation of military professionalism, did not delve deeply, either theoretically or empirically, into the meaning of the military profession or professionalism.[3]

An exception to this general trend was Jacobus Adrianus Antonius (Jacques) van Doorn.[4] He used a structural-functionalist approach (Moelker and Soeters 2008) to refine the key concepts of the sociology of the military profession. Highly influential, in a career that spanned 57 years (Moelker et al. 2009), his work is much less known and influential nowadays, which may be a result of the increasing split into North-American and European streams in the civil-military relations literature. While the works of Huntington and Janowitz are still considered relevant and often cited in current North-American studies, this is not necessarily true in European studies. In addition, while the classic studies of Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) were written in the lingua franca of science (i.e., English), most of Van Doorn's and his contemporaries' studies were written in their native languages and were only accessible to the English-speaking audience via either old (by now) translations or as references in English studies.

One of Van Doorn's main contributions was the distinction between the institutional patterns of professions and bureaucracies. In a representative article, Van Doorn (1965) claimed that

> the most important difference between the professional man and the bureaucrat, however, is their distinctive frame of reference. The loyalty of the professional man is directed at his profession: his loyalty to the employing organization is low. He takes his standards and norms from the professional community, and he tries to protect these from interference and administrators. His performance as a professional can only be validated by colleagues, not by his superiors and still less by a layman. Connected with this is the "horizontal" structure of the profession which is composed of equals (pp. 262–263)

---

[3]This trend continued if not until this day than for several decades at least. Writing in the late 1980s, Caforio (1988, p. 65) indicated that although there were many studies concerning the relations between the military profession and its parent society, "they are all studies that have been done from outside the military profession (or, at least, on its relations with the outside world), almost as if the military were an impenetrable subject of study, one not approachable from within."

[4]Moelker and Soeters (2008, p. 36) defined Van Doorn as one of the founding fathers of military sociology, alongside Janowitz and Raymond Aron.

In spite of these observed differences, a societal process of convergence between professions and bureaucracies began in the 1950s, leading scholars to conclude that "conflicts easily arise, and where the 'interlocking controls' of professions and organizations clash, the professional seems to be the weaker partner" (Van Doorn 1965, p. 263).

Van Doorn (1965, p. 263) indicated that this process took place within Western armed forces, and commented that it is remarkable that the military profession is seldom or never mentioned in these studies. Sometimes the professional soldier is not mentioned at all, evidently because his calling is not regarded as a profession. Sometimes he is mentioned in passing, but his position is not further discussed (p. 263).

Ultimately, Van Doorn contradicted this position and defined officers as professionals, in line with Huntington and Janowitz. He argued that, in the context of armed forces, the attribution of professionalism should be restricted to commissioned officers because their "role comprises the elements of specialized expertise and competences, public responsibility, formal license (the commission), corporateness, and a usually strong social isolation in a professional community" (Van Doorn 1965, p. 264).

Thus, drawing on Huntington's (957, p. 16) observation that "the officer corps is both a bureaucratic profession and a bureaucratic organization," Van Doorn (1965, p. 264) argued that that the officer corps is a fusion of a profession and bureaucracy. This conclusion seems to derive from his structural-functionalist analysis of the armed forces' function:

> The distinction between officers and men is certainly not simply the outcome of a historical process. Rather, it is a functional distinction: the military profession is traditionally and actually a managerial profession.

Therefore, assigning the attribution of professionalism to non-commissioned officers runs against the institutional logic of the armed forces. Van Doorn (1965) further elaborated this point:

> The combination of profession and organization in the army has thus been institutionalized in two ways: in fusion on the level of the officer corps, and in a simultaneous segregation of both patterns in the army as a whole by a sharp division between officers and men. This dichotomy might endanger the functioning of the military forces, if the army was not part of an institution strongly isolated from society (p. 271).

Hence, from the structural-functionalist perspective of the first generation, discerning and maintaining these structural distinctions among the various strata within armed forces were of the utmost importance for its internal function and relations with its parent society. It was reflected in Van Doorn's (1965) observation that

> This isolation, which exceeds the normal institutionalized division of labor in modern societies, may be explained especially by the very exceptional function of the army: the conduct of war, respectively, the preparation for war. This function is so exceptional and therefore differs so sharply from other institutions which ensure the continuity of society, that the

standing armies were distinctly isolated from the rest of society, logically, socially, and culturally; in ethos, ideology, ritual and dress. This situation strongly fostered the integration of all sections of the armed forces as well as the emergence of a specific military culture (pp. 271–272).

Further, from the structural-functionalist standpoint, the erosion of internal and external isolation results in tensions, if not crisis. Van Doorn observed several causes in his time that led to this erosion, many of them continuing today: politicization of domestic and international politics that violate professional neutrality, erosion of the elite status of the officer corps and of its distinction from the other military ranks, and segregation from society due to growing democratization of Western societies, growing inter-service competition within the armed forces, and increasing competition from civilian security experts (Van Doorn 1965, pp. 273–274).

Ironically, at exactly the same time as Van Doorn wrote this, these assumptions concerning how professions in general, and the military profession in particular, began to be questioned (Eyal and Pok 2015):

Once the relative dominance enjoyed by the established professions was challenged…which happened precisely during the 1960s, the number of contenders for expert status increased and the basis for their claims became more heterogeneous (p. 39).

Thus, in the 1960s, social scientists replaced the structural-functionalist logic with a conflictual one, perceiving professions as self-interest groups (Burk 2002a). By the late 1970s, this was implicitly integrated into the work of Moskos (1977). In a series of studies, he presented the institutional/occupational (I/O) model, arguing that the military profession moved away from institutional–professional principles and toward occupational ones (Moskos 1981, 1986, Moskos and Wood 1988). Moskos defined the institution as

legitimized in term of values and norms: that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good….Members of an institution are often viewed as following a calling (Caforio 1988, p. 55).

In contrast he defined the occupation as

legitimized in terms of the marketplace—that is, prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies….The occupational model implies a priority of self-interest rather than of the employing organization (p. 55).

Moskos suggested a set of indicators that he claimed could indicate whether a given armed forces is institutional, occupational, or positioned between these poles (Caforio 1988; Nuciari 1994). The indicators diverged from each other in their weight concerning the determination of where a specific armed force was positioned along the spectrum (Nuciari 1994). According to Caforio (1994), most of these indicators could also be used with profession, rather than institution, in the opposite pole from occupation. However, this would have required limiting the inquiry only to the officer corps; i.e., to military professionals. Caforio (1994) also attributed the popularity of the model in the late 1980s to the ease with which this set of indicators could be implemented, as well as the perception of scholars and practitioners that Moskos was a scientific authority. As Caforio (1994) argued

> Moskos uses the term occupation in a general sense—that is, including both professional and nonprofessional jobs—rather than in a specific sense—in contrast to a professional activity—as it has been used up to now [i.e., clearly distinguished from professionalism] (pp. 66–67, footnote 6).

This was part of a wider tendency of Moskos to re-coin common terms using alternative, ambiguous terminology, thereby damaging the prospects of shared understanding among academic and professional communities (Sørensen 1994). Caforio (1988) was probably the first to notice that Moskos did not explicitly define the distinction between his institutional/occupational dichotomy and the first generation's professional/occupational dichotomy. This resulted in wide misuse of the concrete concepts of profession, institution, and occupation in in academic and military-professional research.

In a more analytical terms the institutional/occupational model, as was mentioned above, ran against the key distinction of the first generation of military profession scholars between profession and occupation. Their structural-functionalist orientation resulted in a focus on the officer corps and in insisting that its separation from the other ranks was crucial to the functioning of the armed forces. In contrast, the institutional/occupational model conceptualized the entire armed forces as a social group, rather than focusing on the officer corps (Nuciari 1994). Hence, Moskos, who could be seen as the founder of the second generation of military profession scholars, imported the "dynamic logic" of the sociology of the professions of his time into the sociology of the military profession. This definition of Moskos draws upon Nuciari's (1994) observation that the institutional/occupational model set a new, different course for the sociology of the military profession than the original one set by Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960).

The research program of the second generation of the sociology of the military profession drew upon Moskos's studies and criticized them. Nuciari (1994) indicated that the institutional/occupational model gained with time the status of a classical point of reference rather than an actual research design. To some degree, a growing division could be seen in the literature in North America and Europe. A prominent figure among the European second generation scholars was Giuseppe Caforio, a retired Italian brigadier general turned scholar. In his early works in English, Caforio discussed Moskos's work a lot. In a typical early study, he referred to the institutional/occupational model as the predominant framework for analyzing processes of change in the military profession at that time (the late 1980s). In this work, Caforio (1988) defined the military profession as

> a lifetime work activity that is essential (or at least useful) to the community and that is sufficiently demanding to require a certain intellectual ability and the acquisition of considerable theoretical knowledge, specific to the particular profession. This knowledge is acquired through educational institutions at the university level that are dedicated to that specific profession (p. 55).

In his inquiry into analytical frameworks for explaining processes of change in the military profession, Caforio (1994) relied on Van Doorn's work on the dual nature of the officer corps as a profession and a bureaucracy. This led him to see this structural

tension as a reason to think about professionalism as a degree rather than as a fixed property (Caforio 1988):

> I consider the officer's profession to be a bureaucratic one, in which there exists a dialectic tension between the hierarchic and the professional poles. The distribution of the positions taken by individual officers between these two poles can, in different historical and environmental contexts, render the role of officer more—or less—professional (p. 55).

Caforio (1994) had relied to a large degree on surveys in order to study processes of change in the military profession, using survey data to evaluate the dominant role-orientations among officers. He argued that the professional and occupational dimensions should be analytically separate when evaluating this. Moreover, he argued that despite this analytical distinction, these orientations were not mutually exclusive but could exist simultaneously, resulting in a fourfold typology of ideals.

His prolific research agenda was often done in collaboration with the no-less-influential Marina Nuciari, an Italian professor at the University of Turin. In the early 1990s, she also contributed significantly to the revived interest in the sociology of the military profession. Much like Caforio, Nuciari's (1994) work was based on Van Doorn: "All scholars dealing with the military profession agree on one peculiarity: it is simultaneously a bureaucracy and a profession" (p. 15). Moreover, she added a crucial complementary observation:

> In formal organizations…professional roles are usually intertwined with a complex role system reflecting the functional structure of the organization itself, so that the necessary integration of the professional activity leads to a strong limitation of the single professional practitioner's autonomy, discretion and control. These limitations are counterbalanced, however, by the fact that the top level of the organization is often formed by people belonging to the same professional group (p. 8).

This determination is valid in the military, perhaps even more than in other organizations, because its top leadership—the generals—could be appointed only from within the members of the officer corps. Thus, Nuciari (2012) argued that the professional characteristics of the military profession are hardly distinguishable from its organizational (i.e., bureaucratic) ones. She claimed, further, that this was emphasized as the unique characteristic of the military profession in most, if not all, the theoretical models for explaining the changes in contemporary armed forces:

> The common core of all research relating to these models seem to lie in the generalized perception of an ongoing decline in the relevance, legitimacy and prestige accorded by contemporary affluent society to the military profession, which can be defined as a "role crisis" or as "deprofessionalization" or as the "occupationalization" of the military profession. This process of change is also signaled by a change in the value orientations of military professionals, who seem to be turning from reference patterns based on the assumption of definite responsibilities in favor of the community (the defence of the common good) at the expense of the individual good, to individualistic patterns grounded in career and job security, like any other occupation (p. 8).

In North America, similar reasoning a decade later brought about a group of U.S. Army researchers, with Don Snider as the leading figure, to turn to Huntington's and Janowitz's concepts of military professionalism as the conceptual foundation for

proposing reforms for the U.S. Army (Matthews 2002), marking the beginning of the third generation in the literature. Thus, according to Snider and Watkins (2002), military organizations have a dual nature, being both professions and bureaucracies simultaneously. As professions, they focus on developing expert knowledge in their members and encouraging them to implement it in new situations. As bureaucracies, they concentrate on the implementation of expertise in routines and organizational processes. They argued that this analytical framework can be used to identify "professional deficiencies" in armed forces and develop appropriate remedies. Meanwhile, militaries' ability to maintain professional characteristics had significantly declined. The integration of an increasing variety of actors in military operations challenged the military's claim to unique expertise, eroding its status as a profession (Heinecken 2014).

Although relying on similar conceptual foundations, the second generation's European and third generation's North American sociology of the military profession diverged significantly from each other. The former, while it often involved either soldiers–scholars or civilian faculty members of military colleges, was mostly academically oriented and often referenced the work of the previous generation (e.g., Van Doorn), which was accessible mostly only in European languages. The latter, although it often involved collaboration with civilian scholars, was much more policy-oriented in its goals, as reflected in Snider's work (Snider and Watkins 2000, 2002; Snider 2012). Both strands did recognize that the military profession was in a crisis for reasons similar to those that caused the crisis of civilian professions.

The recognition that "the scope of the phenomenon has changed, and that a new approach is needed" (Eyal and Pok 2015, p. 39) was also the common thread in the work of the third generation. This scholarship can be divided into two strands. The first consists of studies influenced by Moskos's terminological ambiguity and the over-stretched concept of military professionalism. As Moten (2011) observed:

> Some writers loosely use the term professional when describing the Armed Forces, meaning that the Services are a standing force or that its members serve for long periods of time. Such imprecision conflates "professional" with "regular" and a "professional military" with a "standing army" (p. 15).

While some argue that this should be looked upon as an alternative conceptualization, they tend to ignore that "those terms are not synonymous" (Moten 2011, p. 15). Moreover, the loose use of concepts, which amounts to academic submission to popular abuse of defined concepts,[5] sacrifices the internal coherence and explanatory power of the concepts (i.e., what a profession is and who is a professional). This resulted in growing ambiguity as to the meaning of military professionalism (e.g., equating the status of professional with a type of military manpower system—the all-volunteer force; Renz 2014; Szymański 2015; Wyss 2011) and who could be defined

---

[5]Moten (2011) eloquently described this practice as follows: "From time to time in the United States, a clearly defined word will find itself dragooned by popular culture to serve the common lexicon. Before long, that proud old word will get bandied about so much that it changes and morphs into something that is at once broader and less than its former self. The term professional is such a word. Today, everyone wants to be a professional" (p. 14).

as a professional (e.g., defining non-commissioned officers as military professionals; Gutknecht 2005; Willeford 2014).

The second strand includes studies that adopted a normative stance and assumed that, despite the crisis of professions, militaries should stay professional (Libel 2010, 2013). These studies are theoretically sound and draw upon the well-established literature concerning professions in general and the military profession in particular. However, while scholars who work in this strand acknowledge the crisis of professions, they tend, as a rule, to assume that it can be remedied (Snider and Watkins 2002). In other words, these scholars reject either explicitly or implicitly the virtual irreversibility of the crisis and resulting decline of the theoretical value of the concept for analysis of contemporary armed forces and civil-military relations.[6]

From the Sociology of the Military Profession to the Sociology of Security Expertise?

The decline in the conceptual clarity and scientific value of the sociology of professions in the civil-military relations literature requires turning to the sociology of expertise. According to Eyal and Pok (2015):

> the field covered by the sociology of professions is too narrow to be able to contend with the diverse phenomena of expertise in contemporary society…. This analytical move from professions to "expertise" reflects a historical transformation in the social organization of knowledge production….Once the relative dominance enjoyed by the established professions was challenged, however, which happened precisely during the 1960s, the number of contenders for expert status increased and the basis for their claims became more heterogeneous (p. 42).

This in turn necessitates clarifying the distinction between the two analytical frameworks. The sociology of professions is focused on jurisdiction, "the link between a profession and its work" (Abbott 2002, p. 20 in Eyal 2013, p. 864). In other words, "the approach is focused on who has control and of what kind over a task, while leaving aside the question of what arrangements must be in place for a task to be accomplished and through what processes these arrangements were created" (Eyal 2013, p. 864).

In contrast, the sociology of expertise focuses on "the arrangements and conditions necessary for problems to become objects of expert labor" (Eyal 2013, p. 864). Its aim is to combine the analysis of "how networks of expertise are assembled with jurisdictional analysis in order to conduct a history of tasks and problems" (Eyal 2013, pp. 868–869). Table 2.1 presents an abbreviated version of the table of Eyal and Pok (2015, p. 41) that detailed key distinctions between the two sociologies.

---

[6]It should be emphasized that the concept of military professionalism maintains its theoretical value for analysis of historical periods or geographical regions in which professions are either not in crisis or are able to win battles over jurisdiction (Burk 2002).

Table 2.1 Dimensions of contrast between the sociology of expertise and the sociology of professions

	Sociology of professions	Sociology of expertise
Scope	Limited to professions and would-be professions	Inclusive of all who can make viable claims to expertise
Modes of analysis	Expertise reducible to the expert's interests and world-views	Experts and expertise distinguished as two different modes of analysis
What is privileged?	Organizational and institutional forms: credentialing, licensing, associations, etc.	What experts actually do. The capacity to perform a task better and faster than others
What is expertise?	Attribution, a formal quality reducible to actors' interests	A network connecting together actors, devices, concepts, institutional, and spatial arrangements
Abstraction	The most distinctive characteristic of professions is their possession of esoteric, decontextualized knowledge	Abstraction is just shorthand for a chain of practical transcriptions. Different forms of expertise abstract differently, because their chains are different

Source Eyal and Pok (2015), p. 38. The table is copied verbatim

With regard to the scope of the sociology of professions, the phenomena under study are limited to those that either are or would be professions, while the sociology of expertise consists of all those who could inform the analysis. Similarly, regarding modes of analysis, expertise is equated in the sociology of professions with the interests and worldviews of members of the profession. Alternatively, the focus on expertise in the sociology of expertise results in an analytical distinction between experts and expertise. The former are the "actors who make claims to jurisdiction over a task" (Eyal 2013, p. 869), and the latter is the "capacity to accomplish this task better and faster" (Eyal 2013, p. 869).

With regard to what is privileged, the emphasis is on the "set of mechanisms designed to control the supply of and demand for professional services" (Eyal 2013, p. 874). The autonomy of the profession gives it a monopoly over who can become a member of the profession and how. In contrast, the sociology of expertise focuses on analyzing expertise as the "capacity to accomplish this task better and faster" (Eyal 2013, p. 869). With regard to what is expertise in the sociology of professions, expertise is "an attribution, a quality that the experts possess by virtue of recognition granted by significant others and thereby reducible to their interests, role sets, and modes of organization" (Eyal 2013, p. 870). Concerning abstraction, the autonomy and monopoly of the profession depends on the existence and codification of some abstract knowledge uniquely possessed by the profession. In contrast, the sociology of expertise, with its distinction between experts and expertise, suggests that different groups of experts would have different abstract knowledge. Thus, the analysis of abstraction should be of the ways and the chains of reasoning (i.e., transcriptions) for each of these groups.

Table 2.2 Dimensions of contrast between the sociology of the military profession and the sociology of security expertise

	Sociology of military profession	Sociology of security expertise
Scope	Limited to commissioned officers	Inclusive of all who can make viable claims of security expertise
Modes of analysis	Expertise reducible to the officer corps' interests and worldviews	Security experts and security expertise distinguished as two different modes of analysis
What is privileged?	Organizational and institutional controls and practices	What security experts actually do: the capacity of a security expert to perform a security-related task better and faster than others
What is expertise?	Formal military doctrine	A network connecting national and transnational as well as public and private security actors, devices and concepts, including institutional and spatial arrangements
Abstraction	The most distinctive characteristic of the military profession is the formal codification of its abstract knowledge into field manuals	Abstraction is just shorthand for a chain of practical transcriptions. Different forms of security expertise abstract differently because their chains are different

Source Author's depiction following Eyal and Pok (2015, p. 38)

The sociology of expertise's inclusive approach encompasses the current security environment where the officer corps is just one, albeit often the leading one, among many actors. Because the analysis provided by Eyal and Pok (2015) does not pertain to either military or security organizations per se, their generic analytical framework has to be adapted to military settings. Table 2.2 contrasts the sociology of the military profession with the sociology of security expertise.

The evolution of the sociology of the military profession (whose characteristics are distilled in Table 2.2's left-hand column) was described above. The characteristics of the suggested alternative analytical framework, the sociology of security expertise, are described in Table 2.2's right-hand column. Further work is required to explore its potential and applicability.[7]

Conclusions

This paper is built on Eyal and Pok's (2015) sociology of expertise in two ways. First, their discussion of the evolution of the sociology of professions is used to analyze the development in the literature of the two concepts of the military profession and military professionalism. Second, the paper demonstrates that their critique of the

---

[7]For a first implementation of sociology of security expertise see Libel (2019).

limitations of the sociology of professions and their suggested alternative framework also applies to the study of the military profession. The analysis shows that the concepts of profession and professionalism do not apply to the officer corps adequately. Moreover, the concept of profession has lost its value in military affairs because it does not account for the characteristics and developments of contemporary armed forces and military operations. Hence, the general alternative framework suggested by Eyal and Pok (2015) was adapted to the analysis of the military domain. This new approach can be termed the "sociology of security expertise" in accordance with Eyal and Pok's more general "sociology of expertise." Further work is required to develop the sociology of security expertise into a fully-fledged research agenda.

From these general findings, several additional conclusions could be drawn. First, the officer corps never fully met the characteristics of a profession, as defined by the sociology of professions. Above all, the officer corps existed within state bureaucracy, which led Van Doorn (1965), perhaps the leading theorist in the first generation of the military profession literature, to tackle the issue via the construct of the officer corps' dual nature, being a fusion of profession and bureaucracy.

While conceptually beneficial in the revival of military professionalism theory in both the second generation in Europe (e.g., Nuciari and Caforio) and the third generation in the U.S. (e.g., Snider and Watkins), there is still reason to question whether defining the officer corps as a profession was appropriate to begin with. If this doubt is valid in regard to the officer corps, then the common practice of defining and referring to other ranks within the armed forces as professionals should certainly be avoided.

Next, the sociology of the military profession's evolution followed roughly the developments identified by Eyal and Pok (2015) in the scholarship of the sociology of professions. Thus, it seems that the leading figures in each of the three generations were familiar, if not well-versed, in the wider scholarship on professions. This is especially noticeable in the cases of the founders (i.e., Huntington, Janowitz, Van Doorn, and in the deans of the American strand of the third generation; i.e., Snider and Watkins 2002). The latter even included in their work discussions concerning the evolution of the literature on the military profession (Burk 2002a) and professions in general (Abbot 2002).

As a result, continuous trends—for example, those identified already the 1960s by Van Doorn (1965, pp. 273–274), such as the competition of officers with civilian security experts—were labeled as new developments. This is especially noticeable in the influence of the digital revolution and big data analytics on the military profession. One can find a large number of either heavenly or apocalyptic forecasts about the "obvious" ramifications of these developments for the military organization. A historically informed analysis, which would have to take into account the inherent relations of the officer corps and military expertise to technological innovation, could probably reach a much more balanced and policy-relevant analysis.[8]

---

[8]For comprehensive discussion of this issue see the Chap. 15 in this volume.

The new, more comprehensive theoretical framework of sociology of security expertise, as proposed above, could facilitate the understanding and comparison of such cases.

References

Abbott, A. (2002). The Army and the theory of professions. In L. J. Mathews (Ed.), *The future of the army profession* (1st ed., pp. 523–536). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Burk, J. (2002a). Expertise, jurisdiction, and legitimacy of the military profession. In L. J. Matthews (Ed.), *The future of the army profession* (pp. 19–38). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Burk, J. (2002b). Theories of democratic civil-military relations. *Armed Forces & Society, 29*(1), 7–29.

Caforio, G. (1988). The military profession: Theories of change. *Armed Forces & Society, 15*(1), 55–69.

Caforio, G. (1994). The officer profession: Ideal-type. *Current Sociology, 42*(3), 33–56.

Charles, W. M. (1956). *The power elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Crosbie, T., & Kleykamp, M. (2018). Fault lines of the American military profession. *Armed Forces & Society, 44*(3), 521–543.

Dandeker, C. (1994). New times for the military: Some sociological remarks on the changing role and structure of the armed forces of the advanced societies. *British Journal of Sociology, 45*(4), 637–654.

Dew, K. (2014). Structural functionalism. In W. C. Cockerham, R. Dingwall, & S. R. Quah (Eds.), *Wiley Blackwell encyclopedia of health, illness, behavior, and society* (pp. 2390–2394). Oxford, UK: John Wiley.

Downes, C. (1985). To be or not to be a profession: The military case. *Defense Analysis, 1*(3), 147–171.

Eyal, G. (2013). For a sociology of expertise: The social origins of the autism epidemic. *American Journal of Sociology, 118*(4), 863–907.

Eyal, G., & Pok, G. (2015). What is security expertise? From the sociology of professions to the analysis of networks of expertise. In T. V. Berling & C. Bueger (Eds.), *Security expertise: practice, power and responsibility* (pp. 37–58). New York, NY: Routledge.

Gutknecht, S. P. (2005). *Job satisfaction and intention to quit among Swiss military professionals during organizational changes: A longitudinal study*. Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.516.657&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

Heinecken, L. (2014). Outsourcing public security: The unforeseen consequences for the military profession. *Armed Forces & Society, 40*(4), 625–646.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *Soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*. London: Free Press of Gelncoe.

Lasswell, H. B. (1941). The garrison state. *American Journal of Sociology, 46*(4), 455–468.

Libel, T. (2010). *Training and education of the combat professional officer corps in the West during the post-modern era*. Dissertation, Bar Ilan University [Hebrew].

Libel, T. (2013). From the people's army to the Jewish people's army: The IDF's force structure between professionalization and militarization. *Defense & Security Analysis, 29*(4), 280–292.

Libel, T., & Gal, R. (2015). Between military-society and religion-military relations: Different aspects of the growing religiosity in the Israeli defense forces. *Defense & Security Analysis, 31*(3), 213–227.

Libel, T. (2016). *European military culture and security governance: Soldiers, scholars and national defence universities*. London: Routledge.

Libel, T. (2019). From the sociology of the (military) profession to the sociology of (security) expertise: the case of European national defence universities. *Defence Studies, 19*(1), 62–84.

Luttwak, E. N. (1995). Toward post-heroic warfare. *Foreign Affairs, 74*(3), 109–122.

Matthews, L. J. (Ed.). (2002). *The future of the army profession*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Moelker, R., & Soeters, J. (2008). Van Doorn and beyond: From teaching sociology to interdisciplinary, problem solving-based learning in Dutch officer training. *Armed Forces & Society, 35*(1), 36–48.

Moelker, R., Soeters, J., & van der Meulen, J. (2009). Jacques van Doorn. *Armed Forces & Society, 35*(2), 212–213.

Moten, M. (2011). Who is a member of the military profession? *Joint Force Quarterly, 62*(3), 14–17.

Moskos, C. C. (1977). From institution to occupation: Trends in military organization. *Armed Forces & Society, 4*(1), 41–50.

Moskos, C. C. (1981). *Institution versus occupation: Contrasting models of military organization* (No. 3985–407). Evanston, IL: Department of Sociology, Northwestern University.

Moskos, C. C. (1986). Institutional/occupational trends in armed forces: An update. *Armed Forces and Society, 12*(3), 377–382.

Moskos, C. C., & Wood, F. R. (Eds.). (1988). *The military: More than just a job?*. Lincoln: Potomac Books.

Nielsen, S. C. (2012). American civil-military relations today: The continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State. *International Affairs, 88*(2), 369–376.

Nuciari, M. (1994). Rethinking the military profession: Models of change compared. *Current Sociology, 42*(3), 7–21.

Renz, B. (2014). Russian military capabilities after 20 years of reform. *Survival, 56*(3), 61–84.

Snider, D. M. (2012). *Once again, the challenge to the US Army during a defense reduction: To remain a military profession*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

Snider, D. M., & Watkins, G. L. (2000). The future of army professionalism: A need for renewal and redefinition. *Parameters, 30*(3), 5–20.

Snider, D. M., & Watkins, G. L. (2002). Introduction. In L. J. Mathews (Ed.), *The future of the army profession* (1st ed., pp. 3–18). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Sørensen, H. (1994). New perspectives on the military profession: The I/O model and esprit de corps reevaluated. *Armed Forces & Society, 20*(4), 599–617.

Sorensen, H. (2000). Conscription in Scandinavia during the last quarter century: Developments and arguments. *Armed Forces & Society, 26*(2), 313–334.

Szymański, P. (2015). The Baltic States' Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. *Centre for Security Studies Commentary, 165,* 1–8.

Van der Meulen, M. J., & Manigart, P. (1997). Zero draft in the Low Countries: The final shift to the all-volunteer force. *Armed Forces & Society, 24*(2), 315–332.

Van Doorn, J. (1965). The officer corps: A fusion of profession and organization. *European Journal of Sociology, 6*(2), 262–282.

Waters, C. P. M. (2008). Is the military legally encircled? *Defence Studies, 8*(1), 26–48.

Willeford, J. D. (2014). What is a military professional? Do we have professional enlisted corps? *Marine Corps Gazette, 98*(9), 95–99.

Wyss, M. (2011). Military transformation in Europe's neutral and non-allied states. *RUSI Journal, 156*(2), 44–51.

Chapter 3
The Changing Military Profession in Bulgaria

Yantsislav Yanakiev

Abstract This chapter analyzes the transformation of the Bulgarian military and its concept of professionalism after the end of the Cold War, beginning with the social and political transition from socialism to democracy after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991. The focus is the postmodern trends in the military organization, such as the change in the traditional warrior's role as a result of participating in international missions and operations, the creation of an all-volunteer force, and the full integration of women into the services. In addition, this chapter presents survey results from military members regarding their perceptions of their social status, the prestige of the military profession, and the public image of the defense institution. Finally, public support for the military institution and the military profession is discussed. The chapter concludes with some views about the future of the military profession in Bulgaria and the key challenges to military expertise.

Keywords Military professionalism · Postmodern military · All-volunteer force · Public image of the military · Peace support operations · Bulgarian armed forces

Background: The Bulgarian Military Transition from Socialism to Democracy

Bulgaria was a member of the Warsaw Pact until March 31, 1991, and one of the closest allies of the Soviet Union. Under the conditions of socialist society, the core role of the military profession was the defense of the socialist social system on the national and international level. In essence, this role was first and foremost political: the Peoples' Republic of Bulgaria was a socialist state by virtue of the Article 1 of the *Constitution the Peoples' Republic of Bulgaria* from 1971.

The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the Bulgarian Defence Institute (BDI) or the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence.

Y. Yanakiev (✉)
Bulgarian Defence Institute, Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov Blvd, 1592 Sofia, Bulgaria
e-mail: y.yanakiev@di.mod.bg

The dominant ideology was uniform and corresponded to an axiological self-identification. There was a hierarchical structure of participation of the military in exercising power. In addition, there was an established system of restrictions and privileges for the military (basically, the officer corps), justified by its assigned role as guarantor of the established socio-political system. Finally, there was a clear policy on shaping and maintaining the public image of the armed forces as the "sentinel of peace and socialism."

Since the end of the Cold War, in the conditions of a radically changed social environment and pluralistic society, the core role of the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) became the defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity (see the *Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria*, Art. 9 in National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria 2011). Correspondingly, the core of military professionalism changed significantly toward the acceptance of new democratic values and norms by service members, even though the norms were quite different from those of the authoritarian socialist society.

The 1990 *Political Parties Act* effectively banned political activity in the BAF. The act bans command personnel and ranks from membership in parties and political organizations. It bans also political and religious propaganda in the units. The majority of the officer corps approved of these changes (Bongalova et al. 1995a, pp. 41–46). The process of changeover from socialism to democracy was not easy, and it did not happen overnight. First, the process of differentiation between the political and professional ranks in the top echelons of the military administration and building democratic civil-military relations had started in the beginning of the 1990s, but the process was too slow and accompanied with many tensions (Yanakiev 2005). Second, the definition of the national ideal concept—the axiological backbone of the officer's professional identity—was even more ambivalent and vague. To quote Charles Moskos, the military profession is "legitimated in terms of values and norms: that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good" (Moskos 1986, pp. 377–382).

According to data from surveys carried out in 1994–1995 in the military organization, at the individual level, the majority of military members felt that their profession had low social prestige, and this was an important indicator of the crisis in professional identity (Bongalova et al. 1995b, pp. 53–60). Similarly, opinion polls carried out in Bulgaria after 1990 showed that the public assessed the performance of defense in quite disparate terms. On the one hand, the Bulgarian public was steadily appreciative of the military as an institution. For the period 1990–1995, public trust in the BAF as an institution varied from 65 to 75%, and mistrust from 10 to 12%. During the first five years of the transition to democracy, the BAF had undoubtedly been one of the highest rated institutions in the state. On the other hand, the same public was not so positive about the military profession. Few young people were interested in joining the armed forces. Conscription was not popular at all. At the same time, close to two-thirds of the commissioned officers were not satisfied with the social status of the military profession (Bongalova et al. 1995b, pp. 53–60).

There were several social reasons for this situation: lack of public recognition of the military profession as a "value for the others," lack of stability and predictability,

underpayment, no housing arrangements, lack of adequate jobs for spouses, etc. As a result, the key characteristics of the military profession, such as public recognition, predictability, stability, job security, were undermined. Last but not least, funding for defense has been a major problem for the BAF since the end of the Cold War.

Nonetheless, the social and political context in Bulgaria has gradually changed, even if there is room for improvement. Several factors contributed to gradual improvement of the situation of the Bulgarian military over the last two decades and there have been significant changes in the understanding of military professionalism.

First, Bulgaria became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and of the European Union (EU) in 2007. The country has been an active member of the Alliance, and it has deployed troops on various NATO and EU missions and operations. Moreover, Bulgaria looks for an expanded NATO presence in the Black Sea region and, in support of this goal, has held a growing number of joint NATO military exercises in recent years. A NATO Force Integration Unit was also established at the MoD in Sofia in September 2016, which contributes to better coordination of national and Alliance efforts to guarantee security and stability in the region (NATO 2019).

The second factor is related to active Bulgarian participation in regional and bilateral security cooperation in South Eastern Europe (SEE). A practical expression of the cooperation in the framework of this process is the establishment of the South-East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in 1998 (South-East European Brigade 2019). In addition, the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 28 April 2006 between the United States and Bulgaria allows the U.S. government to deploy and train up to 2,500 soldiers at three joint Bulgarian and U.S. military installations (AFB *Graf Ignatievo*, AFB *Bezmer*, and Army training range *Novo Selo*) under Bulgarian command (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria 2019d).

The third important factor for the positive change of the situation of the BAF and the military profession is related to the political will to increase defense spending over the last several years. During the NATO Wells Summit in 2014, Bulgaria agreed to spend at least 2% of its GDP on defense. In accordance with this decision, a national plan for increasing defense spending to 2% of gross domestic product until 2024 was approved by Parliament (Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria 2017). This important commitment of the Bulgarian government for increasing defense spending made possible new projects for modernizing the BAF. These projects included procuring new multipurpose fighter jets for the Air Force, building new patrol ships and renovating existing frigates for the Navy, and procuring new armored vehicles for the Army (Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria 2015).

Today, the BAF has a clearly defined role and missions. The main role of the armed forces is to guarantee the sovereignty, security, and independence of the country and defend its territorial integrity. There are three main missions for the Bulgarian Armed Forces: defense, support of international peace and security, and national security in peacetime (Republic of Bulgaria 2010).

To summarize, important political, economic, legal, and organizational developments have transformed the defense institution in Bulgaria, its civil-military relations, and have contributed to a new type of military professionalism.

Postmodern Missions and Postmodern Soldiers

The post-Cold War era has seen a significant increase in the number of military operations requiring multinational coalitions, such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, anti-terrorism, stability and support, search and rescue, humanitarian, etc. None of these missions were traditional military operations, being quite different from Samuel Huntington's classical definition of the military profession as "direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primarily function is the application of violence" (Huntington 1957).

Under these circumstances, gradual change in the nature of military professionalism and the traditional military culture has taken place. Military sociologists defined the period as postmodern and, correspondingly, the defense forces as postmodern organizations. The broader range of recent operations requires additional knowledge and skills from the military and "alternative professional types" have emerged. Besides the traditional warrior's role, military professionals today are expected to be "soldier–statesmen," "soldier–scholars," "soldier–diplomats," etc. In addition, there is a trend toward more extensive use of multinational military forces and internationalization of military forces themselves (Moskos et al. 2000). Today, one can identify many of these postmodern trends in the defense organization in Bulgaria. The first trend in Bulgarian military professionalism is the new missions undertaken by the BAF after 1990, beginning in 1992 with the international deployment of the Bulgarian military with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Two infantry battalions, 850 personnel each, took part in UNTAC. The mission started in June 1992 and ended in September 1993. This was the first mission in which 10 Bulgarian soldiers died in service (MoD of the Republic of Bulgaria, Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia 2019).

Following the UNTAC mission, Bulgaria took an active part in several NATO and EU peacekeeping activities, as well as ad hoc coalitions to enhance the international security environment. Most active and lengthy were the missions in the Balkans NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian military contributed one engineering and one transportation platoon to SFOR as a part of the Dutch contingent and the logistic group HELBA/BELUGA under Greek command during 1997–2001. In addition, a force protection company of 149 personnel and equipment was attached to SFOR HQ in the operation from 2002 to 2004. Finally, several Bulgarian military served as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) officers.

An official ceremony of handing over peacekeeping duties from the NATO-led SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU's military operation EUFOR (Operation ALTHEA) was held on December 2004 at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo. The BAF participated in Operation ALTHEA with a 120-strong contingent, comprising a light infantry company protecting the headquarters of the operation, a national support element, a liaison and observation team, and staff officers at operation headquarters (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria 2019c).

Bulgarian military personnel were also deployed in both missions in Kosovo, the NATO-led KFOR and the UN peacekeeping operation (UNMIK). Since February 2000, a 40-strong Bulgarian engineering platoon (attached first to the Dutch and later the German contingent) took part in the construction, maintenance, and repair of engineering facilities, as well as in the reconstruction of buildings needed by the local population. Since January 15, 2000, Bulgarian military observers have also been deployed in UNMIK. As part of the planned reduction in the strength of KFOR, our engineering platoon terminated its participation in the operation at the end of 2009. Currently, the Bulgarian contribution to KFOR is 10 military personnel at mission headquarters (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria 2019b).

Bulgarian participation in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan started in the beginning of 2002 with a small 32 personnel sanitary contingent deployed in the area of responsibility of the British contingent outside Kabul. Changes in the security environment in the region have necessitated changes in the tasks performed by the contingent. Since 2003, the National Assembly authorized the participation of a mechanized platoon in ISAF and instructors to train the Afghan National Army. In 2007, our country gradually increased its contribution, sending another two companies, one under the Italian Battle Group in Kabul, the second in the defence of Kandahar Air Field, along with experts in specific tasks (i.e., Air Traffic Control of Kabul Airport, intelligence groups, and a military police platoon).

During the handover of security responsibilities in the capital from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces in 2009, our mechanized company and the safe-guard platoon were pulled out of the operation zone. However, in 2009, a Bulgarian company took over the protection of Kabul Airport's inner perimeter. Early in 2009, Bulgaria sent an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team to Kandahar in support of the Afghan National Army, and in 2011 another three such teams (two in Kabul and one in Kandahar), along with a Senior Advisors Team. Bulgaria has also committed medical teams to the operation in Kabul, sending the first team of surgeons to work under the Spanish Field Hospital in 2004, and later enlarging the participation of Bulgarian medical surgery teams in Herat and Kandahar.

In September 2012, the four Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams in support of the Afghan National Army were transformed into Advisor Teams. Following the operational transformation processes, the Ministry of Defence conducted a military assessment, with analysis and recommendations for our participation in the operation in 2011. As a result, by the end of the same year the government had adopted the *Strategy for Transformation of the Participation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan*, setting up the framework of the forthcoming transformation of the Bulgarian contingent.

Currently, Bulgaria participates in NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which is focused on the preparing, assisting, and provisioning teams of advisers for the Afghan state institutions and national security forces in the Afghan government, along with partners and other international organizations engaged in the regional mission (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria 2019a).

Since 2005, the Bulgarian Navy has supported Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), part of NATO's naval force in the Mediterranean, which is an effort by the international community to combat terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. The Bulgarian Navy provided a frigate with a crew of roughly 110 service members to participate in the operation for a month each year, as well as a task force of the special maritime vessel inspection team. The Bulgarian frigate last participated in the October 2009 OAE mission (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria 2011b).

In addition to the above-mentioned missions and operations, Bulgaria contributed to the first phase of the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR), from 2003 until the end of 2005, as a part of the multinational coalition forces in the Polish division. During this period, five infantry battalions were rotated, each deployed for 6 months. As a whole, 2,309 Bulgarian military personnel participated in this phase of the SFIR operation, primarily in CIMIC projects and patrolling. Officially, the battalion commander was the Military Governor of Karbala. After 2005, and until 2008, the Bulgarian contingent was redeployed to guarding the Ashraf Detention and Protection Centre and to the protection of detainees undergoing a reintegration program at the Cropper Base in Baghdad (Global Security Forum 2019).

Bulgaria has also contributed to the NATO Training Mission–Iraq (NTM–I), which was launched in 2004 to provide practical assistance in the training and equipping of the Iraqi Security Forces. NTM–I focused on training and educating mid-to-senior-level officers and the creation of robust and reliable military leadership at the strategic and the operational levels. In essence, NTM–I was not a combat mission; it was a separate operation, auxiliary to other international efforts aimed at the relief and reconstruction in Iraq. Since the beginning of 2009, Bulgaria has renewed its contribution to NTM–I, deploying two military personnel to mission headquarters (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria 2011a).

All told, the military has been much more involved in operations that differ from the warfighting that they had been trained for. Bulgarian participation in peace support operations (PSOs), the umbrella term for operations like the traditional peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, peace-building, peace-making, humanitarian operations, conflict prevention, etc., has initiated a process of transition from the traditional role of the warrior toward the new role of the proactive peacekeeper (Yanakiev 2000). In other words, this long participation in peace-support operations has precipitated a gradual change in the traditional military culture.

One of the most important indicators of the change is the relation between the military and the local population in the area of deployment. The peace-support force is deployed in the host country, both in the case of traditional peacekeeping and in peace enforcement, in order to help people and to protect their lives and their rights. This is a quite different role from the one of the warrior in the previous times.

The second important characteristic of the military culture change is the military's involvement in managing civilian tasks. This is particularly true for the role of proactive peacekeepers. The PSOs, as a result of their complex character, involve many actors in the field, both military and civilian. Both sides frequently have different

perceptions of the success of the PSOs. The way of working of the civilian organizations is quite different from the typical military understanding of organization, discipline, and responsibility. In such situations, the military has had to cooperate and work together with civilian organizations.

The third characteristic of the military role change, which distinguishes it from the traditional role of the warrior, is related to the extensive use of multinational military forces for executing PSOs. This change elevated the importance of cultural adaptability and cross-cultural competence among peacekeepers who had to be able to work with their counterparts from other military contingents and local populations.

The Bulgarian military was challenged to work with colleagues who have different organizational culture (decentralized vs. the centralized one typical for the Bulgarians), different leadership skills (direct vs. indirect, which is common for the Bulgarians), different education and training, and, among other differences, the language barrier. In addition, the Bulgarian military faced organizational barriers to effective integration in multinational coalitions, such as different concepts of tactics and mission planning, different disciplinary codes, different command and control systems, equipment and armament, payment differences, and so forth.

All these factors undoubtedly influenced the change in military professionalism in the BAF. The role of proactive peacekeepers is connected with the performance of new tasks concerning active cooperation and coordination with civilian organizations, the local population, and the mass media. At the same time, the new generation PSOs have faced many of the demands belonging to traditional military professionalism. As we have seen in the recent PSOs, like ISAF and SFIR, strong combatant skills are still required to succeed in the operation. In this respect, the traditional military skills and values have not lost their value.

It is therefore important to determine the kinds of knowledge and skills the military needs to succeed in the new missions. A survey of Bulgarian service members—specifically, the contingent in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan—regarding challenges that they had encountered in multinational operations identified a number of gaps in knowledge and training (Yanakiev 2012). More than half the respondents (53.4%) reported needing additional English-language training, particularly in the specialized English used in the documents they worked with on the mission (e.g., NATO abbreviations).

A second gap in the preparation of the Bulgarian military, according to about one-third of respondents, was knowledge of international law (35.3%), national psychology in the region of the mission (35.0%), religious communities in the region of the mission (33.3%), and international relations (32.7%). These knowledge gaps characterize the new dimensions of the military job and point to the need for new professional types, which differ from the traditional understanding of the military.

The third gap was in pre-deployment training, which almost one-third of respondents cited, and also relates to specific tasks during multinational operations: multicultural communication techniques (31.3%), history of the mission area (31.0%), and logistics on a mission (29.6%).

The fourth gap in training mentioned by about one-fourth of respondents was knowledge in the spheres of CIMIC (25.2%), economy in the region of the mission (25.2%), and public relations (23.7%). This knowledge is important for the success of contemporary military operations, which require good awareness of the socio-political and economic situation in the region of the mission, as well as the organization of CIMIC projects for winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

In fifth place, about one-fifth of respondents noted that they needed additional training in public administration and administrative procedures when working in multinational operations, including better information about the administrative system in the region where the operation was carried out (21.1%), as well as the manuals and regulations of a NATO-led multinational operations (20.9%).

The lowest-ranked items on respondents' list were additional knowledge in topography (14%), tactics (9.8%), conflict-resolution skills (13.2%), leadership skills for working in a mission (11.3%), team-working skills (9.5%), and decision-making skills (8.7%).

The comparison of these data with the data gathered from earlier surveys shows a steady trend of interest in additional knowledge and skills in multicultural communication techniques and the need for a better knowledge of the history of the conflict. This is easy to understand when one bears in mind that the Bulgarian contingent in the NATO ISAF acted in a relatively strange and remote region and among a population different from the Bulgarian culture. The share of the respondents who wanted more knowledge about logistics on missions was also relatively high.

To summarize, the data analysis shows that Bulgarian military personnel were satisfied with the level of their training as military specialists. When compared with their colleagues from other countries, 79% of the Bulgarian military personnel declared they did not face any deficiencies in their professional military education and training. At the same time, they lacked the training needed to fulfil the nontraditional part of their military jobs—of the "soldier diplomat" and the "soldier statesman," which became more and more important on operations. They also thought it was very important to broaden their English-language proficiency in the new subject matter areas, such as rules of engagement, logistics, staff procedures, etc.

Transition to an All-Volunteer Force

The Bulgarian Parliament decided to end conscription after 31 December 2007. This significantly changed the concept of military service and military professionalism, influencing the recruitment, motivation, and retention of Bulgarian military personnel. The decision to abolish conscription in Bulgaria was made as a result of two main factors. The first was the significant downsizing of the BAF after the end of the Cold War. From 1960 to 1990, the strength of the BAF was around 120,000. Until 1990, the period of conscription was two years for the Army and Air Force, and three years for the Navy. A 1990 amendment to the *Universal Conscription Act*

reduced the draft to 18 months. As a result, the strength of the BAF was downsized to 104,000. After that, the government adopted what was known as "Plan 2004," which provided for decreasing the number of soldiers to 45,000 by the end of 2004 and ending conscription by 2007. During this time, the conscription period was reduced to 9 months. All the same, the motivation of young people to serve in the military was extremely low. In addition, this short term of service was not enough to train a soldier (Domozetov et al. 1999). The second important factor behind abolishing conscription was the need for military training and skills needed for the BAF's new missions. Sending mixed military formations (professional, conscript, and reserve) in the UNTAC mission in Cambodia had been unsuccessful.

Today, more than 10 years after abolishing conscription, the Bulgarian military is undergoing a mixture of "institutional" and "occupational" trends, to use Charles Moskos's terms. According to Moskos, traditional military culture is based on specific norms and values, which constitute a specific military ethic (i.e., defense of the common good, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity). This is one side of the coin of Moskos's understanding of the military as an institution. The other side is the understanding of the military profession as an occupation or as a job "like any other job." In this case, the main source of legitimacy is the market: Self-interest is a high priority, rather than the interest of society (Moskos 1986, pp. 377–382).

Representative surveys for the BAF carried out by the Defence Advanced Research Institute at G. S. Rakovski National Defence College from 2013 to 2017 are indicative of the gradual transition from the institutional to the occupational model of military professionalism in Bulgaria, even though the two models still co-exist.

Table 3.1 presents some indicators of this trend, based on data from the last survey of BAF members in 2017. The first indicator is related to the leading motives of service members who have chosen a career in the BAF. For those surveyed, the top three motivators for becoming a military professional were the desire to serve the motherland ($M = 4.40$), job security ($M = 4.36$), the amount of pay ($M = 4.31$), and the opportunity for professional development ($M = 4.24$). Interest in a specific specialty ($M = 4.11$), early retirement opportunity ($M = 4.06$), and interest in military equipment, weapons, and technology ($M = 4.05$) were also highly rated.

Motivators with comparatively less importance were the public prestige of the military profession ($M = 3.90$), the possibility for longer annual leave ($M = 3.89$), and the challenges of the military profession ($M = 3.74$). Finally, the motives with the lowest importance were the opportunity to use military housing ($M = 2.95$), participation in missions abroad ($M = 3.41$), and a desire for leadership and command of other people ($M = 3.51$).

The results on two indicators need additional clarification. The first is the comparatively low importance of a typical institutional factor like the public prestige of the military profession. The result can be explained by the fact that military personnel perceive the image of the profession as comparatively low. The analysis of the data from the last survey in 2017 shows that nearly half of the respondents (49.0%) perceived the image of the institution as "not very good" and 31.0% considered it as "not good at all." Merely 17.0% of respondents gave a moderately good rating to the public image of the military institution, and only 2% rated it unconditionally as "very

Table 3.1 Arithmetic mean scores of the answers of the respondents on the degree of importance of motives for career development in the BAF

Career development motives	Average arithmetic mean score
Desire to serve my home country	4.40
Safe and secure work place	4.36
Amount of pay	4.31
Professional career opportunity	4.24
I like the particular specialty I work in	4.06
Early retirement opportunity	4.05
Interest in military equipment, weapons and technology	4.03
Public prestige of the military profession	3.90
Possibility for longer annual leave	3.89
The challenges of the military profession	3.74
The desire to be a leader, to command and to lead others	3.51
Opportunity to participate in missions abroad	3.41
Opportunity to use military housing	2.95

Scale minimum = 1, maximum = 5

good." The comparative analysis of the data for the period 2013–2017 confirms the negative tendency in the self-assessment of the public image of the BAF.

The poor perceived public image of the military is a worrying tendency because it influences the core value of the military profession as a "profession for the others" aimed at "defense of the common good." When military members perceive their job as not prestigious and not valued by society, this creates problems with attraction, recruitment, motivation, and retention of human capital.

The second indicator needing additional comment is the comparatively low importance of a typical "occupational" factor like the opportunity to use military housing. This result can be explained by the fact that in the period after 1990 the military housing opportunities have been significantly reduced and, as a result, this is not a real motivator for military service.

To summarize, the leading motives for career development in the BAF were identical to those identified in the previous surveys from 2013 to 2015, and they relate mainly to the desire to serve the motherland (institutional motive) and the social aspects of the service and job security (occupational motive). An emerging trend is

the higher importance accorded to stability and the predictability of a professional position in a defense organization over more traditional factors, such as participation in operations abroad and the command of others.

In the context of these occupational trends in the military professionalism in Bulgaria, two more indicators deserve attention. The first is the self-assessment of the social status of military personnel. The 2017 survey data clearly expressed negative self-assessments by service members of their social status. The overwhelming majority of respondents gave their social status a low assessment: 48.3% reported "not very good" and 36.2% "not good at all." Moderately positive self-esteem was expressed by less than one-fifth of the surveyed members (17.3%). The percentage of those respondents who rated their social status as "very good" was only 2.2%. A comparison of 2017 data with the data from previous years (2013–2015) shows that there were no significant changes over the years regarding the self-assessment of the prestige of the military profession.

The second indicator is the perceived job stability and predictability provided by the military profession. Respondents were asked to assess the degree to which BAF service guarantees them a safe and secure future. The answers to this question can be interpreted as an overwhelming perception of insecurity among the respondents about the future of their military service. Nearly half the respondents (46.2%) declared "I rather do not feel secure," and 14.3% said "I do not feel secure at all." Less than one-tenth (5.9%) perceived complete job security, and close to a third (33.6%) felt rather secure about their future. A comparison with previous surveys from 2013 to 2015 shows a sustained negative trend of uncertainty among service members about their future in the BAF. Accordingly, there is also a reduction in the relative share of those who perceived service in the institution as predictable and stable.

To summarize, the low level of perceived social status among BAF personnel in combination with perceived job instability and lack of predictability provided by the military profession deserves particular attention because it can lead to severe difficulties with attraction, recruitment, and retention of members in the years to come. Actually, the services have already experienced such problems.

Full Integration of Women into the Services

The third postmodern trend in the BAF is the full integration of women into the services. As a result of abolishing formal barriers to service in the defense institution, all positions in the BAF are now open to women, and there has been a gradual increase in women's representation. Table 3.2 shows that for the period 2014–2018 the percentage of women among active duty military increased from 14.8 to 16.0%.

In addition, more women have been participating in international missions and operations (Table 3.3). For the period 2014–2018, the average female participation rate in Bulgarian military contingents abroad was 9.4%, and the highest percentage of women on such a mission was 12.5% during the four-year period.

Table 3.2 Female active duty military personnel members of the Bulgarian Armed Forces

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
%	14.8%	15.1%	15.2%	15.9%	16.0%

Source Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. Action plan for implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria (Ministry of the Republic of Bulgaria 2019e)

Table 3.3 Female active duty military personnel in international missions and operations

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
%	6.5%	10.1%	12.5%	8.3%	9.6%

Source Unpublished internal report of the Bulgarian MoD

Compared with the previous four-year period, 2009–2013, where women's share in Bulgarian contingents was about 7%, the participation of women in international military missions and operations has been increasing. Women in medical positions and CIMIC teams, where they are in permanent contact with a wide range of civilian organizations and local community representatives, have been particularly valuable.

The results from the surveys carried out in Bulgarian defense during the period 2013–2017 confirmed that there is no indication of organizational discrimination against female service members. People of both sexes reported that there are equal opportunities for professional realization in the defense institution. Thus, measures taken by the Ministry of Defence leadership to remove legislative and organizational barriers to guarantee gender equality are working. The problem is gradually overcoming prejudices and stereotypes in people's minds, which is a process that will require focused policy, systematic work, and education.

Public Support for the Military Institution and the Military Profession

Public support for the defense institution and the military profession is important for defense policy development and implementation. This section looks at the perceptions and attitudes of citizens regarding the BAF and the military profession.

According to data from a recent nation-wide public opinion poll carried out by the Bulgarian Defence Institute Professor Tsvetan Lazarov, in cooperation with Gallup International Balkan EAD in July–August 2019, the BAF was the second most highly approved national institution, after the president. The majority of Bulgarians (60.8%) approve of the BAF's performance as an institution. The lack of approval was close to a fifth (21.3%), and 17.9% of respondents had no opinion. In addition, more than half of Bulgarians had "very positive" (15.9%) or "rather positive" (42.0%) personal attitudes toward the BAF. Those who had "rather negative" and "negative" attitudes

amounted to 11.5 and 4.7%. One-fifth of the respondents (20.0%) declared that they had no opinion on the question.

When Bulgarians were asked whether they trusted the BAF as the guarantor of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, most of them declared that they "trust fully" (19.0%) or "rather trust" (38.0%) that the institution will be able to fulfil its constitutional responsibilities. About a third stated that they "rather do not trust" (22.3%) and "do not thrust at all" (11.5%), while 9.2% had no opinion.

Moreover, the vast majority of the citizens reported that improving the public prestige of the BAF was a "very important" (50.2%) or "important" (33.7%) goal for the government, while 3.5% thought it "rather unimportant" and 1.2% "unimportant." Less than a tenth (8.1%) were indifferent, and 3.3% had no opinion. Similarly, the great majority of Bulgarians thought that building and maintaining a strong BAF was a "very important" (59.1%) or "important" (28.4%) goal, with only 1.6% thinking it "rather unimportant" and 0.9% "unimportant." Less than a tenth (7.4%) were indifferent, and 2.7% had no opinion on the question.

Data clearly show a positive and supportive attitude of Bulgarians toward the BAF. If we compare these results with the data from the beginning of the democratic changes in Bulgaria, we see that the positive attitude toward the defense institution has been stable, and there have been no significant changes over the time. Hence, the BAF can rely on comparatively high public support.

Regarding the public image of the military profession, a majority of Bulgarians perceived it as "very good" (15.1%) or "good" (43.6%), while less than a fifth considered the prestige of the profession as "not very good" (11.5%) or "not good at all" (4.7%). Another fifth (20.0%) had no opinion on the question. Comparing these data with military members' self-assessment of their profession presented in the previous section, we see that BAF members are much more critical and unsatisfied than Bulgarian citizens. This discrepancy is likely the result of different expectations, different bases for comparison, and different levels of information. In any case, the low level of perceived prestige of the military profession among service members deserves attention by policy-makers.

When compared with 17 of the most popular professions in the country, commissioned officer (CO), non-commissioned officer (NCO), and volunteer soldier/sailor were rated 9th, 14th, and 15th. Obviously, the public makes a distinction between the hierarchical positions inside the military profession, placing COs in the middle of the rating scale and NCOs and volunteer soldiers/sailors at the bottom. According to the data, commercial airline pilots, medical doctors, diplomats, university professors, engineers, pharmacists, attorneys in law, and judges were perceived to be much more prestigious than being a CO. Less prestigious than COs were the professions of public prosecutor, journalist, police officer, clergyman, and customs officer. Without analyzing the reasons behind the ratings, it should be mentioned that the CO profession has occupied the middle of the rating in previous surveys.

Conclusion: The Future of the Military Profession in Bulgaria

This final section of the chapter presents a view about the transformation of the military professional in Bulgaria and some of the key challenges to military expertise. First of all, the postmodern trends show every sign of continuing to develop in the Bulgarian military, especially the change to occupational motives for military service. For this reason, it is important for the government to create and implement a corresponding long-term vision, strategy, and policy options for attraction, selection, recruitment, motivation, retention, and development in the defense organization.

The low level of perceived public prestige for the military profession by BAF members, their perceived lack of stability and predictability in military service, and their perceived lack of public support must be ended. Achieving this goal will require a whole-of-society approach that includes policy-makers, military leadership, educational institutions and academia, non-governmental institutions, media, and citizens themselves. Otherwise, the defense institution will be unable to attract and retain qualified young people.

Second, the rapidly changing strategic security environment and the rising unpredictability of the world conflicts will require augmentation and intense specialization of the competencies of military professionals. The military will continue to be involved in implementing civilian tasks, in addition to warfighting. The process of integrating military and civilian expertise while guaranteeing security will continue to advance and, as a consequence, the competencies required to work in interagency and diverse environments will become more and more essential for the military professional. In order to be effective in tomorrow's military operations, leaders and the teams will have to be able to adapt rapidly not only to the military requirements of future operations, but they must also be able to collaborate with many civilian actors. Obviously, the military has to pursue a mixture of role models that combine traditional warrior's skills with the skills of soldier diplomat, statesmen, mediator, etc. In addition, military leaders will have to develop a strong coalition and joint culture because future operations will be joint, multinational, and interagency. Likewise, the future armed forces will have to develop leaders who can lead the transformation process and build a new organizational culture.

Third, the BAF, like other postmodern armed forces, will continue to follow the process of changing the military organization as a whole—i.e., from a hierarchical to a network-building principle. The focus will be on de-learning and decentralization of the organizational processes, which will require a change in leadership practices and the organizational culture as a whole.

Fourth, the military profession will be strongly influenced by the development of new defense technologies, particularly digitalization and artificial intelligence (AI). One of the key questions is whether in the mid-term AI will replace human decision making in defense organizations. The answer is likely no, but AI will definitely be valuable in enhancing the human capacity to process huge amount of data and to increase immensely human effectiveness in decision making. To win future wars,

defense organizations will have to leverage specialized skills in digital automation and AI. In addition, it is important that commanders have experts with a data science background, as well as people with on-the-ground expertise—i.e., people who understand use-cases and objectives.

Finally, and equally important, the process of building and sustaining democratic civil-military relations in Bulgaria and the improvement of civilian control over defense will continue in the context of Bulgaria's membership in the EU and NATO. The key element of future civil-military relations will be the awareness of policy-makers in the military and security domains and the broadening of the expertise and skills of the military in global, regional, and national security policy. All this will require cultivating military-sensitive politicians and a politically sensitive military.

References

Bongalova, S., Yanakiev, Y., & Genkova, N. (1995a). Bulgarian Army officers as a socio-professional group: State and prospects. *Military Journal, 1*(Spring), 41–46.

Bongalova, S., Yanakiev, Y., & Genkova, N. (1995b). The military profession: Inside and outside view. *Military Journal, 4*(Winter), 53–60.

Domozetov, C., Yanakiev, Y., Karastoyanov, G., & Christov, H. (1999). The Bulgarian Army: The transition from conscript to volunteer recruitment pattern. In S. E. Nikolov & Y. Yanakiev (Eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* (pp. 253–284). Sofia: Publishing House of the Ministry of Defence.

Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2015). *Programme for the development of the defence capabilities of the Bulgarian armed forces 2020*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/cooperation/20181009_DefCapab_Program_EN.pdf.

Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2017). *National plan for increasing the defence spending to 2% of the gross domestic product until 2024*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/programi/20180202_National_Plan_EN.pdf.

Global Security Forum. (2019). *Iraq coalition troops*. Retrieved from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition_050816.htm.

Huntington, S. (1957). *The soldier and the state*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2011a). *NATO Training Mission-Iraq*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/tema/MissionsOperations5.pdf.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2011b). *Participation in operation active endeavour*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/tema/MissionsOperations4.pdf.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2019). *Peacekeeping operation in Cambodia UNTAC*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/bg/tema_MissionsOperations_Over.html#10.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2019a). *General information concerning ISAF and the countries participating in the mission*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/tema_MissionsOperations_Afghanistan.html.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2019b). *Bulgarian military personnel in the KFOR and UNMIK missions in Kosovo*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/tema/MissionsOperations2.pdf.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2019c). *Participation of Bulgarian military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR/ALTHEA)*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/tema/MissionsOperations3.pdf.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2019d). *Main bilateral military cooperation agreements*. Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/cooperation_bilateral_agreements.html.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2019e). *Action plan for implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325.* Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/gender/20111114_ActioPlan1325.pdf.

Moskos, C. (1986). Institutional/occupational trends in the armed forces: An update. *Armed Forces & Society, 12*(3), 377–382.

Moskos, C., Williams, J. A., & Segal, D. R. (Eds.). (2000). *The post-modern military: Armed forces after the Cold War.* New York: Oxford University Press.

National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2011). *Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria*, Art. 9. Retrieved from https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/bg/bg033en.pdf.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2019). *NATO force integration units*. Retrieved from https://shape.nato.int/operations/nato-force-integration-units.

Republic of Bulgaria. (2010). *Law on defence and armed forces of the republic of Bulgaria*, Art. 52(1). Retrieved from https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/zakoni/20100226_ZOVSRB.pdf.

South East European Brigade. (2019). Homepage. Retrieved from https://www.seebrig.org/.

Yanakiev, Y. (2000). Military co-operation in South Eastern Europe and the future of multinational peace support operations. Rome: NATO Defense College, Rome, Monograph Series, Spring 2000.

Yanakiev, Y. (2005). Cultural dimensions of civil-military relations for democratic society: The case of Bulgaria. In G. Caforio & G. Kuemmel (Eds.), *Military missions and their implications reconsidered: The aftermath of September 11th* (pp. 93–113). Amsterdam, NL: Elsevier.

Yanakiev, Y. (2012). Professional military education and training focused on cross-cultural competencies building and adaptability in multinational coalitions. In Y. Yanakiev & G. S. Rakovski (Eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on the Occasion of 100th Anniversary of Professional military education and defense studies: Past, present and future* (pp. 387–402). Sofia: G. S. Rakovski National Defence College Press.

Chapter 4
Perspectives on Military Professionalism from Canadian Armed Forces Members

Krystal K. Hachey

Abstract Little research has been conducted on how diversity and gender affect military professionalism (Ewles et al. 2017) and how diverse groups perceive this concept. This project examined perspectives on military professionalism and unprofessionalism from diverse members across the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) using a qualitative approach. To ensure diverse participation, the study was based on the constructivist paradigm (i.e., multiple realities), using the Gender-Based Analysis Plus process, which helps identify the differential impacts of research on diverse groups of men and women. A total of $N = 125$ individuals participated in interviews and focus groups from October 2016 to January 2017. Results revealed that there are unique aspects associated with both professionalism and unprofessionalism, with leadership playing a key role. This study sheds light onto the experiences of members and how perceptions of professionalism are shaped by members' experiences.

Keywords Canadian Armed Forces · Military · Professionalism · Qualitative research · Diversity

Introduction

Professionalism in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has been defined for almost two decades by *Duty with Honour* (2003, reprinted in 2009), a guidance document prepared by the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute under the aegis of the Chief of the Defence Staff. As the introduction suggests, *Duty with Honour* was strongly influenced by the concepts of military professionalism advanced by Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960):

> The profession of arms is distinguished by the concept of service before self, the lawful, ordered application of military force, and the acceptance of the concept of unlimited liability. Its members possess a systematic and specialized body of military knowledge and skills

K. K. Hachey (✉)
Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, 101 Colonel by Drive, Ottawa, ON K1A0K2, Canada
e-mail: krystal.hachey@forces.gc.ca

acquired through education, training and experience, and they apply this expertise competently and objectively in the accomplishment of their missions. Members of the Canadian profession of arms share a set of core values and beliefs found in the military ethos that guides them in the performance of their duty and allows a special relationship of trust to be maintained with Canadian society (National Defence and CAF 2009, p. 10).

The traditional touchstones in Huntington's and Janowitz's definitions of professionalism—specialized knowledge, responsibility, competence, and the nature of civil-military relations—are woven with traditional military concepts like unlimited liability, the fighting spirit, discipline, and teamwork, along with Canadian and Canadian military values, such as duty, loyalty, integrity, courage, and the warrior's honor (CAF 2003). Social and organizational imperatives are laid out as well, including different levels of responsibility (e.g., organizational, professional) and kinds of expertise (i.e., core, supporting, specialized, and common knowledge). *Duty with Honour* defines leadership, policies for professional development, history, heritage and traditions, and the key roles these concepts play in sustaining the profession of arms (CAF 2003). Figure 4.1 is meant to symbolize the relation between the concepts that represent Canadian military professionalism.

Duty with Honour also speaks to the importance of adapting to the evolving nature of professionalism as the environment and culture changes. The profession of arms must stay relevant (i.e., meet Canadians needs), be open (i.e., knowledge and relevant skills), be consistent (i.e., attributes of responsibility, expertise, and identity are consistent), and provide reciprocity (i.e., expectations and obligations between the Canadian society and the profession and vice versa). In keeping with the model in Fig. 4.1, changes in one area will affect other areas. Changes in technology, for example, will lead to changes in expertise and perhaps changes in one's responsibility and identity (e.g., different occupation; CAF 2003). In this respect, *Duty with Honour* recognizes that military professionalism is shaped by the surrounding culture and its values (English 2004; Evetts 2013; Ewles et al. 2017; Hachey 2017; Rudvin 2007).

Fig. 4.1 Theoretical construct of the profession of arms in Canada (CAF 2009)

Over the years, military professionalism has been shaped by conceptual and cultural influences. On the conceptual side, theories of military professionalism have been evolving since Huntington and Janowitz as a result of changes in society and changes in the function of the military (Ewles et al. 2017; Gates 1985). Researchers have sought to understand the influence from social, organizational, and individual levels, including a move from a more traditional view of the military (e.g., Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Sarkesian 1981) to one shaped by the external environment (Abbott 1988). On the cultural side, the Government of Canada recently released a new defense policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, which calls for institutionalized culture change that is more inclusive of gender and diversity (CAF 2017).

Considerable research has examined the military as a profession (e.g., Crosbie and Kleykamp 2017; Snider 2015; Stouffer and Lindsay 2012) and militaries' efforts to increase diversity (e.g., Scoppio 2009), but few researchers have examined the diverse perspectives of members themselves concerning the concept of military professionalism and how diversity fits into it. The goal of this project, therefore, was to examine the perspectives on military professionalism from diverse members across the CAF using a qualitative approach informed by Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) (Status Women of Canada, 2018). GBA+ challenges assumptions regarding shared experiences among diverse men and women to better understand diverse perspectives and experiences regarding the concept of military professionalism in the Canadian military.

Methods and Participants

The research was developed using a constructivist paradigm, which emphasizes the inclusion of many social realities experienced by participants (Creswell 2007; Lincoln et al. 2011) and the GBA+ process (Status of Women Canada 2015, 2016, 2018) to capture experiences from a wide variety of participants. This paradigm considers how racial, cultural, ethnic, and gender identities are included in the military institution, which has a robust socialization processes to create a shared identity.[1]

After Department of National Defence (DND) ethics approval,[2] members of the Canadian military were invited to participate through a parallel subgroup (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007) and snowball sampling technique (Mason 1996) to ensure diverse participation (Hachey et al. 2018). Participants were selected from across specific demographic groups, including age, gender, military rank, geographic location, and diverse identities, including Indigenous and visible minority people, and members with a disability.[3] Participants employed in occupations with a low

---

[1]For more information on the methodology of the study consult Hachey et al. (2018). For more information on the larger study results consult Hachey (2019).

[2]Department of National Defence Social Science Review Board Ethics Approval 1565/16F.

[3]In complying with national legislation, the *Employment Equity Act* of the Government of Canada, the Canadian Armed Forces is required to ensure representation in the military of designated group

representation of men (e.g., men employed as dentists) or women (e.g., women in the combat arms; CAF 2015a) were sought out.[4] Potential participants were invited via email to in-person interviews or focus groups at bases across Canada or to a telephone interview at their own convenience. All data were collected between October 2016 and January 2017. Interviews and focus groups ranged between 30 and 90 min (Hachey et al. 2018), including administration of a consent form, semi-structured discussion using interview and focus group protocols, and debriefing regarding follow-up contact should they have further questions. While all the data were integrated for data analysis, some focus groups were mixed gender and some only contained men or women.

As Table 4.1 shows, the final sample of voluntary participants consisted of 125 CAF members, with the highest representation being older than 35 (76.5%); Regular Force members (53.7%); those wearing a Navy uniform (56.1%); men (58.0%); English speakers (72.5%); and officers holding the rank of major and above (36.2%). Moreover, the majority of participants came from National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa ($n = 37$; 29.6%), two naval operational bases in Victoria ($n = 20$; 16.0%) and Halifax ($n = 13$; 10.4%), the Primary Reserve headquarters in Québec City ($n = 11$; 8.8%) and a Regular Force base in Vancouver ($n = 14$; 11.2%). As shown in Table 4.2, roughly a third of the sample identified as designated group members, with roughly the same number from each group. While efforts were made to include diverse perspectives (e.g., visible minority), there are limitations to understanding the intersectionality (e.g., visible minority women) of these perspectives.

Since this research project focused on investigating military professionalism among diverse CAF members, the following questions sought to tap into their perceptions of professionalism, which would have been shaped, in part, by *Duty with Honour* (CAF 2009):

1. As a CAF member, how would you describe professionalism?

    a. What are the characteristics that make an individual professional?
    b. What makes a military professional?
    c. What makes you a professional?

2. To what extent is it important for the military to be considered a profession?

    a. In your experience, to what extent is professionalism an important part of the CAF/Royal Canadian Navy/Canadian Army/Royal Canadian Air Force/Regular or Reserve Force/your unit?

---

members (DGM), defined by four designated groups: women, Indigenous people, persons with disabilities, and members of visible minorities (Government of Canada 2007, 2019). As a result, member sampling can include those who have self-identified in one of these categories. Purposive sampling was not possible for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) members as this information is not held in databases from which samples are drawn.

[4] A representative sample of potential participants was created using SAS software. CAF member data were obtained from Director Human Resources Information Management, while employment equity DGM information (e.g., Indigenous people) was obtained from Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity (Hachey et al. 2018).

Table 4.1 Demographic characteristics

Demographic characteristic	Frequency	Percentage
Age		
Youth (18–24)	4	3.4
Young adults (25–35)	24	20.2
Middle age (36–49)	*51*	*42.9*
Older adulthood	40	33.6
Service component		
Regular Force	*66*	*53.7*
Primary Reserve Force	56	45.5
Environmental uniform		
Sea[a]	*69*	*56.1*
Land	40	32.5
Air	14	11.4
Gender		
Female	29	42.0
Male	*40*	*58.0*
First official language		
French-speaking	15	21.7
English-speaking	*50*	*72.5*
Other	4	5.8
Rank		
Junior Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) (private/ordinary seaman to master corporal/master seaman)	11	15.9
Senior NCM (sergeant/petty officer 2nd class to chief warrant officer/chief petty officer 1st class)	15	21.7
Junior Officer (officer cadet/naval cadet to captain/lieutenant [navy])	18	26.1
Senior Officer (major/lieutenant-commander and above)	*25*	*36.2*

[a]The proportion of Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) participants was higher because they were targeted for another project involving the RCN

Table 4.2 Additional employment equity group membership

Employment equity group	Frequency	Percentage
Indigenous person	14	11.4
Person with a disability	12	9.7
Member of a visible minority	15	12/1

Given the impact of social media on professionalism, and in particular the potential impacts on the relationship between personal and professional identity (Mostaghimi and Crotty 2011), the following questions were included:

1. With the increase in the use of social media, to what extent is social media changing how work and personal life are divided?

    a. To what extent is social media impacting your professional relationships? On professionalism?

Once the interviews and focus groups were completed, data were first coded using the questions in the protocol, followed by a deeper investigation of the themes and patterns in the data (Miles et al. 2014). NVivo (2015) was used to organize the data and present large themes, Microsoft OneNote to summarize and articulate the themes, and Microsoft Excel to present a summary matrix of all the themes discovered.

Results

This section presents the major themes in professionalism and unprofessionalism (a theme that emerged in the analysis) identified by participants.[5]

Professionalism

When asked about aspects of professionalism in general and whether the Canadian military was considered a profession, some participants felt that it was not a profession, others that it was difficult to define, and still others that it was more of a job than a career, calling to mind Moskos's (1977) institutional/occupational model of military professionalism (Cotton 1995). Some participants felt that professionalism depended on occupation, service type, and environment. One participant thought that professionalism was more important for the Army than for the Air Force or Navy "because you are more in the public eye" (interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, RCAF, junior NCM, female). Conversely, those who felt that the military was a profession generally spoke of its importance across the Canadian military.

Trust was an important aspect of military professionalism for participants in several senses: One must be trusted to get the job done, one must be able to trust that one's peers will have one's back, and the Canadian public must trust one's efforts and approach. One participant remarked,

> I think because there's a lot of trust that's put into us, not just in the role that we play in…but that we have to be able to work within our own organization and trust and believe in each

---

[5]Quotations will include (if applicable) (1) Interview or focus group, (2) Regular Force or Primary Reserve, (3) First official language (English, French), (4) RCN, Canadian Army (CA), or Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), (5) officer or NCM, (6) male or female, and (7) DGM status.

other and believe that you have a good leader….But there's a lot of trust needed from outside, in society, as well (focus group, English-speaking, senior officer, female).

Several participants related professionalism to the purpose of the military and the reason people join: that members know the risks, show a willingness to serve, that the military is a way of being, and, above all else, the military is unique among professions. As one participant defined military professionalism, "It's just a way of being" (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, RCAF, officer, female, member of a visible minority).

Many participants noticed a change in what it meant to be a professional since the strong public reaction to military misconduct in Somalia in 1992 (Coombs 2017; Shorey 2000–2001), which resulted in the murder of a civilian during a peacekeeping mission and became part of the cultural narrative, resulting in professional leadership doctrine being developed (National Defence and the CAF 2005). There has also been heightened attention to sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the CAF, with the release of the Deschamps (2015) report on sexual misconduct in the CAF and the Baines (2014) report on misconduct in the Navy. Finally, the culture has also been affected by a younger generation reshaping the values, beliefs, and norms of the military (see also Hinote and Sundvall 2015).

The major specific themes that arose concerning professionalism can be grouped under (1) code of conduct and DND standards, (2) cohesion and loyalty, (3) competencies and individual characteristics (positive), (4) dress and deportment, (5) societal standards and public image, and (6) training, education, and professional development.[6]

Code of conduct and DND standards. DND and the CAF have a *Code of Values and Ethics* that sets a standard for members (National Defence and the CAF Forces 2014). Participants identified the code and its ethos as being key aspects of professionalism. One participant stated,

To be a professional, in general, basically means that you have a culture and understanding of what is right and wrong and how to go about doing things to be successful (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, CA, senior officer, male).

Professionalism meant adhering to standards set out by the military and society. As one participant noted, "It also means acting in an ethical manner in terms of not taking advantage of people, either in the chain of command, those who are above, or those below you" (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, RCN, senior officer, male).

Cohesion and loyalty. Several participants noted that being professional also included teamwork and feeling a connection with those around you: "To me, professionalism means building a team, being loyal to your superiors above within the limits of the law, and showing loyalty downwards to your subordinates" (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, RCN, male). Another participant remarked that "we all learn about each other, then we have this symbiotic work relationship that we all understand and do" (focus group, English-speaking, senior officer, female).

---

[6]Results are presented in alphabetical order.

Competencies and individual characteristics (positive). Several participants listed competencies and individual characteristics important to being a professional, such as honesty, integrity, loyalty, selflessness, sacrifice, reliability, and especially discipline and respect. Many participants felt that discipline was a main tenet of military professionalism: "I'd say a high degree of discipline and self-control makes one a professional" (focus group, English-speaking, Primary Reserve, CA, male). On being respectful, one participant remarked, "I would suggest that a professional treats every human being the same regardless of their culture, or where or how they identify" (interview, French-speaking, Regular Force, RCN, junior officer, male), while another stated, "Respect and fairness… I think professionalism has a lot to do with treating people fairly and equitably" (focus group, Regular Force, RCN, senior officer, female). Another participant stated that "Professionalism comes from a lot of personal characteristics…to be dedicated, to be honest, integrity, loyalty, those sorts of things, and to respect your surroundings, everyone in it" (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, CA, junior officer, female, Indigenous member).

Dress and deportment. Participants often reported that one's dress and how one portrays oneself were key features of professionalism, which is articulated in CAF dress instructions (National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018): "Professionalism is looking sharp each and every day, being kind, and being respectful" (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, CA, senior NCM, male). Another participant remarked, "What I believe is professionalism in the Armed Forces is an individual, a soldier who exemplifies the discipline and the deportment that is required of a soldier at any rank" (interview, English-speaking, Primary Reserve, CA, senior NCM, member of a visible minority). This sentiment was widely shared by the participants.

Societal standards and public image. While linked to dress and deportment, as well as to the code of ethics, several participants suggested that general social standards and public image play a role in professionalism. One participant said, "We are a profession because we have standards that have been published and everybody has agreed to" (interview, English-speaking, Primary Reserve, RCAF, senior NCM, male), while another stated,

> The military has to be professional because not only are we projecting a sense of professionalism out to the civilian population who are looking at us each and every day…it's something the country can use to be proud of their military as an institution (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, CA, senior NCM, male).

Liability to the public was another standard: "We're accountable to the public, there's that expectation of accountability" (focus group, English-speaking, senior officer, female). Finally, some participants felt that professionalism extended to one's personal life. One's actions reflect either positively or negatively on one's professionalism:

> I think it should be expected outside of work as well. You are always in the public eye. When you make your oath to serve the Queen and the country, it's not to make an oath to serve them eight hours a day; it's for the whole time (interview, Regular Force, English- speaking, RCAF, junior NCM, female).

Training, education, and professional development. Finally, competence in one's occupation and a continued interest to learn through training, education, and professional development was considered a main theme of professionalism. One participant stated, "I think professionalism is based in the education" (interview, Regular Force, CA, junior NCM, female member of a visible minority), while another remarked, "we are a group of people that have to be highly skilled" (interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, CA, senior officer, male). Given the expertise required for a number of occupations in the CAF, several participants felt that maintaining and pursuing education, training, and professional development opportunities were important aspects of being a military professional.

Unprofessionalism[7]

When asked to identify aspects of unprofessionalism in the military, some participants felt there were none to report, while others felt that there were, but that they were not unique to the military. Several participants also felt that the culture had changed over the years. As one reported,

> I feel there is a change that is happening and I think it is the right change, what is acceptable, what is not acceptable, and it seems like people are slowly buying into it. And it's really difficult to create change especially in a masculine environment (interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, RCN, junior officer, male).

For those who identified aspects of unprofessionalism, the following themes emerged: (1) alcohol in the military, (2) aspects of military culture, (3) individual characteristics (negative), and (4) subcultures in the military.

Alcohol in the military. Changes have been made to alcohol policies in the military over the years (e.g., *RCN Internal Review of Personal Conduct*, Baines 2014), and several participants noted the impact it has had on unprofessionalism. One participant stated, "One of our big things was drinking, and we would see in foreign ports people would do stupid things" (interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, RCN, senior officer, male). Another remarked that when a tradition involves drinking, "unprofessional behavior can follow" (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior officer, male, person with a disability). Although drinking was still part of mess life, several participants felt that the use of alcohol in the military had changed substantially. As one participant remarked, "Now it's controlled" (interview, Primary Reserve, French-speaking, RCN, senior NCM, male).

Aspects of military culture. Several participants identified customs and traditions that can support poor or unprofessional behavior, including the language imbedded in everyday life, as well as jokes and hazing, but they acknowledged that the culture was undergoing changes: "Sometimes the language is not as sensitive at times to certain items. But I would say we are definitely working to try to resolve

---

[7]Results are presented in alphabetical order.

that" (interview, Regular Force, RCN, senior officer, female, member of a visible minority). Another participant felt,

> I will tell you that I feel there is a change that is happening and I think it is the right change, what is acceptable, what is not acceptable, and seems like people are slowly buying into it (interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, RCN, junior officer, male).

One participant stated, "Gender-related jokes and stuff still happen" (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, RCN, senior NCM, male, member of a visible minority), while another noted,

> A lot of ethnic groups love to make fun of themselves….I have definitely participated in that where we all make fun of each other in front of others. So we perpetuate a racial stereotype, but at the same time we are laughing about it (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, senior NCM, male, member of a visible minority).

Another participant stated that, "Sometimes it comes out in jokes and sometimes those jokes go a little too far, but this day and age, people catch on to it pretty quick an apologize" (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior officer, Indigenous member). Those who noted the inclusion of these aspects in military culture also felt that it was changing and that they had been desensitized to the full impact. As one participant stated,

> There's a lot of inside kind of jokes and within different communities….There's a different sense of humor, but maybe I'm desensitized to it to a certain degree, and I know how to stop if the conversation goes too far (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, RCAF, junior NCM, female).

Individual characteristics (negative). Several participants felt that certain individual characteristics in people who join and how individuals portray themselves can affect professionalism. One participant noted, "This is an organization that you really want certain personality attributes….But the very attributes that benefit a person tend to push against some of the politically correct ideals that we see" (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior officer, male, person with a disability), while another suggested that "some people, regardless of the job or culture they are in, are unprofessional" (interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, RCN, junior officer, male). Another characteristic raised by participants concerned being self-serving. As one participant remarked, "Most people are there for themselves. Either they will try to get all the credit so that they can look good, so they can go and get promoted" (interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, male).

Subcultures in the military. A number of participants perceived that unprofessionalism was more prevalent in certain military subcultures. One participant suggested that there was "a culture of who's good enough, who can measure up" in specific subcultures (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, RCN, junior officer, Indigenous member). Another stated that in other subcultures it can be a "ground for military problem children" (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior NCM, male, member of a visible minority). One participant felt that there has been "a lack of professionalism" in some as well (interview, Regular Force,

English-speaking, RCN, junior NCM, male, Indigenous member). While not exhaustive in the examination of subcultures in the CAF, these remarks do suggest that unprofessionalism in some subcultures in the CAF should be further investigated.

Leadership

Leaders were seen as essential to the professionalism or unprofessionalism of their subordinates. Participants thought that those who became role models had to provide support both to their subordinates and to their chain of command. One participant summarized the relation between leaders and professionalism as follows: "Leading from the top and setting those standards and achieving them yourself….A professional can't hold anybody else to a standard if they're not willing to do it themselves" (focus group, English-speaking, RCN, female). Another stated that "there has to be an active interest on the part of leaders to develop and mentor those who are coming after them" (interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, RCN, senior officer, male).

Those who identified unprofessional aspects of leadership referred to certain types of leadership and organizational approaches. Echoing the approach to unprofessional behavior in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (2005), one participant said that when unprofessional behavior occurs,

> leaders have to engage themselves at all levels. And the corporal has to grab the private and the sergeant has to grab the corporal. You can start off with a little bit of gentle coaching to bring things back in line—or you can stomp your foot and say, "That's it." (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior officer, male, person with a disability).

Some participants felt that lack of consistent organizational communications and a consistent response to unprofessional behavior has affected professionalism in the military. One participant stated regarding lack of communication, "It was a couple of months ago they suddenly announced that four people were getting court-marshalled back East….Nobody saw anything until this all popped up" (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, senior NCM, male). Another participant, regarding appropriate approaches to unprofessionalism, remarked, "But you don't get fired, even if you don't show up for work, even if you do something bad, the punishment is so ridiculous—you get promoted anyway" (interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, RCN, senior officer, male).

Discussion

This qualitative study examined the perspectives of diverse CAF members on military professionalism to see how their perspectives of Canadian military professionalism related to the concept of professionalism in *Duty with Honour* (CAF 2003), the CAF's long-standing guide to military professionalism. This section discusses

the main themes that emerged and how they compare with the concept of military professionalism in *Duty with Honour* and in recent literature.

Figure 4.2 illustrates themes related to professionalism and unprofessionalism as experienced by members of the CAF. Participants identified several aspects of unprofessionalism (left side of figure) and professionalism (right side of figure) that are all affected by leadership. The relationship between leadership and professionalism mirrors the one in *Duty with Honour* in which leadership is essential to sustaining the profession (CAF 2003). For the participants, ultimately, professionalism is presented, understood, and practiced through leadership (CAF 2003), which is also responsible for creating a culture inclusive of gender and diversity (see also Gibbons 2010; Hachey 2017; Segal et al. 2015).

Given the importance of leadership in regulating the military as a profession, problems arise when that leadership is toxic (e.g., micro-manager; Box 2012; Elle 2012; Reed 2004; Truhon 2016) or ineffective (laissez-faire; Elle 2012; Bass 1985; Truhon 2016), or perceived as narcissistic (Elle 2012; Doty and Fenlason 2013; Truhon 2016). This can be an issue when there are ethical lapses (Crosbie and Kleykamp 2017) that require leadership intervention. Solutions to admonish toxic leadership include leadership performance, which takes into account subordinate feedback (Hardinson et al. 2015), advisory panels (Bass 1985), and increased focus on the qualities of effective leadership (Elle 2012; Truhon 2016).

The CAF leadership model, which focuses on the qualities of values-based leadership (CAF 2005) is defined as "directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission, professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success" (p. i). Ultimately, vertical cohesion is an important aspect of group performance and mission success; how effective a leader is, affects how members work with one another (Segal et al. 2015). As depicted in Fig. 4.2 cohesion and maintaining and pursuing training, educational, and professional development opportunities were identified as key aspects of professionalism.


Fig. 4.2 Meaning of unprofessionalism and professionalism from a sample of CAF members

While cohesion here was described as working with others, research has shown that task cohesion, rather than group cohesion, is important to performance (Mullen and Copper 1994; Segal and Kestnbaum 2002; Segal et al. 2015). In other words, the competence of the group members working toward a common goal matters more than whether they fit together socially (i.e., group cohesion), which has implications for diversity. Leaders who focus on tasks and practice respecting and caring for others lead to more successful teams (Segal and Kestnbaum 2002; Segal et al. 2015).

As in *Duty with Honour*, participants considered adhering to a code of conduct, DND standards, dress and deportment guidelines, societal standards, and maintaining a professional public image were key to professionalism. These aspects depend on policies being clear and concise, as well as how members are socialized into them (Hachey 2017; Pinch 2004). This points to the importance of inclusive policies and leadership adhering and maintaining a consistent practice of these policies. As articulated by Canada's latest defense policy, *Strong*, *Secure*, *Engaged*, people are an important part of the military and, thus, the new policy aims to have "well-supported diverse, resilient people and families" (National Defence and the CAF 2017, p. 19). To allow time for these changes to be integrated into the culture of the CAF, it would be beneficial to revisit in a couple of years to see whether these changes have taken effect.

Instances of unprofessionalism were attributed to the use of alcohol (at certain events or during customs and traditions), specific aspects of military culture (e.g., jokes), specific individual characteristics (negative: individualistic versus collectivist), and military subcultures where the environment is highly competitive. Basically, these aspects demonstrate where there are gaps in the professionalism of the military, some of which are currently being addressed by Operation HONOUR, the CAF strategy to eliminate inappropriate sexual behavior (National Defence and the CAF 2015b), as well as Canada's defense policy (National Defence and the CAF 2017). Again, this policy was released just after the current research was conducted, so it would be beneficial to revisit unprofessionalism once more time has passed to see whether cultural changes have taken place.

Important Considerations and Limitations

It is important to keep in mind several considerations and limitations when interpreting the results reported here (Hachey 2019). In particular, external influences, such as the situational or environmental aspects that could have shaped participants responses—e.g., the release of the Deschamps report (2015) on sexual misconduct in the CAF and the Baines report (2014) on misconduct in the Navy. A second consideration is the research method, which was shaped by GBA+ to ensure diverse participation. Linked to the participation of diverse members, a third consideration is the sampling procedure, which sought input from specific groups (i.e., DGM). There are limitations regarding the representativeness of the experiences of diverse

men and women (i.e., only binary information collected) and the generalizability of the findings to the entire CAF population.

While efforts were made through sampling to target diverse CAF members, only binary information was collected for gender; therefore, other gender identities could not be included in the sampling strategy, which is also important for understanding diverse views. Nor could this research consider intersectionality (e.g., visible minority women) and its effects on experience, professional identity, and perspectives on the military profession. Future research, therefore, should explore how models of professionalism impact different gender identities and the intersectionality of those identities. In addition, the goal of a qualitative study is not to generalize across a population but to provide insight into the experiences of a group of CAF members, which can be used to formulate future research considerations (Hachey 2019).

Further, military professionalism has been examined many times before (e.g., Burke 2002), and the definition has been evolving for over 50 years. Although not generalizable to the entire CAF population, the results nonetheless demonstrate CAF members' perspectives and experiences reflect the traditional concept of military professionalism. Notably, leadership is seen as one of the most important aspects for facilitating a diverse culture in the military (Gibbons 2010; Hachey 2017), and it can affect both professional and unprofessional behavior.

Conclusion

This research focused on the diverse perspectives of CAF members and their understanding of professionalism and unprofessionalism. Using a qualitative approach integrated with the GBA+ process, interviews and focus groups were conducted across Canada. The pivotal role that leadership plays in conveying, understanding, and practicing professional behavior is key. This research highlights the many factors concerning professional behavior, with important considerations and future research in the field of military professionalism. Further research will be important to better understand how diversity contributes to, and to what extent different others are absorbed within, traditional models of military professionalism.

References

Abbott, A. (1988). *The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor*. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.

Baines, C. (2014). *Executive summary Royal Canadian Navy: Internal review of personal conduct.* Retrieved from http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/assets/NAVY_Internet/docs/en/baines/rcn_irpc_exec_summary.pdf.

Bass, B. N. (1985). *Leadership and performance beyond expectations*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Box, J. E. (2012). *Toxic leadership in the military profession* (Defence Technical Information Center). Pennsylvania, MA: United States Army War College. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA560886.

Burke, J. (2002). Expertise, jurisdiction, and legitimacy in the military profession. In D. M. Snider & G. L. Watkins (Eds.), *The future of the army profession* (pp. 19–38). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Canadian Armed Forces. (2003). *Summary of Duty with honour: The profession of arms in Canada*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Canadian Armed Forces. (2005). *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual foundations.* Retrieved from http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2013/dn-nd/D2-313-2-2005-eng.pdf.

Canadian Armed Forces. (2009). *Duty with honour: The profession of arms in Canada*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Cotton, C. A. (1995). The institutional organization model and the military. In C. C. Moskos & F. R. Wood (Eds.), *The military: More than just a job*? Pergamon-Brassey's.

Crosbie, T., & Kleykamp, M. (2017). Fault lines of the American military profession. *Armed Forces & Society, 44*(3), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X17715437.

Coombs, H. (2017). 25 years after Somalia: How it changed Canadian Armed Forces preparations for operations. *Canadian Military Journal, 17*(4), 35–46. Retrieved from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/Vol17/no4/PDF/CMJ174Ep35.pdf.

Creswell, J. W. (2007). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Deschamps, M. (2015). *External review into sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces*. Retrieved from http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-support-services/external-review-sexual-mh-2015/summary.page.

Doty, J., & Fenlason, J. (2013). Narcissism and toxic leaders. *Military Review, 92*(1), 55–60. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a576059.pdf.

Elle, S. A. (2012). *Breaking the toxic leadership paradigm in the U.S. Army* (Defence Technical Information Center). Pennsylvania, MA: Army War College. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA561024.

English, A. D. (2004). *Understanding military culture: A Canadian perspective*. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's U. P.

Evetts, J. (2013). Professionalism: Value and ideology. *Current Sociology Review, 61*(5–6), 778–796.

Ewles, G., van der Werf, D., & Butler, A. (2017). *Literature review—Sexual misconduct: GBA+ and the concept of professionalism* (Human Resources Systems Group, Ltd., DRDC-RDDC-2017-C022). Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.

Gates, J. M. (1985). The "new" military professionalism. *Armed Forces and Society, 11*(3), 427–436.

Gibbons, T. J. (2010). Honor codes and military values: Social policies that work. In J. E. Parco & D. A. Levy (Eds.), *Attitudes aren't free: Thinking deeply about diversity in the US Armed Forces*. Air U. P.: Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.

Government of Canada. (2007). *Employment equity groups*. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/public-service-commission/services/appointment-framework/employment-equity-diversity/employment-equity-groups.html.

Government of Canada. (2019). *Military Personnel Command: Human rights and employment equity publications and posters*. Retrieved from http://cmp-cpm.mil.ca/en/support/employment-equity/employment-equity-publications.page.

Hachey, K. K. (2017). *Summary and analysis of the contract report on* Sexual misconduct: Gender-based analysis plus and the concept of professionalism *by Human Resources Systems Groups* (DRDC-RDDC-2017-L347). Ottawa, ON: Defence Research Development Canada.

Hachey, K. K., Bryson, R., & Davis, K. D. (2018). *The gender-based analysis + process and social science research* (Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, DRDC-RDDC-2018-R197). Ottawa, ON; Defence Research Development Canada.

Hachey, K. K. (2019). *Member perspectives on military culture, customs and traditions across the Canadian armed forces* (Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, DRDC-RDDC-2019-R026). Ottawa, Ontario: Defence Research Development Canada.

Hardinson, C. M. Zaydman, M., Oluwatola, O. A., Saavedra, A. R., Bush, T., Peterson, H., & Straus, S. G. (2015). *360 degree assessments: Are they the right thing for the U. S. Military*? Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Hinote, S. C., & Sundvall, T. J. (2015). *Leading Millennials.* Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a622314.pdf.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations*. New York, NY: Harvard U. P.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait. New York*. NY: Free Press.

Lincoln, Y. S., Lynham, S. A., & Guba, E. G. (2011). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences, revisited. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 97–128). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mason, J. (1996). *Qualitative researching*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2014). *Qualitative data analysis: A methods sourcebook* (3rd ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

Moskos, C. C. (1977). From institution to occupation: Trends in military organization. *Armed Forces and Society, 4*(1), 41–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7700400103.

Mostaghimi, A., & Crotty, B. (2011). Professionalism in the digital age. *Annals of Internal Medicine, 154,* 560–562. https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-154-8-201104190-00008.

Mullen, B., & Copper, C. (1994). The relation between group cohesiveness and performance. *Psychological Bulletin, 115*, 210–227. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0062687.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2014). *The DND and CF code of values and ethics*. Retrieved from http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/code-of-values-and-ethics.page.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2015a). *Canadian Armed Forces employment equity report 2014–2015*. Retrieved from http://cmp-cpm.mil.ca/assets/CMP_Intranet/docs/en/support/eer-reme-eng.pdf.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2015b). *CDS Op Order—Op HONOUR*, Chief of the Defence Staff, 14 August 2015.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2017). *Strong, secure, engaged: Canada's defence policy*. Retrieved from http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2018). *CF dress instructions*. Retrieved from http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/pub/ins-265/index-eng.asp.

NVivo Qualitative Data Analysis Software. (2015). *Version 11*. QSR International.

Onwuegbuzie, A. J. & Leech, N. L. (2007). Sampling designs in qualitative research: Making the sampling process more public. *Qualitative Report, 12*(2), 238–254. Retrieved from https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol12/iss2/7.

Pinch, F. C. (2004). *Challenge and change in the military: Gender and diversity issues* (Canadian Forces Leadership Institute). Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Reed, G. E. (2004). Toxic leadership. *Military review*, *July–August*, 67–71. Retrieved from http://www.george-reed.com/uploads/3/4/4/5/34450740/toxic_leadership.pdf.

Rudvin, M. (2007). Professionalism and ethics in community interpreting: The impact of individualist versus collective group identity. *Interpreting, 9*(1), 47–69.

Sarkesian, S. C. (1981). Military professionalism and civil–military relations in the West. *International Political Science Review, 2*(3), 283–297.

Scoppio, G. (2009). Diversity best practices in military organizations in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. *Canadian Military Journal, 9*(3), 17–30.

Segal, D. R., & Kestnbaum, M. (2002). Professional closure in the military labor market: A critique of pure cohesion. In L. J. Matthews (Ed.), *The future of the army profession* (pp. 441–458). Boston, MA: McGraw Hill.

Segal, D. R., Segal, M. W., & Reed, B. J. (2015). Diversity and citizenship in modern military organization. *Turkish Journal of Sociology, 45,* 63. https://doi.org/10.16917/sd.2015.2.0022.

Shorey, G. (2000–2001). Bystander non-intervention and the Somalia incident. *Canadian Military Journal, 1*(4), 19–28. Retrieved from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo1/no4/doc/19-28-eng.pdf.

Snider, D. M. (2015–16). Professionalism and the volunteer military: Will Army 2025 be a military profession? *Parameters, 45*(4), 39–51.

Status of Women Canada. (2015). *A brief history of GBA+*. Retrieved from http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/gba-acs/history-histoire-en.html.

Status of Women Canada. (2016). *GBA+ research guide*. Retrieved from http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/gba-acs/research-recherche-eng.pdf.

Status of Women Canada. (2018). *Gender-based analysis plus*. Retrieved from https://cfc-swc.gc.ca/gba-acs/index-en.html.

Stouffer, J., & Lindsay, D. (2012). *Threats to military professionalism: International perspectives*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Truhon, S. A. (2016). Toxic leadership. In D. Watola & D. Woycheshin (Eds.), *Negative leadership: International perspectives*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Chapter 5
New Times for Military Professionalism: Rethinking Core Competencies and Dynamic Capabilities

Laurence Frank

Abstract This chapter examines the future of military professionalism in the context of technological advances, social evolutions, and capacity-building requirements. New applications have arisen from technological innovation, such as human-machine interface, artificial intelligence, and drones, with significant effects on the organization of military operations. But military professionalism is also bound by values and traditions that also provide capabilities to accomplish future missions. This study seeks to explain how military organizations can adapt to change and become more agile to better cope with the unpredictability of the future political context and social evolutions, especially in the domain of human resources management with the coexistence of varying technological dexterity. A review of properties underpinning adaptive and agile organizations is proposed here as a new framework to effectively cope with multidimensional challenges and resource base reconfiguration.

Keywords Military professionalism · Military competencies · Military capabilities · Capacity building

Context: Evolutions for French Defense

In France, the election of a new president generally comes with an update of the Defense White Paper outlining the overarching defense orientation, at the heart of which is the preservation of France's independence and sovereignty. The most recent *White Paper* (2016) published under the presidency of François Hollande highlighted the increasing complexity of the defense sector. The state set strategic priorities for the coming years, encompassing homeland security and the continuity of the nation's essential functions, and at the external level the maintenance of security in Europe and in the North Atlantic space, the control of amplifying risks and threats arising from economic globalization, crisis analysis and management, the fight against terrorism and criminal trafficking, and strengthening of cybersecurity. High technologies have become an important part of military equipment evolution and a prerequisite to

L. Frank (✉)
Air Force Academy Research Center, Airbase 701, 13300 Salon de Provence, France
e-mail: laurencefrank.intl@gmail.com

improving operational performance. The state engaged significant investments in its Defense Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) to equip defense forces with new generations of arms, anticipation and tracking devices, and enhanced destruction capabilities. The Ministry of Armies (MoA) now has a dedicated body, the Agency for Defense Innovation, which coordinates all research and development projects initiated with industrial partners and with academic and research institutions. The atypical ties the MoA has with industrial consortiums also fostered the need to control DITB firms' internationalization strategies, mergers, and the opening of investment to foreign countries, which have led to complex contractual arrangements and the necessity of balancing secret defense aspects and the strategic positions of French defense with the business competitiveness of the DITB.

In 2016, the MoA employed 205,120 military personnel and 60,300 civilians, according to the Social Yearbook of 2016. Past cuts in military budgets have restructured the whole of the defense sector and led to the scaling down of operations and the reduction of staff. New operational challenges, the appearance of new threats, and increased participation in international military alliances forced the MoA to expand human resources and financial means. The new defense orientations also require new skills and expertise, mostly technological knowledge for intelligence units, which led to a recruitment campaign seeking 15,000 officers under fixed-term contracts. Major efforts have been deployed to attract female candidates with minimal success. The share of female staff in the MoA has stagnated at around 20% (civil/military). The MoA takes pride in being one of the most feminized armies in the world. Equality is one of the founding principles of armies since 1972, and women and men soldiers have exactly the same rights and duties.

As with any public institution, defense also faces the need to modernize its functioning and to become a more adaptive organization able to cope with the changes occurring in the business environment. The capacity to handle change has become a major asset and a critical capability in both public and private sectors. Change can be needed at different levels and varies from incremental modifications to discontinuous flows. At best, change improves the overall functioning after a reconfiguration of the organization and at worse it raises anxiety and skepticism when the actors do not perceive themselves to be gaining from the restructuring process. Baker (2007) observes that the pace of technological innovation is increasing and that most organizations are under greater pressure to deal with constant and pervasive technology, which in turn requires enhanced skills and active strategic management processes. Technology has the power to revolutionize the way an organization operates and to set new working patterns that lead to increased productivity and more efficient resource consumption (human and material). Sometimes change occurs like a big bang that acts like a shock to the system and to historical practices, such as demonstrated by drones flying over a remote war zone with air control performed in a container located in the United States.

Sophistication and precision of weapons is expected to reduce of the number of collateral civilian casualties and to enhance tactical performance. The recent kill shot record by Canadian special forces in 2017 on an ISIS target in Iraq from a distance of more than 3500 m shows that electronics have improved. Optical equipment,

such as rangefinders and ballistic calculators, have eliminated manual mathematical calculations to determine elevation and windage.

Military applications developed with artificial intelligence (AI) will undeniably mark the end of an epoch. AI is a priority defense issue for all military powers of the twenty-first century. The U.S. and China are currently at the forefront of the new digitalized arms race (Noel 2018). The French MoA believes that AI will be crucial for tomorrow's military operations. A new dedicated agency has a budget of 100 million euros to handle all AI projects and ventures until 2025, and more than 200 experts will be recruited. Human-machine interface (HMI) technology has been used in different industries, like electronics, entertainment, military, and medicine, and helps in integrating humans into complex technological systems. The interface consists of hardware and software that allow user inputs to be translated as signals for machines that, in turn, provide the required result to the user.

The use of electronic control systems, HMI, and AI has initiated profound changes in military practice. It has redefined operational tactics, widened the scope of activities, and also effected the way forces are trained, managed, and assigned to missions. The subject of technology assisted wars and remote control systems has led to the discussion of whether a physical military presence in the field will still be required as technology evolves. If soldiers are no longer deployed in the field and if most of the work is performed from home in a safe working environment, what will become of military values? How is military professionalism going to evolve in the context of increasing technological assistance? In the armed forces, terms such as discipline, obedience, commitment, unity, and comradery have long been considered the essence of military professionalism. With technological progress and new actors setting foot in the military sector, new ethical and moral questions arise. Countries like the U.S., Canada, and the UK regularly resort to private military service providers, but France remains reluctant to use the services of contractors. When discussing the matter in an economics of defense class in the French Air Force Academy, a majority of cadets felt that private military contractors might be less committed and more motivated by high wages. They questioned the military values of private agents they perceived as mercenaries.

The new types of war require new skills, means, and dynamic capabilities. Contemporary military operations are conducted in the era of the knowledge economy and professionalism is now defined by essential skills. Skills allows members of the military to complete missions assigned to them and complete them well. Professionalism is the key to any job, but probably more so when it comes to the military. An infantry soldier needs to be able to shoot, an engineer to build, and a pilot to fly. Lacking knowledge and skills can mean death for someone who has only seconds to react to fire or stop the bleeding of a wounded comrade. Professionalism entails that the evolution of skills and competencies follow technical evolutions and that continuous learning becomes the priority of human resources management. In sociology, many authors have raised the difficulty public institutions have in freeing themselves from path dependency because the past often determines organizational evolution. How will military culture and traditions cope with the new digitalized defense system? Will this affect the core essence of military values and hence military professionalism?

Moving to a new level of capacity requires capacity building, which results from a series of decisions and actions made at different organizational levels. Miller (1996) brought up the importance of configuration as a distinctive asset explaining the firm's performance. Value stems from the synchronizing of all organizational elements, such as technology, policies, and systems and routines, which determine "the degree to which an organization's elements are orchestrated and connected by a single theme" (p. 509). Miller argues that successful configurations derive from competitive tactics, organizational skills and resources, decision support systems, and coordinative mechanisms. With the current pace of innovation and technological revolutions, the military institution will have to become ductile, a process that Rindova and Kotha (2001) named continuous morphing as the capacity to reshuffle resources and skills as needs arise to preserve a competitive advantage and stay ahead of the competition.

In this chapter, I examine the future of military professionalism in light of these evolutions. In management science, the subject is usually studied under the rubric of the revolution in military affairs. I first address the meaning of military professionalism that prevails and how things have been done and envisioned in the armed forces. I then provide a quick overview of new technological applications that will complement or become alternative military practices. In the following section, I discuss the need to reach a dynamic state where the French Army is organizationally aligned with innovation and meets its new capabilities requirements. Finally, I review the set of properties making organizations more adaptive and agile, and I propose a conceptual model for military professionalism that accounts for these multidimensional challenges and enables military institutions to reconfigure their resource base when necessary, without compromising the core values and the cohesion of the entire system.

The Way We Do Things Around Here

A military career is not like any other occupation. It is a patriotic commitment, a mission, and a moral engagement with something bigger than a job. Military professionalism embodies sacred values and representations, and the traditional military terminology still encompasses the words loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and courage. Facing fear, danger, and adversity (physical or moral) shape the personal courage that has long been associated with armies. It is a matter of enduring physical duress and at times risking personal safety. Military professionalism was discussed in the special issue of *Joint Force Quarterly* in 2011, which reiterated the notion that dedication remains at the heart of military engagement:

> It's an Army of flesh and blood, an Army of young men and women like yourselves who signed up willingly to face danger and to risk their lives for something greater than those lives. Your job is to lead them and lead them well. That is what they expect of you. Actually, it isn't a job at all; it's a duty. For those of you who have no prior service, you are going to be awestruck at the manner in which these young Soldiers do their duty every single day (p. 6).

Meaning is essential and significant both personally and culturally. How belief and culture are understood, interpreted, translated, internalized, applied, and put into practice can be complicated. Leaders set the tone of the culture of their organizations. The meaning of the community, no matter how defined, becomes essential for interconnectedness, for bonding, and for understanding. It all has to do with the relationship between the organization and the individual. Military institutions also reflect national and cultural values and cultural peculiarities. Licht et al. (2007) studied the cultural rules governing social institutions. On the matter of hierarchy versus egalitarianism, for instance, they examined the ideal way to elicit cooperative, productive activity in society and observed that hierarchy refers to a cultural emphasis on obeying role obligations within a legitimately unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources. The study of cultural features in a given society also provides interesting insights on the particular values shaping a nation's social pact, such as the use of violence, gender parity, innovation, and democracy. Cultural peculiarities might become even more prominent when armies live, interact, and work together in coalitions, and coordinating multinational forces requires strong cross-cultural management skills.

Making public institutions more adaptive also implies overcoming the hurdles of bureaucracy and a great deal of skepticism from civil servants. Organizational sociologists have observed trajectories in public institutions causing path dependency effects (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). In the public sector, history matters; it matters even more in the military. Emblematic leaders and war heroes, collective pride, values and culture shape the military memory. Change can be seen as a betrayal of former heroes' actions or a decoupling of decisions and orientations taken by highly ranked officers or officials. Path dependency shapes organizational patterns, which in turn predesign sequences of actions entrenched in the day-to-day functioning. Saying that individuals are naturally inclined to make the right decisions on the basis of available options is a simplistic view of things. In the armed forces, the symbolic nature of things cannot be ignored, and pragmatism can be offset by traditions, thereby reducing the number of available options to resolve a given situation. Political institutions might be less fluid than other sectors and less flexible because structural arrangements reflect historical decisions and political ambitions and aspirations.

Di Maggio and Powell (1983) have coined the term institutional isomorphism (also called the Iron Cage) to describe the tendency of leaders to imitate other organizations: "Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them." Isomorphism is particularly common in public institutions as it guarantees legitimacy, proven decision-making, and the reproduction of successful past actions. In France, for instance, high-level bureaucrats have graduated from the same prestigious schools and have obtained a standardized education and similar training. There is a sense of a professional community sharing the same beliefs and vision in various sectors and interacting on a regular basis about what they deem to be "best practices." In public institutions, two sources of pressure co-exist: the pressure of compliance/efficacy guaranteed by the application of norms and procedural patterns and the pressure to maintain ceremonial organizational cultures. These aspects are deeply ingrained in

the functioning of the public system and usually survive political change because high-level civil servants remain in place in France after presidential elections.

In the turmoil of current times, institutions face the double pressure of coping with unforeseen events and to modernize, which implies that technological progress is likely to reengineer organizational and human routines. The next section provides a brief overview of what awaits the military sector with regard to technological revolution.

The Way We Will Do Things from Now on: War-Embedded Technologies

Is military professionalism called into question in the contemporary political and social environment? According to Carnes Lord in *Joint Force Quarterly* (2011), the U.S. Army is suffering an erosion of the traditional values that underpin its professional ethos on account of the continuing disintegration of traditional moral and cultural values in the larger society:

> The weakening of organized religion in much of the country, the breakdown of the family, the impact of Hollywood and popular music and related developments pose a formidable challenge to the good order and discipline of a military that, thanks to the internet and contemporary social media is even more inextricably embedded in civilian society and culture than ever before (p. 71).

Inevitably, internal tensions arise with progress. The digital divide is not to be taken lightly because in military institutions rank sustains historical working patterns, resists the adoption of new technologies, and maintains obsolete procedures. The pace of innovation of the last three decades created three generations of militaries with variable digital dexterity and enthusiasm for electronic and automated devices. In France, a quick look at the career officers age-pyramid indicates that four "technological generations" interact, the mean age of officers being 41.6 years in 2016 (age interval ranges from 22 to 61 years), with a significant proportion between 42 and 52 years (MoA 2016).

Maintaining military critical capabilities requires advanced technology. Will traditions and beliefs be sustained if human relationships and communications become increasingly handled by technological applications? Major technological changes have reshaped strategic priorities in defense. Cybersecurity, whose function is to protect systems, networks, and programs from digital attacks, has become a cornerstone of military activity. Cyberattacks usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying sensitive information, extorting money from users, or interrupting normal business processes now target civilian public infrastructures (e.g., hospitals, power plants, water and sanitation systems). Strengthened surveillance, control, and security have become a critical component of the MoA's mission, which is also in charge of protecting strategic sites, ensuring nuclear deterrence, and maintaining homeland security in times of repeated terrorist attacks.

Artificial intelligence is becoming a critical part of modern warfare. Compared with conventional systems, military systems equipped with AI are capable of handling larger volumes of data more efficiently. In addition, AI self-control, regulation, and actuation of combat systems (due to its inherent computing and decision-making capabilities) is expected to increase performance and empower armed forces with new capabilities: automation of actions, increased pace of operations, better prepared forces and strengthened strategic influence, and psychological domination (Noel 2018). AI applications already in use allow facial recognition, image reading, and making sense of a large volume of data. Inventoried AI military applications that will be put in use in the years to come include the following (Singh and Gulhane 2018):

Warfare platforms: efficient warfare systems, less reliant on human input and increased synergy, and enhanced performance of warfare systems while requiring less maintenance.

Cybersecurity: protect networks, computers, programs, and data from any kind of intrusion. Cyberattacks can lead to loss of classified military information and damage to military systems.

Logistics and transportation: prepare effective and safe transportation of goods, ammunition, armaments, and troops. AI may help lower transportation costs and reduce human operational efforts.

Target recognition: enhance the accuracy of target recognition in complex combat environments. Defense forces may gain an in-depth understanding of potential operation areas by analyzing reports, documents, news feeds, and other forms of unstructured information.

Battlefield healthcare: robotic surgical systems and robotic ground platforms can provide remote surgical support and evacuation activities in war zones. Systems equipped with AI can mine soldiers' medical records and assist in complex diagnosis. IBM's Watson research team partnered with the U.S. Veterans Administration to develop a clinical reasoning prototype known as the Electronic Medical Record Analyzer. The technology is designed to use machine learning techniques to process patients' electronic medical records and automatically identify and rank their most critical health problems.

Combat simulation and training: construct computerized models that acquaint soldiers with the various combat systems deployed during military operations.

Threat monitoring and situational awareness: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations used to acquire and process information to support a range of military activities.

AI and data information processing: quickly and efficiently process large volumes of data to obtain valuable information. AI can assist in culling and aggregating information from different datasets, as well as acquiring and summing supersets of information from various sources. These devices include probability-based forecasts of enemy behavior, aggregation of weather and environmental conditions, anticipation and flagging of potential supply line bottlenecks.

Augmented soldiers: technologies that augment human capabilities with material such as exoskeletons and wearables based on soft robotics that tune into the human body, which are being created to directly interact with the central nervous system of the soldier.

Innovation makes available less expensive and human-costly flying equipment, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly called drones, which are remotely piloted aerial vehicles that have significant roles in defense as well as commercial sectors. UAVs are increasingly used for border surveillance, and they allow monitoring, surveying, and mapping tasks formerly performed by fighter planes and

a human presence on the ground. Drones also have improved range, persistence, and surveillance capabilities, along with the ability to use force without physical risk to the attacker.

The use of drones in the French Air Force

The potential of drones became obvious in the Air Force. In 1995, four Hunter models, conceived by Israel Aerospace Industries were acquired and used until 2004. To welcome these devices, an inter-army team was put in place in the Air Force Experimentation Center (CEAM) in Mont-de-Marsan before the creation in 2001 of the experimentation squadron drone 1/33 Adour, renamed in 2010 "Escadron de drones 1/33 Belfort," based in Cognac since 2009. The tactical Hunter drone, deployed in Kosovo in October 2001, completed 25 missions and was also used by civil authorities to conduct surveillance of the G8 Summit in Evian in 2003 and 60th anniversary of D-Day in 2004 in Normandy. The European Harfang drone completed its first operational mission in Afghanistan from the Bagram base in 2009.

Medium altitude long-endurance drones have unique features. They allow a permanent and discreet presence in target zones and improve understanding of conditions on the ground, movements of the enemy, and real-time data transmission. Their 24/7 availability provides a major time efficiency. By increasing potential interactions between observation-decision-action, drones have significantly contributed to the reliability and the shortening of decision-making process, called the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, and act) or Boyd cycle, also referred to as F2T2EA (find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess).

Integrating new devices, such as drones, automated applications, and, very soon, AI-enabled systems, goes far beyond the simple acquisition of technology. As Baker (2007) argues, technology has the power to reshape institutional functioning, and a change of such magnitude will necessarily marshal a vast quantity of additional means and resources as well as new skills leading to new capabilities. It goes without saying that AI will instigate profound changes in the configuration of armies and in the way operations have been conceived until now. For instance, the use of combat simulation and training will require major investments in computers, simulation software, training of trainers, and a reconfiguration of education programs in military academic institutions. The introduction of AI also entails that life-long learning will become an essential component of a military career. Military education will be impacted too, and many courses, such as human resources management, aeronautical engineering, ethics and legal knowledge, and the economics of innovation—to mention just a few examples—will need updating.

The adoption, testing, and integration of a new generation of devices induces a time-lag until they are sufficiently reliable to shift practices. During this time, it is business as usual. The capacity to remain efficient in this dual mode of functioning means that military institutions need to become ambidextrous, a notion that I explain in the next section. It also supposes a complete shift of mindset about the organization of the war and the preparation of forces. The dual functioning entails major adaptations in terms of training, learning, changing processes, review of strategies,

and operational tactics. Needless to say, military institutions will have to become more adaptive, find ways to develop skills rapidly, and remove the bottlenecks of bureaucracy.

Making Institutions Agile and Capacity Building

Change management and capacity building are intertwined notions. Making institutions more agile and reactive means that these systems are prepared for reconfiguration, optimization, and modernization, both at the human and structural levels. Armies deal with two types of pressures: maintain peace and security in the state and abroad and adapt to external changes, such as the social and cultural environment, which compel defense to accept more intimate relations with the rest of society through more open and transparent communication from political power. With information and communication technology, social media, and the free press, citizens have the right to be accurately informed.

The need to preserve traditional values while inculcating new modes of functioning (with technologically assisted and automated material, for example) forces military institutions to practice a dichotomous management that academic research calls organizational ambidexterity. Some authors have characterized satisfying competing or antagonistic objectives as organizational schizophrenia (Gureja 2013). The concept of organizational ambidexterity stems from the field of organizational learning and innovation in which March (1991) first examined how firms have, on the one hand, exploited accumulated knowledge and perfected processes to organize their activities, and have, on the other hand, experimented in new directions, taken risks, and created new knowledge. In the managerial literature, ambidexterity refers to the capacity to produce and combine innovations sourced in both exploitation and experimentation so as to develop the scope of business and optimize strategies. Further research has identified four types of ambidexterity: structural ambidexterity, a deliberate split of exploration and exploitation activities within the firm, temporal ambidexterity, alternating periods focused on one or the other, reticular ambidexterity, the capacity to liaise with other organizations in the innovation process, and contextual ambidexterity, an intrinsic way of functioning in which some firms are genetically ambidextrous (Dhifallah et al. 2008). O'Reilly and Tushman (2004) also observed ambidexterity among individuals who simultaneously performed routinized tasks and innovation actions. Lievre and Aubry (2007) described how project managers handled emergency situations in polar expeditions and observed that their propensity to react efficiently to sudden events depends on their capacity to articulate in situ exploitation and exploration skills, as well as to adapt and to resort to rational thinking.

How firms rapidly and fluidly adapt to change has led to extensive research in organization sciences. From the 1970s onward, many authors have investigated the field of capacity and how organizations cope with organizational change and modernization. The capacity to make an appropriate change has paved the way to the study of dynamic

capabilities, which provides insight for strategic renewal, agile organizations, change management, reconfiguration of routines, and flexible processes. The seminal work of Teece et al. (1997) laid the foundations of dynamic capabilities, which means the ability of an organization to purposefully adapt an organization's resource base. Dynamic capabilities underpin the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments.

Dynamic capabilities theory provides senior managers of successful companies with actionable tools to adapt to radical discontinuous change, while maintaining minimum capability standards to ensure competitive survival. Accordingly, managers reorganize their own routines to make the most of their existing resources while simultaneously planning for future process changes as the resources depreciate. Dynamic capabilities divide into three categories: anticipate and influence opportunities and threats, seize and take up opportunities and reconfigure the resource-base, and protect and optimize tangible and intangible assets.

At the individual level, capacities and capabilities arise from a blend of knowledge acquired in the socializing process, as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) have shown. The authors observed that while people interact in an organization, they exchange and gain tacit and explicit knowledge. New knowledge, new know-how, and competencies form in learning stages and follow an incremental process in which new mental schemes set in (Argyris and Schön 2002; Huber 1991; Bennis and Nanus 1985). If people have a propensity to learn, so do organizations. In the past two decades, managerial research has shown that when individuals work together and cooperate they develop collective skills and capabilities (Ferrary and Pesqueux 2011; Cohendet et al. 2006). Rindova and Kotha (2001), who have studied the lifecycle of Yahoo and Excite, noted that firms became more agile and adaptive from the moment they opted for continuous morphing, which describes the comprehensive ongoing transformation through which the focal firms sought to regenerate their transient competitive advantage in hypercompetitive environments.

If everyone agrees on the importance of capacity and capability to achieve the desired objectives, less attention has been paid to the practice of capacity building. Capacity building is a term used by international donors and development experts to designate actions aimed at creating an enabling environment. The problem with the capacity-building concept is that it has become too closely associated with initiatives such as micro-credit programs, health policies, trainings, organizational modernization, livelihood policies, economic development, entrepreneurship innovation, technological progress, etc. This expansion of the concept has made it ambiguous, inviting many critics among academics and practitioners. Yet most agree on the fact that there are actions that enable individuals, organizations, and countries to "access more capacity." For Hilderbrand and Grindle (1994), capacity building refers to efficacy, the "ability to perform proper tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably." For the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2006), capacity building is the "ability to handle or manage affairs successfully." Systemic approaches have been adopted to understand how capacities and capabilities arise from the combinations of skills (Alaerts and Kaspersma 2009), and how knowledge

can be marshalled to solve problems. Until now, capacity building has found no legitimacy and no academic credibility from a theoretical standpoint, although capacity is the stepping stone of individual, organizational, and institutional development.

Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that the ability to exploit external knowledge is another critical component of innovative capabilities. The ability to evaluate and utilize knowledge from outside stems from the use of prior related knowledge. At the most elemental level, this prior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared language but may also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments in a given field. Thus, prior related knowledge confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to achieve a goal. These abilities collectively constitute what is called a firm's absorptive capacity, with the assumption being that the organization needs prior related knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge.

Military knowledge and practice now apply to a wider array of people and organizations. New technological knowledge, the need to gain more human resources flexibility and the rising privatization trends have led to a greater mixing in the composition of armed forces. In the operating environment, diverse categories of actors interact and handle warfare with, as one might expect, a different conception of military professionalism. Historically, the military usually distinguishes between enlisted and officer careers. In 1996, French president Jacques Chirac announced the end of mandatory military service and his decision to professionalize armies. Professionalization draws from the hypothesis that the industrialization of Western countries, the weakening legitimacy of the use of force, the nuclear threat, and the rise of technologies made the annual costly training of thousands of new young soldiers irrelevant. In a context in which new technologies arose and missions gained in complexity, more specialized manpower was needed. Handing over expensive material and sensitive functions to inexperienced hands could not be allowed. Technological skills became the backbone of the institution, and the MoA now recruits contract officers on 5- and 15-year contracts to rapidly inject technical expertise into the various domains, with new staff capable of using and mastering the most advanced knowledge and technologies. Armies now have a critical need for specialists in various fields, such as ICT, logistics and maintenance, human resources management, and communications. An accelerated training of six months is provided to acquaint these candidates with the military culture and functioning. The war in Iraq has witnessed the entry of a new category of military personnel, with varying degrees of acceptability around the world, private militaries or military contractors. The so-called business of war includes independent corporations offering military services to national governments, international organizations, and also to non-state actors. They are providing combat and protection forces and other support or technical services. In some countries, private militaries are controversial, but more subtle forms of privatization exist. In France, private companies such as Defense conseil international, Cassidian, and Helidax provide military training for cadets and special forces, helicopters, aircraft maintenance, and other support services to the military.

Whether these new actors have conferred greater agility and capacity on the French military forces has led to animated debates, but the matter remains to be studied

academically. The most skeptical viewpoints argue that these "mercenaries" do not share military values and the institutional culture. At worst, it is believed that they could join opposing forces for higher wages if the opportunity arose.

Is military professionalism gender sensitive? Many studies have tried with mitigated success to investigate (with good intentions) whether women bring specific skills to militaries. The matter usually leads to stereotyped ideas or clichés, such as "women are more caring, social or less violent." No study differentiates gender-based skills or competencies within forces. As General de Lattre de Tassigny once said: "I don't want to know if there are women in the division, for me there are only soldiers" (Pajon 2016a, b). Of course, reality is more complicated.

Sisters in Arms

For modern armies, gender mixing is an asset and an opportunity to display modern values. There are many reasons explaining the discrepancies of gender representations at the center of which glass-ceiling effects and invisible filters prevent female candidates from climbing the rank ladder. Role and status may lead to different analyses. With a rate of 20%, the French MoA is among the top four most feminized MoDs worldwide. Women make up 55,000 of 266,800 staff and have access to all functions—32,000 women serve in the army. Women only count for 7% of general officers and for 8% of all deployed staff in external operations. The 2019–2025 Military Law Project ensures that women get access to officer positions at the Chief of Staff level and to the French War College. A recent survey indicates that 60% of MoA female staff feel it is difficult to be a women in the army. The recruitment of female candidates has been stable since 2008, and several explanations have been put forward. Pajon (2016a, b), who conducted several studies related to the role of women in the air force, notes that the strong masculine cohesion and promiscuity representations could deter women. Women might also be more caught between female identity and military identity in international conflicts. The symbol of morals (courage), physical features, and virility also belong to masculine representations, and the percentage of women decreases in the higher ranks. In addition, the French military recruits in prestigious engineering schools and scientific and technical academic institutions that have low feminization rates.

The nature of war is changing, and Rambo-style illustrations of soldiers have given way to an image of technological dexterity and expertise. Less direct combat, more anticipation, more analysis and efficiency in four dimensions dominate military practices today. Pajon (2016a, b) proposed that the increasing technologization of military operations will have an impact on the attractiveness of a military career for women because it reduces the use of physical force. Other aspects might be worth investigating. From my experience as a lecturer at the French Air Force Academy, female military personnel open up more easily about their dissatisfaction or their difficulty respecting and being managed by a superior they consider not competent enough. Generational gaps also seem to widen and the perceived obsolescence of

military structures and the burden of bureaucracy often deter young hires who share some disappointment and a relative skepticism about the military institution and its overall performance.

Military Professionalism in the Era of the Millennials

The Millennials, also known as Generation Y, are the demographic cohort following Generation X and preceding Generation Z. Millennials are sometimes referred to by media and social networks as "echo boomers" due to a major surge in birth rates in the 1980s and 1990s, and because millennials are often the children of baby boomers. For the last few years, the driving force behind organizational transitions has been the Millennial generation. The "digital natives" have infused the working world with their own style of communication and relationship to personal information. Organization 1.0 was structured according to rigid processes. This process-dominated system of management is now challenged by an expectation of greater flexibility and mobility. Organization 2.0 has to be responsive, which presents a major problem for human resources because a hierarchical structure is replaced by internal networking through social communities. Performance and results are attained with a more collaborative, solutions-based work structure, which often blurs hierarchy or makes routines obsolete. Managerial figures are no longer involved in day-to-day projects because the system does not endow them with classic authority and capacity. Nimon (2007) believed that the employee of the future does not need to have experience as much as a potential for learning skills. In a system of agile process management, employees want to be constantly informed as to how successfully or efficiently they are executing the tasks assigned to them. And to achieve this, a new culture of evaluation has to be created. Born in the digital society, Millennials are also more concerned with ethics, social impacts, and environmental considerations of business.

In the era of the Millennials, will the military be judged negatively by concerns for global peace, justice, and ecological behavior? A national poll in 2018[1] in France indicates that the perception of the military remains positive:

- 84% of the French people have a good image of their military
- The young generation shares this opinion in the same proportion (84%)
- Militaries are perceived as efficient (79%), reactive (79%), reassuring (77%), and they have a special place in the French spirit
- Courage (47%) and commitment (45%) are the two values that best reflect French soldiers
- 84% of those under 30 years old consider that being a military member is rewarding
- 81% believe that defense budgets should be maintained or increased
- 48% think that soldiers are insufficiently equipped with materiel and weapons to fulfill their assignments.

---

[1]Ministry of Armies, IFOP-DICoD, May 2018.

At the organizational level, moving forward is easier when citizens support the institution and have a positive opinion about its missions. This being said, the enthusiastic portrait of the French armed forces should be placed in context because these surveys took place after major terrorist attacks perpetrated in Nice and Paris in 2016 and 2017.

The Outlook of Military Professionalism

Resteigne and Soeters (2010) argue that working in military coalitions has become the rule rather than the exception. Since the Cold War, several reasons have led to increased cooperation between national militaries. First, professionalization of forces and the end of conscription decreased the number of available soldiers. Second, the end of the Soviet threat and the global financial crisis impacted national budgets (and hence military spending). The quest for efficiency and the elimination of resource duplication also motivated forces to share resources. Given the more diffuse nature of threats, extended overseas postings are required, and operations are extended over longer periods.

Working in military coalitions entails multicultural interactions, reflecting varying military cultures, professional organizations, languages, religions, and visions. The modular environment can lead to culture shocks when some values or beliefs collide, become incompatible, or difficult to accept by others. The concept of military culture has been vastly debated in sociology through its symbols, physical attributes, language, traditions and history, and if common culture elements have been observed, significant peculiarities remain among international forces involved in joint operations.

The rationale for coalitions (EU, NATO) is the "pooling and sharing" policy, which describes various forms of defense cooperation. Pooling means that national capabilities are provided to other countries. A special multinational structure is set up to pool these contributions and coordinate their deployment. The European Air Transport Command is one such example. Pooling can occur in the development, procurement, or subsequent operation of sharing, which means that one or more countries provide their partners with capability or equipment (such as airlift) or undertake a task for another country (Mölling 2012). If this occurs on a permanent basis, the partners can cut this capability and, theoretically, save on costs. In the EU Council's conclusions on military capability development of December 2010, the EU proposes pooling and sharing as a solution to save money and increase the efficiency of their military resources. NATO is pursuing similar aims with its Smart Defense initiative, made official at the Alliance's summit in Chicago in May 2012. As Mölling (2012) observes, role specialization takes place if a state gives up certain capabilities and concentrates only on a few others. Many European states refuse to do so as they are afraid of mutual dependence. Nevertheless, role specialization is already taking place, but it is involuntary, uncoordinated, and has major consequences for the capability of all partners.

Considering that coalition partners have different means and capacities, some will struggle more than others to afford expensive equipment. In addition, state modernization actions undertaken in many countries worldwide have led to costly change management programs, limiting their capacity and willingness to purchase new military material not considered a national priority.

Military Professionalism in Motion: Making Sense of the Current Defense Environment

Military professionalism is a dynamic concept that is meant to evolve to remain aligned with societal changes and the global environment. On the one hand, military professionalism seeks to preserve the core values and the traditions that keep the spirit of individuals willing to serve their country and work for the security of others. On the other hand, professionalism requires a vision and new ideas to strengthen the capacity of the institution to accomplish its mission through a system endowed with enhanced and distinctive capabilities (Fig. 5.1).

In order to meet the upcoming challenges, military institutions need to make agility their main objective if they want to become more adaptive. To become agile, the military institution will have to bring profound changes to its current configuration and "walk the talk" of modernization. Ingraining dynamic capabilities will ensure that adaptiveness, interconnectedness, resilience, and regenerative capacity become entrenched institutional assets and not artefacts. Professionalism also entails marshalling the right amount of resources to achieve goals and to reduce the opportunity cost of military spending. A recent study conducted with the French Air Force shows that increasing budgets does not go hand in hand with increased performance. Despite the additional funding granted to aeronautical maintenance, the number of available and ready-to-use aircraft has not improved. Problems such as organizational inertia and burdensome work processes have to be addressed to allow agility to set in (Frank 2014).

Table 5.1 synthesizes the set of capacities military organizations will need to become agile. I applied generic properties identified in former studies to the military environment.

Fig. 5.1 The properties of military professionalism

Values, norms, traditions, culture

Innovation, agility, capacity, knowledge

Military professionalism

Table 5.1 Typology of dynamic capabilities

Type of capacity	Properties	Military specifics
Strategic	Sensing and seizing new business opportunities and market repositioning	Implement ambidexterity in institutional functioning. Develop stronger anticipation skills and seek higher impacts with less resource consumption. Reduce actions' opportunity costs
Managerial	Quality of leaders' skills and competencies	Adopt management practices valuing competencies and skills rather than only ranks. Train managers to effectively lead different military generations and inculcate a life-long learning culture
Operational	Process reengineering and redefinition of operational flows	Boost operational readiness with rehearsing and simulations. Nurture ambidexterity to exploit/explore knowledge, solutions, and ideas in home bases and on international operations
Innovation	Creativity, new ideas and resources to innovate	Lighten top-down processes and allow new ideas and solutions to come from everywhere and everyone in the organization, including from external contributors
Relational	Quality of relations with stakeholders (SHs)	SH support eases change, so adopt fluid and transparent communication with all SHs (civil/military)
Reticular	Strategic networks and alliances, communities of practice, clusters	Avoid unnecessary duplication of resources and means. Use knowledge transfer and information sharing with all stakeholders (internal and external)
Structural	Corporate design, organization of business units	Reduce bureaucratic rigidity and remove burdensome procedures. Avoid duplication of units and ease decision-making at all levels. Set up loosely-coupled units promoting creative thinking (ideas lab model)
Transfer	Projection into another organizational set up	No one size fits all system. Design and reconfigure units to enable then to cope with future actions and specialties according to their strengths and distinctive capabilities

(continued)

Table 5.1 (continued)

Type of capacity	Properties	Military specifics
Mimetism	Anticipation and alignment with strategic repositioning needs in the sector	Perform feedback with alliance partners and industrial/academic project managers to identify best practices and opportunities. Resorb the path-dependency that limits future options
Resilience	Recovery and survival in times of crisis or emergency	Value the reporting of mistakes and failure so as to learn from experience, adjust and improve actions. Create a knowledge-management system
Intercultural	Acceptation of ideas/concepts from other cultural paradigms	Develop cross-cultural management skills to facilitate coalition work and negotiations with host governments. Set up international innovation teams

Adapted from Frank (2014)

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the future of military professionalism and the evolution of armed forces' core competencies in the light of technological advances, new sources of threats, performance requirements, and generational stratification of the workforce. There have been numerous advancements on the battlefield in the form of arms, decision-making tools, transportation, and air power. Technological inventions have direct impacts not only on the battlefield, but also on all the people operating on a remote computer thousands of miles away from a conflict zone.

AI-assisted warfare is slowly but surely transforming the nature of war, leaving heroism open for redefinition. Demonstrating overwhelming force while using superior technology and intelligence stems from the illusion of technological domination, according to Lefeez (2017). She adds that the increase in armaments combined with stagnating military budgets might compel military decision-makers to abandon core capabilities to acquire these expensive materials. Ultimately, it might even be counter-productive and lead to a loss of capacities. Other social priorities have to be addressed, such as preserving domestic safety and security, and armed forces missions must fit into a larger social project (e.g., stabilization, reconstruction). The positive opinions reflected by polls can quickly be ruined by exaggerated military spending, due to the high opportunity cost that they entail.

The political turmoil and the pace of innovation entails that military organizations must ingrain dynamic capabilities in their structures and processes. In the short term, operational units may be more concerned about agility than bureaucracies. Upstream, sharp anticipation skills allow militaries to sense and seize opportunities and to be better prepared for the unexpected. Ultimately, these capabilities enable militaries

to detect weak signals and boost reactivity. Downstream, these dynamic capabilities enable people and organizations to build distinctive assets and unique resources, to valorize new learning and knowledge, and to make the system responsive to the changes in the operating environment—all this, of course, without harming the core values that ensure the cohesion of the system.

With respect to gender equality, armed forces are recruiting more women, who nevertheless continue to face a glass ceiling. The peculiar input or skills supplied by women is totally subjective, academically speaking. To some, empowering women in conflict may be one of the most sensible and effective ways to build peace. For others, feminization might increase with the technologization of war as lethality decreases.

What the hiring and retaining of highly educated and skilled Millennials will require in terms of new managerial skills and practices is another aspect of organizational evolution. According to three senior U.S. officers,[2]

> it is time to understand them. Considering the average age of enlisted members was 27 and the average age of officers was 34 1/2 as of 2015, Millennials are moving into junior leadership positions where they are shaping the Army's values, ethics and organizational functions.

The challenge awaiting armies is to preserve the core values of military engagement and answer the ever-increasing demand for performance. The growing social pressure concerning the preservation of natural resources, human rights, and the accountability for the destruction of populated living areas will need to be addressed in future strategies. However, the main challenge resides in the management of the transition period. Understanding the mechanisms of organizational ambidexterity will help fill the gap. In practice, the existing material and resources will be used to their end of life, while new high tech material is gradually added to the artillery.

To conclude, the main challenge is institutional. Changing work routines can be painstaking if the system values the past over the present. In military institutions, history matters, and it probably matters more than in any other government department. Agility requires getting rid of bureaucratic bottlenecks and also of mental cages locking the system in the past. The following citation could not better illustrate this state of mind:

> At its center, war defines the military profession and, therefore, war is what officers must study. History offers the reality of war far more effectively—and realistically—than exercises, simulations, or the efforts of war gamers using computers to imagine an unknowable future (Kohn 2013).

References

Alaerts, G. J., & Kaspersma, J. M. (2009). Progress and challenges in knowledge and capacity development. In M. W. Blokland (Ed.), *Capacity development for improved water management*. Delft, NL: CRC Press.

---

[2]https://www.ausa.org/articles/today%E2%80%99s-millennials-are-todays-leaders

Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (2002). *L'apprentissage organisationnel: Théorie, méthode, pratique*. Paris: De Boeck Université.

Association of the United States Army. (2019). Today's millennials are today's leaders. Retrieved from https://www.ausa.org/articles/today%E2%80%99s-millennials-are-todays-leaders.

Baker, D. (2007). *Strategic change management in public sector organizations*. Oxford: Chandos.

Bennis, W., & Nanus, B. (1985). *Leaders: The strategies for taking charge*. New York: Harper and Row.

Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *35*(1), Special Issue: Technology, Organizations, and Innovation, 128–152.

Cohendet, P., Créplet, F., & Dupouët, O. (2006). *La gestion des connaissances: Firmes et communautés de savoir*. Paris: Economica.

Dhifallah, S., Chanal, V., & Defelix, C. (2008). Quelle gestion des ressources humaines dans les organisations ambidextres?, *Revue française de gestion*, 2008/7 (n° 187), pp. 161–175.

Di Maggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review, 48*(2), 147–160.

Ferrary, M., & Pesqueux, Y. (2011). Management de la connaissance, Chapitre 3, in L'apprentissage organisationnel. *Revue Economica, 2006,* 63–93.

Frank, L. (2014). L'aéroport commercialisé. Adaptation, transformation et capacités dynamiques. In L. Renard & R. Soparnot (Eds.), *Gérer les capacités organisationnelles: un état des lieux des approches théoriques, méthodologiques et empiriques*. Paris: Les Éditions EMS.

Gureja, G. K. (2013). *Organisational schizophrenia: Impact on customer service quality*. New Delhi: SAGE.

Hilderbrand, M. E., & Grindle, M. S. (1994). *Building sustainable capacity: challenges for the public sector*. Prepared for the United Nations Development Programme, Pilot Study of Capacity Building by the Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University.

Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the literatures. *Organization Science, 2*(1), 88–115.

Joint Force Quarterly. (2011). Military professionalism. Strategist as hero. *Complex relief ops, 62*(3). Retrieved from ndupress.ndu.edu.

Kohn, R. (2013). First priorities in military professionalism. *Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.05.005.

Lefeez, S. (2017). *L'illusion technologique dans la pensée militaire*. Paris: Nuvis.

Licht, A. N., Goldschmidt, C., & Schwartz, S. H. (2007). Culture rules: The foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance. *Journal of Comparative Economics, 35,* 659–688.

Lièvre, P., & Aubry, M. (2008). L'ambidextrie des chefs de projet: le cas des expéditions polaires, Colloque Gérer la tension entre exploration et exploitation, IREGE, Université de Savoie, 26 septembre.

Mahoney, J. (2000). Path dependence in historical sociology. *Theory and Society, 29*(4), 507–548.

March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. *Organization Science, 2*(1), 71–87.

Miller, D. (1996). Configurations revisited. *Strategic Management Journal, 17*(7), 505–512.

Ministry of Armies. (2019). *Le plan mixité du Ministère des armées. Y aller, y rester, y évoluer*. Dossier de presse. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/le-plan-mixite-du-ministere-des-armees-y-aller-y-rester-y-evoluer.

Ministry of Armies. (2018). *Les chiffres clés de sondages de la défense*, 14 juillet 2018. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/sondage-les-chiffres-cles-de-la-defense-juillet-2018.

Ministry of Armies. (2016). *Bilan Social 2016*. Direction des ressources humaines du ministère de la defense: Rapport de situation comparée.

Mölling, C. (2012). *Pooling and sharing in the EU and NATO. European defence needs political commitment rather than technocratic solutions*. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. June 18, 2012. Retrieved from https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/europes-defence-pooling-sharing/.

Nimon, S. (2007). Generation Y and higher education. The other Y2K. *Journal of Institutional Research, 13*(1), 24–41.

Noel, J. C. (2018). Intelligence artificielle. Vers une nouvelle revolution militaire*? Focus stratégique*, *84*. Institut français des relations internationals IFRI.

Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). *The knowledge-creating company: How Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2006). *The challenge of capacity development. Working towards good practice*. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/capacitybuilding/pdf/DAC_paper_final.pdf.

O'Reilly, A., & Tushman, M. L. (2004). The ambidextrous organization. *Harvard Business Review, 82*(4), 74–81.

Pajon, C. (2016). Les femmes, des militaires comme les autres? *The Conversation*. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/les-femmes-des-militaires-comme-les-autres.

Pajon, C. (2016). *Corps et armes: les risques du métier et les femmes militaires*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326583255_Corps_et_armes_les_risques_du_metier_et_les_femmes_militaires.

Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. *American Political Science Review, 94*(2), 251–267.

Resteigne, D., & Soeters, J. (2010). Différenciation culturelle et stratégies de coopération en milieux militaires multinationaux. *Cultures & Conflits, 77*(1), 59–76.

Rindova, V. P., & Kotha, S. (2001). Continuous morphing: Competing through dynamic capabilities, form, and function. *Academy of Management Journal, 44*(6), 1263–1278.

Singh, T. & Gulhane, A. (2018). *Key military applications for artificial intelligence in 2018*. Retrieved from https://blog.marketresearch.com/8-key-military-applications-for-artificial-intelligence-in-2018.

Teece, D., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. *Strategic Management Journal, 18*(7), 509–533.

Chapter 6
Irish Defence Forces Implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

Glen Segell

Abstract   The Republic of Ireland Defence Forces (DF) has taken substantive measures to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) on gender equality. SCR 1325 was the first of its kind to call on all states to implement the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. This chapter describes how the DF introduced gender equality into recruitment and retention, in-service life, training and professional military education, and created representative associations through three national action plans. The changes to suit SCR 1325 are structural and formal changes that make the DF more inclusive, without undermining the core of the DF's military professionalism. It also harmonizes the DF with its partners in the United Nations, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Keywords Republic of Ireland Defence Forces · United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 · Civil-military relations · Gender equality

Introduction

October 2020 will be the twentieth anniversary of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 (UN 2000), which called for all states to implement a Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. UN member states were to implement the WPS agenda through national action plans (NAPs), and 78 member states, 23 of which are European Union member states, have created NAPs. The Republic of Ireland Defence Forces (DF) are currently implementing a third NAP for the years 2019–2024. Martin (2006, p. 10) observes that SCR 1325 was a watershed moment for gender equality in Ireland's DF when it was passed by the UN in 2000. Although Ireland had allowed women to join the DF in 1979, and it had been the first European military to allow women in all roles (including combat), there had been few efforts toward gender equality in the DF before SCR 1325.

G. Segell (✉)
Ezri Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies, University of Haifa, Ahie Eilat Street 4/3, 2421112 Akko, Israel
e-mail: glen@segell.com

This chapter discusses the DF's implementation of SCR 1325 principles of gender equality in recruitment, retention, in service, and in professional military training and development through successive NAPs. This first section describes the contents of the three NAPs, the second describes the civil-military coalescence that took place to foster the broad changes in the DF, and the third discusses how the changes played out across the four areas of concern—recruitment, retention, in service, and in professional military training and education. I suggest, moreover, that the changes initiated in the various areas were structural and formal changes that did not affect the core of military professionalism in the DF, yet they have made the DF more representative and inclusive of a diverse society and less male-dominated.

National Action Plans

Democratically elected governments, such as in Ireland, uses the expertise and advice of military professionals in reaching policy decisions about defense and national security. Civilian officials rely on military expert advice in these matters. But elected civilian leadership makes ultimate policy decisions, which the military then must implement in its sphere. Since 2000, UN SCR 1325 has become an integral part of the Irish government's agenda, including legislation and its NAPs, which have included the DF. The DF provided expert advice on the formulation of the parts of the NAP that applied to the military so that any changes did not compromise its core mission, tactics, or strategy. This can be seen in the NAP itself.

The Irish government initiated the first NAP in 2011, the second in 2015, and the third NAP for the years 2019–2024 was launched on June 21, 2019. Ireland's third NAP on the WPS agenda was led by a working group made up of 50% government and 50% civil society outside of government. It was based on the findings and recommendations of the midterm and final reviews of the second NAP, including a review of 48 written public consultation submissions and three public consultation workshops attended by over 100 representatives from civil society, academia, and the government.

The NAP approached the implementation of the WPS agenda domestically and internationally, following the key pillars of SCR 1325: (1) the prevention of gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse; (2) empowerment and participation of women in decision-making; (3) protection, relief and recovery, and (4) the promotion of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, nationally and internationally. According to a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) report (2017, p. 5), the Irish DF and Danish and Finnish Armed Forces are exemplary as the only militaries in the world with NAPs on SCR 1325 specifically prepared by and for their own defense forces.

One of the initiatives the DF is taking includes ensuring that all policies contain clauses about gender equality (Department of Defence 2015, p. 4). This is evident in the Department of Defence's (2016, p. 3) Equality Policy, which describes equality of opportunity in recruitment and retention, training and education, and the deployment

of forces. The specific reference is to women. It is stated therein that there is no gender-specific requirement for any DF task or deployment. And all roles, functions, and tasks are open to all genders based on merit. There is a gender advisor in DF Headquarters to monitor gender neutrality.

The Impetus for Change in the Irish Defence Forces

The impetus behind the implementation of the SCR 1325-influenced NAP in Ireland's DF was a coalescence among civilian and military leaders on the need to harmonize DF policies with its partners in the EU, the UN, and NATO, which were implementing changes in line with SCR 1325 (NATO 2018, p. 27). Accordingly, the DF incorporated gender perspectives, as defined by NATO, within the analysis, planning, execution, and evaluation of its operations and missions (NATO 2009, p. 3). As a signatory member of the NATO Partners for Peace, moreover, Ireland's DF agreed to participate, contribute, initiate, respond, and comply with the agendas, initiatives, and policies of other NATO countries, which includes matters of gender equality (NATO 2016, p. 4).

Ireland has consulted with experts from public institutions, academia, and non-governmental organizations on how to participate in Partners for Peace gender equality projects stemming from SCR 1325 (NATO 2019, p. 9). A review and assessment of projects from the second and third NAP for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions shows which have been implemented in the DF. The projects included (1) mapping the integration of women into armed forces; (2) handling gender-related complaints; (3) writing a handbook on how to prevent and respond to gender-related discrimination, harassment, bullying and abuse; (4) promoting greater gender equality; (5) increasing the participation of women in defense and security institutions for collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security; (6) removing barriers for women's participation in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building; (7) summit debates and resolutions; and (8) the appointment of a NATO Special Representative as the high-level focal point on all aspects of NATO's contributions to the WPS agenda (Government of Ireland 2019).

The DF also participates in the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective (NCGP). In compliance with the NCGP recommendations to the NATO Military Committee in 2015 and 2016, the DF has (1) appointed gender advisors to operational headquarters in order to build capacity in gender perspectives and (2) is fulfilling its commitments under the SCR 1325 WPS agenda to institutionalize a gender perspective by way of the DF Action Plan on WPS designed to complement gender perspective training programs (NATO 2019, p. 14).

Cottey (2017, p. 29) observed that Ireland's and the DF's gender initiatives are also linked to EU co-operation in international affairs through the Common Foreign and Security Policy agreement, which coordinates opinions and policies among EU members. Since the EU treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Lisbon (2007), military

tasks fall under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As Cohn et al. (2004, p. 133) point out, being part of the CSFP and the ESDP brings Ireland under EU human rights legislation, which includes gender equality requirements mirroring SCR 1325.

The DF's preparation for an EU deployment, including recruitment and training, is no different from NATO or UN missions. The European Peace Building Liaison Office (2018, p. 78) specifies that Irish participation in the EU's four units are obliged to follow SCR 1325 guidelines by sending representatives for the following roles: (1) Principal Advisor on Gender and on SCR 1325 (created 2015) to ensure exchanges and coordination of the EU with other international, regional, and national actors on policy and action related to gender and SCR 1325; (2) the EU Informal Task Force (set up 2009) to share information relevant for SCR 1325 and organize annual EU member states meetings on SCR 1325; (3) the Council Working Group on Human Rights that gathers representatives from EU Member States to discuss issues related to human rights; and (4) the United Nations Council Working Group responsible for developing common EU policies with regards to UN issues, including SCR 1325.

With respect to deployments, the political leadership decides why, when, and where to deploy and the budget for the deployment. The DF leadership decides on the most appropriate means to accomplish the mission and how and what to use both in equipment and human resources—these are operational decisions. The Department of Defence (2014, p. 7) stipulates that human resources policy is the same for domestic and international deployments. There is no gender-specific requirements for any role in the DF in either domestic or international deployment. All roles, functions, and tasks are open to all genders based on merit. A change in the gender composition of the DF to suit SCR 1325 would not touch the core of the DF's mission and roles, or its tactics and strategy. Yet it would make the DF more representative and inclusive of a diverse society and less patriarchal.

MacCarro (2012, p. 87) observes that the Irish Army is almost never deployed domestically and only infrequently deployed on international missions for the UN, EU, and NATO. Domestic deployments of the Army have always been for non-combatant purposes. A typical task for the DF is to be on stand-by to assist in adverse weather conditions. As Tonra and Ward (2002, p. 31) explain, Ireland has historically been neutral. It was only after it became a member of the UN in 1955 that a decision was taken to deploy the DF outside of the state borders for the first time. Deployments since the first in 1958 were for humanitarian activities and peace-orientated tasks, and not to take sides or to intervene militarily in any conflict.

MacCarro (2012, p. 32) observes that the UN missions have set the standard in having no specific gender requirements for any mission and all roles open to all genders. To be sure, it would be better for some roles to be filled by both males and females to be operationally efficient where local customs segregate genders for religious or other reasons.

In sum, Ireland implemented SCR 1325 to harmonize the DF with other states that Ireland partners with in the EU. These activities are intended to make the DF more representative and inclusive of a diverse society and less patriarchal. All roles are open to all genders based on merit. It should be noted, however, that these structural

and formal changes do not touch the core of the DF's mission, tactics, or strategy or the roles of its members.

The Process of Equal Opportunity

This section looks at the DF's implementation of an NAP to meet SCR 1325 and how it has affected recruitment, the service, retention, and training and professional military education. The Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces' rationale for meeting the gender equality requirements of SCR 1325 ran as follows: Equality of opportunity in recruitment and in training and education within a merit-based system leads to performance, and performance leads to advancements in rank. If experience is permitted through training and deployment, then there would be equal opportunity to compete on an equal footing for promotion. Promotion, in turn, would lead to retention through the status and pay that comes with higher rank.

Recruitment

The first stage of the NAP to meet SCR 1325 was recruitment into the DF, which is an all-volunteer force. Before 2000 (and pre-SCR 1325) women made up less than 1% of the DF. By late 2017, women had increased to 6% of DF personnel (595 of 9,214 total active personnel). A total of 751 new recruits were enlisted in 2017, of which 73 or 9.7% were women (Varadkar 2017, p. 9). As described in the *White Paper on Defence* (Department of Defence 2015 p. 3), the DF is committed to increasing the gender balance within the organization. As a public sector body, moreover, the DF must be fully compliant with all equality legislation in Ireland, referred to as the *Equality Acts 1998–2015*. There are no quota systems for men or women in the DF.

As an all-volunteer force, the DF competes with other private and public sector employers for employees. Thus, the DF Public Relations branch is trying to increase public awareness about the variety of jobs and opportunities in the DF (further detailed in Department of Defence 2015, p. 7). The focus on gender equality and equity in recruitment aims to be reflective of society, not confined to any ethnic or minority background. The DF has increased initiatives and tailors specific information to attract female recruits aimed at increasing the participation of women in the DF. The DF has targeted its advertisement campaigns at women via cinema, television, and social media. Communications strategies and initiatives include the "Join our Team" campaign, for example, which is directed at women and for which the DF has won an award for innovation. The DF has a gender, equality, and diversity booklet, which is part of an external communications plan. The Department of Defence (2015, p. 9) also has a female-specific recruitment day. Prospective employees can meet serving female soldiers from a variety of corps and hear stories and anecdotes about service in general and specific roles and fitness demonstrations. The

information provided is meant to overcome previously identified barriers, such as problems or misconceptions with the fitness test. For example, the physical entrance test for men and women varies slightly to consider natural physiological differences in order to be equitable. Women can do modified push-ups (on their knees) and have an additional 1 min and 30 s to complete a 1.5-mile run (men 11.40', women 13.10'). Enlistment requirements related to physical characteristics (height, weight) are the same for both sexes, and men and women enlist at the same age.

To ensure that gender equality in recruitment is implemented smoothly and without any misconception of bias in the application, the interview boards and panels have both women and men as interviewers (Department of Defence 2019, p. 2). In 2016, women represented 15% (680) of total applicants, which was an increase of 10% (530) in 2015 and proved to be more resilient than previous years: 71 female applicants successfully completed the fitness test in 2016, compared with 44 in 2015, and 47 women were enlisted in the DF in 2016, compared with 27 in 2015 (Varadkar 2017, p. 9).

In-Service

Gender equality in service was the next process in the NAP to meet SCR 1325. According to the Department of Defence (2019, p. 8), an increasingly complex security environment requires a diverse military force and an environment where all employees can contribute fully to tackle unforeseen events and threats. Creating equal opportunity in service is understood as an iterative process in keeping with national legislation, specifically Section 42 of the *Human Rights and Equality Commission Act* (Department of Defence 2019, p. 10). Section 42 places a positive duty on all public sector bodies, including the DF, to eliminate discrimination, promote equality, and protect human rights in their daily work. The DF complies with this legislation through the NAP (Department of Defence 2019, p. 11). The DF also liaises with the Human Rights and Equality Commission for advice on best practices (Human Rights and Equality Commission 2014, p. 87).

Further, the DF has a robust complaints mechanism through the chain of command, through a redress of wrongs office, and by the ombudsman for the DF. Complaints concerning and made by serving and former members of the DF can be investigated by the independent Office of the Ombudsman for the DF, in cases where internal grievance procedures within the DF have been exhausted. The DF has also implemented strategies and programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual abuse within the DF, and the strategies state that bullying, sexual harassment, and harassment in any form will not be tolerated (Department of Defence 2016, p. 21).

The interests of members of the DF are represented by several representative associations, which are like trade unions. Officers of the DF are represented by the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers, while rank-and-file members

of the DF are represented by the Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks Representative Association, which is affiliated to the Irish Conference of Professional and Service Associations and the European Organisation of Military Associations.

To ensure in-service gender equality to meet SCR 1325, the Department of Defence (2016, p. 34) states how gender is a topic in operational planning, and it is included in pre-deployment training and exercises. All DF career courses and overseas pre-deployment training includes a gender perspective brief, which incorporates material on gender equality, the NAP to meet SCR 1325, gender-based violence, and sexual exploitation and abuse. At all stages of the planning process and operations, a gender perspective is relevant, effective, and responsive to the needs of both women and men.

On military operations, both in domestic and international deployment, the DF encourages mixed-gender units in order to have female and male personnel available to respond to any given situation. This includes urban operations, search operations, working on checkpoints, patrolling villages and towns, and in responding to cases of gender-based violence in post-conflict UN, EU, and NATO deployments. Military installations have been adapted to both sexes—specifically, female toilets and female-only accommodation. This includes seagoing operations. Equipment is not fitted for men and women; it is the same for both genders. Female and male uniforms are available and are monitored by a clothing committee. Maternity uniforms are also available.

The DF created the *Dignity Charter*, which reflects the SCR 1325 ideals, to prescribe expectations for members in service (Department of Defence 2016, p. 19). The charter commits the DF to encouraging and supporting the right to dignity at work and states that the DF supports an inclusive workplace where dignity and respect are afforded to all, regardless of rank, gender, race, religion, civil status, family status, sexual orientation, and membership in the traveling community. It also states that personnel are selected for various appointments on competency and merit.

Retention

The NAP to meet SCR 1325 makes gender equality in retention an important goal in DF human resource policy. The Department of Defence (2017 p. 15) has specific gender equality retention policies, procedures, and initiatives. Some are social, some are legal, and some are financial, but all are aimed at being practical. There is gender focal point officer in each barracks and unit trained to assist and mentor women in their units. The DF has also put in place practices that allow for flexibility due to family circumstances. For example, legal and social support is given to mothers during pregnancy. There are specific programs and measures to support parents when both are in the military. Both parents of a new-born child are offered paid maternity/paternity leave, along with extended periods of leave without pay. Parental leave is up to 52 weeks, of which 14 are paid. Mothers can only be deployed on overseas operations if they specifically volunteer to go and not for two years after

giving birth in order to allow for breastfeeding. The DF also allows short-term leave to assist single parents or those experiencing difficulties, provided it does not affect operational commitments (Department of Defence 2017, p. 29).

Further initiatives include the DF Women's Network, established in 2016 by the HR Unit J1–HR, which is based around learning circles and is in keeping with both the *White Paper on Defence* (2015) and the *Human Rights and Equality Commission Act* (2014). The aim of the Women's Network is to support women in all aspects of their work to increase participation and help with retention. The network has a lead point of contact in each brigade and is coordinated by the DF Headquarters Gender Advisor (Ireland 2019; HREC 2014). Another initiative is the DF Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Allies Network (LGBTA), called Defend with Pride, launched in 2016 and aimed at providing support, information, and guidance for LGBTA personnel and for those who wish to support colleagues, family, and friends (Department of Defence 2017, p. 43).

In email correspondence on February 5, 2019, with the Gillian Collins, Commandant, PSS Gender Equality and Diversity Advisor, Human Resources Branch (J1), I was informed that the DF carries out exit surveys for men and women who leave the military. A DF psychologist carries out the exit surveys in order to gain an insight into why personnel leave the DF. The surveys are monitored by J1-HR, which then makes recommendations to the General Staff. A climate survey noted that more men than women were leaving the DF. It was also noted that women were more content in their work environment than their male colleagues were. The main reasons both men and women tend to leave the armed forces are better pay in the private sector and retirement.

Training and Professional Military Education

The NAP to meet SCR 1325 emphasizes the importance of professional military training and education for gender equality (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015, p. 2). The underlying principle is that if there is equality of opportunity in recruitment and a merit-based system, training and education will lead to performance, and performance to advancement in rank. If experience through deployment is permitted after training, then there will be an equality of opportunity to compete on an equal footing for promotion. Inherent in promotion is status, which potentially assists the processes of retention.

From the onset of the creation of the DF, there has been an emphasis on service, duties, and standards instilled by training and education. Shortly after independence, the first *Defence Act* (Ireland 1923) of the new parliament established an Irish military college. The most recent *White Paper on Defence* (Department of Defence 2015) states that training and education are essential for military personnel. The DF sees its responsibility to provide both collective and individual training and education so that "all personnel will be provided with the opportunity for personal development

and associated professional experience in order to realise their full potential during their service in the DF" (Department of Defence 2015, paragraph 463).

Initial or basic training is provided for all branches (Army, Navy and Air Corp), both for recruits and officer cadets, aimed to ensure that they can operate the equipment to fulfil their roles, functions, and tasks. There is also specialist training and training for international deployments for all personnel at the UN Training School, Ireland. This training is expanded through an active program of liaison and exchange with other military and civilian educational and training institutions, nationally and with international partners. Both genders are trained together across the board.

The DF provides two specialized gender-related training programs (NATO 2018, p. 56). The first is the Gender Perspective Training for Career Course. Participants are introduced to the main theories and framework of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda from SCR 1325, the NAP, and the terminology associated with a gender perspective. Participants are also introduced to gender in military operations, aimed at the officer ranks OF-1 to OF-5 and all non-commissioned officers. It is a part of the pre-deployment training and the standard national training.

The second course, Gender Focal Point Training, builds on the main theories and framework of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda from SCR 1325, the NAP, and the terminology associated with a gender perspective. Participants study gender-based violence and go through facilitated scenario training. The course targets officers of the ranks OF-1 to OF-2 and OR-1 to OR-4, and it is a part of pre-deployment and the standard national training. The DF trained 122 gender focal point officers in 2017. Gender focal point officers are posted in units at the tactical level. All units deploying overseas have at least five gender focal points officers.

In email correspondence on February 5, 2019, with the Gillian Collins, Commandant, PSS Gender Equality and Diversity Advisor, Human Resources Branch (J1), I was informed that the DF also employs military gender advisors to provide education on the gender perspective and awareness of gender-based violence in conflicts and other settings. Each brigade has a gender advisor in its HQ staff. In 2017, Ireland had 14 trained gender advisors serving in the DF, compared with two in the United States. All 14 have been trained in the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations. The DF also has specialized gender training for the prevention of sexual harassment (Ireland 2019, p. 2). This includes a designated contact-person training program where personnel are trained to inform and to support victims of harassment. The DF's military police receive specialized training for investigation of sexual assaults, and all personnel are briefed regularly throughout their career on interpersonal relationships.

Professional military education (PME), as high as third-level university degrees, is available and encouraged beyond in-house DF training (Ireland 2019, p. 5). The Director of DF Training makes all DF personnel aware of the wide variety of skills available through civilian educational institutions and embraces these courses under various educational schemes. The accreditation of training and education programs represents a policy-strategy match to fulfil DF operational and training requirements, as well as individual careers during and after service in the DF. The accreditation for all learning conducted through collaboration with appropriate higher education

institutions adheres to the standards laid down in the *Qualification (Education & Training) Act* (1999), as governed by the National Qualifications Authority of Ireland. In doing so, the DF aims to support lifelong learning.

The changes in training and professional military education to comply with SCR 1325 have been structural and formal changes that, arguably, do not touch the core of the DF's mission or its tactics and strategy. They have been aimed at making the DF more representative and inclusive of a diverse society and less patriarchal. The most recent NAP for gender equality in recruitment, in service, retention, and professional military training and education was released on September 16, 2019. On the same day, Maureen O'Brien became the first woman promoted to the general rank (brigadier general) in the Defence Forces. And she has deployed in an operational role as Deputy Force Commander with the United Nations Disengagement of Forces mission in the Golan Heights, Syria.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the Republic of Ireland Defence Forces' (DF) implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 adopted in 2000. SCR 1325 is significant in the history of the UN, with its unique Women, Peace, and Security agenda. In Ireland, three national action plans in line with SCR 1325 have been formulated and implemented, becoming the catalyst for gender equality in the DF by allowing all citizens to join the DF and for all DF personnel to compete on an equal basis. Pre-SCR 1325 the DF was a male-dominated profession, even though there was no law or regulation making it so.

The defense white papers, the three national action plans, and the policies and plans resulting from these were influenced by SCR 1325. All these documents recommended the removal of barriers to enable and to empower women to play a full and equal part in security and defense matters. This chapter showed that a gender equality apparatus exists in the DF, having been introduced through SCR 1325. There are now complaints and grievance procedures and representative organizations. Institutional barriers and gender requirements have been removed in recruitment and retention, and in training and professional military education.

Gender equality is being implemented by the DF quantitatively by increasing female personnel and qualitatively by granting all an equality of opportunity. There is no quota system or physical limitations. There is open and transparent competition for places on courses. There is no suggestion of an imbalance in the gender division of labor that would indicate a discriminatory environment. All roles within the DF are open to men and women on merit and equal opportunity. Women have been serving in operational appointments and deployment overseas.

It was also shown that the DF is working with partner nations in the UN, EU, and NATO for harmonization with them on gender equality to meet the implementation of SCR 1325. In all these cases, the analysis suggests that the changes made in the

DF to meet SCR 1325 are structural and formal changes that do not touch the core of the DF's mission and roles, or its tactics and strategy, but rather make it more representative and inclusive of a diverse society and less patriarchal.

References

Cohn, C., Kinsella, H., & Gibbings, S. (2004). Women, Peace and Security Resolution 1325. *International Feminist Journal of Politics, 6*(1), 130–140. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461674032000165969.

Cottey, A. (2017). *The European neutrals and NATO: Non-alignment, partnership, membership*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Department of Defence. (2013). *Green paper on defence.* Retrieved from http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/grnPaperE.

Department of Defence. (2014). *Roles of the naval service.* Retrieved from http://www.military.ie/naval-service/organisation/roles-of-the-naval-service/.

Department of Defence. (2015). *White paper on defence.* Retrieved from http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/WP2015E.

Department of Defence. (2016). *Defence Forces equality policy.* Retrieved from http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/Docs2/EqualityPolicy_2017.pdf.

Department of Defence. (2017). *Defence Forces: How we are organised*. Retrieved from http://www.military.ie/en/info-centre/how-we-are-organised/.

Department of Defence. (2019). *Defence Forces recruitment.* Retrieved from http://www.military.ie/careers/army/recruits/.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2015). *Second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2015–2018.* Retrieved from https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/ourwork/empoweringwomen-peaceandsecurity/s-second-National-Action-Plan-on-Women-Peace-and-Security.pdf.

European Peace Building Liaison Office. (2018). *SCR 1325 and gender main streaming in the EU.* Retrieved from http://eplo.org/activities/policy-work/gender-peace-security-2/gender-mainstreaming-eu/.

Government of Ireland. (2019). *Women, Peace and Security Ireland's third National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions 2019–2024*. Retrieved from https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Ireland%20NAP%202019.pdf.

Human Rights and Equality Commission. (2014). *Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission.* Retrieved from https://www.ihrec.ie/publications/.

Ireland. (1923). *Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act.* Retrieved from http://acts.oireachtas.ie/en.act.1923.0030.1.html.

Ireland. (2019). *Defence Forces training and education*. Retrieved from http://www.military.ie/education-hq/.

MacCarro, D. (2012). *The Irish Defence Forces since 1922*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Martin, M. (2006). *Breaking ranks: The shaping of civil–military relations in Ireland*. Washington: The History Press.

NATO. (2009). *BI-SCD 40-1 Bi-SC Directive September 2009 integrating SCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the NATO command structure*. Retrieved from htts://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_09/20090924_Bi-SC_DIRECTIVE_40-1.pdf.

NATO. (2016). *Relations with Ireland.* Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_51979.htm.

NATO. (2017). *Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives.* Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_11/20171122_2016_Summary_of_NRs_to_NCGP.pdf, Page 36.

NATO. (2018). *Gender perspectives in NATO armed forces.* Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_101372.htm.

NATO. (2019). *Taking action nationally on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.* Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_131459.htm?selectedLocale=en.

Tonra, B., & Ward, E. (2002). *Ireland in international affairs: Interests, institutions and identities.* Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.

United Nations. (2000). *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security*. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/cdrom/documents/Background_Paper_Africa.pdf.

Varadkar, L. (2017). *Defence Forces personnel data September 2017.* Dáil Irelandann Debate 960(9). Retrieved from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2017102600082?opendocument#WRN03800.

Chapter 7
Power Resources Among Female Military Personnel

Frida Linehagen

Abstract The Armed Forces are one of Sweden's largest governmental organizations and at the same time one of Sweden's most gender-segregated and male-dominated workplaces. Recruiting more women into the organization is one of the organization's main goals for personnel planning, along with providing them with more opportunities for career development. This study sought a deeper understanding of the power resources that can be identified and which are used by female military personnel within the armed forces. A total of 16 women were interviewed and their ranks ranged from soldier/sailor to general/admiral. The qualitative analysis of the interviews shows that female military personnel use power resources to adapt to the male-dominated organization's demands and to even out perceived asymmetric power relationships in their daily professional work. The power resources can be explained using four themes: structural power resources, cultural and social power resources, emotional power resources, and minority perspective as a power resource. More female military personnel would have increased the task effectiveness of the military organization. To make that possible, the Swedish Armed Forces would have to discuss the prevailing masculinity norm, the meaning of being a man, and the gains of a more gender-equal organization.

Keywords Military women · Power resources · Swedish armed forces · Military professionalism · Gender perspectives · Qualitative study

Introduction

The Swedish Armed Forces are a politically controlled, bureaucratic, and hierarchical institution (Alvinius 2013; Bonnes 2017) with a male-dominated culture (Kronsell 2012). Further, Castilla and Benard (2010) argue that the organization is meritocratic and emphasizes rank, degree, competence, and strong social cohesion. For example, studies among rangers in the Swedish Armed Forces show that a specific type of

F. Linehagen (✉)
Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defence University, 11428 Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: frida.linehagen@fhs.se

masculinity fits the culture. The culture states what the men are and are not allowed to feel, and it creates, among other things, focus and a strong sense of community (Alvinius et al. 2016). The organization makes clear demands on its members, both women and men, who are (literally) prepared to sacrifice their lives (Coser 1974; Ydén 2008).

According to the European Institute for Gender Equality, Sweden is one of the world's most gender-equal countries, with the first feminist government in the world (European Institute for Gender Equality 2017; Swedish Government 2018). The Armed Forces are one of Sweden's largest government organizations and, at the same time, one of the most male-dominated among them (Linehagen 2018). Soldiers and sailors have long been men only, as well as their commanders. Since 1980, women are allowed to enter the military, but in specific positions only. The restrictions were removed in 1989, and there have been no formal limitations on the roles and units women can apply for since then (Sundevall 2011). Today, after 39 years with women in military positions, women make up about 8% of the active-duty force (Swedish Armed Forces 2018). This study examines the historically male-dominated military profession where the organization conforms to masculine norms (Alvinius et al. 2016; Boldry et al. 2001; Sasson-Levy 2003), which in turn influences how military women identify with and behave in the organization.

Military organizations have been challenged by the processes of normalization in relation to other state institutions, professionalization, and social acceleration (Forster 2006; Holmberg and Alvinius 2019; Norheim-Martinsen 2016; Rosa 2013). The integration of women and the demands for gender equality seem to challenge the military profession (Holmberg and Alvinius 2019). Hofstede (2001) argues that Swedish organizations are considered feminine and women-friendly when they value care and welfare. This contrasts with the Swedish Armed Forces, which is a masculine organization with a hierarchy and meritocracy. This means that the political decisions made by the Swedish feminist government collide with the masculine norms in the Swedish Armed Forces.

Iskra (2007), who studied women in the U.S. military elite and their strategies for achieving success shows that women use opportunities that arise to further their careers. They do not doubt their ability to be women and feel attached and loyal to their workplaces, which offer a system with mentors for professional guidance and personal support. The support systems are crucial to help women in their carriers, which Alvinius et al. (2016) show in their study.

In order to conform to the male norm within the military, women develop strategies at the individual level (Löfgren Lundqvist 2014), such as distancing themselves from traditional femininity and instead approaching the prevailing masculine norm by imitating fighting soldiers (Sasson-Levy 2003). Likewise, Linehagen (2018) writes that women develop strategies, and the author considers it a complicated balancing act between being a woman and an accepted colleague in the military culture. Similar results can be found in other Western countries (Herbert 1995; Mills 2002; Silva 2008).

Kovitz (2001) suggests that when women demand integration on equal terms they are perceived as "enemies" in their own organization because women in such roles

constitute a threat to men's existence and to the masculine structure. Although there are women within male-dominated organizations, the male perspective is reinforced and communicated as the generally accepted norm. The military culture creates a context in which the male-dominated norm constitutes informal rules (Kronsell 2005; Elmore 2009; Perriton 2009).

Several studies on gender stereotypes show that men are expected to be authoritative, competent, and dominant, while women are expected to be kind, supportive, and helpful (Eagly 1987; Carli and Eagly 2011; Powell and Eddleston 2013). Stereotypes also demonstrate perceptions about status, and in male-dominated contexts men are awarded higher status than women (Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway 2014). Research also shows that organizations that have long been male-dominated resist female leadership and are unwelcoming to women because the roles of wife and mother make it more difficult for the women to succeed in the military profession (Shields 1985). Several other studies from various countries and organizations (Ivarsson 2001; Iskra 2007; Löfgren Lundqvist 2014) show that when setbacks at work become too noticeable, the informal support of a partner or other family member is important.

The focus of this study is informal and formal support, which will be referred to by the more general term *resources* so as to include power and power resources. Resources describe the relationship between the individual and the organization, in particular between female military personnel and the armed forces. Based on the literature and the Swedish context, this study examines power resources because power is a natural part of a hierarchical and bureaucratic organization (O'Neill 1986), such as the Swedish Armed Forces. The purpose is to arrive at a deeper understanding of the power resources used by female military personnel within the armed forces.

Power Resources

The empirical evidence in this study shows that capabilities and assets are important for female personnel in a male-dominated organization. Korpi (1985) suggested that assets and capabilities are power resources one uses in organizations. There is a lack of knowledge about power resources among female members of militaries, which is why the present study can fill a gap in our knowledge. This section looks at the concept of power resources.

One of the most-cited researchers on power is Max Weber who defines power as the probability of getting one's will done despite opposition (Weber 1978). Ahrne and Roman's (1997) concept of normative power, which is aimed at consciousness, is the most applicable in the military context. Korpi (1985) states that the concept of power is not only about exercising power, but also about possessing resources for power without having to use them. Having these resources keeps opposing actors under control because they know they will lose a conflict if it arises. Korpi defines power resources as actors' capacities to use their means to reward or punish other actors. Ahrne and Roman (1997) state that power relationships are not just about

conflicts and hard resistance, but also about collaboration that arises from access to differing power resources. They also claim that one normative power resource is the ability to change perceptions and awareness (Ahrne and Roman 1997).

An actor with many power resources finds it easier to get their will done in a relationship, according to Korpi (1985), who presents a model for power resources that explains how the use of power resources express itself as reward or punishment, depending on how they are used. Korpi (1985) suggests that power is relational and can therefore be exchanged, where *exchange* means that two actors trade mutual rewards, which occurs when there are great differences in power resources between actors. The stronger actor does not have the need to punish, and the weaker actor understands that a peaceful outcome pays the greatest dividend, which is at the same time the weaker actor's reward to the stronger actor. *Conflict* is the opposite of exchange. It occurs when both actors use power resources to punish each other, which may occur when the actors' power resources are close to each other. The *exploitation* interaction occurs when one actor uses a *pressure resource*, a power resource with negative impact on the actor, whereupon the other actor does as they are told without confrontation and, in this way, gives some type of reward (Korpi 1985).

Lindgren (1985) studies gender in organizations using Korpi's (1985) power resource model. Lindgren considers that power conditions that arise between colleagues of different genders are not as easy to determine as formal power relations between superiors and subordinates. Lindgren (1985) considers that there is imbalance in power resources between women and men in male-dominated organizations and, therefore, draws on the exchange interaction in this study.

Method

This study was qualitative and inductive in design, with the purpose of the study to gain a deeper understanding in which power resources are useful for female personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces. Thematic analysis was used to examine the data (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Thematic analysis is a structured process in which the first step consists of open coding aimed at identifying meaningful units in each transcribed interview.

Selection of Participants

This study focused on female military personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces. An open request for participation was published on a joint social media platform. There were about 1,000 members in the group, all women within the Swedish Armed Forces. The women who fulfilled the study's inclusion criteria and who would consider participating replied by email and were contacted to book a time for an interview. A total of 16 participants of various ages were interviewed. Rank varied from the

lowest (soldier/sailor) to the highest (general/admiral). The participants had between 3 and 33 years of service in the armed forces, and all services were represented (army, navy and air force). Because there were few women within each rank and from each service, however, no identifying information is given for quotations in the study to protect participants' anonymity.

Although not generalizable to all the female personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces, the 16 interviews provided an in-depth analysis of the power resources used by the participants in the organization. Bryant and Charmaz (2010) warn about collect too much data, and mean that the analysis of fewer interviews gives better data quality.

Data Collection

A semi-structured interview guide was created for data collection, consisting of two themes: experiences concerning the military profession and experiences around gender, status, and support. The interviews were conducted in a location where the respondent felt most comfortable. The respondents were able to talk about their experiences of and thoughts about their work in the Swedish Armed Forces and were not interrupted if they strayed into issues other than those included in the interview guide. Following Bryman (2001), further questions were asked, based on themes emerging from the respondents' description of their experiences as the interview proceeded. Follow-up questions such as "What do you mean? Did I understand you correctly? Please describe it in more detail" were used to obtain deeper insight into the participants' experiences. The interviews lasted 35–59 min and were recorded, with the participant's permission. The material was transcribed in conjunction with the interview and was thereafter printed out.

Data Analysis

Data analysis followed Braun and Clarke's (2013) method of thematic analysis. The first stage was to become familiar with the material. Parts of the material had to be read several times in order to note initial analytical observations. The second stage involved coding, whereby the material that was relevant to the issue of power resources was labelled. In total, around 50 labels were generated at this stage. Stage three of data analysis sought themes, and the 50 labels were placed into eleven subcategories, which were reduced to four themes. In the fourth stage, the various subcategories and themes were scrutinized to see whether they held against each other. During this review, six subcategories were sorted under other categories or merged. The fifth stage of the thematic analysis involved identifying the essence of each theme and naming them. The four themes that emerged were structural power resources, cultural and social power resources, emotional power resources, and minority perspective as a power resource. The sixth and the final stage of the

thematic analysis involved linking together data and the analytical descriptions into a story and giving it a context in relation to existing literature. This stage forms the discussion section.

Results

Analysis of the data revealed four themes describing the power resources female military personnel highlighted in the interviews. The women in the study revealed that power resources were used in relation to men and the organization and served the position of the women in the organization. The power resources were multifaceted and ranged from the organizational to the individual level. All themes are described in detail and reinforced with quotations.

Structural Power Resources

The structural power resources category concerns how the women in the study found methods for success in the structure of the military organization and consists of the subordinate categories competence, work processes, and career planning.

Competence. The participants reported growing tired of their jobs periodically and sought to develop. Some had taken leave, and several had attended the Swedish Armed Forces' program for life and career development. The women thought that competence development through trying out a new job or attending a course had helped them get new positions or other work tasks within the armed forces. In several cases, the women in the study had university-level education that they had obtained either before they became members or simultaneously with their military work, or by taking study leave, and then returning to the armed forces. One participant remarked,

> I am an upper-secondary school teacher too, so that fits in really well, the educational training is largely identical I would say, apart from teacher training being longer….My subjects are Swedish, history and English, and I studied for six years.

The women had studied in order to change occupations but had the opportunity to use their new knowledge in other positions within the armed forces. Others had wanted to remain with their employer, but felt they were not able to further their careers and had therefore chosen to study at a civilian university in the hope that this would take them further within the organization, which it had also done. One participant remarked,

> I tried to become an engineering trainee in the armed forces and wanted to study in my home town, but that university didn't count in this concept. So I took study leave and did other things for a bit, and then I got a place at the university to study engineering. Despite knowing it was a risk, I started studying in any case. During my study years, the rules changed…and I was finally counted as an engineering trainee in the armed forces.

Work processes. Performing well was important to most women in the study. Some were driven to perform to ensure their own unit or group was the best. Others placed great demands on themselves because they liked to challenge themselves. However, most performed because they believed they had to perform better than men do to deserve their place in the armed forces. As one participant said:

> You had to cover up all failings, and you had to be on top. Perform in order to be good enough. This is something personal I carry within myself…but what I can feel is that before I put more of the burden on myself, but instead it is actually about me being different.…It isn't really about me, instead it is about us being women among men, somehow.

Others thought that it is important to be inconspicuous, not to be too much not too little—but at the same time be better than the men, but without showing it. Several of the women considered that they had fought hard to get to where they were. At the same time, several women in the study said that they lacked professional feedback and often had to find alternative ways to get it. In one workplace where several women work, they linked up to pep talk each other and give feedback. The feedback often came from the outside, by someone completely different giving feedback on what they had seen and appreciated.

Keeping things in order and creating structure at work was something that many women in the study saw as their strength. Several women thought being helpful and responsible was strongly associated with the military profession:

> Yes, well I know that I am one of those persons who get things done, you know. Orderly and detailed in what I do.

Some women in the study even said that they had worked out methods of getting men to agree to their ideas and proposals. They suggested that one way was to talk individually with the men about your proposal to establish it with each one of them before raising it with the team. Another way was to choose men closer to oneself and tell them first. It was important to know that the men are on one's side.

Career planning. Often, the women in the study did not follow the template for a military career; instead, they sought and found other routes through their profession. The reasons were several. One was that they had not found the position they sought congenial; another reason was that they chose to work in a position closer to office hours after having a child. Several women have also changed jobs for safety reasons during pregnancy. Many times, the women had found interesting work that engaged them and that they had not included in their career plan to begin with:

> Then there was the requirement for international postings, and the whole focus changed in the Armed Forces. And I am a bit of two minds there, and haven't wanted to take that track, have felt doubtful about what we are doing. Therefore I have niched myself a bit, within education and people, because I think that is interesting.

Several of the women stated that they primarily wanted interesting jobs where they felt comfortable and they could contribute something. They were aware that the jobs they had were not always the most attractive from a career standpoint, but at the same time they were happy to have been able to have had an impact on their position and their tasks. Because several of the women had found their own niche within the

profession and had not followed the standard template, they had also mostly been able to drive their own development and career themselves. Many more women did not have any particular career plans. One woman said that she had never had the ambition to have a career or to rise through the ranks, although she held one of the highest ranks in the Swedish Armed Forces.

At the same time, several of the women in the study thought that women on the whole needed more pushing than men to advance in their careers. One participant thought the reason was that women tend to rate themselves lower than men and that they believe they are not sufficiently good at their jobs. Others thought that women hesitate a bit longer and therefore need a push in the right direction. Several of the women in the study described that they themselves had been lifted up by others in the organization, that there had been people who believed in them and that this support had been necessary for them to dare to take the step. For others, it was the other way round. Several women described having been openly opposed for no objective reason when they had applied for jobs. In the end, they had used the last resort and approached the most senior manager who had decided the case in their favor:

> There was a lot of bother before I got the position I had trained for. Despite me having everything that was required, they still chose not to employ anyone, and said that there was no vacant position. In the end, I keyed myself up and told the top boss, who blew his top. After that, I got the job.

Several women in the study took a long view and were keen to know and be able to impact their careers in the long term. Some had changed direction entirely, because the career ladder was very narrow and slow; others hoped that the organization would open more doors to validate previous academic education to allow quicker career progress. Some of the women said they had chosen not to study certain courses or join certain units because there has been no woman predecessor, so the women had judged it an impossible or extremely complicated route to follow. Some women had also been tactical in terms of pregnancies and parental leave during their careers and had clear plans about how to have a career in a system where the majority were men.

Cultural and Social Power Resources

The category concerns how women in the study found methods for success in the military organization culture and consists of the subcategories resistance and adaptation.

Resistance. It emerged from the study that it is important to carry out just the right amount of gender equality work. The women thought that too much led to people becoming worried that the smallest miss-speaking might be reported, which is not considered good. Nobody in the study mentioned anything about too little gender equality work. To make men think about issues related to gender equality, the women in the study had sometimes used humor:

But it was because they were talking about it, and then I just wanted, but we do joke quite a lot, and then it turned out that I somehow said it in that way. It wasn't really anything… and he understood that it was nothing. But perhaps there was a bit of seriousness in it too from my side, to get an answer. "How shall we do it? Shall I sit by myself in a sauna then, or? Shall I sit by myself and discuss it myself? While you are sitting together?".

The women in the study said that, despite lack of gender equality and derogatory comments about women making themselves heard whenever, they choose well-timed moments to make a stand. They also said that these reprimands did not appear to help. It seems like no-one cares, and nothing changes.

Several women in the study felt that it was difficult to take the initiative in the expected way in a male organization. One woman said that men could step up and carry out a fairly new task with self-confidence while she was expected to not undertake a similar task unless it was a requirement. The women in the study chose to take the initiative only when they felt secure:

It is after all, the case that the Armed Forces are made by men, for men. Both in how things work and how things are done. That is after all the male way of doing things! It might perhaps be the best way, I don't know, but women do perhaps have other ways of leading or thinking. It would be a good thing to include that further up the system too.

Adaptation. It emerged from the study that it might be important for women not to contribute to the idea that they are different. The participants said that they had often been asked to give a female viewpoint on something, but they thought that they could not always do this because they did not know what a female viewpoint was. Most of the women in the study could not see any differences between women and men in the exercise of the military profession. When gender differences were highlighted, they were quickly put down to personality. Many were careful not to generalize about male and female characteristics.

Similarly, differences between the armed forces and other actors in society were not discussed. When subjects such as gender inequality in terms of salary, derogatory jargon, or male-dominated culture were raised, the women in the study were careful to state that these issues were not unique to the armed forces. On the question of whether women are treated differently from men in the armed forces, one woman answered:

Yes, you probably are. Just as you probably are in the rest of society, nothing specific to the armed forces.

It was also important for several of the women in the study to adopt attributes of the majority, such as using coarse language when suitable.

The participants also learned how to pigeonhole some individuals in the organization because it helped them navigate the system by keeping an eye on where the adversary was. It might be that a top-level manager, for example, only has a few honest individuals to ask for advice.

Emotional Power Resources

Emotional power resources concerns how women in the study drew on personal attributes to achieve success in the military organization. The category consists of the following subcategories: meaningfulness, positive emotional coping, distancing, and being oneself.

Meaningfulness. Making a difference in society is a feature most of the women in the study thought vital to their success. Doing something important for Sweden weighed heavily on the women, and a few also emphasized that they needed to feel needed. Several were proud of being part of the security process in Sweden.

Positive emotional coping. It was important to feel comfortable and have fun at work. The women described their workdays as varied and eventful. They also thought that they contributed happiness to their work teams, but at the same time that they also bore an expectation to be happy. Many of the women in the study described themselves as social beings, with a strong interest in people and curiosity, which helped them to carry out their work:

> Then some come to me and want a confidential chat. They want a sounding board for ideas about how they can take things further or talk about having encountered this and that. These things happen now and then, and then I take the time.

Several of the women in the study said that they preferred the company of men. Some had almost exclusively male friends and others had always really liked working with men.

Fighting to be considered an equal in a community of men was also significant for the women in the study. Gaining legitimacy among the men might express itself as always hurrying so as not to be forgotten or battling with a task so that it is really well done. Many fought to perform their work tasks well, and one woman thought that this was one of the reasons many women in the armed forces left early—i.e., because they were simply too ambitious.

Distancing. For several women in the study, it was important to be honest and straightforward, but at the same time even more important not to seem too sensitive. A few women confessed that they were sad not to have been allowed to become one of the gang of men at work, but were anxious not to show this. Others said that they had not at all bothered about being included somewhere. The "blokey" atmosphere that was common in several places was something that most women shrugged their shoulders about, at least outwardly. It was more important for the younger women in the study to be included and less important for the older ones:

> This thing about being one of the blokes. I don't feel very engaged in it, to be honest. I'm in my bubble somehow, and I do what I'm supposed to.

Being oneself. Not adopting a formal work persona was a characteristic that several participants thought helped them at work. Yet several thought that they were expected to be formal as military members, so it was necessary to have a good sense of what was suitable for the situation. The women in the study reported that that they sometimes heard from men in the organization that they should be less informal, and

some were doubtful about how they were supposed to act. Most, however, saw their informal side as a strength, in being fair, showing fellowship feelings and listening equally to all, irrespective of their military rank. For all women in the study, it was important to be the same person at work as at home:

> I have actually always been the same at work as I am at home! I don't think you should assume a role just because you put on the uniform; instead, it is much easier to just be as I am.

Despite this, it was important for several women in the study to avoid bringing the military home with them. Several shared a home with another military person, and recognized that it was good for them to talk about other things than work during leisure time. Some of the women in the study made it clear that although they liked their jobs very much, their lives were not consumed by work—they did not sit at home in the evening studying work matters. They also said they enjoyed being women during leisure hours, putting on makeup, painting their nails, and chatting with other women.

Living in a gender-equal relationship was important for many of the women in the study. Several said that they shared parental leave and days off to care for sick children. Making two military careers work, where both travelled periodically, was not easy, but it worked if you lived in a gender-equal relationship. The women in the study who were not living with a partner thought that they would have to search a long time before finding a partner who would buy into their demand for gender equality:

> My husband had to assume chief responsibility at home when I was attending a long and demanding course some time ago. He is not a military officer anymore, and that is good, because then we would both have had to be away, but it is great that he has been a military officer, because that way he knows what it entails.

Minority as a Power Resource

Minority as a power resource concerns how women in the study balanced their roles as divergent to achieve success in the military organization. This category consists of the following subcategories: seeking out like-minded people, and avoidance.

Seeking out like-minded people. Most of the participants in the study did not work closely with other woman. Sometimes they knew other female military personnel at the periphery, in other positions, or with other military grades, which meant that the women had differing work duties. Several described it as a bit of a relief to sometimes work closely with other women, and sometimes it was enough that the other woman was nearby. The study shows that women choose to talk about other things with women than they usually do with men, and that they think that community feeling is different when there are more women in the workplace. As a minority, the women were used to receiving more attention, and the older women in the study had often been groundbreakers in their field:

> During my second maternity leave, I decided I wanted to go back to the Navy again and wanted to go to sea. At that time, there was no other woman who had done that—gone to sea after having children—and then lots of people thought it was mega-odd.

Several of the women chose to contribute actively with their difference and were proud to be women in the armed forces. Some of them even chose to use their femininity provocatively; for example, by using strong perfume. After many years in the armed forces, several women in the study had become increasingly positive toward other women in the organization; they supported and singled out each other as positive examples.

Avoidance. At the same time, it was important not to overdo being a woman. It was important to wear the uniform correctly and not to wear jewelry that stands out too much, to wear one's hair up, and so on. According to one woman in the study, the best situation for them was when the men forgot that they woman. On the whole, it has taken longer for older women to permit themselves to be women than for the younger women in the study:

> So I can actually admire those young girls today, who stand up for being a woman. Because I didn't! It was more like, I would have climbed up and fetched the moon, if anyone asked me to do so. Like, I will transform myself!

Some of the women in the study said that they were not against gender equality initiatives but that they had never had any problem and that they were not intending to work toward a gender-equal organization. Nor did the participants think it a given that women would be partial toward other women simply because they were women, and some admitted that they had periodically resisted other women. At the same time, it was important to not see too much of any man either. Rumors spread quickly and it was not advantageous for the women either, they say.

Discussion

This study sought a deeper understanding of the power resources used by female military personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces. The interviews with women in the Swedish forces revealed several power resources among female military personnel. The women used power resources to participate and advance in the Swedish Armed Forces. Analysis of the data revealed four themes describing the power resources female military personnel highlighted in the interviews. The themes are structural power resources, social and cultural power resources, emotional power resources and minority as a power resource. These power resources are individual, informal and to some extent hidden. It is the women themselves who generate the strategies, to adapt to organizational requirements and structures and to facilitate them to remain in the organization. But at the same time this makes it difficult for future recruitment. This is discussed in detail in the following.

Choosing a career path that differs from the organization's planned path was a theme throughout for the women in the study. Congeniality, family logistics, and

interest were offered as some of the reasons for a different career path, and the women underlined that they have had to work hard themselves to find this career path, rarely without encountering resistance. The fact that the organization is so strongly male-coded could be an underlying reason for their lack of interest and comfort. Kanter (1977) argued that the women's behavior can be traced back to their positions in the organization and considers that the organizational structure limits women's opportunities. Women have little expectation of promotion, low ambitions, and tend to undervalue their competence, which explains why the women in the study lack career plans, have more education than their positions require, and why they choose different career paths than those the organization planned. Using power strategies in this context is a way of adapting to the masculine norms within male dominated military organization. On the other hand, there appear to be extra demands, hidden conditions and invisible power resources that the women individually develop that also constitute an obstacle for the Swedish Armed Forces to achieve its long-term goal, which is to recruit more women. Recent studies have shown that this development is slow (Linehagen 2018).

Although the participants' education, for example, appears to be strong power resource, it is still used as an exchange relationship, according to Korpi's (1985) model. As the military organizational structure limits women's opportunities, the women understand that they gain most from a peaceful settlement here too, and reward the organization. That is to say, the women hold back and fall into place instead of fighting for themselves by putting their structural power resources into play. The fact that most of the women found their own career paths can be seen as a power resource that helps them forward in the organization, but in the longer term also punishes them. According to Korpi (1985), we can understand that the women, by choosing a different and informal career path, have found a place in the organization's advancement system and their power resources have been strengthened to a level equal to that of the organization, whereupon they challenge the formal organizational structure. In this way, a conflict relationship arises, when both parties are punished: The organization, as its structure is undermined and deviated from, and the women, as they quickly encounter resistance and withdrawn opportunities.

As Lindgren (1985) wrote, the men in the organization probably have the upper hand in terms of power resources in the male-dominated armed forces, and the cultural and social power resources found among the women in the study are largely used as an exchange relationship, according to Korpi (1985). The women in the study understand that they are in an inferior position as a minority and that they gain most from not opposing the masculinity norm. For this reason, they adapt to the prevailing norm by not contributing with their difference, for example, or by refraining from criticism of the culture. At the same time, the actions of the women function as a reward for the male-dominated organization, which is reproduced over time. The resistance that the women put up against the male-dominated organization is extremely careful; for example, by joking to make men think in a gender-equal way, and only using carefully chosen moments to make a stand. This carefulness protects the women from punishing and being punishing, and it does not have any negative impact on the male-coded organization either; instead, it can still be interpreted as

an exchange relationship. The reward to the women is to be welcomed into the organization, and the reward to the organization is that it retains and is reinforced in its masculinity norm. The cultural and social power resources can be likened to what Ahrne and Roman (1997) call "normative power resources," as both the resistance and the adaptation largely aim to change others' perceptions and awareness of women and their assumed intentions. That is, by managing to change the view of themselves, from probably being a demanding minority asking for gender-equal conditions and an organization that is adapted to them too, to apparently adapting to the demands and masculinity norm of the organization.

The emotional resources can be likened to Hochschild's theory of emotional labor. Hochschild (1983) argued that emotions and their meaning are socially construed in relation to their specific context (the relationship between employee, employer, customers, clients, and colleagues), and that we learn the rules for when, where, and how some feelings should be expressed by sensing the atmosphere. The theory, according to Hochschild (1983), concerns work is carried out according to an employer's specific emotional rules for what is permitted or not, but like several other researchers (Mumby and Putnam 1992; Pugliesi 1999; Bolton and Boyd 2003), I would like to widen the concept to a power resource from a gender perspective, where women form a minority and need to survive in a male-dominated organization. For this reason, methods such as distancing, feeling meaningfulness, being oneself and using positive emotional coping are important resources in negotiating power with male colleagues and with the employer. Women control their own and others' emotions through distancing or through positive coping, to name some examples. The emotional power resources can also be likened to coping strategies, according to Lazarus's (1986) model. But women's power resources should be seen in light of work life research and in an organization context, which means that Hochschild's theory of emotional labor fits well.

The women describe themselves as happy and structured, which reinforces the gender-stereotyped image of women, and give them a lower status in relation to what Ridgeway (2014) and Ridgeway and Corell (2004) write about men are accorded higher status in male-dominated contexts. Being typically feminine does not constitute a threat to the male-dominated organization because such a person does not challenge the gender order (Wahl 1996) and, therefore, does not give rise to any punishment (Korpi 1985). Wahl (1996) also argues that a woman's typically feminine behavior offers limited opportunities for advancement because a woman exhibiting typically feminine behavior is considered to lack the authority required of managers. In the long term, women experience the feeling of punishment, according to Korpi's model.

When women use the minority perspective as a power resource, they eventually join together and seek support in each other or find themselves and are proud of being women. The strength in this provides a power resource that can be used as a pressure resource, according to Korpi (1985), and the result is that the male-dominated organization offers a reward for not being confrontational because this would have a negative impact on it. However, the exploitation occurs, in Korpi's words, when

women receive attention for being a minority or choose to be provocative in their femininity. At the same time, the minority perspective's power resource is antagonistic when women, instead of choosing the strength of their femininity, choose the strength in the male-dominated organization. From women's viewpoint, the avoidance's dissociation from other women and from gender-equality work develops into a reward to the male-dominated organization, and the exchange relationship is established, which is in line with Korpi's (1985) theoretical perspective.

The study also showed that what, on the one hand, is a power resource, on the other hand often functions as resistance against something different. According to Korpi (1985), several of the women's power resources can reward or punish the male-dominated organization (Lindgren 1985). The results of this study suggest the organization usually receives rewards. When the women in the study reward and reproduce the male-coded organization, which is what the organization demands (Coser 1974), I suggest they are punishing themselves, their femininity, and the right to a gender-equal workplace.

The study highlights how women's power resources in an organization with male traditions and dominance largely neither reach their full potential nor are utilized in the organization. With an increased number of women, their power resources would have grown stronger, and the Swedish Armed Forces would have benefited and probably increased its effective ability. Like Wahl (1996), I consider that the increased number of women also must increase the number of women in management positions, because an increased number of female managers means an increased number of women with power. Wahl differentiates between the group of women as an unused power resource, and as an unused complementary resource, where the group of women as a power resource is permitted to exercise power, not be used by the power. I consider that more women with power in the armed forces would both have increased the power resources of individual women, and the group of women as a power resource would, in turn, have increased the task effectiveness of the military organization.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, military organizations have been challenged by the processes of normalization with other state institutions, professionalization, and social change (Forster 2006; Rosa 2013; Norheim-Martinsen 2016; Holmberg and Alvinius 2019). The integration of women and demands for gender equality seem to confront the military profession (Holmberg and Alvinius 2019). The military organization has survived many years in its form and although Sweden is one of the most gender-equal countries in the world, the challenge with feminization is obvious.

Achieving gender equality in the Swedish Armed Forces requires discussing the prevailing masculinity norm and the benefits of a more gender-equal organization. The Swedish Armed Forces would have to reverse the perceived challenge feminization presents to the military profession into a strength and allow more women in leadership positions.

Finally, this is not a study of the military profession, but the study contributes to a scientific debate about the challenges women face in military organization. This

needs to be explored from a military professional perspective, including by both women and men, which is further highlighted in the next section.

Conclusion

The analysis of the interviews shows that the female military personnel use power resources to adapt to the male-dominated organization's demands and to even out perceived asymmetric power relationships in their daily professional work. To participate and advance in the organization, the women use power resources that can be explained using four themes: structural power resources, cultural and social power resources, emotional power resources and minority perspective as a power resource.

The results of the study can be used as the basis for discussion in education and in conversations about the conditions of women in the organization, but also as documentation for illuminating the gender perspective in personnel provision and in recruitment to the armed forces.

Further quantitative studies are required on the power resources of both women and men in military organizations. It would also be interesting to make a qualitative study of the power resources of military men, and then compare it to this study. The result would create a broad basis for discussions about gender equality, power, and effectiveness in the armed forces.

References

Ahrne, G., & Roman, C. (1997). *Hemmet, barnen och makten: Förhandlingar om arbete och pengar i familjen. Statens offentliga utredningar*, 1997:139. Retrieved from http://jamda.ub.gu.se/bitstream/1/88/1/73bd60b1.pdf. Accessed March 20, 2019.

Alvinius, A. (2013). *Bridging boundaries in the borderland of bureaucracies: Individual impact on organisational adaption to demanding situations in civil and military contexts*. Karlstad: Karlstads University.

Alvinius, A., Starrin, B., & Larsson, G. (2016). Becoming a Swedish Military Ranger: A grounded theory study. *NORMA, 11*(1), 34–51.

Boldry, J., Wood, W., & Kashy, D. A. (2001). Gender stereotypes and the evaluation of men and women in military training. *Journal of Social Issues, 57*(4), 689–705.

Bolton, S. C., & Boyd, C. (2003). Trolley dolly or skilled emotion manager? Moving on from Hochschild's managed heart. *Work, Employment & Society, 17*(2), 289–308.

Bonnes, S. (2017). The bureaucratic harassment of U.S. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2013).*Successful qualitative research: a practical guide for beginners*, (1st edn.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Bryant, A. & Charmaz, K. (Eds.) (2010/2007). *The SAGE handbook of grounded theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Bryman, A. (2001). *Social research methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carli, L., & Eagly, A. (2011). Gender and leadership. In A. Byman, D. Collinson, K. Grint, B. Jackson, & M. Uhl-Bien (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of leadership* (pp. 103–117). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.

Castilla, E., & Benard, S. (2010). The paradox of meritocracy in organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 55*(4), 543–676.

Coser, L. A. (1974). *Greedy institutions: patterns of undivided commitment*. New York: Free Press.

Eagly, A. H. (1987). Reporting sex differences. *American Psychologist, 42*(7), 756–757.

Elmore, C. (2009). Turning points and turnover among female journalists: Communicating resistance and repression. *Women's Studies in Communication, 32*(2), 232–254.

European Institute for Gender Equality. (2017). *Gender Equality Index 2017: Measuring gender equality in the European Union 2005–2015, Report*. Retrieved from http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/eige-publications/gender-equality-index-2017-measuring-gender-equality-european-union-2005–2015-report.

Forster, A. (2006). *Armed forces and society in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Government of Sweden. (2018). *A feminist government*. Retrieved from http://www.government.se/government-policy/a-feminist-government/.

Herbert, M. S. (1995). *A fine line: The management of gender among women in the military*. Tucson: University of Arizona.

Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Holmberg, A., & Alvinius, A. (2019). How pressure for change challenge military organizational characteristics. *Defence Studies, 19*(2), 130–148.

Iskra, D. M. (2007). *Breaking through the "brass" ceiling: Elite military women's strategies for success*. Washington, DC: University of Maryland.

Ivarsson, S. (2001). *Kvinnors karriärväg mot chefskap: om könsrelaterade mönster i karriärutvecklingsprocessen*. Stockholm: Arbetslivsinstitutet.

Kanter, R. M. (1977). *Men and women of the corporation* (2nd ed.). New York: Basic books.

Korpi, W. (1985). Power resources approach vs. action and conflict : On causal and intentional explanations in the study of power. *Sociological Theory*, *3*(2), 31–45.

Kovitz, M. (2001). Women soldiers: The enemy within. In G. Kümmel (Ed.), *The challenging continuity of change and the military: Female soldiers—conflict resolution—South America* (pp. 247–264). Strausberg: SOWI.

Kronsell, A. (2005). Gendered practices in institutions of hegemonic masculinity. *International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7*(2), 280–298.

Kronsell, A. (2012). *Gender, sex, and the postnationel defense: Militarism and peacekeeping*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Lazaruz, R. (1986). Coping strategies. In S. MvHugh & T. Vallis (Eds.), *Illness behavior*. Boston, MA: Springer.

Lindgren, G. (1985). *Kamrater, kollegor och kvinnor—en studie av könssegregeringsprocessen i två mansdominerade organisationer*. Umeå: Umeå Universitet.

Linehagen, F. (2018). Conforming one's conduct to unwritten rules experiences of female military personnel in a male-dominated organization. *Res Militaris, 8*(1), 1–25.

Löfgren Lundqvist, A. (2014). *Gynnsamma och ogynnsamma aspekter i rekrytering av kvinnor i Försvarsmakten*. Stockholm.

Mills, A. J. (2002). Studying the gendering of organizational culture over time: Concerns, issues and strategies. *Gender, Work & Organization, 9,* 286–307.

Mumby, D. K., & Putnam, L. L. (1992). The politics of emotion: A feminist reading of bounded rationality. *Academy of Management Review, 17*(3), 465–486.

Norheim-Martinsen, P. M. (2016). New sources of military change—armed forces as normal organizations. *Defence Studies, 16*(3), 312–326.

O'Niell, J. (1986). The disciplinary society: From weber to foucault. *British Journal of Sociology, 37*(1), 42–60.

Perriton, L. (2009). "We don't want complaining women!" A critical analysis of the business case for diversity. *Management Communication Quarterly, 23*(2), 218–243.

Powell, G. N., & Eddleston, K. A. (2013). Linking family-to-business enrichment and support to entrepreneurial success: Do female and male entrepreneurs experience different outcomes? *Journal of Business Venturing, 28*(2), 261–280.

Pugliesi, K. (1999). The consequences of emotional labor: Effects on work stress, job satisfaction, and well-being. *Motivation and Emotion, 23*(2), 125–154.

Ridgeway, C. L. (2014). Why status matters for inequality. *American Sociological Review, 79*(1), 1–16.

Ridgeway, C. L., & Correll, S. J. (2004). Unpacking the gender system: A theoretical perspective on gender beliefs and social relations. *Gender and Society, 18*(4), 510–531.

Rosa, H. (2013). *Social acceleration: A new theory of modernity*. Chicago: Columbia University.

Sasson-Levy, O. (2003). Feminism and military gender practices: Israeli women soldiers in "masculine" roles. *Sociological Inquiry, 73*(3), 440–465.

Shields, P. M. (1985). *Women as military leaders—promises and pitfalls*. San Marcos: Southwest Texas State University.

Silva, J. M. (2008). *A new generation of women? How female ROTC cadets negotiate the tension between masculine military culture and traditional femininity*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia.

Sundevall, F. (2011). *Det sista manliga yrkesmonopolet: genus och militärt arbete i Sverige 1865-1989*. Stockholm: Makadam.

Swedish Armed Forces. (2018). Försvarsmaktens årsredovisning 2018. Stockholm. Retrieved from http://e-journal.uajy.ac.id/14649/1/JURNAL.pdf. Accessed March 20, 2019.

Wahl, A. (1996). Företagsledning som konstruktion av manlighet. *Kvinnovetenskaplig Tidskrift, 17*(1), 15–29.

Weber, M. (1978). *Den protestantiska etiken och kapitalismens anda*. Lund: Argos.

Ydén, K. (2008). *"Kriget" och karriärsystemet: Försvarsmaktens organiserande i fred*. Göteborg: Göteborgs universistet.

Chapter 8
Military Professionalism and the British Army

Rita Hawkshaw and Clodia N. O'Neil

Abstract The changing character of conflict and competition demands that the British Army re-appraise what it means to be a military professional. This requires a common understanding of military professionalism, which places an emphasis on professional development throughout a military career, ensuring the British Army is able to continuously adapt to changing demands. This chapter draws on Butler and Budgell's (2015) study of the critical components of military professionalism derived from influential theories to briefly review professionalism in the British Army. The main focus of the review is on professional development, which is a key enabler of the professional components. We present an initial conceptualization of the tenets of the profession of arms and the supporting continuing professional development (CPD) approach, based on a review of the British Army's current CPD approach.

Keywords British army · Military professionalism · Continuing professional development

Introduction

The rapidly changing security environment requires the British Army to re-evaluate what it means to be a military professional. This necessitates a common understanding of military professionalism that emphasizes continuing professional development (CPD), ensuring that members of the British Army remain competent professionals who are able to continually adapt to contemporary and future challenges. In the first step to achieving this aim, the British Army sought to conceptualize tenets of the profession of arms and the supporting CPD approach. The focus on professional development was taken because this was recognized to be a key lever to professionalization in the British Army. To inform the concept, a review of the current CPD

R. Hawkshaw (✉) · C. N. O'Neil
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Army Headquarters, Marlborought Lines, Monxton Rd, Army HQ, Andover SP11 8HJ, UK
e-mail: rita.hawkshaw100@mod.gov.uk

C. N. O'Neil
e-mail: clodia.oneill907@mod.gov.uk

113

approach was undertaken to identify opportunities that could, ultimately, further professionalize the British Army. This chapter predominately outlines the findings from the review and presents the initial conceptualization of the professional tenets and the supporting CPD approach. To gain a broader understanding, a brief review of professionalism in the British Army was undertaken using Butler and Budgell's (2015) four critical professional components. These components were derived from the theories of Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), Sarkesian (1981), and Abbott (2014). This brief review will help contextualize the key reasons professional development is an important enabler of professionalism in the British Army. Further opportunities for professionalism are highlighted.

A Brief Review of Professionalism in the British Army

A number of influential theories of military professionalism have been espoused, evolving over time to reflect social and cultural influences and the changing function of the military (i.e., Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Sarkesain 1981; Abbott 2014). The early theories were shaped by the hegemony of men (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Sarkesain 1981) and the management of violence (Huntington 1957). However, there are a number of enduring commonalities within these theories from which Butler and Budgell (2015) identified four critical components of professionalism: expertise, legitimacy, jurisdiction, and identity and culture. These components are not mutually exclusive and will be briefly reviewed in the context of the British Army. While professional development strongly contributes to expertise, for example, it is also a key enabler of the other components. Thus, there is a focus on professional development in the review of all the components. An in-depth review of the British Army's current CPD approach will be presented under expertise.

Expertise

A fundamental distinguishing characteristic of a profession from other occupations is the possession of an expert body of abstract knowledge and skills (Snider 2003). This expertise is accumulated through lengthy training and experience (e.g., Mosher 1982). Contemporary areas of military expertise include "direction, operation, and control of a human organization, including the application of violence, peacekeeping, and stabilization and reconstruction operations" (Butler and Budgell 2015, p. 21). CPD enables members of the military profession to maintain their expertise and acquire new knowledge and skills required to meet these contemporary and changing demands (Snider 2003). Further, maintenance and evolution of military expertise through CPD allows the profession to uphold standards of practice, which instils public trust, providing assurance the military can fulfil its social responsibility (Butler and Budgell 2015).

Recognizing that CPD is a key enabler for the twenty-first century British profession of arms, a review[1] of the British Army's CPD approach was undertaken. Related aspects of career development were also reviewed. The findings would inform the development of tenets of the profession of arms and supporting CPD framework. Initially, critical themes were identified that had to be included across all ranks' education and development if the Army was to remain competitive in future conflicts. These included enhancing thinking skills (intellectual flexibility) and, specifically, creative, critical, and adaptive thinking to support the development of new doctrine, capabilities, and ways of fighting in new types of operations and environments. The primary method of analysis used in the review was a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis, looking holistically through the career learning and development system for both officers and soldiers. Additionally, an internal benchmarking analysis was conducted to compare the differences in development between corps, officers, and soldiers. The main findings from the review are outlined below, along with opportunities to develop the CPD approach to enhance relevant expertise and further professionalize the British Army.

Course Format

Allowing for some notable exceptions, the majority of courses required for promotion and development at all ranks are residential, class-based courses, some of which are nearly a year long. Attendance is either based on promotion or selection within the promoted cohort. Once a course has been completed, there are no "top-up courses." Nor can an individual who has not been selected attend relevant modules or access online materials. Nor, in general, can an attendee opt out of a section that has no relevance. Courses are all or nothing; they are not modular, so must be taken in a single attempt or not at all, with the issue compounded by the fact that selection and attendance must be at a specific time in rank and career. There is no ability or incentive to attend courses early or to self-teach elements to get ahead. There are areas of similarity between officer, senior non-commissioned officer, and junior non-commissioned officer training, specifically in some areas of the Army Leadership Development and Development Programme (ALDP). But there is no synergy between the courses that would allow integration between officers and non-commissioned officers. The current course format does not allow flexibility for the organization, or personal agency for the individual. The British Army training and education system, the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT), is widely regarded as an excellent mechanism for articulating course requirement and framing course content, and it would support more distributed and workplace training. However, the bureaucratic process that has

---

[1]Review undertaken by the British Army Programme CASTLE. CASTLE's objective is to modernise the British Army Career pathways enabling greater organisational agility, institutional and individual choice. The programme will maximise the opportunities for, and the talent of, the Army's people so that they are motivated, ready and skilled to prevail in day to day competition and war.

been built up around DSAT has, in many areas, led to a system and course content that is very slow to change and adapt to new requirements.

To change this format of exhaustive content at long residential courses to facilitate shorter modular courses will require the British Army to take greater risk in course content. The risk is that the Army will no longer be able to train for every eventuality. The Army will have to allow areas currently taught in the classroom to be delivered through self-study, on-demand learning at the point of need, or in the workplace. Soldiers and officers will not leave a course as finished product but will need to seek additional information and resources on their own. Further study will be required, and units will need a higher tolerance of mistakes. This carries risks and requires a change in attitude to courses in both the Army and Defence. It may be the case that a nuanced approach can be taken, depending on course content. The Army Advanced Development Programme[2] scheme, which adheres to a 70:20:10 approach,[3] is an example of a different approach to course format.

Army versus cap-badge learning. The training for rank is standardized and well-defined for soldiers in the ALDP. On top of this requirement, specifically for soldiers, the cap badges lay on additional educational requirements. There is a large variation in time and style. For example, a Royal Engineer (RE) artisan bricklayer will have undertaken 478 days of role training for promotion, in addition to that required by the ALDP, by the time they reach warrant officer. A Royal Logistics Corps logistic specialist, on reaching the same rank, will have conducted 82 days of role training, while an infantry warrant officer will have conducted 224 days. Different corps have different approaches to workplace learning. Some, such as the Adjutant General's Corps and the Corps of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, depend on workplace learning to develop skills taught on course because they are used every day in unit. Conversely, for some, such as the RE bricklayer, most skills are assumed to be taught on course, with minimal additional training in unit. Most skills are taught at the private to corporal ranks, and then not used once attaining the senior non-commissioned officer ranks. There are no top-up courses offered to maintain competency for those who may take longer to be promoted. While the Army has a standard training profile for rank training, the profile between cap badges varies significantly. The cost implications of this variance are currently being investigated.

Officer versus soldier learning: focus. Interventions seem to favor *trade* training for soldiers, and *rank* training for officers. This is understandable. Soldiers deliver their military effect through their trade, while officers are more likely to serve in a headquarters and in staff roles, so a more generic training for rank seems appropriate. The logic fails in the transition from soldier to officer. A late-entry officer attending the Intermediate Command and Staff Course, aimed at preparing majors for sub-unit command, will have spent on average 350 days in trade training (corps and trade

---

[2]AADP prepares lieutenant colonels for the rank of colonel.

[3]The 70:20:10 model for learning and development assumes 70% of an individual's time is spent on challenging assignments (learning on the job and on the job experience), 20% on developmental relationships (learning from others through mentoring and coaching) and 10% on formal coursework and training (structured learning).

dependent) but only an average of 20 days in formal educational training. Conversely, their direct-entry officer counterpart will most likely have an undergraduate degree. To achieve an equitable level of military education, the training gap must be closed.

Officer versus soldier learning: syllabus. The ALDP syllabus for soldiers is progressive and clear, showing development from one rank to the next in consistent areas of command, leadership, and management. Conversely, there is no such clear progression for officers. There is some consistency and development of behavioral and functional areas between sequential officer ranks, but there is no behavioral or functional area that is covered and developed consistently throughout an officer's career from junior officer (lieutenant–captain) through field ranks (major–lieutenant colonel) to senior officer (colonel and above).

Officer versus soldier learning: risk.[4] Officer education held very little risk. In most courses less than 10% of the syllabus was assumed to be undertaken in workplace training, and even less was held as a training gap. As an example, only one element of the Junior Officer Tactical Awareness Course[5] training syllabus is held as a training gap (i.e., execute the operation) and three elements were taken as workplace training (e.g., apply command functions at sub-unit level). The only officer course to take large areas at risk was the Commanding Officers' Designate Course. All this stands in stark contrast with soldier ALDP training. Here, up to half of the elements within the syllabus are taken at risk, to be trained in units. The attitude to risk in officer and soldier training appears to be very different. It is possible that officers are assumed to require a greater assurance in their training because they have to take responsibility for activities. The hallmark of officer education seem to be that the Army is trying to teach for every eventuality, as opposed to teaching a state of mind or an approach to dealing with problems supported by an understanding of where additional knowledge can be found.

In adopting more workplace learning, the Army must accept that soldiers will return to their units after a course and still require training. This affects the assessment of trained strength and will require different tools to articulate the people capability that each unit and sub-unit must have. The effect could be mitigated, however, through extended pre-deployment training. But there are risks involved with adopting a "just-in-time approach" to training. Soldiers will need to continue their development and training in unit to gain and retain their competencies. This may require additional training-focused personnel and resource in units, such as a reinvigorated training wing that can assess requirements and assure training outcomes. The ability to deliver this training and continuation training may be difficult due to the tempo of exercises, deployments, operations, and trawls, unless the activity forms part of the education.

Link between education, promotion, and posting. The findings from focus groups with officers and soldiers, interviews with career managers, and a review of the personnel and learning and development practices, indicate that education had little impact on progression, posting, or selection for further development that shaped and developed individuals' expertise for the longer term. This was consistent

---

[4]Learning risk: assumption that training will be undertaken in the workplace/unit.

[5]This course prepares officers for the rank of captain.

when considering prior educational qualifications, meaning those who had undertaken a military sponsored (and financed) educational qualification (e.g., postgraduate degree) or an external industrial placement. It is possible that this is due to a lack of information on education qualifications available from the personnel administrative system to assist boards in making their decisions. As a result, the Army does not receive a return on investment, and individuals may experience low job satisfaction because they are unable to apply their expert skills (Parker et al. 2001). Military personnel may be disincentivized to pursue further education and self-improvement because these are perceived not to be valued by the Army establishment.

There is an opportunity to formalize placements and education into the career structure. This could be used to incentivize further education and broaden experience within the organization. However, to justify the placement or course, there will need to be an organizational benefit that outweighs having an individual away from the workplace. Additionally, the Army may wish to consider the inherent value of learning prior to pre-employment training[6] to develop creativity, adaptability, and a broad base of knowledge and skills to draw upon. This must include a clear policy on how the Army will track and use an individual's previously attained qualifications, such as degrees or apprenticeships, and their previous work-based knowledge, skills, and experience. The Army might consider whether they recognize and reward these or only those attained while in service. An Army competency framework may help develop a method of slotting in previous qualifications. CPD in the form of the knowledge, skills, and experience—behaviors (KSE-B) framework could be fully integrated into career structures and career management, forming part of the criteria for progression, posting, and development.

Currently, some courses carry a personal obligation in the form of return of service. There is no organizational equivalent; the Army is not obliged to use an individual in the skillset in which they have been trained for. If the Army wishes to develop specific people capabilities, especially if there is an individual investment, then the Army may have to make its obligations explicit. This may take the form of guaranteeing the next one or two postings, geographic stability, or the promise of additional courses leading to accreditation. The Army may have to further develop its long-term succession planning to ensure the best return on education for both the individual and the organization. This may come at the cost of organizational agility and individual choice.

To summarize, the findings from the review of the British Army CPD approach, the current learning and development system will not be able to adapt to future and rapidly changing requirements; it is inflexible and heavily bureaucratic and is not structured to deliver (or assist with) through-life personal CPD and the through-life requirements of the Army. Learning and development at every rank will become more important to generating the required expertise for the conflicts of the future. The learning and development pathways are markedly different between corps, trades, and markedly between officers and soldiers. The Army has a very low-risk appetite when setting

---

[6]Pre-employment training is training provided at the end of a military career to support the transition to a civilian career.

course content, especially in officer education. The educational progression through soldier ranks is well defined, as are the pan-Army requirements for every soldier rank (corps requirements vary). This is not the case for officers, where the educational requirement through career is more fractured and less well articulated. The lack of connection between education and development, and a career (outside of specified courses) may contribute to the variation in interest and focus within the learning culture throughout the organization and between individuals. If the Army wishes to adopt a framework for a profession of arms, part of which is the requirement for CPD, then there must be a culture that supports, prioritizes, and encourages learning and education. It is suggested that the fastest way to bring this ethos into the core is to link CPD to the career structure, career management, and the reward strategy.

A consideration of the factors, potential opportunities, and investment in resources will help the British Army's CPD maintain a high level of expertise; maintaining military expertise is crucial to remaining a legitimate professional body that the public trusts (Beckman 1990).

Legitimacy

Butler and Budgell (2015) describe professional legitimacy in this statement:

> When society grants a profession the authority and autonomy to monopolize an area of expert knowledge such as law, medicine, and national defence, the profession is seen to be operating as a legitimate agent of society and the public trusts that the profession will act in the best interests of society (p. 22).

In the UK, the British Army ultimately acts to "protect our people and our values, and ensure that our country prospers" (HM Government 2015, p. 9). The British military professional further reciprocates with selfless commitment to British sovereignty and the nation, unlimited liability, and political neutrality (Swain 2010). Integral to professional legitimacy, the profession is bestowed with the autonomy to implement mechanisms to ensure the profession instils public trust, to maintain legitimacy, and to uphold their social responsibility. Establishing and adhering to standards of conduct and maintaining expertise and internal professional regulation are important to retaining legitimacy (Collins and Jacobs 2002; Martin and McCausland 2002; Abbot 1988; Middlehurst and Kennie 1997).

The standards of conduct are embodied in the British Army's (2018) values and standards. The values are courage, discipline, respect for others, integrity, loyalty, and selfless commitment. The three standards outline the way that the values should be enacted: lawful, appropriate, and with total professionalism. Breaches in the Army values and standards that adversely impact the efficiency or operational effectiveness of the service are appraised through established disciplinary mechanisms. The importance of the standard of conduct to legitimacy is reflected in the following excerpt.

The British Army has a unique and trusted standing in the Nation and more widely. Founded on principles that underpin our society, the Army's Values and Standards contribute directly to preserving this position and delivering operational effectiveness (The British Army 2018, p. 30).

To further ensure a shared understanding of the required standard of behavior, the British Army's appraisals (introduced in 2015) employ performance attributes based on a framework of core knowledge, skills and experience (CKSE). These have been developed from an analysis of military behaviors and characteristics to provide a broad, modern, and objective basis for assessment. The CKSE framework's ten attributes are adaptability and initiative, awareness and understanding, breadth of perspective, communication and influence, delivering results, physical and mental resilience, problem solving and decision making, teamwork and collaboration, values and standards, and leadership. To help standardize behaviors, the types of observable behaviors of both positive and negative performance are provided to service personnel, along with the definitions and factors that support each attribute.

CPD tries to inculcate the standards of conduct along with expert skills and knowledge to conduct military functions (e.g., Mattox 2002; Butler and Budgell 2015; Collins and Jacob 2002). The review of the British Army's current CPD approach discussed above found that training for officers and soldiers initially had a stronger focus on compliance (discipline) and deference than on the other British Army values and standards. These findings reflect a cross-cultural study where British officers-in-training rated discipline as more important than other Western European countries and the Latin countries (Soertes and Recht 1998). Balancing discipline with the other values and standards in training may help entrench these behaviors in the British military professional, subsequently strengthening professional legitimacy.

Jurisdiction

Professional jurisdiction, "the boundaries of a domain within which expert knowledge is applied" (Butler and Budgell 2015, p. 23), is likely to be maintained through establishing legitimacy (Abbott 1988) and success in that domain (Abbot 1988; Martin and McCausland 2002). A clear strategic vision will support the claim of professional jurisdiction (Butler and Budgell 2015). Britain's most recent five-year strategic vision for Defence was set out in the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (HM Government 2015).

Our vision is for a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence. Everything we do in the UK and around the world is driven by our determination to protect our people and our values, and ensure that our country prospers (p. 9).

The strategic vision has been integrated into the British Army's organizational and operational strategies, enabling members of the military profession to understand their professional jurisdiction. The vision should also emphasize the importance of

broadening the expert knowledge and skill base (Butler and Budgell 2015); this perspective is captured in the *Strategic Defence and Security Review*.

> Our Armed Forces rely on the skills, commitment and professionalism of our people. We place heavy demands on them. Recruiting, training and retaining the right mix of capable and motivated Service personnel is essential to deliver success on operations (HM Government p. 32).

Identity and Culture

Professional identity has been defined as "one's professional self-concept based on the central, distinctive, and enduring attributes, beliefs, motives, and experiences that exemplify a profession" (Butler et al. 2014, p. 9). Leonard et al. (1999) proposed that key components of identity also include competencies (skills, abilities, talent and knowledge), values and beliefs, and desired behaviors. Socialization (conveying knowledge primarily to newcomers) and continuous training in the competencies and values would, alongside work experience, create, and then strengthen, military professional identity (Ostroff and Kozlowski 1992; Fine 1996). The beneficial outcome of strengthening a work group identity has been found to be positively related to high job satisfaction and job involvement (Van Knippenberg and Van Schie 2000). In the British Army, while the majority of the key competencies are taught, there is an opportunity to enhance professional identity by embedding all the British Army's values and standards in training, which currently only focuses on discipline and compliance.

Walsh and Gordon (2008) further postulated that military identity is influenced by the broader military culture. The extensive research on organizational culture can help with understanding the military professional culture. Woods and West (2010) define organizational culture as "shared meanings, values and attitudes and beliefs that are created and communicated within an organisation" (p. 525). In addition, Schein (1992) distinguished three different levels of an organization's culture. Examples from the British military profession are provided for two of Schein's cultural levels: espoused values, which are the Army's explicit values and standards, and artefacts, which are the levels of hierarchy, ritual, military uniform and regimental insignia. The third cultural level is basic hidden assumptions: unconscious values and behaviors that can be made explicit through discussion with organizational members. The British Army displays a number of characteristics that distinguish military culture from other professional cultures. These include communal life, hierarchical structure, deference to the chain of command (with associated rules and regulations), a strict disciplinary system to maintain standards of behavior, and national social responsibilities (Bannerjee et al. 2011).

Leaders have a strong effect on culture and are also reciprocally influenced by important cultural values (Woods and West 2010). Leaders can strengthen identification with their professional members by emulating values (Shamir et al. 2000). The British Army (2015) developed a Leadership Code, drawing on values-based, transformational, and transactional leadership theories, for all leaders (officers and soldiers), which sought to embed the military profession values. The Leadership Code translated the British Army's values and standards into desired leadership behaviors: lead by example, encourage thinking, apply reward and discipline, demand high performance, encourage confidence in the team, recognize individual strengths and weaknesses, and strive for team goals, which was made into the acronym LEADERS. To assist senior military leaders to lead by example, 360° feedback assessments are undertaken to enhance self-awareness and personal and professional development of behaviors. There is the opportunity to explicitly embed the Army Leadership Code in the progressive levels of leadership training to further influence the values and behaviors of British military professionals.

Butler and Budgell (2015) further outlined three constructs, which underpin military professionalism. These constructs have been discussed in the review of military professional components: military ethics (discussed in legitimacy, values, and standards), leadership, and discipline.

In this brief review, examples have been provided where the British Army supports the four critical professional components. Drawing together these components, Butler and Budgell (2015) outlined the role of professionalism in the Army:

- The Army as a profession is focused on the development and application of the esoteric knowledge and related practical professional skills of land warfare (Expertise)
- The Army has a social responsibility to its people to fight and win the nation's wars and to preserve and protect their way of life (Legitimacy and Jurisdiction)
- The Army profession maintains a professional ethic of selfless service that is committed to the prevention of abuse of its own authority and power (Legitimacy) (p. 31).

The above interlocking components are reinforced by the final component, identity and culture, and are underpinned by military ethics, leadership, and discipline. There are opportunities to enhance and sustain the British Army profession in the face of the changing character of conflict and competition in the twenty-first century. With CPD being an important enabler of the professional components, a key opportunity is to strengthen and adapt the CPD approach to further professionalize the British Army.

Initial Conceptualization of the Professional Tenets and the CPD Approach

The CASTLE program has sought to develop tenets of the profession of arms and a supporting CPD approach, based on the review of the current professional development approach (discussed above). From the review, a key finding was the inflexibility and high level of bureaucracy in the British Army's learning and development system. This may impede the expansion of the professional knowledge and skills required within a rapidly changing environment and may have a detrimental effect on the British Army's status as a profession (Wong 2002).

Tenets of the Profession of Arms

The six professional tenets were conceptualized prior to the development of this chapter and drew on the prominent theories of Huntington (1957), Hackett (1963), and Janowitz (1960). To provide consistency with the review undertaken in this chapter, Butler and Budgell's (2015) professional components are placed in parentheses and italicized:

1. **Service**. An ethos of service to the Queen, country, public, Army, regiment and comrades above individual self-interest. (Legitimacy, jurisdiction, identity and culture)
2. **Values**. An individual's behavior and conduct is based upon and held to account against, the values of the British Army: courage, discipline, respect for others, integrity, loyalty and selfless commitment. (Legitimacy, identity and culture)
3. **Martial knowledge**. A deep understanding of war's enduring nature and changing character and how it impacts all aspects of military activity and thinking. (Expertise)
4. **Mission command**. The combination of leadership, decision-making, control and management that manifests in the uniquely military state of Mission Command. (Expertise)
5. **Martial skill**. The ability to plan, direct, deliver, and contribute to military force to achieve politically directed ends at every level, tactical to strategic, against a capable adversary (Expertise)
6. **Staff skill**. The ability to plan, direct, deliver, and contribute to the staff capability required to develop and sustain the Army while it prepares for war (Expertise).

It is proposed that these six tenets apply to all ranks in the Army. The depth of knowledge and skills develop with study and experience. The ethos of service and values are universal to all, regardless of rank or position. The development and maintenance of the six professional tenets will require professional development. This focus is consistent with Jans and Schmidtchen's (2002) view that a professional development approach should help to convert professional values into professional

behaviors. The development and maintenance of professional competence in all six areas will require a combination of study and practice throughout a military career.

The CPD Approach to Support the Attainment of the Professional Tenets

The KSE-B framework. To support the development of a professional force within the proposed tenets, Army learning and development must be structured accordingly. This structure could be provided through the adoption of a KSE-B framework based around the professional tenets, forming the ways of delivering a formally professionalized force. Based on the themes identified in an analysis of future educational requirements, a high-level KSE-B framework was suggested as follows.

1. Knowledge. The knowledge base for both officers and soldiers required three forms of knowledge:

   - To be a military professional requires that all ranks have an understanding appropriate to their role and rank of the following:
     i.   Current and evolving conflicts.
     ii. Current UK doctrine and military capability.
     iii. Likely adversary doctrine, capability, and likely theatres of operation.
   - To deliver operational capability in line with their operational role so they can deliver military effect in the Battlespace in times of competition.
   - To deliver staff capability so they can effectively manage the Army in peacetime and when at home.

2. Skills and ability. A military professional needs to be able to perform the following:

   - Plan at an appropriate level.
   - Manage, lead, and command personnel and equipment appropriate to their level.
   - Think, so they are creative, critical, and adaptive.
   - Engage with other officers, soldiers, services, government departments, the public and the media.

3. Behaviors and traits. All military individuals at all ranks must be able to act as follows:

   - Ethically, able to think through ethical problems using the framework provided by the British Army values.
   - Collaboratively, with other Army personnel, other services, and civilians.
   - Professionally, able to develop their military thinking.

   Learning and development principles. The following principles should underpin the design of the content and method of future Army learning and development,

providing the means to attain the professional objectives. These aim to increase flexibility and decrease the bureaucracy of the learning and development system:

1. Professional. Mastery of the profession of arms enabled by learning and development and ingrained through CPD is considered an integral part of a military career. There is a clear progression and development of professional military knowledge and skills through all ranks.
2. Individual and organizational agility. The Army adopts a KSE-B framework, based around the profession of arms, to facilitate more choice for the individual and opportunity for the organization to develop specific people capability.
3. Integrated. The KSE-B framework is fully integrated with career structures and career management throughout the chain of command; used as evidence for progression, posting, and selection for further development.
4. Workplace orientated. Where operational risk allows, focus learning and development in the workplace in the form of exercises, projects, programs, and external placements, as well as every day activities, adopting the 70:20:10 principle.
5. Meritocratic. Access to courses and course content is primarily due to ability and potential.
6. Rewarded. Those who demonstrate commitment to the mastery of the profession of arms through professional development, higher education, and its application in the workplace (military or on attachment) are rewarded.

An overview of the initial conceptualization of the profession of arms and the supporting professional development approach is provided in Fig. 8.1.

Fig. 8.1 An initial conceptualization of the tenets of the profession of arms and the supporting professional development approach

Conclusion

A re-appraisal of what it means to be a British Army professional was required owing to the changing character of conflict and competition. To gain a current and broad perspective of military professionalism in the British Army, a brief review was undertaken using Butler and Budgell's (2015) four critical professional components: expertise, legitimacy, jurisdiction, and identity and culture. The review provided examples where the British Army emulates the four critical components. CPD was considered to be a key lever to enhancing professionalization in the British Army because it enables the following:

- Members of the military profession to maintain their expertise and acquire new knowledge and skills required to meet the contemporary and changing contextual demands, which instils public trust by assuring the military can fulfil its social responsibility. (*Expertise*)
- The British Army to remain professional—not only as a mechanism to maintain expert skills and knowledge to effectively conduct the military but also to inculcate the standards of conduct. (*Legitimacy*)
- Professional jurisdiction, by supporting legitimacy and success in the military domain through continuous education to renew and broaden the expert knowledge and skills needed to adapt to the changing context and threats. (*Jurisdiction*)
- The strengthening of the military professional identity and culture by continuous training in the competencies and values *(Identity and culture)*.

Recognizing the importance of professional development, the first step to achieving a common understanding of military professionalism, we conceptualized the tenets of the profession of arms and the supporting CPD approach. Drawing on influential military professionalism theories, the proposed professional tenets were service, values, martial knowledge, mission command, martial skill, and staff skill. The six tenets apply across all ranks. The development of the CPD approach was based on an in-depth review of the current CPD approach. To support the attainment of the professional tenets, a KSE-B framework was postulated around these tenets. A key finding from the review was the inflexibility and high level of bureaucracy in the current learning and development system. This may impede the expansion of professional knowledge and skills required within a rapidly changing environment and may have a detrimental effect on the Army's professional status. Thus, to increase flexibility and decrease the bureaucracy in the training system, the following learning and development principles were recommended: professional, individual and organizational agility, integrated, workplace orientated, meritocratic and rewarded. An opportunity identified to enhance the professionalism of the British Army was the extensive embedding of the British Army's values—the initial conceptualization of the professional tenets and the CPD approach addresses this. Another opportunity is to explicitly embed the Army Leadership code in the progressive levels of leadership

training to further influence the values and behaviors of British military professionals. Ultimately, it is anticipated that the final iteration of the professional tenets and supporting CPD approach will help reinforce and sustain the British Army profession to meet the military challenges of the twenty-first century.

References

Abbott, A. (1988). *The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Abbott, A. (2014). *The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bannerjee, S., Jedwab, J., Thomas, T., & Soroka, S. (2011). *Cultural intelligence and identity development: Concepts, measures and relationship to Canadian Forces professional development*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.

The British Army. (2018). *The Army leadership code: An introductory guide*, 1st Ed., AC 72021.

The British Army (2015). *Values and standards of the British Army*, AC 64649.

Beckman, S. (1990). Professionalization: Borderline authority and autonomy in work. In M. Burrage & R. Torstendahl (Eds.), *Professions in theory and history: Rethinking the study of professions*. London: Sage.

Butler, A., & Budgell, G. (2015). *Study on army professionalism*. Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada, Human Resource Systems Group, Ltd.

Butler, A., Eren, E., & Budgell, G. (2014). *Literature review: Theories, concepts and measures of professional, organizational, and military identity*. Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada, Human Resource Systems Group Ltd.

Collins, J. J., & Jacobs, T. O. (2002). Trust in the military profession. In D. M. Snider & G. L. Watkins (Eds.), *The future of the army profession*. Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing.

Fine, G. A. (1996). Justifying work: Occupational rhetorics as resources in restaurant kitchens. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 41*(1), 90–115.

Hackett, J. (1963). *The profession of arms*. London: Times Publishing.

HM Government. (2015). *National security strategy and strategic defence and security review 2015*. Retrieved from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*. New York: The Free Press.

Jans, N., & Schmidtchen, D. (2002). *The real C-Cubed: Culture, careers, and climate and how they affect capability*. Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defense Centre, Australian National University.

Leonard, N. H., Beauvais, L. L., & Scholl, R. W. (1999). Work motivation: The incorporation of self-concept-based processes. *Human Relations, 52*(8), 969–998.

Martin, G. F., & McCausland, J. D. (2002). The role of strategic leaders for the future army profession. In D. M. Snider & G. L. Watkins (Eds.), *The future of the army profession*. Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing.

Mattox, J. M. (2002). The ties that bind: The Army officer's moral obligation. In D. M. Snider & G. L. Watkins (Eds.), *The future of the army profession*. Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing.

Middlehurst, R., & Kennie, T. (1997). Leading professionals: Towards new concepts of professionalism. In J. Broadbent, M. Dietrich, & J. Roberts (Eds.), *The end of the professions? The restructuring of professional work*. London: Routledge.

Mosher, F. C. (1982). *Democracy and the public service* (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Ostroff, C., & Kozlowski, S. W. (1992). Organizational socialization as a learning process: The role of information acquisition. *Personnel Psychology, 45*(4), 849–874.

Parker, S. K., Wall, T. D., & Cordery, J. L. (2001). Future work design research and practice: towards an elaborated model of work design. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 74*(4), 413–440.

Sarkesian, S. C. (1981). Military professionalism and civil-military relations in the West. *International Political Science Review, 2*(3), 283–297.

Schein, E. (1992). *Organizational culture and leadership* (2nd ed.). San Francisco: JosseyBass.

Shamir, B., Zakay, E., Brainin, E., & Popper, M. (2000). Leadership and social identification in military units: Direct and indirect relationships. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30*(3), 612–640.

Snider, D. M. (2003). *Jointness, defense transformation, and the need for a new joint warfare profession*. New York: Military Academy West Point.

Soeters, J. L., & Recht, R. (1998). Culture and discipline in military academies: An international comparison. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 26,* 169–189.

Swain, R. (2010). *The obligations of military professionalism: Service unsullied by partisanship*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense.

Van Knippenberg, D., & Van Schie, E. C. (2000). Foci and correlates of organizational identification. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 73*(2), 137–147.

Walsh, K., & Gordon, J. R. (2008). Creating an individual work identity. *Human Resource Management Review, 18*(1), 46–61.

Woods, S. A., & West, M. A. (2010). *The psychology of work and organizations*. Cengage Learning EMEA.

Wong, L. (2002). *Stifling innovation: Developing tomorrow's leaders today*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.

Chapter 9
Civilian Military Experts: Findings from the 2017 Survey of American Military Experts

Thomas Crosbie and Meredith Kleykamp

Abstract Military expertise is constructed inside and outside military organizations, but little research has been collected on outside military expertise. This chapter presents findings from the first phase of the Survey of American Military Experts (SAME), a biannual survey of about 250 experts on American military affairs. We present a first look at how two expert communities conceptualize media coverage of the military, public interest in military topics and how these relate to civilian leadership. The first community of interest is the population of academic-facing researchers working in civilian and military research institutions. The second is the population of journalists who regularly cover the American military, national security, and war. While our findings indicate distinct patterns in who works in these fields and how these experts see the U.S. military, we also present evidence of strong similarities in the concerns of these experts and their overall assessment of on the current health of American military affairs.

Keywords Expertise · Professionalism · Journalism · Military sociology

Introduction

Theories of the military profession, drawing from a larger sociology of professions, generally posit that military expertise is linked to both the corporateness (or identity) of the officer corps and the ethical norms of those officers (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Crosbie and Kleykamp 2017; Crosbie and Kleykamp 2018). As the field shifts from a professions focus to an expertise focus (see Libel 2019), the grip of the military professional over military expertise loosens, at least as a concept. From this emerging perspective, uniformed officers are not the only military experts. Missing from our collective understanding is a sense of the other fields of military expertise

T. Crosbie (✉)
Royal Danish Defence College, Krokodillegade 2, 1326 Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: thcr@fak.dk

M. Kleykamp
Centre for Research on Military Organization, University of Maryland, 2112 Parren Mitchell
Art-Sociology Building (Bldg 146), 3834 Campus Dr, College Park, MD 20742, USA

that intersect with the military's own experts. While in a sense all professionals are participants in a specific expertise community, not all experts are also professionals whose identity and sense of responsibility are tied to this expertise. Thus, the turn toward focusing on expertise should not replace the study of professions, but it can enrich that study.

What does this mean for the study of militaries? Military professionals use (and likely understand) military expertise differently from their civilian counterparts. Nevertheless, military professionals are not likely to produce their version of military expertise in a vacuum, but rather to do so in dialogue with other expert communities. To understand the way ideas drive military policy, we need to understand the circulation of knowledge both within the officer corps and among those civilian communities who co-construct expert military knowledge.

Compared with the community of uniformed military professionals, the community of civilian military experts is poorly understood. Abbott (2002) writes about how many occupational groups are entangled in the military's work, but these ecologies have yet to be mapped. Despite the privatization of security (Swed and Crosbie 2019), the rise of other governmental agencies in the projection of American force, and the failure to achieve American interests abroad through the use of military force, the American military remains an unprecedently powerful and resilient organization. Military expertise (and the interacting communities of experts who help define that expertise) continues to exert a claim on our interest.

The Survey of American Military Experts (SAME 2017) is a biannual survey of about 250 experts in American military affairs. The survey is intended to enrich our understanding of civilians who shape military expertise. This chapter presents findings from SAME 2017, which focused on the military-media-civilian leadership nexus.

Some aspects of expert military knowledge are kept secret, so we will likely never have a comprehensive overview of how civilian populations inform military expertise. The civilians who contribute the most to military expertise may be invisible to those excluded from the E-Ring of the Pentagon, for example. There are, however, several important public-facing expert communities who are accessible to researchers. The 2017 SAME looked at two such populations: academic researchers who publish research on the U.S. military in leading journals and journalists who report on the American military for media outlets. The 2017 SAME revealed how these groups of experts think the U.S. military should respond to emerging challenges and how senior officers should interface with domestic political processes. While we think understanding civilian military experts is a valuable task in its own right, we conclude by pointing toward the need to link this research back to outcomes in military policy and practice.

By learning how civilian military experts think about military affairs, we can refine our understanding of how military organizations navigate complex global and domestic responsibilities—how, in other words, military professionals transform military expertise into policy.

The Theory of Military Expertise

Who can be categorized as a military expert? According to Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), uniformed officers have a monopoly on expert military knowledge, along with a sense of corporateness and responsibility. The two thinkers disagreed on what counts as *military* expertise, however. Huntington (1957) focused exclusively on management of violence and, hence, was chiefly concerned with military expertise as it guides what a given polity holds as legitimate violence. Janowitz (1960) extended the notion of military professional to encompass experts in logistics, support services, and acquisition processes that were equally necessary for success in war.

The decades since Huntington and Janowitz have been marked by a shift in military affairs, from a focus on conventional interstate conflict to other types of conflict. Accordingly, changes in strategic context and a gradual mission creep have pushed the military's actual responsibilities further and further from a conventional force model. Today, the notion of military-specific expertise has become too narrow. Even staunch conservatives like Will (2017) recognize that military expertise extends beyond the traditional battlefield. Emerging military operational concepts extend the immediate purview of battlefield commanders deep into the electronic and human domains—the U.S. Army-led multi-domain operations and the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force-led Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons are two examples of this expansion (Perkins 2017; Hutchens et al. 2017). Thus, for military professionals working today, military expertise is understood as an expansive and evolving concept that overlaps with knowledge in a variety of civilian sectors.

In Libel's new conception, which draws on Eyal and Pok's (2015) work, security expertise is understood to be "a network connecting national and transnational as well as public and private security actors, devices and concepts, including institutional and spatial arrangements" (Libel 2019, Table 2). Emphasized in this definition is the sense of expert knowledge flowing across organizational boundaries, which we see today in military professionals acting in their own knowledge production.

The military is used by policymakers to project power, generally outside the territorial boundaries of the state. In democracies, this power is directed by elected officials, but it is wielded by organizations staffed and managed by service members. These service members, in turn, are empowered to arrange their internal affairs, which includes everything from the planning of operations, the movement and maneuver of units, to the targeting of fires and beyond. Such arrangements have not arisen ex nihilo; rather, they are the product of bureaucratic and conceptual struggles. We view the policies produced through such struggles as the most potent form of military expertise. A military expert is thus a member of the network of individuals inside and outside military organizations who contributes to policies informing the actions of military organizations. While the purest expression of this may be on the battlefield, military expertise inevitably exists within a conceptually fuzzy landscape of policies and practices that defy simple definitions. In this sense, military expertise can be understood as a subcategory of security expertise (as outlined by Libel

2019), focused on what militaries do within the broader security environment, shared between civilian and military communities of practice, but lacking sharp definition.

It is worth considering the implications of such a post-military conception of military expertise. Military expertise in our new understanding is not coextensive with military professionalism, just as civilian-dominated arenas (e.g., cyberspace or outer space) are now being colonized by military actors, and civilians are entering military-dominated arenas. Eyal's (2002) influential study of the academia-intelligence interface in Israel is but one example. In that case, the relationship was fairly straightforward: Intelligence analysts and scholars influence one another through processes of exchange. We should be equally open to the possibility of subtler and less tangible sites of civilian–military expertise exchange.

This brief theoretical discussion has only hinted at the complexity of contemporary military expertise, but it shows why we surveyed two populations far removed from battlefield decisions, namely, researchers and journalists. Of course, surveying these populations cannot replace research on uniformed military professionals, but neither is researching only those in uniform sufficient for understanding contemporary military expertise. At a more practical level, researchers should note the near-impossibility of surveying American service members, especially when asking about politically-sensitive issues and when researching across service lines. For these reasons, part of rethinking military professionalism will be to collect data, not only on those in uniform, but also on those in other occupational groups contributing to the networked system of knowledge production and consumption that informs military policy, including academic researchers and journalists who create knowledge in spheres far removed from operational command. Our vision for the future of military studies is based in large part on the development of longitudinal data—including replicated survey items—that will allow us to track changes throughout the landscape of military expert knowledge production.

Survey Methodology

A number of research and journalist communities can make reasonable claims to be counted as military experts. The most expansive might include all of academia and journalism contributing to the power-knowledge nexus within which the military is deployed. From an expertise perspective, however, selection criteria emerge along the loose boundaries of occupational groups. American military expertise, which we conceived as a specific subset of security expertise, is neither academic research nor news but is partly co-constructed from both. Let us consider, first, which occupational groups within these neighboring professions are most likely to inform American military expertise.

Researchers as Military Experts

Research on the American military is published across hundreds if not thousands of platforms, ranging from personal blogs and twitter feeds to academic journals and publishers to mass market presses. How should we decide who are experts? One way to select experts would be to look at the research endorsed by the military itself. Not only are many publishing platforms owned and operated by the U.S. Department of Defense, but many high-ranking officers publish suggested reading lists. An equally valid approach would be to select based on place of employment: the American service academies, staff and command colleges, war colleges and the like (collectively referred to as professional military education [PME] institutions/organizations) employ hundreds of staff members who might reasonably be viewed as a community of military experts.

Problems arise with each of these approaches, however. The research published and endorsed by the American military is not meaningfully separable from other academic research, and this literature is at best a fuzzy subset of academic research. Thus, sampling in this way would fail to capture much of the important research on the topic (which appears in civilian publications), while foregrounding the work of less impactful authors who happen to be published on military platforms. A similar problem arises when we select on employment at a PME institution. Our focus is on research that influences research: the body of self-reflexive and co-constituting expert knowledge validated by a community of practice. While many influential researchers work at such institutions, many more are employed at civilian universities and colleges, and not all PME employees are engaged in producing influential research on the American military.[1]

To solve this problem, we focus on those researchers who produce research on the American military that is recognized as adhering to the highest academic standards. Thus, we define the population of interest among researchers as those who publish research on the American military in the highest-ranking military studies venues (described further below). This provides us with an agnostic view on discipline, place of employment, and other standard markers of status within academia. By selecting research that meets the demands of the most selective journals and publishers, we lose researchers who prefer to publish in boutique venues that cater to military topics, but we gain confidence that our population of researchers adheres to the highest standards in theory, methods, and data.

Developing a database of researchers who met our criteria was difficult. We digitally convened a group of colleagues working in each of the specified disciplines to identify the leading figures in their discipline's military subfields.[2] Next, we included the top-ten international relations researchers who focused on U.S. security, as identified in the Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) survey (Maliniak et al.

---

[1]To be influential in this context means to exert influence over the identified body of knowledge, not over the consumers of the knowledge (or indeed over others).

[2]The selection of disciplinary representatives was done by reaching out to colleagues in our networks who work on military topics in other disciplines.

2014). The majority of respondents were added in the next two phases: comprehensive searches of the leading military studies journals, and then of academic presses over a period of ten years (2006–2016).[3] Researchers were added to the database if they had authored or coauthored an article on American military affairs, construed broadly to include any work that touched on the U.S. Department of Defense or armed services (but excluding research on private contractors, foreign militaries, other governmental agencies, and similar topics, which are military-inflected but do not address military-specific populations, organizations, or themes).[4]

Our population of interest was thus academic researchers who published in the leading military studies venues on American military topics. We erred on the side of being too narrow, excluding many highly qualified individuals who did not publish in the top-ten journals or presses during this ten-year window and who were not otherwise validated by disciplinary experts. The reason for our high standards for inclusion was to ensure high quality data. Our chief interest was to ensure that every respondent was indeed a recognized expert who had published work on the topic at the highest levels of their field. With these standards in mind, we established a pool of 224 researchers who had a strong claim to the title of expert on the American military.

Researcher Response Rates and Population Characteristics

The 2017 SAME was sent to 224 validated experts in 11 social science fields: anthropology, gender studies, geography, history, law, organizational studies, peace studies, political studies, psychology, religious studies, and sociology. The response rate was 50% (112 surveys completed). By far the largest share of the population, 62%, worked in political studies departments, which in our classification includes international relations, government, and political science (see Table 9.1). Our experts came primarily from civilian public and private universities and colleges, accounting for 166 or 74% of respondents. The rest worked at military research and education facilities, almost entirely American war colleges and military academies (but not command and staff colleges), with a handful of researchers at foreign military educational institutions.

---

[3]The top ten journals were identified through Google Scholar's military studies rankings in 2017, dropping specialist journals that publish work only in one subfield. The selected journals are *Security Dialogue*, *International Security*, *Survival*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, *Security Studies*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *Contemporary Security Policy*, *Armed Forces & Society*, *Parameters* and *Naval War College Review*. The top academic presses were identified through consultation with our research informants in the various disciplines. They are Cambridge University Press, Princeton University Press, Oxford University Press, University of Chicago Press, Harvard University Press, Cornell University Press, University of Michigan Press, Yale University Press, Palgrave Macmillan and Routledge.

[4]More names were sought through a search of JSTOR for ("Americ*" and "military") and of the top security studies programs for authors publishing in high-status journals and presses on explicitly American military-related topics, but doing so only revealed duplicates.

Table 9.1 Population characteristics: researcher academic setting

Social science field	Number of researchers	Total (%)
Political studies	138	62
History	28	13
Sociology	20	9
Anthropology	16	7
Psychology	8	4
Legal studies	5	2
Geography	5	2
Gender studies	1	<1
Religious studies	1	<1
Peace studies	1	<1
Organizational studies	1	<1
Total:	**224**	

Defense Journalists

In contrast with the population of expert researchers, the population of expert journalists was much simpler to define. Our population of interest comprised professional journalists who covered American military and national security affairs full-time for news agencies. Our key indicator was job title, which was normally war correspondent, Pentagon correspondent, national security correspondent, or military correspondent. This focus excluded two groups of potential interest, freelancers who contributed to a variety of agencies but were not full-time employees at any one place, and journalists who were employed full time at an agency but whose job titles did not indicate that they reported full time on military affairs.

Helpfully for our purposes, a number of websites gather public data on journalists. The best source of public data was the now-defunct reportersinfo.com, which provided the foundation for our own database. Our next technique to identify respondents involved searching through the websites of leading television, radio, wire services, newspaper and web news agencies, including for those individuals with the appropriate job titles. We then searched Twitter extensively by media platforms and job titles. Finally, we added names to our population as they were identified through a question on the survey ("List four journalists in your field whose work has had the greatest influence over the past 20 years"). Through these methods, we identified 161 reporters who had relevant job titles with news agencies and who reported primarily on American national security, military affairs or war topics, or were directly validated as experts by their colleagues in responses to the survey.

Journalist Response Rates and Population Characteristics

The 2017 SAME had a response rate of 26% among the journalists sampled (42 completed surveys from 161 solicitations). As tabulated below, and not surprising given the logic of how we developed the population, the largest employer of expert journalists was still traditional media, with newspapers, the most traditional of all traditional media being the largest employer (33%). Experts employed full-time by digital platforms made up a fairly small portion of our population (8%).

This story was complicated somewhat by our decision to place journalists who worked for a military trade publication into a single category, defense-industry media. We saw the work done within this category as more self-similar and different from civilian media. These media platforms are also primarily traditional: While we included journalists who worked for online defense-oriented media, including Military.com, many more came from such established periodicals as *Stars and Stripes* and *Army Times*.

We considered military experts in the media to be those who dedicated most of their time to reporting on military affairs and to work for news agencies and those who were recognized as experts by their colleagues. As the media landscape continues to undergo dramatic structural shifts, we may reasonably expect that digital platforms will replace print media. Presently, however, it appears that the experts mostly work for traditional media and gain status and recognition among their peers while working in those roles (Table 9.2).

We have discussed the population above in detail for a simple reason.[5] Due to the small size of this population and the public nature of this expertise, we collected very little demographic data about our survey respondents and, thus, leave for future researchers any further questions about the structural configuration of these expert communities.[6]

Table 9.2 Population characteristics: journalists by platform

Media platform	Number of journalists	Total (%)
Newspaper	53	33
Defense-industry media	51	32
Television	16	10
Website/digital	13	8
Wire service	9	6
Magazine	8	5
Other print media	7	4
Radio	4	2
Total:	**161**	

[5]Collectively, our respondents constitute 40% of the population of interest.

[6]Names of respondents were collected on the introductory page of the survey to ensure that only individuals within our population were included in the survey. These names were then separated from the answers.

Survey Instrument

The survey was developed in dialogue with a similar survey of military populations, the Revolution in Military Professionalism (RMP), part of a large research project funded by the Army Research Institute (Crosbie and Kleykamp 2017). The ongoing RMP survey was developed for American war college students and solicits information on the three traditional dimensions of military professionalism. It is also partly a replication of two much earlier research efforts, namely, Masland and Radway's (1957) survey and Janowitz's (1960) interviews with officers in the Pentagon.[7] Continuing in the spirit of replication, we adopted two questions from the landmark Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) survey (see Holsti 2001, p. 19), one of which had also been asked by Urben (2010) in her dissertation research.[8] Finally, we drew from the TRIP survey in the hope of comparing our experts with the international politics experts who are the subject of that ongoing research.[9]

An important consideration in surveying these two expert populations is that virtually every respondent is likely to be overworked and cautious with their time. We concluded that a long survey would have few respondents and thus limited ourselves to 20 questions, with an estimated length of 10 min, aiming to maximize comparison with other surveys and leave as much to the discretion of respondents as possible. Of the 20 questions, we asked seven replicated or adapted from earlier studies, and seven of the remaining questions used free-response text boxes. As the high response rates suggest, we were fortunate to have strong interest among our respondents, which translated into many long and thoughtful responses. Indeed, so rich are these data that only a brief overview of our findings can be presented in this chapter, focusing on one slice of findings that explores the linkages from media to military to political leadership.

Findings

In this section we begin by looking at who the expert researchers in our two populations were, and what they thought about the state of military affairs in general. We then look at their thoughts on the link between military and the media and political

---

[7]We adapted two items from Janowitz (his questions 14 and 15) and directly replicated one from Masland and Radway (their question 6). Janowitz used Masland and Radway's survey as a basis for his own claims in *The Professional Soldier* and the only extant copy of their documents reside in Janowitz's archival holdings at the University of Chicago.

[8]We replicated TISS's questions 16 and 13, on the proper role of senior officers in committing U.S. forces and on the knowledgeability of political leaders, respectively. Urben replicated the former.

[9]We replicated three TRIP survey items, slightly altering the wording on two of these to adapt to the present context.

leadership of the military. Finally, we report their thoughts on the so-called elephant in the room, the Trump presidency, which emerged as a major concern among respondents.

Length of Career, Prior Military Service, and Political Attitudes

Our researcher respondents have published articles or books in one or more of the top-ten military studies journals or top-ten academic presses on topics related to the U.S. military. Our journalist respondents mostly worked full-time for news agencies covering American wars or American military affairs, with a handful of additional respondents added to the population having been validated as experts by their colleagues. These respondents had a rich and detailed understanding of the questions we raised in the survey. Given that their responses were anonymous, they did not have to tailor their words to avoid reputational effects. In other words, we asked those whom we considered to be the most informed people available to give their real opinions about the state of American military affairs in 2017.

As Fig. 9.1 suggests, this was a highly experienced group. Reporting an average of 16 years' experience working on military, defense, and national security topics for journalists, and an average of 26 years' experience for researchers, our average respondents had a long time horizon against which to compare the present state of affairs. They were, of course, a diverse group. At the lowest end, one researcher indicated only half a year of experience, suggesting that this person had enjoyed quick success in a new field of research. By contrast, more than 10% of respondents indicated 50 years or more of experience. The distribution of journalists was quite different, not surprising given how different these careers can be. Journalists in our sample clustered around the 5–19 year mark, with a steep drop off, though researchers with anywhere from 10 to 39 years' experience were well represented.

Fig. 9.1 Distribution of researchers and journalists by self-reported years of experience

From the distribution of self-reported years of experience, we can draw several tentative insights. The entry barrier for researchers, perhaps counter-intuitively, appears lower than that of journalists. To meet our conditions of expertise, journalists needed to have secured a permanent job, something that may well take five or more years of freelance work to achieve (which would explain why no journalists self-reported under 5 years' experience). By contrast, researchers can enter the expert conversation simply through publishing a relevant article. While our own experience would indicate that successful placement of a military-centric piece in one of our selected venues does indeed require significant professional experience, it seems likely that professional research skills can be transferred from one topic to another, thereby allowing a skilled researcher to quickly publish in a new field. On the other hand, researchers appeared more likely to have exceptionally long careers in their field, or perhaps they counted more of their prior life experience as relevant to their research.

This leads us to the next question, "Have you ever served in the U.S. military?" The responses (included in Table 9.3) were surprising to us. We expected researchers drawn to the sort of military research that qualifies them for inclusion in our survey would often be former officers, and the tendency of retired colonels to monopolize professional military education teaching positions described by some scholars would also suggest a veteran-heavy population (Johnson-Freese 2013, p. 70). In contrast, we found that 82 of the 112 researcher respondents (73%) had never served in any capacity; only 25 (22%) were former officers. Among journalists, 81% had never served. Another point of difference was that journalist veterans were more likely to have been enlisted than officers. While these rates of prior service were not as high as we had expected in these populations, they were much higher than the national rate of military service. So we can conclude that military experts from the research and media communities are more likely than the rest of the population to have been active duty service members, although by far the majority of such experts were civilians who had never served (and indeed both of the present authors are civilian non-veterans).

A final item concerning political identification (Table 9.4) can help us better understand *who* the experts were. The item "In domestic politics, do you consider yourself as…," provided five categories and a sixth free-response option. As the distribution

Table 9.3 Prior military service

	Journalists		Researchers	
Active duty officer	4.76%	2	22.32%	25
Active duty enlisted	11.90%	5	1.79%	2
Reserve/guard officer/never active duty	0.00%	0	1.79%	2
Reserve/guard enlisted/never active duty	2.38%	1	0.00%	0
Foreign military	0.00%	0	0.89%	1
Never	80.95%	34	73.21%	82
	Total	**42**	Total	**112**

Table 9.4 Political orientation

	Journalists		Researchers	
Conservative	2.38%	1	2.68%	3
A little on the conservative side	9.52%	4	10.71%	12
Liberal	14.29%	6	29.46%	33
A little on the liberal side	14.29%	6	15.18%	17
Moderate/Independent	35.71%	15	32.14%	36
Other	23.81%	10	9.82%	11
	Total	**42**	Total	**112**

in Table 9.2 indicates, many respondents resisted the liberal versus conservative cate-gorization and embraced the moderate/independent category or filled in alternatives, almost always left-leaning.[10] We see plainly that researchers and journalists alike rarely saw themselves as "conservatives" (less than 3% of each). While researchers were more comfortable with the "liberal" category (45% were liberal or a little on the liberal side, compared with only 28% of journalists), a large number of respondents were eager to separate their political attitudes from the dominant partisan labels of our time. Nevertheless, as we will see, our experts are quite conscious of the partisan environment. For the remainder of this chapter, we focus on unravelling this thread, asking, in other words, how our two groups of experts situate the military in our deeply divided domestic political environment.

The Military-Media Link

The previous section showed that our respondents were highly experienced, mostly non-veterans, and generally politically liberal, but with many respondents wary of labeling their political identity. What might such respondents make of the way the American media covers military affairs? The researchers overwhelming saw the media as supportive of the military (Table 9.5). Nearly 90% of researchers reported that the media was very or somewhat supportive of the military, and none thought the media was not supportive at all. By contrast, journalists—in effect, the media—were more skeptical, but even they mostly agreed, with 60% seeing themselves as very or somewhat supportive.

What can we make of these findings? The researchers, drawing on an average of 26 years' experience, understood the 2017 media environment to be very friendly to military interests. The journalists, who happened to average a decade less of experience than the researchers, and who were also assessing their own performance,

---

[10]Only one respondent, a researcher, indicated a right-leaning identification ("libertarian") in the free response, with most of the rest (journalists and researchers) adding "progressive," "left of liberal," and similar generic expressions. Four respondents indicated they were apolitical or did not discuss politics.

Table 9.5 Degree of media support for the military

	Journalists		Researchers	
	%	Count	%	Count
Very supportive	39	14	58	61
Somewhat supportive	19	7	30	32
Slightly supportive	28	10	11	12
Not supportive at all	3	1	0	0
No opinion	11	4	1	1
	Total:	**36**	Total:	**106**

Table 9.6 Whether the media keeps the public informed about military affairs

	Journalists		Researchers	
Yes	67%	28	58%	59
No	31%	13	40%	40
Don't know	2%	1	2%	2
	Total	**42**	Total	**101**

also largely agreed that media coverage has been positive, even if they were less convinced that the media has been actively supportive.

With this in mind, we asked a more probing question, "Do journalists by and large succeed in keeping the American public informed about military affairs? If no, why not?" Respondents filled out their answer in free-response boxes. Their yes/no responses can be found in Table 9.6, but of equal interest are their qualifications.

For the journalists, this was once again a self-assessment question, with two thirds being self-congratulatory and one third self-critical. The self-congratulations were highly qualified, however. Several respondents added that while they did keep the public informed, the public was simply not interested, rendering their efforts moot. Others who responded "yes" had equally significant reservations, noting that the U.S. Congress was not interested, that more was needed, that there had not been enough access to certain areas, and that the military was empowered to hide behind national security concerns to slow down reporting. Along similar lines, several journalists responded that their fellow journalists did not have any military knowledge and that they relied too much on official information from the military.

The third of journalists who believed that the media did not keep the public informed about military affairs expressed a raft of concerns. Several noted that the military was simply too powerful or too inaccessible to allow journalists to report on it, citing particularly the rise of special forces operations. Others criticized military public affairs as playing favorites with the press and noted that there were simply too few journalists to do the job. When we consider that our extensive search for expert journalists yielded only 161 names, and that these 161 individuals were virtually the

only people reporting on the world's largest employer, which has bases around the globe, such complaints are worth considering.

Naturally, researchers were speaking from both a less biased but also presumably less informed position regarding the degree to which the military's affairs are publicized by the media. And where most journalists responded with substantive comments, the majority of researchers provided only a simple yes or no response. Here too, however, serious concerns were raised by the respondents, with those who believed the media was succeeding in informing the public warning that the reporting was often too superficial, the public too uninterested, and that newer reporters were not very good (as three separate researchers noted). Those who believed that the media had failed to keep the public informed noted that reporters were too uncritical, too biased, too politically correct, and that they had failed to gain sufficient access to the military's inner workings.

In reflecting on what our respondents had told us about the military-media link, we came to some troubling conclusions. On one hand, the press supports the military. On the other hand, its efforts to inform the public are tainted by serious concerns about the quality of the coverage and the public's interest in being informed. These two pieces, positive media coverage and ineffective media penetration, are troublingly reminiscent of the golden age of media-military relations, World War II (Crosbie 2018). While that era's compliant press had been justified in the eyes of many by the existential threat posed by Axis forces, we see no such justification today. This concern led us to a separate line of inquiry. Given the poor state of public oversight, how knowledgeable is the political leadership of the military?

Leadership Problems

In 1998 and 1999, researchers from the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) surveyed military leaders and civilian veteran and non-veteran leaders. At that time, a cleavage was noted between the civilian and military perspectives on a number of items, including the question, "How knowledgeable do you think our political leaders are about the modern military?" Whereas military leaders had a dim view of political leaders' knowledge of the military, civilian leaders, both veteran and non-veteran, were rather more optimistic (Holsti 2001, p. 481). We replicated this item on the 2017 SAME and tabulate our findings alongside the TISS findings below (Table 9.7).

In the intervening 18 years, much has changed, but it is striking to see how closely both our samples conform not only with one another but also with the views of the military leaders surveyed by the TISS team. Seen differently, there has been a very notable divergence between the views of civilians in 1998–1999 and their views in 2017.

This alignment of contemporary civilian attitudes with the military populations' attitudes from nearly 20 years ago are easier to see in Fig. 9.2. Our two groups were virtually identical in their critical views of politicians' level of knowledge, with about

Table 9.7   How knowledgeable political leaders are about the military (%)?

	1998–1999	1998–1999	1998–1999	2017	2017
	Military leaders	Civilian vet. leaders	Civilian non-vet. leaders	Survey of researchers	Survey of journalists
Very knowledgeable	1	8.1	10.2	0.93	0
Somewhat knowledgeable	33	53.8	58	23.36	25
Slightly knowledgeable	52.3	30.4	25.7	53.27	55.56
Not knowledgeable at all	13.5	7	3.9	20.56	16.67
No opinion	0.5	0.8	2.2	1.87	2.78

Fig. 9.2   Comparison of TISS and SAME responses: How knowledgeable are civilian leaders?

73% of journalists and 74% of researchers reporting that political leaders were only slightly or not at all knowledgeable, compared with two thirds of the TISS military sample but only about a third of the civilian populations.

Specific Concerns About the Trump Presidency: The Elephant in the Room

No survey of experts on the American military can hope to escape the overwhelming influence of the day's partisan debates. Our own challenge was to gather expert opinion during the months following Donald J. Trump's election to the presidency of the United States, a time of endless hot takes and thought pieces framing the administration and the president's likely approach to foreign policy—"policy by tweet," as it was frequently derided (Gilsinan and Freidman 2017). We refrained in our survey from directly soliciting input regarding the new administration and sought instead to step outside the terms of the debate in the public sphere. But our respondents were not members of the general public: They were elite producers of knowledge who collectively shape much of our understanding of the military and its relationship to our political systems, and many of them found it necessary to direct our attention to the Trump administration. They told us, quite clearly, that there was a problem with the political leadership that had direct and significant negative impacts on the American military.

In two-paired, open-ended questions, we asked the experts to tell us the biggest challenges facing the American military and national security more broadly. Cutting through the wide-ranging responses was a palpable fear of the effect of a Trump presidency on American military affairs. We quote several of the respondents to convey the intensity of their views. To the question "What are the biggest challenges facing American national security?" researchers responded:

> An unbelievably incompetent president
>
> Right now, a fraud as president and global responsibilities that he and most of his people do not begin to understand
>
> Trump administration (not committing to NATO, not maintaining relationships with traditional allies)
>
> ISIS and President Trump
>
> We have a president who is mentally ill and acts without consideration to the effects on our country and our military. He is acting in such a way that we are threatened from within and without
>
> Donald Trump's unpredictability, belligerence, and complete lack of understanding of national defense issues

Journalists responded in a similar vein:

> The president appears incapable of critical thought on complicated issues and while the Pentagon appears to be in very capable hands, it does not seem to be on the same page as the

> White House or State Department. The messages coming from each portion of the executive branch of the government are entirely incongruent.

> A narcissistic man-child in the White House and a Congress dominated by the GOP, a party that is far more concerned with ideology than governing

> Distrust in the intelligence agencies, lack of coherent foreign-military policy, the administration's hostile treatment of people by category alienates groups that would be our allies protecting the nation

To the question "What are the biggest challenges facing the American military as an organization?" researchers responded as follows:

> The radiation clouds blowing our way because Donald Trump is a fucking moron

> The US armed forces have suffered profound trauma as a result of the mistaken policies of the Bush Administration. They need time to recover and rebuild. Instead they are being committed to new military adventures by a president who lacks strategic sense

> An unstable commander-in-chief

Skeptics might view the above items as irrelevant emotional outbursts. We prefer to think that they are *extraordinarily relevant* emotional outbursts, emphatic expressions of concern by those who we might reasonably conclude know what they are talking about. Of course, the present chapter is not passing judgment on the quality of Donald Trump's leadership. Rather, the chapter communicates the concerns we have received about the quality of Donald Trump's leadership with respect to American military affairs from two samples of civilian military experts. The civilian military experts who filled out our survey were by and large troubled by the way this administration approached military affairs in late 2017.

Future Directions

The Survey of American Military Experts solicited the opinions of the world's leading experts (from academia and news media) on the American military. Each respondent provided valuable insights, since we assume their responses were based on a deep understanding of the context and the realities facing militaries, even though the nature of that expertise is highly individualized. In anonymously collecting these data, we sought their holistic judgment, hoping to learn what the experts really thought, not just what they succeed in publishing. By aggregating responses, we hoped to portray these fields in egalitarian terms, neutralizing the confounding effects of status and prestige with the hope of looking beyond intellectual fashions and socially-desirable responses.

This chapter could cover only a brief cross-section of our findings, but we believe that even in this abbreviated form, a clear logic can be identified regarding what experts really think about the state of military affairs in 2017. Let us briefly summarize our findings before turning to future directions for this research.

We first asked what civilian groups should be counted among the world's experts on the American military. We identified two groups of public-facing experts who

have special claims on our attention. The first was the community of researchers who published research on the American military in leading military studies journals and university and trade publishers, of whom we identified 224 in our population, sampling half ($N = 112$). The second is the community of 161 journalists who work full-time on military topics, of whom we surveyed about a quarter ($N = 42$). Our respondent groups were both remarkably experienced, with the journalists averaging 16 years' and the researchers 26 years' experience working on military-related subjects. Neither group contained large numbers of veterans, with 73% of researchers and 81% of journalists having never served in a military. Very few identified as conservative, while less than half of researchers and just over a quarter of journalists identified as liberal.

We asked our respondents about whether they thought the media was supportive of the military and found that most did (about 90% of researchers and about 60% of journalists). Looking more deeply into the character of media coverage, we asked respondents to reflect on whether the media kept the public informed about military affairs. While most respondents (58% of researchers and 67% of journalists) believed the media kept the public informed, a large number of the positive responses were qualified with warnings about the quality of the media's oversight. We believe we see reflections in these concerns in the critical perspectives respondents had on political leaders' knowledge of the military. Nearly three quarters of respondents in each group indicated that political leaders were slightly or not at all knowledgeable about the military. We noted that this concern was further highlighted in two separate free-response questions that featured many respondents raising impassioned warnings about the dangers posed by the Trump administration's corruption and incompetence.

We see two communities of experienced experts drawing our attention to a worrying set of relations. Too much media support for the military, based on too little effective oversight, matched by poorly informed leaders and a new administration alarming in its incompetence—this is the most distinctive vision of the state of American military affairs we gleaned from respondents.

To guard against the presentism of these findings, we are moving forward with a 2019 survey round and hope to continue to build a longitudinal dataset on expert opinions about the state of American military affairs with biennial surveys of these two populations. We believe that our experts have signaled concerns with the state of American military affairs, particularly concerning how the military is embedded in its domestic political environment. The experts are worried.

The good news is that recognizing that a problem exists is often the first step to fixing it. This recognition, however, leads us to consider another challenge. Once we have determined the contours and shared beliefs of the most salient expert communities surrounding the military, we should then begin the equally laborious task of making sense of how expert knowledge moves from outside to inside, how military expertise is transmuted into military professionalism.

References

Abbott, A. (2002). The Army and the theory of professions. In L. J. Matthews (Ed.), *The future of the army profession* (pp. 523–536). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom.

Crosbie, T. (2018). The golden age, revisited: General George C. Marshall's press work, 1938–1945. *War in History*. Online First.

Crosbie, T., & Kleykamp, M. (2017). Fault lines of the American military profession. *Armed Forces & Society, 44*(3), 521–543.

Crosbie, T., & Kleykamp, M. (2018). Ethical lapses and the military profession: Three problems and a solution. *Armed Forces & Society, 44*(4), 748–757.

Eyal, G. (2002). Dangerous liaisons between military intelligence and Middle Eastern studies in Israel. *Theory and Society, 31,* 653–693.

Eyal, G., & Pok, K. (2015). From a sociology of professions to a sociology of expertise. In T. V. Berling & C. Bueger (Eds.), *Security expertise: Practice, power and responsibility* (pp. 37–59). PRIO New Security Studies. London: Routledge.

Gilsinan, K., & Friedman, U. (2017, January 5). Donald Trump's asymmetric war on the establishment: The logic of policy by tweet. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/trump-asymmetric-war-establishment/512231/.

Holsti, O. R. (2001). Of chasms and convergences: Attitudes and beliefs of civilians and military elites at the start of a new millennium. In P. D. Feaver & R. H. Kohn (Eds.), *Soldiers and civilians: The civil-military gap and American national security*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hutchens, M. E., Dries, D. D., Perdew, J. C., Bryant, V. D., & Moores, K. E. (2017). Joint concept for access and maneuver in the global commons: A new joint operational concept. *Joint Force Quarterly, 84*(1), 134–139.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*. Glencoe, SL: The Free Press.

Johnson-Freese, J. (2013). *Educating America's military*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Libel, T. (2019). From the sociology of the (military) profession to the sociology of (security) expertise: The case of European national defence universities. *Defence Studies*, online first, 1–23.

Maliniak, D., Peterson, S., Powers, R., & Tierney, M. J. (2014). *TRIP 2014 faculty survey*. Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations. Retrieved from https://trip.wm.edu/charts/.

Masland, J. W., & Radway, L. I. (1957). *Soldiers and scholars: Military education and national policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Perkins, D. G. (2017). Multi-domain battle: Driving change to win the future. *Military Review,* 6–12.

Swed, O., & Crosbie, T. (Eds.). (2019). *The sociology of privatized security*. Cham, SW: Palgrave Macmillan.

Urben, H. (2010). *Civil-military relations in a time of war: Party, politics and the profession of arms*, Dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

Will, G. F. (2017, July 19). Which military weapons are becoming obsolete? *Washington Post*.

Chapter 10
Disrupting Social Constructions in the Profession of Arms

Vanessa Brown and Al Okros

Abstract   As highlighted in other chapters, the military profession is subject to both internal and external pressures to evolve. This chapter will examine key issues in two parts. The first portion reviews the factors that are generating these pressures with consideration of four dimensions. The first comes from the integration of gender perspectives arising from endorsement of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. The second arises from the requirements to address issues of sexual harassment within the military or, more broadly, to meet the expectations of Canadian society about how those in uniform at treated. The third results from the Canadian military aspirations to implement an inclusive diversity strategy that calls for changes in key aspects of professional identity and professional functioning. The second portion of this chapter presents observations by the authors of the consequences of exposing mid-level career officers with concepts that serve to challenge the received professional worldview. The primary implication offered is that these leaders are being encouraged to reconsider key aspects of social construction particularly regarding power, social privilege and the reproduction of the identity, norms, values and beliefs that underpin the military ethos.

Keywords Profession of arms · Professional military education · Gender perspectives · Social construction · Identity · Power · Social privilege · Women, peace, and security

Introduction

The profession of arms has faced external pressures to evolve. As the literature on the revolution in military affairs shows (Beier 2006; Brose 2019; Morgan 2008), new technologies have changed the way war is waged. The "new wars" discussed in the post-Cold War literature (Kaldor and Vashee 1997; Münkler 2005; Kaldor 2012; Mello 2017) highlight how non-state actors and identity politics have altered the

V. Brown (✉) · A. Okros
Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security, Department of National Defence, 215 Young Blvd, Toronto M5M 3H9, ON, Canada
e-mail: vanessa.brown@forces.gc.ca

foreign policy responses, moving the military from state-on-state warfighting to sta-bility operations and hearts-and-minds campaigns. Cyberspace has opened another front where disparate non-state actors and criminal organizations cooperate to pur-sue their illicit agendas (Miklaucic and Brewer 2013; Hughes and Miklaucic 2015; Matfess and Miklaucic 2016). While these external factors have forced the military to adapt technically and strategically, they have not challenged military members' individual and collective identity framed around warfighting and warfighters that underpins Huntington's core competence of the management of collective violence on behalf of the state (Huntington 1957).

This chapter looks at internal change drivers that are having a fundamental effect on precisely these aspects of the profession of arms—on military members' construc-tion of identities and the military professionals' worldview. Section "The Profession of Arms" looks at the way the profession of arms functions with a focus on the concept of social construction, highlighting key aspects of military identity and the dominant military worldview which become problematic when the profession has to evolve to incorporate new concepts or frameworks. Section "The Emergence of New Concepts and Frameworks" reviews four factors generating pressures for the adoption of these new frameworks, resulting in new concepts and ideas being intro-duced into the theoretical knowledge that underpins the profession, which will lead to deeper changes in the profession. Section "Implications: Disrupting Social Con-structions" looks at the consequences of exposing mid-level officers to these new concepts hence challenging their received professional worldview. We begin with key considerations of how the profession is constructed and functions.

The Profession of Arms

Informed by the Canadian Armed Forces' concept of military professionalism in *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, as well as the perspectives pre-sented by Huntington and Janowitz, the profession of arms functions in a unique con-text, being completely subordinate to control by civil or state authority, yet afforded significant latitude to engage in self-regulation (Chief of Defence Staff 2009a, b; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960). The government of the day determines the roles, responsibilities, and missions assigned to the armed forces while the armed forces retains significant control over internal professional functions. In simple terms, the government determines what is to be achieved while the military decides how to generate and employ the capabilities needed to do so.

As presented in *Duty with Honour*, professions contain five facets. The first is jurisdiction, the social function or domain of activity over which society and regula-tory bodies acknowledge the primacy of the profession and for which the profession seeks the power to regulate and control.[1] The second is expertise, particularly the

---

[1] See Abbott 1988 for discussion of professional jurisdictions and Abbott (2002) and Feaver (1996) for perspectives as applied to the profession of arms.

acquisition of specific knowledge, skills, and practices that require a lengthy period of education, training, and experience to perfect. The third is responsibility, in which the profession (as a whole) and each member of the profession (as an individual practitioner) acknowledges and accepts special duties to the society they serve. The fourth is identity. The profession holds a unique status and image in society and individuals see their membership in the profession as a key element of their sense of self. The final attribute is a shared vocational ethic, which, in the case of the armed forces, is the military ethos. The profession's vocational ethic stipulates the particular set of values, beliefs, expectations, and obligations that underpin membership in the profession, along with its members' ethical reasoning and professional practice. The military ethos contains two types of values, outcome and conduct values. Outcome values prioritize what is to be achieved (the ends) and conduct values inform how these outcomes are to be achieved (the means).

Like other professions, the armed forces exercises a generally high degree of autonomy in regulating internal facets, particularly : enforcing the code of conduct (usually by members of the profession as peers), entry to the profession (setting qualifications, certifying professional status, and conferring membership), internal culture and identity (particularly the norms, beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions that are broadly shared by members), and generating and endorsing the body of knowledge that underlies professional practice. Of importance in shaping culture and individual identity, entry-level socialization aims at more than just teaching the "civilian" a set of required military skills; it aims to construct an ideal soldier, sailor, or aviator and, eventually, an ideal leader and commander with a specific worldview.

Important aspects of military culture inculcated during entry-level experiences are normative conformity, obedience to authority, and group loyalty (Okros 2010). When combined with other aspects of professional functioning and daily life, these serve to define the operant (as lived) military culture. Military culture has been explored across a variety of academic disciplines, drawing on diverse theories and perspectives.[2] We compare differences across societies or groups using the cross-cultural concepts of tight versus loose cultures (Berry and Sam 1997; Pelto 1968).

Tight cultures can be characterized as follows:

- homogeneity with clear boundaries as to who is a member of the culture (and who is excluded) and a strong single identity for all members,
- explicit social norms and associated standards of appropriate behavior with severe sanctions applied to those who deviate from these norms,
- clearly differentiated and stratified role requirements (father vs. mother, manager vs. supervisor vs. laborer, etc.) with a high level of role obligation (requirement to fulfill role requirements and to do so in a way that is consistent with the role and social norms),
- an emphasis on the subordination of one's own interests (or perspectives) to the good of the overall group, often incorporated in a common prototype of the good citizen as one who makes personal sacrifices to contribute to an overarching goal,

---

[2]Including sociology, psychology, political science, history, anthropology, managerial theory and gender studies. For a broad overview of definitions and theories on military culture see Price (2017).

- a concern for clarity in language, rules, and social regulation, with limits on the articulation of contrary viewpoints or acts of disobedience, and
- a reliance on history, customs, and traditions to reinforce key themes and to ensure cultural continuity and stability over time.

Loose cultures, on the other hand, are very much the opposite in many of the key areas. They tend to be characterized as follows:

- heterogeneity with a general philosophy that it is the individual who determines whether they are part of the larger group and acceptance that individuals may have multiple or polymorphic identities,
- flexible social norms and standards of behavior shaped by the idea that one does not impose one's own norms, values, or standards on others (thus, an acceptance of diversity in various forms),
- a lack of emphasis on roles and role requirements, with few status distinctions or role-specific obligations,
- an emphasis on citizenship and one's obligations to others on maximizing the benefits to all; hence, the concept of good citizen is one who voluntarily contributes to others' wellbeing, quality of life, or community initiatives,
- acceptance of ambiguity and the likelihood of miscommunication and misunderstanding, with the obligation of each to understand the other's perspective, and
- an expectation that societies and social norms will evolve; hence, an orientation towards the future as something to be created rather than a past to be preserved.

Not only do the characteristics of a tight culture describe the military; the rationale for the development of a tight culture further serves to demonstrate the relevance. These cultures are highly likely to arise under conditions when the society or nation as a whole is threatened by external forces, combined with the belief that is it only when all members of the society contribute that preservation can be achieved (Gefland 2018). The general philosophy communicated is one of conformity within a clearly defined social hierarchy and a system of strong socialization mechanisms. Thus, tight cultures not only strive to ensure commitment to the important overarching goal of survival but attempt to reinforce this commitment through customs, traditions, and norms, based on the assumption that this level of national will/self-sacrifice cannot easily be generated if allowed to erode. It is not surprising that the military practices many of the characteristics of a tight culture because its existence depends on exactly the conditions which lead to tight cultures: threats to survival require a collective contribution of all.

Characterizing the armed forces as a tight culture can be useful in understanding its professional identity and its dominant worldview. The taken-for-granted assumption that a tight culture is needed to succeed in the most extreme of endeavors, with associated norms, roles and -behaviors contributes to the highly masculine nature of the military. Drawing on Connell's theory of hegemonic masculinities (Connell 1987), militarized masculinity, describes a distinct set of masculine behaviors that arise in militaries through the processes used to turn ordinary people into soldiers

(Ashe 2012; Higate 2007). Feminist scholars Sandra Whitworth and Cristina Masters have defined militarized masculinity in Canadian and American militaries as the standardization of specific masculine behaviors associated with "white, male, heterosexual[ity]" (Masters 2005; Whitworth 2005). Militarized masculinities in armed forces, including the CAF, have idealized masculine embodiments of "toughness, violence, aggression, courage, control, and domination" among male and female members (Eichler 2014). The embodiment of these masculine qualities often requires distancing members from feminine behavior and feminine experience (Brown and Okros 2019), an observation we return to later in this chapter.

A second feature of the military's tight culture is the compelling narratives used to create a shared worldview. Articulated doctrine is an essential component of any system of beliefs, and the armed forces strongly emphasize this function as illustrated in the description in the CAF's doctrine on doctrine:

> Doctrine is a body of knowledge and thought that provides direction and aids understanding. The CF definition of doctrine is "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." It embraces established wisdom in the areas of problem solving, decision making and planning, and is sometimes defined as simply "what is taught" (p. 1–1).

While military leaders will point out that doctrine does evolve and that individuals can use discretion in applying it, several characteristics of tight culture, including the concern for clarity, limitations on articulating alternate viewpoints, high social stratification, obedience to authority, and normative conformity all work to restrict individual from exercising 'judgement in application' which necessarily requires challenging the status quo and questioning approved ways of understanding or thinking. In her analyses of several Canadian Armed Forces publications, Taber (2009) identifies the presence of "boss texts" and "ideological codes" that not only convey key ideas regarding the profession and how one serves in it but do so in a way that is not up for debate. She states:

> The texts act as signifiers and normalizing influences to present ideal representations of military membership which are structured to benefit the institution itself. People have agency to resist the perpetuation of normalizations but, due to their embeddedness in accepted practices and policies, they are by their very nature difficult to contest (p. 29).

A third component of tight cultures, and especially as practiced by the military, is the creation of differentiated and stratified role requirements, which in turn result in significant differences in the status and entitlements associated with rank, occupation, and appointment. The result is very clear power structures and systems of social hierarchy, even among those of the same rank (Brown 2018). In the Canadian context, the benefits of social privilege have been increasingly challenged, so the traditional convention that "rank hath its privileges" may be losing the broad acceptance it once had (Okros 2019).

The issue of assumed social privilege is magnified in the profession of arms because it belongs to the minority of professions in which self-reflection is not strongly encouraged or commonly practiced (Okros in press). In psychiatry and religious ministry, for example, members engage in high degrees of self-reflection to

understand how professional practice can influence their values and worldviews and, thus, the decisions they make and the services they provide. Moreover, a growing body of literature highlights the importance of developing future members' self-insight and self-understanding in preparatory education programs for professions (Fullana et al. 2016; Ryan and Ryan 2013; Van Beveren et al. 2018).

This leads to a final observation about the implications of tight culture in the profession of arms: the lack of independent schools of academic thought. Virtually all other professions have some form of academic school embedded in a university that delivers undergraduate and graduate learning and performs the critical function of updating its theoretical knowledge. In rather stark contrast, the armed forces continue to control the design, delivery, and assessment of required learning within their own centers of professional military education (PME). Many militaries have made arrangements for PME learning to be awarded a civilian graduate degree and even for external university faculty to provide PME courses. But these degrees are built around the PME content (rather than the reverse of designing program to deliver the learning associated with an academic discipline) and external faculty are teaching the military-approved syllabi on a contractual basis. The result, as Basil Liddell Hart put it, is that "there are two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old idea out" (1944, p. 115).

In sum, the profession of arms represents a tight culture, with the military identity and worldview informed by Huntington's military ethic, which he characterized as "pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession" (1957, p. 79). Other characteristics that might be offered include paternalistic, action-oriented and, based on Gefland's primary conclusion on tight cultures, prone to interpreting external events as threats (2018). As an introduction to the issues that surface in addressing the topics we turn to next, we would define these characteristics as masculinist in intellectual orientation (not just in behaviors).

The Emergence of New Concepts and Frameworks

Four factors require the armed forces to develop new areas of expertise and, in doing so, to review and likely amend taken-for-granted assumptions underlying professional identity and its worldview. The first comes from what is generally referred to as the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. In the Canadian military, the ideas and objectives of the agenda have been articulated in Chief of Defence Staff direction, which references the series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), starting with UNSCR 1325, along with NATO direction, specifically the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (Bi-SC 40-1) and updates to the federal government's National Action Plan for WPS (CDS 2016a, b; Global Affairs 2017; NATO 2017). As articulated in these two directives, the general intent is for the armed forces to recognize the differential impacts of armed conflict on men, women, boys,

and girls, with an emphasis on having military leaders and planners apply gender perspectives to understand the nuanced differences between these groups in order to protect populations at risk and to achieve sustainable peace and security outcomes.

The challenge in this context is that the origin of the WPS agenda lay with civil society organizations and their efforts to address the root causes of conflict, particularly those in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action. This platform called for significant action in twelve critical areas of concern for gender equality, including poverty, health, education, human rights, the environment, and women's participation in the economy, power systems and political decision making, as well as issues of violence against women and the consequences of armed conflict (Debusscher 2016; UN Women).[3] Various authors have pointed out that the intent and key messages have evolved significantly from the original intent of the activist and critical feminist civil society organizations that heavily contributed to the first iteration, with the UNSCRs increasingly being seen as the politicization of the agenda, the NATO Directive as the militarization of the agenda, and CAF implementation as the operationalization of the agenda (Brown and Okros 2018a).

The second factor is incorporated in the CDS directive on 1325 and the Canadian government's recent emphasis on the application of what is called Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+). GBA+ is defined as an analytical tool the Canadian federal government uses to advance gender equality in Canada. The "plus" in the name highlights that Gender-Based Analysis goes beyond gender and includes the examination of a range of other intersecting identity factors (such as age, education, language, geography, culture and income). GBA+ is used to assess the potential impacts of policies, programs or initiatives on groups of women, men, girls, boys and gender diverse people by taking into account gender and other identity factors. GBA+ helps federal departments to recognize and respond to the different situations and needs of the Canadian population.[4] In the military, GBA+ is also applied to recognize and respond to the different situations and needs of Canadian military personnel, Canadians domestically and populations outside of Canada in operational contexts.[5]

As stated by the lead department:

> GBA+ ensures the inclusion of women, men and gender-diverse people. Moreover, it draws on the insights of "intersectionality," a research and policy model that recognizes the complex composition of factors that shape and influence human lives. Intersectional analysis attempts to "examine the consequences of interacting inequalities on people occupying different social locations as well as address the way that specific acts and policies address the inequalities experienced by various groups" (Bishwarma et al. 2007, p. 9).

GBA+ enables researchers to consider the following:

---

[3]The UN Women information is at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/intergovernmental-support/world-conferences-on-women.

[4]Status of Women Canada, Introduction to GBA+: Glossary. Available at: https://cfc-swc.gc.ca/gba-acs/course-cours/eng/global/glossary_glossaire.html.

[5]Other countries and armed forces may use the terms gender based analysis or applying a gender perspective to plans, policies and procedures. For an example, see NATO Bi-SC 40-1. The Canadian definition incorporates these but adds intersectionality as a key element for analysis.

- Multiple aspects of identity are dynamic and socially constructed (e.g., gender, ethnicity, class, sexuality and ability are fluid and flexible);
- Multiple aspects of identity do not operate in isolation but are interactive (e.g., gender is both shaped and influenced by other factors);
- No one aspect of identity is necessarily more important than any other (e.g., even if gender is considered, it may not be as important as other aspects); and
  - Each issue or problem under investigation requires a different set of aspects of identity (e.g., sometimes it might be gender, ethnicity and class; other times it could be geography, gender and ability, etc.).[6]

While the federal government adopted GBA+ in 1996 as a direct result of the 1995 Beijing Platform, it was only after the Trudeau government was elected that significant attention was placed on actually applying GBA+. As the application to the CAF was contained in the CDS directive on 1325 and linked to NATO Bi-SC 40-1, GBA+ entered the military domain with a very specific focus on military operational planning. We return to the implications of the way in which WPS and GBA+ have been framed in the final portion of this chapter.

The third factor arises from the requirement to address sexual harassment in the military or, more broadly, to meet the expectations of Canadian society about how those in uniform are treated. This is actually not a new issue for the CAF because it first arose in the 1980s with the Bonnie Robichaud case, again in *Macleans Magazine* articles in 1998, 2003, and 2014, before triggering the 2015 External Review by retired Justice Deschamps (Branswell et al. 2003; Deschamps 2015; Mercier and Castonquay 2014; O'Hara et al. 1998; Robichaud versus Canada 1987). The rather well-documented cases of sexual harassment led to two successful class action lawsuits, which were concluded in 2019.[7] It was, however, the 2015 decision by then newly appointed Chief of Defence Staff to issue an operational order, Operation HONOUR, which resulted in formal direction and observable actions to "eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behavior within the CAF" (CDS 2015).

Later modified slightly in updates, Operation HONOUR calls for action in three key areas: leadership-driven culture change, upholding the profession of arms, and provision of support for CAF members. Initiatives implemented include revisions of CAF policies and definitions, changes to processes related to investigations, and disciplinary and administrative measures in response to complaints, social science research, including two external surveys of members' experiences, unit-level professional development sessions, updated content delivered on career courses, and the creation of the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre, which reports to the (civilian) deputy minister.

Results of these various initiatives to date have been inconsistent and less than envisioned by the CDS. As stated in the February 2019 (internal) Progress Report:

---

[6]http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/gba-acs/guide-en.html.

[7]Details on the class action suits and the Federal Court Proceedings are accessible at: https://www.classaction.deloitte.ca/en-ca/Documents/CAF%20DND%20Misconduct/Final%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf.

> The CAF continues to face the serious problem of sexual misconduct. Much has been done, and is currently being done, to address and eventually eliminate this complex cultural affliction, but at this juncture it is still very much a work in progress. There is much yet to be achieved (CDS 2019, p. 1).

The external assessment from the Auditor General provided more detail on the observed deficiencies, noting in particular:

> 5.17. We found that Operation HONOUR increased awareness of inappropriate sexual behavior within the Canadian Armed Forces. However, the Operation had a fragmented approach to victim support as well as unintended consequences that slowed its progress and left some members wondering if it would achieve the expectations set for it.

> 5.19. However, we found that some members still did not feel safe and supported. For example, the duty to report all incidents of inappropriate sexual behavior increased the number of cases reported by a third party, even if the victim was not ready to come forward at that time. Moreover, the Military Police had to conduct an initial investigation of all reports, regardless of a victim's preference to resolve the issue informally. This discouraged some victims from coming forward. Many victims also did not understand or have confidence in the complaint systems (Auditor General 2018, p 3).

We return to issues arising from the way the CAF attempted to address "this complex cultural affliction" in our presentation of the profession seeking to maintain a tight culture.

The fourth factor requiring the profession to accept new concepts and frameworks arises from the CAF's aspiration to implement an inclusive diversity strategy. The 2016 CAF Diversity Strategy replaces the previous Employment Equity Strategy documents (CDS 2016a, b). Based on the requirements of the *Employment Equity Act*, the focus from 1996 to 2015 had been achieving appropriate proportions of three of the four EE-designated groups.[8] The net result was an emphasis on representation: collating personnel records and conducting a regular census of CAF members to determine the percentage of each of the four groups in the ranks. In the new Diversity Strategy, the CAF recognizes that this approach reflected a "compliance-based model," with the statement that the military would now adopt a "values-based" one (CDS 2016b, p. 4) Further, the CDS foreword to the strategy states that it incorporates the legal objectives of employment equity but "adopts a broader, more holistic approach … designed to be an enduring feature of not only the composition of the CAF but how we operate," with direct references to both social and operational imperatives (CDS 2017, foreword). The social aspects cited are the similar ones reflecting the society it serves and ensuring the citizenry accepts the CAF as a legitimate institution, while the operational elements emphasize the benefits of a diverse workforce with individuals bringing unique perspectives, work experiences, lifestyles, and cultures. It is in the latter context of establishing "as a matter of practice, policy and

---

[8]The Canadian government has published specific Canadian Forces Employment Equity Regulations (SOR/2002-421), which take into account unique aspects of military operational effectiveness. Although commonly assumed by many in uniform, these regulations do not exempt the CAF from reporting data on persons with disabilities (see SOR/2002-421 paragraphs 10.1 and 23); however, the CAF is not required to establish goals to achieve a specified representation of persons with disabilities across the organization.

institutional culture [the intent to] embrace and actively promote diversity as a core CAF institutional value" that the new strategy is seen as a marked departure from the previous ones (CDS 2017, foreword).

While the CAF Diversity Strategy did not have the visibility or impact across the military that the first three factors have had, efforts have been made to advance its objectives, including updating the learning objectives and content of CAF career courses. As with the ongoing updates to Operation HONOUR, the CAF Diversity Strategy is seen as a work in progress with additional staff analyses being conducted to update or "refresh" the strategy and its associated action plan.

Implications: Disrupting Social Constructions

Each of the four factors presented in the previous section have been introduced into the CAF through formal direction by the CDS which has included the requirement to update professional development learning outcomes and content (CDS 2016a). The authors have been engaged in designing and facilitating learning among senior officers, in particular Majors attending the Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP) at Canadian Forces College (CFC). JCSP is a competitive program leading to a key career qualification by preparing graduates for senior military command and staff appointments. Integration of gender and cultural perspectives in JCSP in response to direction from the CDS include; implicit bias and awareness content; workshops and case studies on professional conduct and Op HONOUR; critical thinking about diversity in Canada and the military as well as updates to military policy on diversity and inclusion; and GBA+ and WPS agenda content including case studies of their integration into military plans, processes and policies; and integrating GBA+ in the operational planning process. The following are comments drawn from research conducted by the first author (Brown 2017, 2018, draft).

The first general observation is that through these updates to curriculum, CFC has begun to set the conditions through which students and staff have become increasingly open to discussions about gender and cultural inclusivity as the two key concepts informing military thinking and practice. While still presented in a nascent form, teaching within JCSP has begun to touch upon the significance of gender and cultural perspectives to the military and their deep relation to the success of the profession and advances in security both domestically and abroad. Some of the students have engaged in thinking about the issues underlying the WPS agenda, GBA+, Operation HONOUR, and the CAF Diversity Strategy, leading to considerations of the interconnections across these topics, links to the remainder of the JCSP curriculum and, importantly, their roles and responsibilities as senior leaders.

The second key observation is that the perspectives articulated by students reflect a range of views and understandings. To return to the earlier discussions of the military practicing a tight culture and developing specific identities and worldviews, some clearly seek to preserve the traditional constructions of the military and the soldier, sailor, and aviator, with considerations of the WPS agenda or GBA+ constrained

to fit with Huntington's summary of the military ethic or to reframe the objectives of Operation HONOUR or the CAF Diversity Strategy in ways which preserve the cultural status quo. The tendency to present the CAF as "gender neutral" and to refer to all in uniform as "warfighters" reflect the generalized logic being applied. The preservation of traditional frameworks is also evident when some apply simplistic men-versus-women categorizations to complex social issues and consider these to reflect effective GBA+ analyses.[9]

Others, however, are prepared to consider the concepts being presented and, in particular, to begin to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions that characterize the military worldview as well as more critically assessing aspects of professional functioning. Discussions of the appropriate role of the military have recognized the emphasis by the UN on the protection of civilians and the expansion of military missions beyond stability operations or traditional neutral enforcement of negotiated peace accords. Some have pondered the evolution required from the long-standing tight culture emphasis on unity of thought, purpose and action to a looser cultural philosophy of unity of purpose achieved by people with diverse values, capacities and qualities through diverse ways. Thus, a portion of the student body is recognizing that the new concepts and frameworks about gender, culture, diversity and inclusion being introduced in curriculum should not just be layered onto or woven into existing CAF doctrine and the dominant worldview but require careful thought as to how these may be significantly shifting the ways in which the profession defines, assesses, and addresses the practical, real-world problems military leaders must face.

The third observation is that some of these students have had the opportunity to learn about implicit gender and cultural bias. Content such as unconscious bias and inaccurate stereotypes about gender and race demonstrate to students how these can lead to inappropriate decision making in a variety of security contexts. Such curriculum has students digging deeper as they conduct self-reflective assessments of their own values, views, and perspectives. This learning has also enabled some to critically assess aspects of professional functioning, institutional bias and the pressures to fit dominant professional ideals. A central issue that has emerged for a minority is recognizing and then questioning the implicit social hierarchies that serve to distinguish the more important (or more powerful) from those who lack similar social standing. These inquiries lead them to surfacing and interrogating the bases of these power hierarchies; the assumed privileges of place and voice; the meanings associated with terms such as "warfighting" and "warfighters," and, crucially, the processes of social construction being used by the profession. Some have extended their questioning to consider the academic views, perspectives, and voices presented in course learning activities; the messaging of virtually all CFC artwork reflecting the tight culture focus on preserving the past rather than the loose culture creation of

---

[9]This is not helped by the rather simplistic approach evident in the mandated on-line GBA+ training (Status of Women Canada 2018), and also noting the valid critiques launched by critical feminists pertaining to essentialism in applications of gender perspectives, and tendencies for GBA+ to be applied as a descriptive tool rather than a transformational one. For in depth critiques (see Hankivsky 2012; Paterson 2010).

a vision for the future; and, most critically, the ways in which dominant masculinities are produced and reinforced.

Our observations on the ways in which new concepts and frameworks are being received by JCSP students contribute to Muzio et al. (2013) view about the "relative lack of attention for the discursive and performative aspects of professional work" (p. 713) and their question about "what degree of reflexivity or awareness do actors have about institutional pressures?" (p. 715). We suggest that the four topic areas into professional military education are leading to deeper considerations of key aspects of professional identity and professional functioning. As articulated in Okros (2009), we see the potential for two significant re-conceptualizations of the profession of arms.

The first is a shift from the focus on the state or physical security (fighting and winning the nation's wars) to embracing human security (setting the conditions for long-term peace and security). The second is the move from the practice of tight culture to endorsing a looser culture. While the characteristics of a loose culture are likely to be seen by seniors or traditionalists as a recipe for confusion and disorder that would significantly erode essential professional capacities needed for frontline success, the necessity for military uniformity in thought and action is a tenuous concept, particularly when applied to often messy and complex ways that gender and diversity shape contemporary conflict and security (Masters 2005; Duriesmith 2016).

As Duriesmith argues, it is important for practitioners to consider the ways that defining elements of contemporary conflict are socially constructed, particularly in conflict contexts where gender and ethnicity are used to fuel war (such as rape as a weapon of war and ethnic/tribal warfare). To do so, he proposes that "it is necessary to address the role of masculinity at the cultural level in socialising combatants" to recognize "the power of gender relations in informing the forms of violence that new warriors develop" and to identify and understand "the role of patriarchal social structures in constructing new wars" (2016, p. 20). Part of this undertaking, then, requires reflexivity about the role that masculinities and gender have at the cultural level within armed forces in socializing soldiers, warriors, and warfighters (Whitworth 2005; Razack 2004), as well as reflection about military defence agents' socialization to differently gendered non-combative roles (Parpart and Partridge 2014; Duncanson 2015). In addition, part of this undertaking is to identify the patriarchal structures and systems that set conditions for gendered and intersectional hierarchies to develop among such identities and roles. Doing so would help military defence agents to better understand the sorts of norms and behaviors that are ascribed to them, as well as the ways in which they might work toward social equality in their organizations, institutions, and profession (Duncanson 2015; Brown 2018).

As Duncanson (2015) and Parpart and Partridge (2014) contend, it is typically those identities and roles that are deemed to be hegemonically masculine in quality that have traditionally been valued at the expense of concurrently and differently expressed masculine and feminine qualities. Hegemony of particular masculinist worldviews, norms, and practices create conditions for intersectional inequity,

and indeed insecurity, among military professionals within their own organizations and institutions (Holland et al. 2014; Whitworth 2005; Woodward and Winter 2007, pp. 56–58). Importantly, gendered structures and systems are causal in social inequities and contemporary forms of conflict (Cockburn 2010; Duriesmith 2016; Sjoberg 2011); thus, we argue that it is critical for these structures and systems to continue to be considered in the education, planning and work of military members (Duriesmith 2016; Brown and Okros 2018b).

We suggest that by authorizing pluralism, permitting contradictory behaviors, tolerating ambiguity and seeking consensus through understanding vice the use of power to enforce rules, security agencies could, in fact, authorize a range of role definitions, norms and behaviors under a loose culture. Gender scholar Claire Duncanson notes:

> As western militaries increasingly focus their training on stabilization or peacebuilding operations, including issues such as partnering indigenous forces, cultural awareness, and responding to sexual violence, it becomes possible that identities could be forged through recognition of similarity, interdependence, empathy, respect, and equality—both in the sense of discursively adopting subject positions and in real interactions with those in whose lands soldiers intervene (2015, p. 244).

What the updated curriculum in JCSP has begun to demonstrate, the construction of the prototype ideal soldier, sailor or aviator can evolve to encompass a number of perspectives of "effective members." Respect and empathy for such plurality in thought and action in membership affords military defense agents the ability to draw from a broad spectrum of capacities in thought and practice to help them recognize and deal with evolving inequities in their profession (Brown and Okros 2019; Duriesmith 2016) and the sorts of intersectional social inequities that fuel "new wars" (Cockburn 2010; Duncanson 2015).

This necessarily means disrupting several facets of how the profession of arms frames its collective identity, develops the military worldview, and constructs individual identities for those serving within. The calls to a fundamental shift for the profession of arms through the transformational mechanisms we have offered here do not necessitate rapid or abrupt breaks from the past. Rather, we advocate for thoughtful and reflexive moves in diverse and more equitable directions. In this way, while subtle, such careful evolutions in thinking and practice will be particularly evident to those who are attentive to the discursive and performative aspects of professional functioning.

References

Abbott, A. (1988). *The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Abbott, A. (2002). The army and the theory of professions. In D. Snider & G. Watkins (Eds.), *The future of the army profession* (pp. 523–536). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Ashe, F. (2012). Gendering war and peace: Militarized masculinities in Northern Ireland. *Men and Masculinities, 15*(3), 230–248.

Auditor General of Canada. (2018). *2018 fall reports of the Auditor General of Canada to the Parliament of Canada: Report 5—Inappropriate sexual behaviour—Canadian armed forces*. Ottawa, ON: Author.

Beier, J. M. (2006). Outsmarting technologies: Rhetoric, revolutions in military affairs, and the social depth of warfare. *International Politics, 43*(2), 266–280.

Berry, J. W., & Sam, D. L. (1997). Acculturation and adaptation. In J. W. Berry, M. H. Segall, & C. Kagicibaci (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology* (Vol. 31, pp. 291–326)., Social behavior and application Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Bishwakarma, R., Hunt, V. H., & Zajicek, A. (2007). Educating Dalit women: Beyond a one-dimensional policy formulation. *Himalaya, XXVI*(1–2), 27–39.

Branswell, B. C., Harnett, S., Nolen, B., Bergman, J., Geddes, J., O'Hara, J., & Deziel, S. (2003, March 17). More rape in the military. *Maclean's*.

Brose, C. (2019). The new revolution in military affairs: War's sci-fi future. *Foreign Affairs, 98*(3), 68–73.

Brown, V. (2017). *"I was furious that whole roto." Report on gender dynamics and hidden learning Joint Command and Staff Programme* (Residential) 43 Institutional Policy Studies. Reported submitted to Canadian Forces College, August 2017.

Brown, V. (2018, August). *Report on the integration of gender and cultural perspectives and an inclusive learning environment in the Joint Command and Staff Programme*. Kingston, ON: Reported submitted to Canadian Forces College.

Brown, V. (draft). *Integrating gender and cultural perspectives in Canada's professional military education: Transforming military culture through informed leadership*. Draft doctoral thesis, Carleton University, Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

Brown, V., & Okros, A. (2018a, May–June). *Preparing military leaders to achieve the objectives of the women, peace and security agenda*. Paper presented at the 2018 Women Peace and Security Conference: Promoting Global Leadership, Brown University.

Brown, V., & Okros, A. (2018b). New leaders, "new wars": A reflective approach to applying gender and cultural perspectives. In D. Watola & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), *From knowing to doing: International perspectives on leading effectively* (pp. 235–289). Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Brown, V., & Okros, A. (2019). Dancing around gender: Changing identity in Canada's post-Deschamps military. In H. C. Breede (Ed.), *Culture and the soldier: Identities, values, and norms in military engagements*. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press.

Chief of the Defence Staff. (2009a). *Duty with honour: The profession of arms in Canada*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute.

Chief of the Defence Staff. (2009b). *Canadian military doctrine (CFJP 01)*. Ottawa, ON: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre.

Chief of the Defence Staff. (2015, August). Op Order—Op HONOUR. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff.

Chief of the Defence Staff. (2016a, January). *Directive for integrating UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions into CAF planning and operations*. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff.

Chief of the Defence Staff. (2016b). *Canadian armed forces diversity strategy*. Ottawa, ON: Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity.

Chief of the Defence Staff. (2019). *Canadian armed forces progress report addressing sexual misconduct*. Ottawa, ON: Chief of Defence Staff Strategic Response Team—Sexual Misconduct.

Cockburn, C. (2010). Gender relations as causal in militarization and war: A feminist standpoint. *International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12*(2), 139–157.

Connell, R. (1987). *Gender and power: Society, the person, and sexual politics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford U. P.

Debusscher, P. (2015). *Evaluation of the Beijing Platform for Action +20 and the opportunities for achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women in the post-2015 development agenda*. Brussels: European Parliament.

Deschamps, M. [External Review Authority] (2015). *External review into sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces*. Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence.

Duncanson, C. (2015). Hegemonic masculinity and the possibility of change in gender relations. *Men & Masculinities, 18*(2), 231–248.

Duriesmith, D. (2016). *Masculinity and new war: The gendered dynamics of contemporary armed conflict*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Eichler, M. (2014). Militarized masculinities in international relations. *Brown Journal of World Affairs, 21*(1), 81–92.

Feaver, P. (1996). The civil–military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control. *Armed Forces and Society, 23*(2), 149–178.

Fullana, J., Pallisera, M., Colomer, J., Fernández Peña, R., & Pérez-Burriel, M. (2016). Reflective learning in higher education: A qualitative study on students' perceptions. *Studies in Higher Education, 41*(6), 1008–1022.

Gelfand, M. (2018). *Rule makers, rule breakers: How tight and loose cultures wire our world*. New York, NY: Scribner.

Global Affairs Canada. (2017). *Gender equality: A foundation for peace*. *Canada's National Action Plan 2017–2022*: For the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security. Ottawa, ON: Global Affairs Canada.

Hankivsky, O. (2012). The lexicon of mainstreaming equality: Gender based analysis (GBA), gender and diversity analysis (GDA) and intersectionality based analysis (IBA). *Canadian Political Science Review, 6*(2–3), 171–183.

Higate, P. (2007). Peacekeepers, masculinities, and sexual exploitation. *Men and Masculinities, 10*(1), 99–119.

Holland, K. J., Rabelo, V. C., & Cortina, L. M. (2014). Sexual assault training in the military: Evaluating efforts to end the "invisible war". *American Journal of Community Psychology, 54*(3–4), 289–303.

Hughes, M., & Miklaucic, M. (Eds.). (2015). *Impunity: Countering illicit power in war and transition*. Washington, DC: National Defense U. P.

Huntington, S. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations*. New York, NY: Belknap Press.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Kaldor, M., & Vashee, B. (Eds.). (1997). *New wars*. London, UK: Pinter.

Liddell Hart, B. H. (1944). *Thoughts on war*. London, UK: Faber & Faber.

Masters, C. (2005). Bodies of technology: Cyborg soldiers and militarized masculinities. *International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7*(1), 112–132.

Matfess, H., & Miklaucic, M. (Eds.). (2016). *Beyond convergence: World without order*. Washington, DC: National Defense U. P.

Mello, P. A. (2017). "New" and "old" wars. In P. I. Joseph (Ed.), *The Sage encyclopedia of war: Social science perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mercier, N., & Castonguay, A. (2014, May 16). Our military's disgrace. *Maclean's*.

Miklaucic, M., & Brewer, J. (2013). *Convergence: Illicit networks and national security in the age of globalization*. Washington, DC: National Defense U. P.

Morgan, P. M. (2008). The impact of the revolution in military affairs. *Journal of Strategic Studies, 23*(1), 132–162.

Münkler, H. (2005). *The new wars* (P. Camiller, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Muzio, D., Brock, D. M., & Suddaby, R. (2013). Professions and institutional change: Towards an institutionalist sociology of the professions. *Journal of Management Studies, 50*(5), 699–721.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2017, October 17). SH/SAG/GEN/JC/17-317874/1 and TSC-GSL-0010/TT-170733/Ser: 0761, Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure.

O'Hara, J., Branswell, B., Geddes, J., Deziel, S., Doyle Driedger. S., & Nolen, S. (1998, May 25). Rape in the military. *Maclean's*.

Okros, A. C. (2009). Rethinking "diversity" and "security". *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 47*(4), 346–373.

Okros, A. C. (2010). *Leadership in the Canadian military context*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute.

Okros, A. C. (2019, May 28). Women in the Canadian armed forces. Testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women, Ottawa, ON. In K. Vecchio (Chair), *A force for change: Creating a culture of equality for women in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Report of the Committee on the Status of Women). Ottawa, ON: Parliament of Canada.

Okros, A. C. (in press). Introspection on diversity in the Canadian armed forces. In A. Edgar, R. Mangat, & B. Momani (Eds.), *Strengthening the Canadian armed forces through diversity and inclusion* (pp. 101–110). Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Parpart, J., & Partridge, K. (2014). Soldiering on: Pushing militarized masculinities into new territory. In M. Evans, C. Hemmings, & M. Henry (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of feminist theory* (pp. 550–565). London, UK: Sage.

Paterson, S. (2010). What's the problem with gender-based analysis? Gender mainstreaming policy and practice in Canada. *Canadian Public Administration, 53*(3), 395–416.

Pelto, P. J. (1968). The differences between "tight" and "loose" societies. *Trans-Actions,* 37–40.

Price, B. (2017). Military culture. In P. Joseph (Ed.), *The Sage encyclopedia of war: Social science perspectives* (pp. 1096–1099). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Razack, R. (2004). *Dark threats and white knights: The Somalia Affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto P.

Ryan, M., & Ryan, M. (2013). Theorising a model for teaching and assessing reflective learning in higher education. *Higher Education Research & Development, 32*(2), 244–257.

Sjoberg, L. (2011). Gender, the state, and war redux: Feminist international relations across the "levels of analysis". *International Relations, 25*(1), 108–134.

Status of Women Canada. (2018). *Gender based analysis plus: Research guide*. Retrieved from https://cfc-swc.gc.ca/gba-acs/index-en.html.

Supreme Court of Canada. (1987). *Robichaud versus Canada* (Treasury Board). Ottawa; ON: Supreme Court of Canada (2 SCR 84).

Taber, N. (2009). The profession of arms: Ideological codes and dominant narratives of gender in the Canadian military. *Atlantis, 34*(1), 27–36.

Tiessen, R. (2015). Gender essentialism in Canadian foreign aid commitments to women, peace, and security. *International Journal, 70*(1), 84–100.

Van Beveren, L., Roets, G., Buysse, A., & Rutten, K. (2018). We all reflect, but why? A systematic review of the purposes of reflection in higher education in social and behavioral sciences. *Educational Research Review, 24*(2), 1–9.

Whitworth, S. (2005). Militarized masculinities and the politics of peacekeeping: The Canadian case. In K. Booth (Ed.), *Critical security studies and world politics* (pp. 89–106). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Woodward, R., & Winter, T. (2007). *Sexing the soldier: The politics of gender and the contemporary British Army*. London, UK: Routledge.

Chapter 11
A New Spirit of Militarism? Person–Organization Fit and Economies of Worth Among New Military Cadets

Vilhelm Stefan Holsting and Morten Brænder

Abstract In this article we show that there is a misfit between the ideals of the military and the expectations of those entering the organization from the outside. According to Boltanski's conventional sociology, organizations can be understood as encompassing a reservoir of moral principles that prescribe admirable kinds of behavior and distinguish the organization from others. The principles that dominate a particular organization attract people whose value constellation fits the organization's. Traditionally, the military has been seen as holding a particular set of values, and the officer has been seen as exemplifying these values to other members. In Denmark, the military, and officer education in particular, have undergone far-reaching changes, including admitting 50% of military cadets on the basis of a civilian bachelor's degree. In this article, we investigate whether these new cadets also share the values of the modern military. We show that the military has changed its reservoir of moral principles from the "management of violence" to an "adaptive" ideal, but new cadets have only partially adapted the new moral principles. They recognize the need for flexibility and networking, characterizing the new ideal of the "agile officer," but they still place a much stronger emphasis on traditionally domestic and industrial values, such as duty, loyalty, effectiveness, and reliability. The organization may have changed, but the persons entering it seem to fit ideals of the past.

Keywords Officer education · Military values · Boltanski · Denmark · Person–Organization fit

V. S. Holsting (✉)
Royal Danish Defence College, Institute for Leadership and Organisation, ILO, Ryvangs, Allé 1, 2100 København Ø, Denmark
e-mail: viho@fak.dk

M. Brænder
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Batholins Allé 7, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
e-mail: mortenb@ps.au.dk

Introduction

Across the world, militaries and military professions are undergoing substantial changes. The Danish military is no exception to that rule. However, while there are clear signs of changing professional ideals, our research indicates that these ideals are not shared by new members of the profession. As part of the 2012 quadrennial Parliamentary Defence Agreement, the Danish government decided to admit 50% of military cadets on the basis of a civilian bachelor's degree. Modern military education came into being by integrating civilian and military skillsets, (Jansen et al. 2019: 339). And in most modern militaries such processes of integration still prevail, albeit in new forms. The US ROTC constitutes an excellent example. The French military's decision to rank civilian master degrees alongside degrees from the Paris War College constitutes another (Augé 2019). Thus seen, the remarkable innovation of the Danish reform was not the admission of civilians as cadets. Although many Danish officers have, traditionally, started their military careers as conscripts, a large proportion has always been recruited from the outside. What made the difference was that, now, these outsiders already had a tertiary educational degree. And, contrary to the US ROTC, this degree should not necessarily entail any military elements. The reform was received with caution for a number of reasons. Most obviously, it constituted an ill-disguised cost-reduction maneuver. After all, it is much cheaper to hire an engineer and to make him or her into an officer, than it is to pay for officers to take a degree in engineering. Following this line of thought, the new model justified a reduction of officer education by about 20 months (Ministry of Defence 2012). Thus, the fear was that these new officers would devalue the quality—in terms of knowledge and skills—of the profession.

In this paper, we focus on another point of concern raised in the wake of the reform: The fear that these new cadets would not fit into the military institution. The worry was not so much that the "new model officers" would devalue the profession (a fear that was quickly rejected), but, more fundamentally, that this misfit would challenge its philosophy in a wider sense. This fear reflected what Morris Janowitz initially defined as the civil-military "skill differential", the tension between traditional (heroic) officers and the growing need for skills common for civilian administrators such as interpersonal techniques, moral negotiation and symbolic interaction (1957, p. 16). However, Norbert Elias's classic study, *The Genesis of the Naval Profession* (1950), actually provides a precedent for such a change. Elias argued that the integration of army officers and merchant sailors into the Royal Navy enabled the establishment of a navy "habitus" of officers who could both command troops in battle and sail a ship, which distinguished the Royal Navy's leaders from their French and Spanish counterparts. In the same way we could expect the influx of cadets with a stronger civilian background to challenge the Danish military, forcing it to integrate new ideas that will become the hallmark of an adaptable and enterprising Danish officer, who will be able to overcome the civil-military "skill differential."

Before getting our hopes too high, however, we should also keep in mind that, as Elias argued, this new naval profession grew out of a long and excruciating process, with devastating incongruences between the two groups. Despite the eventual success of the initiative, it would have looked at the time to outsiders—as well as to many insiders—like an outright failure (Elias 1950). Patience is a scarce resource in public management; it is highly unlikely that a seemingly failed integration would be allowed to go on for several decades in pursuit of a doubtful prize. As already mentioned, the officer recruitment reform was settled with the underlying intent of gaining efficiency due to a more-for-less management philosophy. Moreover, if the rewards do not materialize in the short term, the volatility of the decision process suggests that reforms of the reform will be initiated. Accordingly, it is important to know whether the fears concerning these new cadets are justified. This constitutes the background for the research question we intend to answer: Do cadets with a civilian background match the military organization they are entering?

Theory

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the new Danish cadets, in possession of a civilian bachelor's degree, can be expected to fit into the military organization. This is not an entirely new question. Recruitment processes have always focused on selecting the right people for military tasks, and these cadets are no exception. The question is especially pertinent in this case, however, because these cadets, unlike previous cohorts, have already spent their formative years outside the military. Our framework for the inquiry is the person–environment theory, which we draw upon to analyze the fit between the cadets and the military, (while however taking into account the theory's practical limitations). We also draw on Luc Boltanski's pragmatic sociology, which we use to identify the values or moral modes of cadets and the military institution, which ought to correspond if there is a fit between the two.

Person–Environment Theory

Person–environment fit, which has been used in public administration research for decades (Kristof 1996), examines whether people search for contexts with values and characteristics that match their own preferences. Analytically, we can distinguish between various kinds of fit (e.g., person–job, person–organization, person–group and person–supervisor fit; Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). This complexity implies a weakness of the overall theory: Nobody is likely to find contexts seamlessly matching their preferences. In real life, we need to adjust our own expectations and preferences. Not all people are equally talented when it comes to learning how to fit a particular

context, but nobody can enter without some effort of adapting. In other words, finding a fit is not only a matter of selection but also of socialization. We return to this point later in the article. For now, it suffices to say that this is especially important to keep in mind in regard to the military, where newcomers face socialization processes that are harsher and more direct than in most other contexts (Stouffer et al. 1949). Thus, a number of studies have used Schneider's (1983) attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) framework to examine how person–organization (P–O) fit can "increase the within-organization homogeneity over time" both within and outside military institutions (Kristof 1996, p. 5; Halfhill et al. 2008; Leisink and Steijn 2008; Wright and Christensen 2010; Brænder and Andersen 2014). Granted, drawing on the different types of fit and on the ASA framework, would yield a highly relevant longitudinal study of the socialization of new cadets. Yet the cross-sectional data used here require a more parsimonious approach. Accordingly, we stick to the P–O fit level.

Following Kristof (1996), P–O fit can be seen in two different ways. If we focus on complementary fit, we focus on the supply-and-demand side of the relation between persons and organizations, and we are most interested in extrinsic factors, such as salary, leisure time, work effort, and qualifications. If we focus on supplementary fit, we are more interested in intrinsic factors, such as values, attitudes, and goals. The point of departure for this study, the military establishment's concerns about the new cadets, is based on the assumption that the military has retained some of its institutional characteristics (Moskos 1977, 2000; Segal 1986; Williams 2008; Taylor et al. 2015). On this view, values still matter in the organization. This also means that we pursue a supplementary P–O fit approach, centering on the value congruency between the cadets and the military organization. Path-breaking studies have centered on value congruency using various kinds of measures (see Andersen et al. 2013, for an overview). Yet developing operationalizations that can compare across organizational and individual levels is challenging. Here we try to respond to that challenge using Luc Boltanski's conventional sociology.

Pragmatic Sociology: A Plurality of Diverging Moral Modes in the Common World

Boltanski and Thévenot's conventional sociology describes how moral judgment—of the quality of people and things—operates through moral modes. These modes have been formalized in Western political philosophy and have emerged as societal realities over time. According to Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), legitimacy is only achievable if the activity is justifiable with reference to an idea of the common good. This is how social order and its coordinating activities are made possible. Hence, the point is that any form of legitimate socially coordinated activity is based on the use of certain historically developed and accepted criteria of quality—a principle of coordination—representing a distinct value scale, which includes distinct qualifying concepts. Legitimate social order cannot be reduced to one single mode.

Instead, actors use several modes in any situation to construct a legitimate social order. Actors or things that embody the primary and most common moral modes by acting in accordance to the qualifying concept are considered the most prominent representatives of the social order. They become worthy, where worthy means fitting the values of the social order of a particular social environment or, as in this case, an organization.

In this study, we focus on a framework of 10 modes relevant for the military. The different modes have been tested on senior leadership in Danish defense (Holsting 2017a). In this respect, they constitute an approach to understanding the dynamics and plurality of officership in relation to the changing post-Cold War military context.

The choice of modes draws on various sources. Originally, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) identified six modes of justification, with contradicting principles of coordination. These modes are inspiration, opinion, domestic, market, industry, and civic. Modes do not appear out of nowhere. Some constitute classical discourses in political thought: The market mode (and the coordinating principle of competition) and the civic mode (and the coordination principle of community) derive from e.g. Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). They develop other modes inductively. Moreover, in 1999, Boltanski and Chiapello added a seventh mode of justification—the project mode—based on studies of the diachronic transformation of the Western capitalism from the 1960s to the 1990s (2007). Moreover, Boltanski (2012) developed another framework, adding another two new moral modes, the mode of love and the mode of fairness. In a military context, the mode of love has been translated into the mode of sacrifice, with devotion as the principle of coordination (Holsting 2017a). Qualifying concepts such as caring, passionate, and unselfish relate to this mode in the military context. Likewise, the mode of fairness has been translated into the military mode of subordination, with naturalness as the principle of coordination (Holsting 2017a). Qualifying concepts such as obedient, disciplined, and tolerant relate to this mode. Finally, a mode of execution has been identified through a diachronic survey of the performance evaluations of officer from the seventeenth to the twenty-first centuries (Holsting 2017a). An overview of the ten moral modes used here to analyze the P–O value fit of the new cadets can be seen in Table 11.3.

A crucial point about each mode is its principle of coordination by means of which legitimacy and quality are evaluated. As a principle of coordination, competition (linked the market mode) has completely different standards than the principle of tradition (linked to the domestic mode). In theory, coexisting modes are impossible because they are mutually exclusive. In practice, however, actors come to pragmatic agreements. In conventional sociological terms, such a coexistence constitutes a compromise. Historically developed compromises allow a plurality of modes to exist side by side in the real world. From this perspective, the plurality of modes is a dynamic process through which new modes emerge and through which the hierarchies of modes undergo changes.

The framework of pragmatic sociology implies three main points concerning social coordination. First, social coordination is a challenging, complex, and uncertain activity. Second, legitimate social coordination can be made explicit as it relates

to observable principles of coordination. Third, the reservoir of modes should not be supposed to determine structures once and for all. Instead, these reservoirs represent potentialities for the actors, individually or collectively, which means that these modes constitute reservoirs of meaning that individual cadets and the military organization can draw upon.

These reservoirs also provide actors with what Boltanski and Thévenot call a "critical capacity" (1999, p. 360), a lens through which actors can engage in and express the values signifying the social order in any situation. In the context of the sociology of professions, this implies that professional *values* are observable through the activities of the actors, especially through their justificatory arguments. Following Boltanski and Thévenot, the values of any social system thereby derive from the level of the actors while they simultaneously relate to different historically developed legitimate modes. In that sense, too, this is a "pragmatic" sociology, contrasting classic economic, structural, or critical sociology. From the pragmatic standpoint, these other theories either under-socialize or over-socialize social actors. Instead, our theoretical point of departure is that social systems (e.g., military institutions) are complex historically developed entities. System-specific modes are dynamic, under constant renegotiation due to the influence of system-internal and system-external technological, institutional, and societal changes. Further, social actors can always introduce new modes or mobilize latent ones through their knowledge and practice. Therefore, several different values may coexist in the same organizational context at the same time.

Person–Organization Value Fit: Hypotheses

The hypotheses below are based on three sources in which Boltanski's framework is relevant in the study of values in the military organization. The common background for these sources is the observation that the primary modes of the military have changed radically in recent years. These changes are summarized in the next three subsections:

(a) **Official organizational requirements**. In 2008, the Danish defense implemented a new leadership code (Defence Command 2008), which represented a radical organizational change in officership. The primary change regarded the status of domestic mode. This mode, traditionally seen as the primary mode of officership, completely vanished from the official requirements of military leadership (Holsting 2017a). One example of this eradication of the domestic requirement was in the assessment of order and duty. In the former performance evaluation system, the "officer and gentleman" requirement had the following definition: "[The Officer should be] careful with his personal appearance and dress and fulfil the military requirements of order and punctuality inside the area of responsibility" (Defence Command 1976, p. 2). The new code represented a distancing from this former ideal type officer, characterized as the formidable and omnipotent father figure and defender of the traditional military lifestyle. Instead of representing tradition, the new code required

that officers become drivers of transformation and institutional change. They should become transformational agents capable of continuous adaption (Yammarino et al. 1993). Thus, new "project mode" requirements like "holism" and "readiness for change" emerged in the performance evaluation system with definitions like "[the officer] adapts to new requirements" or "acts with foresight regarding the development of the unit" (Defence Command 2007, p. 3). The official justification of these transformations of leadership values was the need for rapidly reacting, flexible, and agile military capabilities, which can operate worldwide in the service of global governance (Defence Command 2008). Further, the new code also represents values related to the industrial mode and the execution mode. The reform did not only represent a top-down deductive logic, as the new code was also developed inductively using surveys of existing attitudes toward professionalism among military actors at all levels of the organization (Buhl et al. 2004; Holsting and Damkjer 2007).

(b) **The values of senior officers**. Another way of observing organizational values is to look at the values of high-ranking senior officers. High rank is a marker of worthiness in the military order. Therefore, the values of high-ranking actors should also be considered as markers of organizational values. A radical change of values was observed in the aforementioned survey of performance evaluations of senior officers from 1989 to 2014 (Holsting 2017a). During those years, the entire population of evaluation arguments (written by generals and admirals on colonels and naval captains) using domestic qualifiers decreased from 32.6 to 14.8%. Meanwhile, the evaluation arguments related to project qualifiers increased from 5.8 to 26.1%. This finding suggests that the project mode became one of the primary modes of senior officership, whereas the domestic mode became relegated to secondary status.

(c) **The values of active duty officers**. The values of Danish active duty officers are interesting because they are highly experienced and still active in the core operational environment. Moreover, it is up to them to implement the new, project-oriented ideals in a, traditionally seen, very hierarchical organization, (Nørgaard and Holsting 2006, p. 135). This group has always been caught in a cross-pressure between the demands of the strategic level and tactical realities, (von Moltke p. 77 in Bungay 2011; von Clausewitz 1986: p. 115). The fact that they have to realize the overall value framework set by the top brass, only adds to the complexity of their task. With these points in mind, Holsting (2016, 2017b) surveyed active duty officers enrolled as students in the Master of Military Science (MMS; i.e., the educational program that provides access to the degrees of major and commander) in 2016 and 2017. Here, active duty officers were asked to choose up to five qualifying concepts that they considered most important for officership. These concepts were linked to conventional sociological modes. The results of the questionnaire can be seen in Table 11.1, where the modes are ranked according to their number and frequency of response from the officers. Across the two cohorts of MMS students, the top four modes are the same, and they appear in the same hierarchical order. As in the case of the top brass, the preferred values of these active duty officers were associated with the project mode, followed by the execution mode, the domestic mode, and the industrial mode. The lowest ranking modes were those of the market and the civic mode, which appear to be seen as inferior. (This was also the case in the examination of the senior officers.

Table 11.1 Test of moral modes among MMS students (mid-level officers)

2016 ($N = 206$)			2017 ($N = 175$)		
Mode	Number	%	Mode	Number	%
Project	56	27.2	Project	56	32.0
Execution	46	22.3	Execution	28	16.0
Domestic	32	15.5	Domestic	26	14.9
Industry	23	11.2	Industry	15	8.6
Opinion	20	9.7	Inspiration	13	7.4
Sacrifice	12	5.8	Sacrifice	11	6.3
Inspiration	8	3.9	Subordination	10	5.7
Subordination	6	2.9	Opinion	7	4.0
Market	2	1.0	Civic	5	2.9
Civic	1	0.5	Market	4	2.3

The averaged appearance of the market mode, between 1989 and 2014, lies at merely 1.3% (Holsting 2017a).) The most prominent difference between senior officers and junior officers seems to be the ranking of the execution mode. For senior officers, the average appearance of the execution mode is 5.8% (again between 1989 and 2014; Holsting 2017a). The execution mode scored 16.0% for active duty officers and 22.3% for MMS students. The difference in scoring may result from differences between the political-administrative context in which senior officers must navigate and the organizational reality of the operational context in which junior officers find themselves.

Despite these differences, the three sources (a, b, and c) reveal the contours of the new, post-Cold War view of military organizational values. Traditional military values—those associated with the domestic and the industrial modes—are supplemented by other military values, those associated with the project and the execution modes. At the other end of the scale, we find an unequivocal rejection of values associated with the market mode and the civic mode. These observations form the basis of our two first hypotheses regarding the content of the moral modes of the modern officer:

> **H1a**: Person–organization fit requires, first, that the project mode, the execution mode, the domestic mode, and the industrial mode are the most important for the new cadets.
> **H2a**: Person–organization fit also requires that the market mode and the civic mode are the least important for the cadets.

Looking at the new internal distribution of the four main modes, we also see that the traditional values are considered less important than those associated with the agile, project-centered officer. Likewise, when looking at the modes rejected by mid-level and senior officers, we also see that the civic mode scores notably lower than the

market mode. In light of these observations, the two hypotheses should be further refined:

H1b: A full person–organization fit requires that modes signifying an adaptive approach to military matters (the project and the execution modes) are more prevalent than traditional rule-based modes (the domestic and the industrial modes)

H2b: Second, regarding the rejected modes, a complete person–organization fit also requires that values associated with the civic mode are seen as significantly weaker than those associated with the market mode.

Two things should be remarked in connection to these hypotheses. First, they reflect a static view of the P–O fit approach like the one we identified as a core weakness of the theory: It is not necessarily the value fit that determines why people select into an organization. It could also be the other way around, that selecting into an organization encourages people, subsequently, to adjust their values. Moreover, in organizations where the value framework is changing, those who select in may do so without knowing what they actually select into. The described changes of the Danish Defense may not be known to the new cadets beforehand.

Second, the hypotheses are stated on an everything-else-equal basis, and that should be taken into consideration in the actual analysis. Most importantly, the military is not just the military. We cannot reject the possibility that the value constellation of army cadets may differ substantially from that of their navy or air force colleagues. Former empirical analyses of data related to this project have shown that such service-specific differences actually correlate with the observed differences in respondent values (Brænder and Holsting 2017a, b). Moreover, we also know that values correlate closely with individual background variables, most fundamentally with gender and age: Our values tend to change, as we grow older. This may be due to an increased cognitive maturity or the increased number of obligations we acquire in life (by having children, having a larger income, having to pay mortgages, etc.). Whatever the reason, the importance of age should not be rejected when conducting our explanatory analyses. Likewise, although less than 20% of the respondents were women, we know from other studies of value-differences that gender makes an important difference (Camillieri 2007). Accordingly, our analyses should also account for the potential effect of gender differences.

Data and Methods

The data analyzed below consist of responses from future officers with a civilian bachelor's degree from the 2016, 2017, and 2018 cohorts. After enrolment, these new cadets must gain NCO experience before entering the officer schools (between 6 and 12 months, depending on their service branch). The surveys were collected as group enquiries at the barracks, within a month of the cadets beginning their service-specific NCO training. Participation in the survey collection was voluntary,

Table 11.2 Data overview, cohort, service branch affiliation, gender and age. Cadets enrolled on basis of their civilian bachelor's degree

Cohort	Army	Air force	Navy	Total
2016	26	13	31	**70**
2017	54	20	38	**112**
2018	73	21	42	**136**
Total	**153**	**54**	**111**	318
Percentage of women (*n*)	15% (24)	20% (11)	14% (16)	**16% (51)**
Age mean (*SD*)	25.9 (2.7)	26.6 (2.6)	27.0 (3.2)	**26.4 (2.9)**
Age span, min/max	22/40	22/32	23/44	**22/44**

and all but two cadets handed in a valid questionnaire. The dataset thus contains 318 respondents, 153 from the army, 54 from the air force, and 111 from the navy. Table 11.2 provides a general overview of the data.

Above we identified the moral modes, which we perceive to be crucial in the Danish armed forces, based on conventional sociological theory and previous empirical studies (Holsting 2016, 2017a). Each mode is linked to a principle of coordination through which the military order is established, sanctioned, and evaluated by the actors. To operationalize these modes, we identified three qualifying concepts associated with each mode following the same deductive approach. Consequently, we ended up with 30 qualifying concepts (three concepts for each of the ten modes). In the questionnaire, the cadets were asked to evaluate how important each of these concepts is for an officer. Table 11.3 contains a list of the moral modes, the corresponding principles of coordination, and the associated qualifying concepts. A full list of the question items can be seen in Appendix 1.

The modes are multidimensional, and aspects of each mode can be linked to aspects of other modes. The specific constellation of modes and qualifying concepts is

Table 11.3 Framework of moral modes, their principles of coordination and associated qualifying concepts

Moral modes	Principle of coordination	Qualifying concepts		
Inspiration	Geniality	*Experimenting*	*Challenging*	*Innovative*
Opinion	Fame	*Convincing*	*Reputable*	*Impactful*
Domestic	Tradition	*Respected*	*Loyal*	*Dutiful*
Market	Competition	*Opportunistic*	*Competitive*	*Risk-taking*
Industrial	Efficiency	*Productive*	*Structured*	*Reliable*
Civic	Community	*Solidary*	*Equalizing*	*Just*
Project	Activity	*Flexible*	*Connective*	*Holistic*
Sacrifice	Devotion	*Caring*	*Passionate*	*Unselfish*
Subordination	Naturalness	*Obedient*	*Disciplined*	*Tolerant*
Execution	Power	*Strong-willed*	*Resilient*	*Practical*

context dependent. In the following, our aim is to study the P–O fit between the cadets and the military institution they have entered. However, as the qualifying concepts listed above were selected at the organizational level, they may not correspond with the cadets' own linking of concepts and moral modes, which would be based on their contextually developed perceptions.

Accordingly, when reporting our findings below, we refer both to the overall means of each moral mode—constructed as formative indices—and to the specific means of each of the qualifying concepts used in the 30 questionnaire items. The tables in the findings section report the means of the moral modes; in general (Table 11.4) and by service branch (Table 11.5). Appendices 2 and 3 report the corresponding item means. To ease interpretation when comparing means, all results are reported using a 0–1 scale. Initially, the respondents in 2016 answered using a 4-point scale, while respondents in 2017 and 2018 used a 5-point scale. There are some differences between the cohorts, but analyses show that these cannot be ascribed to the difference between the scales used. Accordingly, the three cohorts are merged when reporting the results.

The first part of the analysis relies on a simple comparison of means. Thus, Table 11.4 (and Appendix 2) ranks the moral modes (and the qualifying concepts) by their mean scores. T tests have been used to estimate whether the observed differences of means are significant and, consequently, to group the moral modes. The second part of the analysis, reported in Table 11.5 (and Appendix 3), compares the mean scores of each mode (and the qualifying concepts) by service. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, including controls for gender, age, and cohort, have been used to estimate whether scores differ significantly between army cadets and their air force and navy colleagues. There are significant differences between the 2016 and 2018 cohorts in some instances, and a significant difference between age groups with regard to one concept. Because neither of these affects the observed bivariate

Table 11.4 Moral modes of future officers. Overall mean scores (standard deviations in parenthesis) and differences of mean [standard errors in brackets]. Cadets enrolled based on their civilian bachelor's degree 2016–2018

Moral mode index	Mean (SD)	Difference of mean [SE]
Domestic	0.9 (0.11)	0.05 [0.01]***
Industrial	0.85 (0.11)	0.03 [0.01]***
Execution	0.81 (0.13)	0.01 [0.01]
Opinion	0.8 (0.13)	0.01 [0.01]
Project	0.8 (0.14)	0.02 [0.01]**
Subordination	0.77 (0.14)	0.03 [0.01]**
Sacrifice	0.75 (0.16)	0.06 [0.01]***
Civic	0.69 (0.2)	0.07 [0.01]***
Market	0.62 (0.16)	0.01 [0.01]
Inspiration	0.61 (0.18)	
$n = 318$		

T test of differences of means
**:$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

Table 11.5 Moral modes of future officers by service branch. Service-specific ranking and mean scores (standard deviations in parenthesis). Cadets enrolled based on their civilian bachelor's degree 2016–2018

Moral mode index	Army (reference)		Air Force		Navy	
	Ranking	Mean (*SD*)	Ranking	Mean (*SD*)	Ranking	Mean (*SD*)
Domestic	1	0.89 (0.11)	1	0.92 (0.09)	1	0.9 (0.11)
Industrial	2	0.83 (0.11)	2	0.88 (0.11)*	2	0.85 (0.12)
Execution	3	0.81 (0.13)	3	0.83 (0.12)	4	0.81 (0.14)
Opinion	4	0.80 (0.14)	5	0.82 (0.11)	5	0.81 (0.13)
Project	5	0.76 (0.14)	4	0.83 (0.13)**	3	0.83 (0.13)***
Subordination	6	0.75 (0.13)	6	0.78 (0.14)**	6	0.8 (0.14)
Sacrifice	7	0.74 (0.16)	7	0.75 (0.16)	7	0.75 (0.16)
Civic	8	0.64 (0.20)	8	0.71 (0.21)*	8	0.74 (0.18)***
Market	9	0.62 (0.15)	9	0.64 (0.17)	10	0.61 (0.17)
Inspiration	10	0.59 (0.18)	10	0.63 (0.16)	9	0.64 (0.17)**
		N = 153		*N* = 54		*N* = 111

OLS-regression with Army mean as reference category and controlled for gender and age
*: $p < 0.05$; **: $p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

correlations, the table and the corresponding appendix only report the overall means and standard deviations.

Observations

Table 11.4 shows the mean scores of each of the 10 identified modes, constructed as formative indices. The modes are ranked according to the means. The corresponding item means for each of the 30 qualifying concepts can be seen in Appendix 2. The *p* values indicate whether the observed differences between two successive modes are significant.

In accordance with H1a, items associated with the domestic, industrial, project, and execution modes score very high, with overall means ranging from 0.90 to 0.80. Likewise, in accordance with H2a, the market and the civic modes can be found toward the bottom of the table, with overall means below 0.70. However, while H1a and H2a are supported, neither H1b nor H2b is. Thus, Table 11.4 and Appendix 2 reveal a number of interesting differences between the theoretical expectations and the empirical observations with regard to the distribution of the highest and lowest scoring indices and items.

First, following the impact of the reformed officer code and the empirical studies of mid-level and senior officers, we expected to see the project and execution modes score significantly higher than the domestic and the industrial modes. The opposite seems to be the case. While modes signifying the postmodern military score high, they score significantly lower than modes associated with the hierarchical and authority concepts traditionally signifying the military. As shown in Appendix 2, the three qualifying concepts linked to the domestic mode—loyalty, duty, and respect—are all found among the 10 highest scoring items, leading to the overall 0.90 average. Likewise, the concepts linked to the industrial mode—reliability, structure, and productivity—are among the 15 highest scoring items. The overall average for this mode, 0.85, is significantly lower than that of the domestic mode, but still significantly higher than other top five modes, all scoring close to 0.80. Accordingly, H1a cannot be sustained.

Second, cadets with a civilian background scored items associated with opinion as importantly as those linked to the project mode and the execution mode. This is unexpected because the mid-level officers surveyed in 2016 and 2017 ranked opinion notably lower than the project and the execution modes. A similar discrepancy can be seen if we turn our attention to the lowest scoring modes. While the mid-level officers ranked the inspirational mode much higher than the market mode and the civic mode, the cadets surveyed here placed it at the very bottom. Moreover, while the mid-level officers ranked the market mode significantly higher than the civic mode, the opposite seems to be the case among cadets enrolled on the basis of their civilian merits. Accordingly, H2b cannot be sustained either. The high mean of the civic mode can be ascribed to one particular qualifying concept, the importance of being just, and points to the importance of considering service-specific differences when studying these modes.

Table 11.5 shows the mean scores of each of the 10 modes for the three service branches. The corresponding item means and ranking for each of the 30 qualifying concepts can be seen in Appendix 3. Here the added p values indicate whether the observed means for the air force and navy cadets, respectively, are significantly different from the corresponding army cadet means, controlled for gender and age.

Controlling for service affiliation does not alter the general observation that qualifying concepts linked to the domestic and the industrial modes score higher than those linked to the project and the execution modes. Neither does it alter the fact that the civic, market, and inspirational modes all ended up at the bottom of the table. Still, there is some variation between services—especially between the navy and the

army cadets with regard to the civic mode and the project mode, where the observed differences are strongly significant.

Both air force and navy cadets differed from their army colleagues with regard to the project mode. Looking at the item scores in Appendix 3, army cadets ranked connectivity twenty-fifth (with a meagre 0.61 mean) and flexibility seventeenth (0.75). The corresponding air force and navy means are nearly 0.10 higher, placing these two items nineteenth and twelfth, respectively. Although this does not mean that the project mode was seen as more important than the domestic and industrial modes, it does tell us that especially army cadets prioritize traditionalist values.

As mentioned above, the unexpectedly high ranking of the civic mode could be ascribed to one particular qualifying concept, the notion that an officer should be just. A look at App. 3 reveals that whereas army and air force cadets placed this fairly low, toward the middle of the table, navy cadets ascribed it a 0.89 mean score, ranking it as the fifth most important item, only surpassed by the concepts of being loyal and dutiful (domestic), holistic (project), and reliable (industry). Accordingly, whereas air force cadets seemed more in line with their navy colleagues with regard to the project mode, they appear to be more in accordance with army cadets when it comes to the civic mode.

Discussion

This discussion focuses on four main points drawn from the empirical findings above: (1) The general observation that cadets seem to be more attached to values characteristic of the classical military. (2) The specific observation in that respect is that the inspirational mode was also ranked lower than expected. (3) The low ranking of the project mode for all services, especially for the army. (4) The unexpected observation that navy cadets seem to pay greater heed to civic values than their army and air force colleagues.

Seen from a traditionalist perspective, it may be comforting that the new cadets seem to value classical bureaucratic military norms. In that view, the fear of a growing gap between cadets with a civilian background and cadets recruited from the military can be rejected. From a progressive perspective, which seem to become increasingly influential, this appears more worrisome. Following Elias's interpretation of the development of the British Navy's officer corps, a clear advantage of recruiting cadets with a civilian education and military professionals would be that a new officer habitus could be established. Moreover, the hypotheses were based on the observation that the Danish military's values have already shifted from traditionalist, rule-based notions, to modern, adaptive ones. Instead of enhancing this modernization process, the new cadets seem to represent the "ancien régime". Moreover, regarding the inspirational mode, they seem even more rigid than would be expected from a traditionalist perspective.

Before jumping to conclusions, we should keep in mind that the surveys were collected at a time when the cadets were in the middle of the military socialization

process and, accordingly, at a time when they were most eager to comply with the values they thought mattered most in their new surroundings. Accordingly, we cannot exclude the possibility that once the cadets have settled into their roles, they will start drawing more on the values characterizing their civilian background. Thus, the new cadets' preference for rule-based norms may simply reflect a prevailing, albeit incorrect, outsider's view of the modern military. Moreover, the interpretation that the observations made here do not necessarily portend the return of strict traditionalist military values, can also be seen from a learning perspective. As mentioned above. Dreyfus and Dreyfus describe the acquisition of skills as a process in five phases, ranging from novice to the knowledgeable expert. This process involves both the acquisition of basic skills and more complex professional skills. Their observations regarding nursing and teaching (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Dreyfus 2004), for example, also apply to the acquisition of skills in officership. The novice professional easily acts rule-based in the initial learning process in the novel military learning environment because of the novice's lack of practical context specific knowledge and experience even though the novice generally appreciates self-direction in other familiar learning contexts. The actions of the expert, on the other hand, are intuitive because of his or her knowledge and experience surplus. Accordingly, in line with Dreyfus and Dreyfus, the only way to reach the intuitive professional level and thereby to become self-directed, flexible, and creative—the core skills of the modes of execution, project, and inspiration—is through a systematic expansion of practical knowledge, which gradually replaces the rule-focus. Thus seen, although Dreyfus's learning perspective does not necessarily oppose the P–O value fit theory, it reminds us that all people need direction and guidance in the initial learning process regardless of their initial value preferences. Fit is not only a matter of selection but also of socialization. Therefore, comprehensive guidance is highly needed in the basic military education, as most military practices, technics, rules and technologies are unfamiliar for the military novice. Again, this may contribute to our understanding of why these officers-to-be seemed to emphasize rule-based traditionalist values more than intuitive modern ones.

With this in mind, we now turn to the observed service branch differences. Although items linked to the project mode scored lower than expected among all cadets, this was particularly evident among army cadets. Given that this pattern is repeated across three different cohorts, it is difficult to ascribe it to mere coincidence. Seen from a static P–O fit perspective, these differences would be seen because of the recruitment process with each service appealing to a certain types of persons, a notion that is supported by the fact that these surveys were conducted at the beginning of the cadets' NCO training. However, given that military socialization represents a very steep learning curve, we cannot reject the possibility that the observed differences are also a product of service branch-specific training.

As for the observed differences, the army is traditionally seen as the ideal of the military. The Danish Defence is no exception to that rule. Although all three services have been deploying service members to high-risk missions over the past 20 years, the burden of losses—most significantly in Iraq and Afghanistan—has been borne by the army. Accordingly, it is no surprise that the army also attracts cadets who

see themselves as real soldiers, and (perhaps mistakenly) see real soldiery as more closely linked to rule-based domestic and industrial values than to those associated with the more intuitive project mode. The navy and the air force, on the other hand, are seen as "smart" or skill-based services. Keeping a vessel afloat or managing the logistics of air supply calls for thinking soldiers, not grunts. Accordingly, it is no surprise either that the future cadets in these services see the project mode as more important than their army colleagues do.

Apart from putting more emphasis on qualifying concepts linked to the project mode, navy cadets also appears to pay greater heed to civic values than both army and air force cadets. Accordingly, they do not only seem to prioritize skill-based thinking but also community values. As the observed differences are significant when controlling for gender, this cannot be ascribed to number of women in the particular services. One possible explanation is that, although interdependency is generally prevalent across the military, it is difficult to study military units without encountering the concept of cohesion, which is probably even stronger in the navy. On a navy vessel, being in the same boat is not just a metaphor. If one person fails to live up to his duties, everybody perishes (not just the man or woman next to you). If this supposition is correct, the notion of seamanship might explain why the navy attracts cadets for whom a balanced approach to rights and obligations is valued. This is why they prioritize civic values. This might also explain why they seem to score higher on subordination and inspiration than their colleagues from the two other services.

Limitations

This study is based on unique data concerning officer reform: Surveys with the new model cadets, conducted shortly after entering boot camp and commencing their military socialization process. Moreover, given that the dataset contains information from three complete successive cohorts, the observations are made without the statistical insecurity of sample data, and the observations can be expected to even out cohort-specific differences. Lastly, this is, to our knowledge, one of the first studies to try to measure moral modes quantitatively. Some of the findings may be at odds with our expectations, but they have nevertheless revealed patterns of interest to both military researchers and practitioners.

The novelty of this measurement also constitutes a weak point for this study. Each dimension constructs a formative index based on the cadets' view of particular values, one by one. The rankings reported above are based on these scores, not on the cadets' own ranking of the modes nor of the particular values. More problematic, these data allow us to say little about the uniqueness of the cadets. When these cadets began their military training, they constituted a unique group in terms of age and educational background, and it is hard to come up with a comparison group within the armed forces. Such studies will have to wait until they start at the officer schools, where these cadets can be compared with those who have followed the

beaten path and entered the academies from the rank and file. Likewise, we do not know whether these cadets—or the cadets in general—differ from their civilian counterparts because the measures have not been tested using a representative sample of this age group. Accordingly, we do not know whether the unexpected finding—the cadets' over-estimation of the domestic and industrial modes, which are no longer absolute in the modern military—is a particular feature of this group or whether it reflects a more general misconception of the military among civilians.

Conclusion

The military organization has changed radically from a traditional and rule-based organization to a more project-centered one. Yet cadets with a civilian academic background entering the military seem more likely to fit the traditionalist ideals of the past. Although the most prevalent and the least prevalent organizational values, generally seen, match the expected pattern (H1a), the new cadets do not rank these values in the same order. While recognizing the need for flexibility, networking, and empowerment (features of the new adaptive officer ideal), the cadets emphasize more strongly the traditional domestic and industrial values, such as duty, loyalty, effectiveness, and reliability. The cadets also demonstrated this traditional and rule-based values approach through less emphasis on inspirational values, such as creativity and experimentation. Underlying these patterns, we identify a number of notable service-specific differences: Army cadets rank values associated with the project mode much lower than others do. Navy cadets put more emphasis on values associated with the civic mode. Both these observations run counter to the general expectation, and, along with the unexpected emphasis on traditionalism, call for studies elucidating the role of values in the cadets' socialization and apprehension processes.

Appendix 1

Question wording, qualifying concepts. English translation.
(Original Danish wording in parentheses).
Indicate on a 1–5 scale*, where 1 means *not important at all* and 5 means *very important*, how significant you think each of the skills listed below is for an officer.
(Angiv på en skala fra 1–5, hvor 1 betyder "slet ikke vigtig" og 5 betyder "meget vigtig", hvor betydningsfuld, du mener, hver af de nedenstående egenskaber er for en officer.)

"It is important for an officer to be reliable"	(Det er vigtigt for en officer at være driftssikker)
"… impactful"	(… gennemslagskraftig)
"… flexible"	(… fleksibel)
" … passionate"	(… passioneret)
"… solidary"	(… solidarisk)
"… challenging"	(… udfordrende)
"… strong-willed"	(… viljestærk)
"… equalizing"	(… lighedsorienteret)
"… opportunistic"	(… opportunistisk)
"… structured"	(… struktureret)
"… just"	(… retfærdig)
"… holistic"	(… helhedsorienteret)
"… caring"	(… omsorgsfuld)
"… resilient"	(… modstandskraftig)
"… loyal"	(… loyal)
"… disciplined"	(… disciplineret)
"… obedient"	(… lydig)
"… competitive"	(… konkurrencevillig)
"… connective"	(… netværksskabende)
"… reputable"	(… velrenommeret)
"… risk-taking"	(… risikovillig)
"… practical"	(… praktisk)
"… unselfish"	(… uselvisk)
"… respected"	(… respekteret)
"… experimenting"	(… eksperimenterende)
"… productive"	(… produktiv)
"… convincing"	(… overbevisende)
"… tolerant"	(… tolerant)
"… dutiful"	(… pligtopfyldende)
"… innovative"	(… nyskabende)

*In 2016, respondents were asked to use a 1–4 scale

Appendix 2

Qualifying concepts of future officers. Overall ranking and mean scores (standard deviations in parenthesis) and differences of mean [standard errors in brackets]. Cadets enrolled on the basis of their civilian bachelor's degree 2016–2018.

Ranking	Qualifying concept (moral mode)	Mean (SD)	Difference [SE]
1	Loyal (domestic)	0.91 (0.15)	0.00 [0.01]
2	Holistic (project)	0.91 (0.15)	0.01 [0.01]
3	Dutiful (domestic)	0.90 (0.15)	0.01 [0.01]+
4	Impactful (opinion)	0.89 (0.16)	0.00 [0.01]
5	Convincing (opinion)	0.88 (0.17)	0.00 [0.01]
6	Disciplined (subordination)	0.88 (0.16)	0.00 [0.01]
7	Reliable (industrial)	0.88 (0.15)	0.01 [0.01]
8	Respected (domestic)	0.87 (0.18)	0.01 [0.01]
9	Strong-willed (execution)	0.87 (0.18)	0.01 [0.01]
10	Structured (industrial)	0.86 (0.18)	0.05 [0.02]**
11	Just (civic)	0.81 (0.24)	0.00 [0.02]
12	Passionate (sacrifice)	0.81 (0.19)	0.00 [0.01]
13	Resilient (execution)	0.81 (0.2)	0.01 [0.01]
14	Productive (industrial)	0.80 (0.18)	0.00 [0.01]
15	Flexible (project)	0.80 (0.2)	0.01 [0.02]
16	Unselfish (sacrifice)	0.79 (0.22)	0.02 [0.02]+
17	Practical (execution)	0.76 (0.2)	0.05 [0.02]**
18	Obedient (subordination)	0.72 (0.2)	0.01 [0.02]
19	Tolerant (subordination)	0.71 (0.24)	0.02 [0.02]
20	Challenging (inspiration)	0.70 (0.22)	0.01 [0.02]
21	Solidary (civic)	0.68 (0.25)	0.01 [0.02]
22	Connective (project)	0.68 (0.25)	0.02 [0.02]
23	Risk-taking (market)	0.66 (0.21)	0.01 [0.02]
24	Reputable (opinion)	0.65 (0.26)	0.01 [0.02]
25	Caring (sacrifice)	0.64 (0.25)	0.03 [0.02]*
26	Innovative (inspiration)	0.60 (0.24)	0.00 [0.02]
27	Opportunistic (market)	0.60 (0.26)	0.01 [0.02]
28	Competitive (market)	0.58 (0.25)	0.02 [0.02]
29	Equalizing (civic)	0.57 (0.28)	0.03 [0.02]+
30	Experimenting (inspiration)	0.54 (0.23)	

T test of differences of means
+: $p < 0.10$; *: $p < 0.05$; **: $p < 0.01$

Appendix 3

Qualifying concepts of future officers by service branch. Service specific ranking and mean scores (standard deviations in parenthesis).
Cadets enrolled based on their civilian bachelor's degree 2016–2018.

Qualifying concept (moral mode)	Army (reference)		Air force		Navy	
		Mean (*SD*)		Mean (*SD*)		Mean (*SD*)
Loyal (domestic)	1	0.91 (0.15)	5	0.91 (0.16)	1	0.93 (0.13)
Holistic (project)	2	0.90 (0.17)	2	0.94 (0.11)+	3	0.91 (0.14)
Dutiful (domestic)	8	0.87 (0.17)	1	0.94 (0.11)**	2	0.92 (0.14)*
Impactful (opinion)	3	0.90 (0.15)	9	0.88 (0.16)	8	0.87 (0.15)
Convincing (opinion)	5	0.88 (0.17)	4	0.91 (0.14)	7	0.87 (0.19)
Disciplined (subordination)	7	0.88 (0.16)	8	0.89 (0.15)	6	0.88 (0.16)
Reliable (industrial)	6	0.88 (0.16)	11	0.84 (0.17)+	4	0.90 (0.14)
Respected (domestic)	4	0.89 (0.17)	6	0.90 (0.14)	10	0.85 (0.2)
Strong-willed (execution)	9	0.87 (0.18)	7	0.89 (0.17)	9	0.86 (0.19)
Structured (industrial)	10	0.85 (0.2)	3	0.93 (0.13)**	11	0.84 (0.19)
Just (civic)	15	0.76 (0.27)	14	0.81 (0.22)	5	0.89 (0.2)***
Passionate (sacrifice)	11	0.82 (0.19)	16	0.79 (0.22)	16	0.80 (0.19)
Resilient (execution)	12	0.79 (0.2)	13	0.83 (0.19)	14	0.81 (0.19)
Productive (industrial)	14	0.76 (0.19)	10	0.87 (0.16)***	13	0.81 (0.17)*
Flexible (project)	17	0.75 (0.21)	12	0.83 (0.16)*	12	0.84 (0.18)**
Unselfish (sacrifice)	13	0.78 (0.23)	15	0.79 (0.2)	15	0.81 (0.22)
Practical (execution)	16	0.75 (0.21)	17	0.77 (0.21)	17	0.77 (0.2)
Obedient (subordination)	18	0.70 (0.21)	20	0.72 (0.21)	20	0.74 (0.19 +
Tolerant (subordination)	21	0.67 (0.25)	18	0.74 (0.22) +	18	0.76 (0.22)**
Challenging (inspiration)	19	0.68 (0.23)	23	0.68 (0.22)	22	0.72 (0.22)
Solidary (civic)	22	0.65 (0.25)	21	0.71 (0.26) +	21	0.72 (0.24)**
Connective (project)	25	0.61 (0.26)	19	0.73 (0.25)**	19	0.75 (0.22)***
Risk-taking (market)	20	0.67 (0.21)	26	0.64 (0.21)	25	0.65 (0.21)
Reputable (opinion)	24	0.62 (0.27)	24	0.67 (0.23)	23	0.67 (0.25) +
Caring (sacrifice)	23	0.62 (0.26)	25	0.66 (0.25)	26	0.65 (0.25)
Innovative (inspiration)	28	0.54 (0.24)	27	0.63 (0.21)+	24	0.67 (0.23)***
Opportunistic (market)	27	0.57 (0.27)	22	0.69 (0.23)**	28	0.61 (0.26)
Competitive (market)	26	0.61 (0.25)	29	0.58 (0.26)	29	0.56 (0.25)
Equalizing (civic)	29	0.52 (0.28)	28	0.6 (0.29)	27	0.62 (0.28)**

(continued)

(continued)

Qualifying concept (moral mode)	Army (reference)		Air force		Navy	
		Mean (*SD*)		Mean (*SD*)		Mean (*SD*)
Experimenting (inspiration)	30	0.52 (0.24)	30	0.57 (0.22)	30	0.55 (0.23)

OLS-regression with Army mean as reference category and controlled for gender and age
+: $p < 0.10$; *: $p < 0.05$; **: $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

References

Andersen, L. B., Jørgensen, T. B., Kjeldsen, A. M., Pedersen, L. H., & Vrangbæk, K. (2013). Public service motivation and public values: Conceptual and empirical relationships. *American Review of Public Administration, 36*(1), 126–136.

Augé, A. (2019, June 17–19). *The graduated officer of the French Army: A marginal military identity*. Paper presented at the 2019 ERGOMAS conference in Lisbon, Portugal.

Boltanski, L. (2012). *Love and justice as competences*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Boltanski, L., & Chiapello, E. (2007). *The new spirit of capitalism* (G. Elliott, Trans.). [First published as *Le nouvel spirit du capitalisme*, Editions Gallimard 1999] London, UK: Verso.

Boltanski, L., & Thévenot, L. (1999). The sociology of critical capacity. *European Journal of Social Theory, 2*(3), 359–377.

Brænder, M., & Andersen, L. B. (2014) Soldier and civilian motivation—Different or similar? A comparison of public service motivation for civilians and military personnel. In *Political and Military Sociology—An Annual Review* (pp. 1–28).

Brænder, M., & Holsting, V. S. (2017a, June). *New model army conservatism: Post-materialist values and military branch affiliation*. Paper presented at the ERGOMAS biannual conference, Athens.

Brænder, M., & Holsting, V. S. (2017b, August). *Like attracts like: Military values and branch affiliation of cadets after the reform*. Paper presented at ASA annual conference, Montréal.

Buhl, L., & Holsting, V. S., & Madsen, K. B. (2004). *Undersøgelsesrapport. Forsvaret i forandring— FOKUS på kompetenceudvikling* [Research report. The armed forces in transition: FOCUS on competency]. Internal report. Marts.

Bungay, S. (2011). *Handlingens kunst: strategisk handling gennem selvledelse [The art of action]*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal Business.

Camilleri, E. (2007). Antecedents affecting public service motivation. *Personnel Review, 26*(3), 356–377.

Defence Command. (1976). FORPUBS [Administrative regulations regarding Defence Competence development and appraisal system] FKOBST.P.405-3 1.

Defence Command. (2007). *Administrative bestemmelser vedr. Forsvarets Kompetenceudviklings- og bedømmelsessystem* (FOKUS) [Administrative regulations regarding Defence Competence development and appraisal system] FPTBST 405-5. 21. MARTS. Copenhagen: Defence Command.

Defence Command. (2008). *Forsvarets Ledelsesgrundlag* [Defence leadership code] FKO DIR UV. 121-5. Copenhagen: Defence Command.

Dreyfus, S. E. (2004). The five-stage model of adult skill acquisition. *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 24*(3), 177–181.

Dreyfus, H. L., & Dreyfus, S. E. (1986). *Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Elias, N. (1950). Studies in the genesis of the naval profession. *British Journal of Sociology, 1*(4), 291–309.

Halfhill, T. R., Nielsen, T. M, & Sundstrom, E. (2008). The ASA framework. A field study of group personality composition and group performance in military action teams. *Small Group Research, 39*(5), 616–635.

Holsting, V. S. (2016, September). *The transformation of professional values in military officership. In the tension between professional and political criteria of quality*. Paper presented at the RC01/ISA conference transformations of the Military profession, Rio de Janeiro.

Holsting, V. S. (2017a). *Militært chefvirke: Kritik og retfærdiggørelse mellem politik og profession* [Military Commandship: Criticism and justification between politics and profession]. PhD thesis, Copenhagen Business School.

Holsting, V. S. (2017b). *Handlingsregimer i officersvirket i følge studerende på MMS* [Modes of action in officership according to MMS students] (in press). Copenhagen, DK: Royal Danish Defence College.

Holsting, V. S., & Damkjer, A. (2007). *Udvikling af nyt ledelsesgrundlag for Forsvaret. Analyse af fokus- og referencegrupper* [Development of a new leadership codex for the Armed Forces. Analysis of focus and reference groups]. Internal report.

Janowitz, M. (1957). Military elites and the study of war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1*(1), 9–18.

Jansen, M. M., Brænder, M., & Moelker, R. (2019). What sets the officer apart? Dutch and Danish educational reforms leading to the habitus of the thinking soldier. In W. Klinkert, M. Bollen, M. Jansen, H. de Jong, E.-H. Kramer, & L. Vos (Eds.), *NL ARMS Netherlands annual review of Military studies* (pp. 337–353). The Hague: Asser Press.

Kristof, A. L. (1996). Person–organization fit: An integrative review of its conceptualizations, measurement, and implications. *Personnel Psychology, 49*(1), 1–49.

Kristof-Brown, A. L., Ryan, D. Z., & Johnson, E. C. (2005). Consequences of individuals' fit at work: A meta-analysis of person–job, person–organization, person–group, and person–supervisor fit. *Personnel Psychology, 58*(2), 281–342.

Leisink, P., & Steijn, B. (2008). Recruitment, attraction, and selection. In J. L. Perry & A. Hondeghem (Eds.), *Motivation in public management: The call of public service* (pp. 118–133). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ministry of Defence. (2012). Danish Defence Agreement 2013–2017 (Overall description in English). Retrieved from https://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/DanishDefenceAgreement2013-2017.aspx.

Moskos, C. (1977). From institution to occupation: Trends in military organization. *Armed Forces & Society, 4*(1), 41–50.

Moskos, C. (2000). Toward a postmodern military. The United States as a paradigm. In C. Moskos, D. R. Segal, & J. A. Williams (Eds.), *The postmodern military: Armed forces after the Cold War* (pp. 14–31). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nørgaard, K., & Holsting, V. S. (2006). *International operations in FOKUS*. Copenhagen, DK: Royal Danish Defence College.

Schneider, B. (1983). Interactional psychology and organizational behavior. *Research in Organizational Behavior, 5,* 1–31.

Segal, D. R. (1986). Measuring the institutional/occupational change thesis. *Armed Forces & Society, 12*(3), 351–376.

Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., DeVinney, L. C., Star, S. A., Williams Jr, R. M. (1949). *The American soldier*, Vol. I: *Adjustment during army life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Taylor, J. K., Clerkin, R. M., Ngaruiya, K. M., & Knox Velez, A.-L. (2015). An exploratory study of public service motivation and the institutional–occupational model of the military. *Armed Forces & Society, 41*(1), 142–162.

Boltanski L., & Thévenot, L. (2006). *On justification, economies of worth* (C. Porter, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

von Clausewitz, C. (1986). *Om Krig [On war]*. Copenhagen, DK: Rhodos. Danish translation.

Williams, J. A. (2008). The military and society. Beyond the postmodern era. I. *Orbis, 52*(2), 199–216.

Wright, B. E., & Christensen, R. K. (2010). Public service motivation: A test of the job attraction-selection-attrition. *International Public Management Journal, 13*(2), 155–176.

Yammarino, F. J., Spangler, W. D., & Bass, B. M. (1993). Transformational leadership and performance: A longitudinal investigation. *Leadership Quarterly, 4*(1), 81–102.

Chapter 12
Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion: Revising the Concept of Military Professionalism in the Canadian Armed Forces

Sara Greco and Stéfanie von Hlatky

Abstract In this chapter, we review how the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) conceptualizes military professionalism with an equity, diversity, and inclusion lens. We ask how the can CAF redefine military professionalism based on changing social and cultural norms. By examining the CAF's *Duty with Honour* manual, which defines Canada's military professionalism, we argue that diversity considerations are underdeveloped. We then turn to the academic and applied literature on military, professionalism to identify opportunities for conceptual and doctrinal adaptation as governments and armed forces embark on culture change. Based on our examination of changing social and cultural norms that have impacted the CAF, we stress the importance of updating common understandings of military professionalism, in theory, and amending the way it is taught.

Keywords Military professionalism · Canadian Armed Forces · Diversity

Introduction

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is often praised for its military professionalism by its leaders in public statements. On August 31, 2019, as the CAF marked the conclusion of its United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Mali, Lieutenant-General Rouleau, Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, noted that "the professionalism of Canadian Armed Forces members was on display throughout the past year in Mali." Similarly, Colonel Travis Morehen, Commander of Task Force Mali, stated that "through outstanding professionalism and warrior spirit, they have proven themselves as the foundation upon which our military's reputation for excellence stands" (Canadian Armed Forces, 2019). At the same time, concepts linked to military professionalism and the idea of a "warrior spirit" have been shaken in the

S. Greco (✉) · S. von Hlatky
Queen's University, 99 University Ave, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada
e-mail: sara.greco@queensu.ca

S. von Hlatky
e-mail: svh@queensu.ca

last five years by an attempt to change the CAF's organizational culture to be more reflective of Canadian society, with a particular emphasis on gender integration.

The goal of this chapter is to offer a critical assessment of the CAF's conception of military professionalism, as greater attention is paid to equity, diversity, and inclusion. In asking how military professionalism adapts to changing social and cultural norms, we turn to CAF's concept of professionalism in *Duty with Honour*. While the document does not currently grapple with diversity considerations, we identify opportunities for conceptual and doctrinal adaptation, as the government and armed forces embark on cultural and organizational change. Our analysis draws on the academic and applied literature on military professionalism to better understand the changing social and cultural norms impacting the CAF.

Our research spotlights equity, diversity, and inclusivity as key features of a professional military. Taken together, these concepts pushback on the tendency for less represented populations (such a women) to assimilate into the CAF's existing (masculine) culture. Equity is the steppingstone to diversity and diversity to inclusivity. In order for the Canadian population—in all its variabilities—to be represented in its armed forces, all individuals should have the same unfettered opportunities to serve. But just because every trade is open to everyone does not mean all groups are represented in the same proportions or included to the same extent. Case in point: female representation in the CAF after all trades were open to them after 2000. In turn, diversity is a necessary steppingstone to inclusivity. In seeking diversity in the CAF, the aim is to have an armed force that reflects the unique identities that make up Canada's fabric, including age, culture, gender, and religion. Diversity is about numbers and measurement: tracking the composition of members by these innate characteristics (Belanger 2018, p. 34). Looking beyond numbers is where inclusivity fits in. In itself, inclusivity is about "fit" and belonging. Just because every Canadian has the same opportunities vis-à-vis the CAF (equity) despite their differences (diversity), does not mean they will feel a sense of belonging (inclusivity) while serving. Military culture has historically accepted the hyper-masculine male, but been resistant to non-conforming masculinities and femininities. As the CAF achieves more equity and diversity, more effort will need to be made to ensure inclusivity. Military professionalism is a strategic concept that can help teach and instill inclusivity, which will in turn, help maintain equity and diversity.

The CAF's Conception of Military Professionalism

Military professionalism is meant to express the higher standard that armed forces are held to. In Canada, it can be read as a commitment from CAF members to Canadian society. Guidance on military professionalism can be found in doctrine, which is meant to be the military's frame of reference.

The CAF unpacks the philosophy and practice of military professionalism in its 2003 publication, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. As this document is currently under review, the time is ripe for unpacking the core principles

that have guided the CAF for over fifteen years. *Duty with Honour* defines military professionalism as follows:

> The fundamental purpose of the Canadian profession of arms is the ordered, lawful application of military force pursuant to governmental direction. This simple fact defines an extraordinary relationship of trust among the people of Canada, the Canadian Forces as an institution and those members of the Forces to have accepted the "unlimited liability" inherent in the profession of arms (2003, p. 4).

To demonstrate professionalism, CAF members must embrace the military ethos, maintain employment requirements, pursue the highest standards of expertise, and accept commitments and responsibilities, including the risk of harm. These are clear operational requirements that military personnel must commit to and a mutual obligation to their fellow personnel.

The *Duty with Honour* manual is an 82-page document that comprehensively lays out the meaning of military professionalism and how it is to be actualized in the CAF. Reading the manual for what it excludes is just as important as examining its contents. This approach helps us to understand where the CAF can establish a link between military professionalism and equity, diversity, and inclusion. For example, other CAF manuals include examples and case studies. Incorporating those into a new version of *Duty with Honour*, may help tie the concept of military professionalism to diversity more concretely. Using a descriptive analysis and close reading of the manual, we summarize its core inclusions and exclusions below.

Duty with Honour outlines the four attributes of the profession of arms, which include responsibility, expertise, and identity, with the military ethos connecting these three characteristics. Each of the four attributes stresses the key features that unite all CAF members, which, we argue, could theoretically promote greater inclusivity. Acting responsibly involves self-accountability and upholding the integrity and reputation of the military. For leaders, responsibility goes a step further and requires them to ensure the proper conduct and well-being of subordinates (Lynch 2015). CAF members are required to maintain the skills necessary for them to perform their occupations and to continuously improve their professional judgment through experience. As the nature of their occupations change and become more complex, CAF members are required to expand their expertise beyond strict military competencies and to take on more responsibility in cultivating their own professionalism instead of having it imparted by a leader. The idea of self-accountability discussed in *Duty with Honour* reinforces the need for policies and training on professionalism that are CAF-wide and not just focused at the leadership levels. Perhaps most significant for our purposes, *Duty with Honour* reinforces the collective identity of all CAF members that comes from the unique attributes of their profession: voluntary service, unlimited liability, and service before self. Tying this conception to Canadian values, what unifies CAF members is also the country they serve, where bilingualism and multiculturalism are enshrined in the *Constitution Act* and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. When it comes to a collective identity and one that reflects the society it serves, the manual indirectly speaks to diversity. Doing so more directly can help link professional service with the upholding of Canadian values on equity, diversity, and inclusion.

How does one reconcile military values with societal values so that they keep pace with one another? The vocational ethic of the military ethos attempts to build that bridge. To assume the military ethos is to accept unlimited liability and the fighting spirit, and to practice discipline and teamwork. In terms of Canadian values, CAF members are required to respect the dignity of all people. Based on a descriptive content analysis of the document, we find that there is no explicit mention of concepts such as equity, diversity, and inclusion. Canadian military values encompass the following responsibilities: duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage. On the one hand, *Duty with Honour* stresses the CAF as a unified collective that differs from the rest of Canada on the basis of service and, on the other, it highlights the CAF as an extension of society. There is a fundamental tension there because it has proven difficult to reconcile the military's uniformity with the requirement that it reflect the population it serves. A case and point is the under-representation of women and visible minorities in the armed forces. As Canadian society changes, how is the CAF meant to adapt and at what kind of expected pace? The manual both indicates that core Canadian values should unify CAF members and highlights the CAF as a distinct entity from the rest of Canadian society, which seems a bit conflicting. Further delving into the similarities and differences between the civilian and military spheres offers a way to clarify this point and to showcase diversity as one of the unifiers.

Duty with Honour points out that technological changes or shifts in the international environment may alter where, how, and with whom the CAF operates. What is missing, however, is a discussion about changes to the composition of the CAF itself. The document assumes operational adaptation, but demographic shifts within the military also require organizational and cultural change, as reflected in the CAF Diversity Strategy, which stresses inclusion, not just greater representation of women, visible minorities, and Indigenous people. Since 2000, women have had every CAF trade open to them and yet the manual is devoid of any discussion about changes to the CAF's composition in terms of diversity. The military has also changed its policies toward LGBTQ2S members and has launched a series of initiatives to increase the diversity of the armed forces, by seeking out more women, visible minorities, and Indigenous members. The 2017 Diversity Strategy is a case in point. It is important to help solidify these demographic shifts, by ensuring they are ubiquitous across CAF documents and policies, including the *Duty with Honour* manual.

In reviewing how the CAF has defined military professionalism in *Duty with Honour*, we see that it lacks specific guidance on equity, diversity, and inclusion, where individual members are exposed to a new narrative about the armed forces, but not necessarily equipped with the tools to foster an inclusive environment. The literature we highlight in the following section helps us understand the ways in which CAF professionalism can be updated to reflect evolving cultural and social norms, as well as changing demographics. Through our reading of *Duty with Honour*, we arrive at three ways the manual can be updated to improve military professionalism within the CAF: update more than just the manual, ensure consistency, and address all service levels, and the literature we present in the following section reinforces these policy prescriptions.

Ways of Improving Military Professionalism

By surveying the academic and applied literature on military professionalism in light of our previous discussion on the CAF's military ethos, our aim is to articulate some policy prescriptions. Ensuring military professionalism reflects a common standard of equity, diversity, and inclusion will require reconciling the individual and collective aspects of military service. First, updating the mandate and concept of military professionalism is not sufficient to remove inequality and achieve inclusivity. The CAF's journey of cultural change must be comprehensive, so that there is coherence across military documents and guidance. Inconsistency risks undermining the messages the CAF is promoting on diversity, which is why revising its manual on military professionalism, *Duty with Honour,* is imperative. Second, in addition to ensuring a consistent message is disseminated, the CAF needs to consider how new guidance will be taught. The CAF undertook a curriculum review and mandated that all of its members take the online Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+) training, with the specific intent of identifying gaps, whether one looks at military education at the Royal Military College, the Staff College, or the Canadian Forces College. At critical junctures in service members' professional military education journey, core messages on equity, diversity, and inclusion need to be reinforced. Third, our chapter highlights the utility of self-accountability, the concept by which an individual serves by example, cultivating their own sense of leadership, even if not serving in a leadership position.

The literature on leadership points to important shortcomings when it comes to addressing equity, diversity, and inclusion (Eagerly and Johannessen-Schmidt 2001). For example, this literature highlights leadership barriers faced by women and other under-represented groups. Another important point is that leadership styles differ between men and women, yet the military tends to favour leadership traits that are traditionally associated with male attributes (Eagerly and Johannessen-Schmidt 2001). The literature on leadership also urges us to broaden conceptions of diversity, to include differences based on sex, gender, ethnicity, culture, and religion (Eagerly and Johannessen-Schmidt 2001). Since barriers to equal and inclusive participation run deep, connecting the dots between diversity and professionalism is not enough. This kind of intersectional diversity should be built into the composition of leadership teams. Given the past discriminatory practices of the CAF, for example, like barring women from accessing certain combat trades until the 1980s, military leadership tends not to be that diverse, which creates a challenge for the application of initiatives like the Diversity Strategy. For example, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, and all service commanders are all male with similar professional backgrounds (combat arms). The only three-star female general is serving abroad, as the Commandant of the NATO Defence College. These remaining gaps may help explain why the CAF has "not yet gone beyond the rhetoric" (Belanger 2018).

Going beyond the issue of representation, which has stressed the increased presence of under-represented groups, we should also consider barriers to full inclusion,

which translates into meaningful participation in the organization. Here, the literature on unconscious bias, privilege, and meritocracy is particularly helpful (Belanger 2018). As Belanger notes in her article (2018), the open acknowledgment of these impediments can lead to an increasingly diverse CAF. But for Belanger, these strategies can add diversity but cannot be sustainable unless individuals feel included: "diversity is about counting numbers. Inclusion is about making numbers count" (Belanger 2018, p. 32). In the Deschamps report, the identification of a culture that is "hostile" to women is an example of how the mere presence of women is distinct from genuine inclusion and acceptance. The contrast Belanger highlights between diversity and inclusion is a useful tool for the CAF to promote sustainable change to its composition. The CAF does provide diversity resources for leaders in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (2007), but the message this literature sends is that the CAF needs to push beyond diversity to achieve inclusion. This doctrine defines leadership as "directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one's intent or a shared purpose" and implies top-down relationship (Harding 2016, p. 63). Why rely solely on leaders to educate other service members on the importance of diversity on professionalism? Offering all soldiers the tools to serve as military professionals in ways that uphold the key values on diversity, remains an underutilized strategy.

Because of how conceptions of leadership are socially constructed through organizational culture and routine practices, gender stereotyping and bias are ubiquitous in assessments of leadership (Drolet 2017). It is also the case that the barrier's women face to acclimating into the CAF surpass standard requirements, "ranging from restricted, capped enrollment to the limited occupation of male-dominated roles" (McCristall and Baggaley 2017, p. 121). McCristall and Baggaley note that as a result of these barriers, women face greater challenges when it comes to career advancement (2019, p. 112). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that, even when men and women engage in equivalent leadership behaviors, women are assessed as less effective performers (Drolet 2017). The social and organizational psychology literature has long debunked the myth that sex differences impact leader effectiveness (Hollander 1992; Eagly et al. 1995; Powell 1998). Observer bias and stereotyped expectations can lead to men being evaluated more favorably than women (Bass 1990; Eagly and Wood 2016, p. 3), which can impact the validity of assessments of current CAF policies and practices vis-à-vis military professionalism. A meta-analysis conducted by Eagly et al. (1995) does, however, show that variations in performance between men and women exist. As these researchers discovered, this variation is in large part due to the way the leader roles were defined. All this to say, instilling in leaders the importance of inclusivity at the team level is not enough. Leadership roles need to also be redefined in a way that will encourage diverse leaders. That means the CAF philosophy of leadership should also be revisited so that there is more coherence and consistency in military guidance, throughout the ranks and at different levels of responsibility. Expanding leadership models to be inclusive of both feminine and masculine traits may help increase the representation of women in positions of leadership.

Bringing nuance to the preceding discussion, the work of Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt links social context to leadership behavior. Their argument runs orthogonal to the claim that men and women have different leadership styles and instead "suggests some tentative generalizations about the increased similarity of men and women who are in the same organizational role" (Eagerly and Johannessen-Schmidt 2001, p. 784). This highlights the power of institutional socialization, especially in a context where members of the organization have been indoctrinated since basic training, with implications for how military professionalism is defined and replicated within an organizational setting (Bradley and Tymchuk 2016).

Over the past few decades, the CAF has seen a shift in its composition, which reflects changes in policies, as well as an increasingly diverse recruitment pool. Age is another important variable of diversity. The CAF has seen the youth recruitment base shrink; at the same time, it has made an effort to bring in older and more qualified applicants (Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute 2005, p. xvi). According to Fetterly, diminished funding for human resource programs negatively affect youth recruitment and retention, by creating "a growing disenchantment in younger military personnel, for whom changes or updates to training do not keep up with evolving requirements in military occupations" (2018, pp. 1–2). Assuming an older force is a more professional one is problematic, particularly since the connection between professionalism and diversity is relatively new. Even though more military personnel are older and, therefore, tend to be more educated and married with children, the suggestion that "they therefore expect and demand that their experience, expertise, and professionalism be respected" breeds organizational conservatism (Capstick 2000). Pressure to conform can make it difficult for personnel to speak up, which perpetuates the mainstream culture and stalls adaptation and organizational change. There is also evidence that men and women become desensitized to a military culture that maintains a masculine heterosexual warrior identity, making the barriers to change even more rigid (Taber 2009, p. 28; Belanger 2018, p. 32).

To that end, there are many scholars who point out that the group culture in the CAF is still hyper-masculine and resistant to change (Taber 2009; Lane 2017; Poulin et al. 2018; Johnstone and Momani 2019). Indeed, as Johnstone and Momani note, the military tends to be slow to change because it prioritizes stability (2019, p. 507). Encouraging personnel "to take responsibility for the unit's reputation" as a way to promote professionalism can only happen if the overarching culture is permissive of such professional adaptation (Bradley and Tymchuk 2016, p. 100). Therefore, working to break the inaccurate association between change and stability is an important step to creating a diverse force.

Related to inconsistencies in messaging, we ought to also consider the relationship between the military and Canadian society. The CAF as a profession "is expected to adhere to a military ethos reflecting society's values and to remain subordinate to the civil authority" (*Duty with Honour* 2003, p. 7). At the same time, the military profession is known for being distinct and remaining "isolated from society" (Soeters 2006, p. 237; Johnstone and Momani 2019, p. 507).

In sum, improving military professionalism in the CAF requires reconciling individual and collective approaches to promoting equity, diversity, and inclusion. This kind of change necessitates a comprehensive review of doctrine and training approaches within the CAF. Updating the CAF's *Duty with Honour* manual is a step in the right direction, but it will ring hollow if service members are exposed to conflicting messages at different stages of their military career cycle. Or, if these messages about diversity are not reinforced consistently over time. In the following section, we outline some of the changing social and cultural norms that have impacted the CAF.

Changing Social and Cultural Norms

Because this chapter is about how the CAF can adapt to changing social and cultural norms, some historical background is in order. Canada pioneered the inclusion of women in the military. Indeed, the CAF's equal employment journey ramped up in 1970, with the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. Several of the Commission's recommendations were specifically aimed at the CAF (Department of National Defence 2014) but the military was initially resistant to change. From 1979 to 1985, the Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles (SWINTER) project was designed to examine the question of women's access to restricted military roles. Then, in the mid-1980s, the Combat Related Employment for Women trials were introduced to assess women's suitability for combat roles.

In the Charter Task Force Final Report, tabled in 1986, successful integration was linked to leadership and the broader culture:

> Evidence from trials and experience has shown that a common problem in gender integration has been the lack of preparedness of both leaders and subordinates to adapt to mixed-gender units. Trial results indicate that problems encountered for the first time by participants included fraternization, unequal treatment, uncertainty as to how to deal with superiors or subordinates of the opposite sex, and negative attitudes within the majority. A consistent view was the firm policy direction, training for leadership in mixed-gender units, and indoctrination training for all members would have assisted participants personally and would have alleviated most of the problems (Women in the Canadian Forces 1986, p. 34).

In 1989, all military occupations were opened to women, with the exception of submarine service, which was later opened in 2000, an anticlimactic turn of events following the various studies and trials that were designed to stall gender integration in the CAF.

Then, a series of sexual misconduct scandals rocked the CAF in the 1990s and 2000s. This prompted a renewed discussion of professional barriers to women in the forces (von Hlatky 2015). Canada was not alone in this struggle. From the United States to Australia, armed forces were dealing with similar scandals and the cause of sexual misconduct increasingly became linked with the prevailing military culture, which was characterized as exclusionary and masculine. The terms "militarized masculinity" and "toxic masculinity" came to define this kind of social and professional

environment, where women and LGBTQ2S service members were essentially given the choice to assimilate or leave.

In Canada, the CAF only acknowledged that culture was part of the problem after former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps completed her external review of the CAF in 2015 (Deschamps 2015). After this turning point, an emphasis on increasing the recruitment of women and other under-represented groups became a priority. The CAF even set out to increase the representation of women to 25%, a ten percentage point increase from when the commitment was made in 2016. This emphasis on recruitment rests on the "critical mass" argument, which suggests that a minimal threshold of about 20% is important for cultural change to take place (Childs and Krook 2008). Once 25% of the CAF population is women, the expectation is that gender integration, as opposed to women simply assimilating into the prevailing military culture, will occur.

There is evidence to suggest that this has worked elsewhere. As one of the first countries to remove all professional barriers to women in the military, with all trades being open by 1985, Norway did not see significant improvement in numbers until it started to pursue gender-balancing policies more aggressively. While the universal draft is one example, co-ed barracks was another measure adopted to improve gender dynamics within the armed forces. According to Norwegian studies, having mixed sleeping quarters has decreased incidents of sexual harassments and improved unit cohesion (Michaels 2016).

By comparison, in Australia, the approach has focused on organizational reform, the culmination of a long investigation and cultural change program called Pathway to Change (Department of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia 2008). The original aspect of this reform process is that its leadership structure combines both civilian and military elements. The Australian Chief of Army at the time, Lieutenant General David Morrison and the Sex Discrimination Officer from the Human Rights Commission, Elizabeth Broderick, embarked on a partnership to promote the plan, both at home and abroad (Morris 2014). In Australia, the policy approach has been an extensive collection of data, through thousands of interviews, followed by a public acknowledgment that the problem was both internal to the armed forces and cultural.

Since the Deschamps report, the CAF has taken steps to dismantle this masculine culture, including through the adoption of a GBA+ training across the forces. The commitment to GBA+ in the CAF was reinforced in Canada's 2018 *Strong, Secure, Engaged* defence policy (Johnstone and Momani 2019, p. 501). Based on a mixed-method approach—including document analysis, interviews, focus groups, participant observation, and surveys—Johnstone and Momani suggested that the implementation of GBA+ in the CAF will lead to "subtle and slow" change because the approach is being adopted into existing cultures (2019, p. 502). They stress the importance of borrowing from sociological institutionalism and "going micro" to study the ideas, culture, norms, and socialization within organizations (Johnstone and Momani 2019, p. 505). For the purposes of this chapter, Johnstone and Momami's work echoes one of our key recommendations: the CAF cannot just amend the concept of military professionalism to force a more inclusive mindset across the organization. Their work also advances learning over adaptation as the better strategy to achieve

organizational change, as the former requires that the organization re-evaluate its underlying values, while the latter forces the modifications to fit within the existing institutional culture (Johnstone and Momani 2019, p. 507).

The CAF's updated uniform policy can be cited as another recent example of how the status quo is being displaced by the recognition and accommodation of gender-based differences. In April 2019, the CAF announced to all military personnel an update that women would now be allowed to wear their hair in a ponytail, have the option not to wear nylons, and have the choice to wear flat shoes when wearing a skirt (Pugliese 2019). In giving CAF members more personal freedom over their appearance, the aim is to increase recruitment and better reflect Canada's social makeup. Allowing and accepting diversity is an important step toward equity and inclusion. Adjustments to increase the number of recruits has also meant updates to the CAF's tattoo policy. In August 2019, the CAF announced that tattoos would only be prohibited on the face and scalp, with accommodations on religious and cultural grounds (Rehman 2019). It still maintains restrictions on tattoos connected to criminal activity, nudity, hatred, violence, discrimination, and harassment. Just like the updated uniform policy, the updated tattoo policy is also meant to allow the CAF to reflect what is mainstream in Canada, with the aim of attracting a more representative force. But as Davis notes, recruitment and retention are two separate challenges the CAF faces, particularly vis-à-vis women (1997). Her message in 1997 rings true over two decades later: "the continuous exit of women from male-dominated environments at a higher rate than their male counterparts is one indication of the failure to achieve full integration" (Davis 1997, p. 183).

Conclusion

This chapter has problematized the concept of military professionalism as the CAF attempts to embrace equity, diversity, and inclusion. What our analysis shows is that national armed forces, organizations that promote uniformity, will necessarily face growing pains as greater diversity is accommodated, forcing cultural change. The chapter has examined some of the causes of such change, from tribunals to sexual misconduct scandals, and has offered some comparisons with like-minded countries that have undergone similar processes of cultural change within their armed forces. What seems clear is that questions of equity, diversity, and inclusion are often addressed through discrete policy solutions, targeting certain phases of the military career cycle (like recruitment) but not others. This makes it difficult to achieve comprehensive and thorough organizational change. Another tension that we have identified in this chapter is the challenge of reconciling military values with societal values. Because the military is often presented as a unique organization, there is a certain level of rigidity to how it has defined its ethos and conception of military professionalism. As the CAF reworks its doctrine, training, and education practices to make room for equity, diversity, and inclusion, finding the right balance

between military requirements and the role the armed forces play within society will be essential.

References

Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass and Stogdill's handbook of leadership theory, research, and managerial applications*. New York: Collier Macmillan.

Belanger, N. (2018). "Inclusive leadership" If we built it will they come? *Canadian Military Journal, 19*(1), 32–39. https://ocul-qu.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01OCUL_QU/sk7he5/proquest2185818655.

Bradley, P., & Tymchuk, S. (2016). Managing ethical risk in the Canadian Armed Forces. In D. Lagacé-Roy & S. A. H. Bélanger (Eds.), *Military operations and the mind: War ethics and soldiers' well-being* (pp. 71–119). Montréal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. (2005). *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual foundations* (NDID A-PA-005-000/AP-004). Retrieved from http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca.

Canadian Armed Forces. (2019). Canadian Armed Forces conclude peacekeeping mission in Mali [Press release]. *Skies Magazine*. Retrieved from https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/canadian-armed-forces-conclude-peacekeeping-mission-in-mali/.

Capstick, M. D. (2000). Command and leadership in other people's wars. In C. McCann & R. Pigeau (Eds.), *The human in command: Exploring the modern military experience* (pp. 83–92). New York, NY: Springer.

Childs, S., & Krook, M. L. (2008). Critical mass theory and women's political representation. *Political Studies, 56*(1), 725–736. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00712.x.

Davis, K. (1997). Understanding women's exit from the Canadian Forces: Implications for integration? In L. Weinstein & C. White (Eds.), *Wives and warriors: Women in the military in the United States and Canada* (pp. 179–199). Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey.

Department of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia. (2008). *Pathway to change—Evolving Defence culture*. Retrieved from http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/.

Department of National Defence. (2014). *Women in the Canadian Forces: Backgrounder*. www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=women-in-the-canadian-armed-forces/hie8w7rm.

Deschamps, M. (2015). *External review into sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces*. Retrieved from http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/caf-community-support-services-harassment/era-final-report-(april-20-2015)-eng.pdf.

Drolet, S. (2017). *In the blind spot of the CAF: Gender differences in leadership*. Canadian Forces College. Retrieved from https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/286/drolet.pdf.

Eagly, A. H., Karau, S. J., & Makhijani, M. G. (1995). Gender and the effectiveness of leaders: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin, 117*(1), 125–145. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.1.125.

Eagly, A. H., & Johannesen-Schmidt, M. C. (2001). The leadership styles of women and men. *Journal of Social Issues, 57*(4), 781–797. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00241.

Eagly, A. H. & Wood, W. (2016). *Social role theory. The Wiley Blackwell encyclopedia of gender and sexuality studies*. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118663219.wbegss183.

Fetterly, R. (2018). *The importance of people in defence,* pp. 1–7. Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Retrieved from https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/3737/attachments/original/1526337824/The_Importance_of_People_in_Defence.pdf?1526337824.

Harding, J. (2016). The foundations of inclusive leadership. *Canadian Military Journal, 16*(4), 62–67. https://ocul-qu.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01OCUL_QU/sk7he5/proquest1847455035.

Hollander, E. P. (1992). The essential interdependence of leadership and followership. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1*(2), 71–75. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.ep11509752.

Johnstone, R., & Momani, B. (2019). Organizational change in Canadian public institutions: The implementation of GBA+ in DND/CAF. *Canadian Public Administration, 62*(3), 500–519. https://doi.org/10.1111/capa.12338.

Lane, A. (2017). Special men: The gendered militarization of the Canadian Armed Forces. *International Journal, 72*(4), 463–483. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017741910.

Lynch, M. (2015). The 4 attributes of transformational leadership. *The Edvocate*. Retrieved from https://www.theedadvocate.org/the-4-attributes-of-transformational-leadership/.

McCristall, P., & Baggaley, K. (2017). The progression of a gendered military: A theoretical examination of gender inequality in the Canadian military. *Perspectives, 5*(1), 119–126. https://doi.org/10.3138/jmvfh.2017-0026.

Michaels, S. (2016). Soldiers blow up 5 myths about women in combat. *Mother Jones*. Retrieved from http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/12/female-officers-break-down-myths-about-women-at-war.

Morris, S. (2014). David Morrison breaking the brass ceiling in the ADF. *The Saturday Paper*. Retrieved from https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/defence/2014/12/13/david-morrison-breaking-the-brass-ceiling-the-adf/14183892001362.

Morrison, D. (2012). Chief of Army Lieutenant General David Morrison message about unacceptable behaviour. Youtube video, 03:06, posted by Australian Army HQ. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QaqpoeVgr8U.

Powell, G. N. (1998). *Women and men in management*. Newbury Park: Sage.

Poulin, C., Gouliquer, L., & McCutcheon, J. (2018). Violating gender norms in the Canadian military: The experiences of gay and lesbian soldiers. *Sexuality Research and Social Policy, 15*(1), 60–73. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13178-017-0304-y.

Pugliese, D. (2019). Bare legs, ponytails and flats now allowed for women as Canadian Forces updated dress regulations. *National Post*. Retrieved from https://nationalpost.com/news/bare-legs-ponytails-and-flats-now-allowed-for-women-as-canadian-forces-update-dress-regulations.

Rehman, M. (2019). CAF announces tattoo policy changes. *Canadian Military Family Magazine*. Retrieved from https://www.cmfmag.ca/policy/caf-announces-tattoo-policy-changes/.

Soeters, J. L. (2006). Organizational cultures in the military. In G. Carforio (Ed.), *Handbook of the sociology of the military* (pp. 251–272). New York, NY: Springer.

Taber, N. (2009). The profession of arms: Ideological codes and dominant narratives of gender in the Canadian military. *Atlantis, 34*(1), 27–36. https://journals.msvu.ca/index.php/atlantis/article/view/216/206.

Von Hlatky, S. (2015). The gender turn in Canadian military interventions. In F. O. Hampson & S. M. Saideman (Eds.), *Canada among nations* (pp. 161–176). Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation.

Women in the Canadian Forces. (1986). *Charter task force final report*, Part 3, 3. Ottawa: Department of National Defence.

Chapter 13
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the Military Profession

Check for updates

Krystal K. Hachey, Tamir Libel, and Zack Partington

Abstract Technological change has always affected the military profession. This chapter explores the impact of artificial intelligence, which seems poised to affect the military as a profession in profound ways. In particular, we review the construct of military professionalism, artificial intelligence, including its potential influence on the military, and offer a summary of the analytical framework developed by Snider and Watkins (2002). Finally, this review will also attempt to outline the directions for future research on AI and the military profession.

Keywords Artificial intelligence · Military profession · Military professionalism · Sociology of professions · Military change · War and technology · Military technology

Introduction

Technology has always been integral to warfare, from pointed sticks to precision guided munitions (Van Creveld 1991), but the advantage conferred by technology depends on how military command adapts to it and adopts it to force development and force employment (Van Creveld 1985). Artificial intelligence (AI) is the most recent technological addition to many militaries, which are examining the impact and potential use to stay ahead of their adversaries in the battlespace (ElMasry 2018; Scharre 2019). AI allows command systems to transmit and process more information faster than ever before, even if it cannot fully lift what Clausewitz called the

K. K. Hachey (✉) · Z. Partington
Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, 101 Colonel by Drive, Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2, Canada
e-mail: krystal.hachey@forces.gc.ca

Z. Partington
e-mail: zackpartington@gmail.com

T. Libel
Postdoctoral Researcher, Chair of Comparative Politics, University of Bamberg, Kupuzinerstraße 16, 96045 Bamberg, Bavaria, Germany
e-mail: tamirlibelphd@gmail.com

fog of war (Van Creveld 1985). After all, AI capability still requires centralizing information processing, whereas successful command always requires decentralization (Van Creveld 1985), such as devolving of authority to lower levels of command. Like previous technological revolutions, AI will play a role in military operations and command, so understanding its possibilities and limitations is critical to successfully adopting and adapting it (Van Creveld 1985).

AI touches on a number of military capabilities and concerns, from intelligence and security to ethical issues surrounding the use of this technology (Thorne 2018). While some militaries are already going through a cultural shift as they become more inclusive and diverse (e.g., the Canadian Armed Forces; National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2017), the question arises as to what effect AI will have on the military profession—for example, on roles (e.g., expanding the scope of a member's occupation), identity (e.g., with the military), and cohesion (e.g., among smaller groups).

This chapter explores the impact of AI on the military profession, including professionalism and professionalization and whether it will redefine what it means to be a military professional. We first outline the concept of AI in relation to the military, followed by an examination of military professionalism and its characteristics. The last part of the chapter focuses on the use of the analytical framework developed by Snider and Watkins (2002) to examine the influence of AI on the military profession, including directions for future research.

Artificial Intelligence

While definitions of AI vary, most researchers seem to agree that it will eventually affect every aspect of human life (West 2018; West and Allen 2018). West and Allen (2018) define AI as "machines that operate in an intentional, intelligent, and adaptive manner" (p. 2). AI's ability to adapt itself without further command is what sets it apart from machine learning algorithms (West 2018). Where machine learning "takes data and looks for underlying trends," AI systems "have the ability to learn and adapt as they make decisions" (West and Allen 2018, p. 3). This self-training requires access to very large datasets, otherwise known as big data (West and Allen 2018), without which the algorithm can neither learn nor adapt. AI must also be able to pilot test itself in real-world conditions (West and Allen 2018), which raises security concerns when dealing with military data (West and Allen 2018).

In the past, many scientific and technological innovations originated in research and development (R&D) within the military or the defense industry. But the main players in AI R&D are private Silicon Valley firms (Cummings 2018; Levine 2018), a reality that has two major ramifications for armed forces and security agencies in Western countries. First, the most advanced AI is often the intellectual property (IP) of multinational technology giants, such as Google and Amazon. As a result, these systems cannot be bought like industrial age technology—like jet fighters or

submarines—but must be licensed at a high cost and under strict conditions (Verdugo and Babin 1990). Militaries are unlikely to get access to the source codes, for example, because the IPs are commercial secrets. Thus, militaries will have to rely on AI systems without knowing how they fully operate or their limitations and vulnerabilities. Second, there is a significant difference—and some evidence of animosity—between the cultures of Silicon Valley and the armed forces that has already limited the willingness of the former to work with the latter, especially in providing access to leading AI products (Canadian Broadcasting Company Radio 2019; Levine 2018).

AI plays a substantial and growing role in the security domain (Thorne 2018; West and Allen 2018). Before looking at some of these areas, it is worth noting that the recognition of its importance among militaries has opened a new arms race that reflects in turn the changing balance of power in international affairs (Horowitz 2018). The United States, China, and Russia, among other countries, have been heavily investing in AI research in a hope of getting ahead of one another (Horowitz 2018). These include major economic powers like Germany and the European Union, but also technologically well-positioned small states, such as Canada and Israel (Thorne 2018).

Intelligence collection and analysis is one area where AI has had a dramatic impact. Its ability to process and analyze an ever-increasing scale of big data in close-to-real-time has significantly improved intelligence analysis across the board (West and Allen 2018). Similarly, the embedding of AI in command and control systems has created decision-support systems that improve command decisions (West and Allen 2018). Of course, AI decision-support systems were a response to the information overload experienced in the new command and control environment, which has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of sources and the volume of information collected by modern armed forces. As the scale and scope of information has increased, so has the need for AI to sort out and determine the relevance for commanders (Kimmons 2019; Schubert et al. 2018). At the same time, incorporating AI into command decisions to handle the volume of information does not necessarily lessen the danger of the excess of information, which can make it difficult for commanders to determine what is relevant, what is important, what is reliable, and what is true (Van Creveld 1985).

The potential effects of AI on the civilian workforce have been widely discussed among policymakers, academia, and in the media. International organizations, such as the World Bank (World Bank Group 2019a, 2019b) the World Economic Forum (2018a, 2018b, 2019) major consultancies like McKinsey (Bughin et al. 2018; Manyika and Sneader, 2018) and Deloitte (Eggers et al. 2019; Volini et al. 2019), and many national governments, such as the United States (2019), the United Kingdom (UK Commission for Employment and Skills 2014) and Canada (Government of Canada n.d.), have turned their attention to what became known as the Future of Work. Early assessments suggesting that AI would make some vocations obsolete and lead to mass layoffs of low-skilled (and sometimes highly-skilled) employees have yielded to forecasts of AI creating new job opportunities and vocations (Stanley-Mitchell 2001). Some suggest that civilian economies can revitalize

their workforces by combining life-long re-training programs, such as training current employees rather than relying on hiring contractors and specialists, and having social media experts to help outline best practices for the use of technology (World Economic Forum 2018a).

Yet what could be called the *Future of Military Work* has not been widely researched. The few studies so far conducted have focused on the positive impacts of AI (Townsend and Charles 2008; Vallor 2013), though some have suggested the digital revolution in general—and AI in particular—will render low-skilled and some high-skilled military jobs obsolete (Layton 2018). Other studies, in contrast, have argued that the augmentation by AI will trump obsoleteness because the technology will only further assist the human elements of war (Caforio and Nuciari 2018; Hoffman 2017). Others have argued that the revitalized military education and training focused on AI will create multi-skilled AI-literate personnel (Ryan 2018) who can perform a variety of new skills, such as combining the vocation of logistical support, operating drones, and decision making (Burmaoglu and Sarıtas 2017). Some have highlighted this as mixing blue and white collar military positions (Singer 2009), while others have argued that AI will blur the lines between military and civilian jobs as demand for technical skills will be in high demand in the civilian market (Gray 2001; Singer 2009; Stanley-Mitchell 2001; Winkler et al. 2019). Training and education can directly shape many aspects of the military profession (Clark 2016); therefore, it is possible that the opportunity to adapt will result in only a limited impact on some military jobs.

Some more speculative authors claim that AI will render human combat soldiers obsolete (Singer 2009). Others have gone further, characterizing the physical and mental qualities required of combat service as relics of a "traditional," "masculine" and "negative" organizational culture that will disappear along with the need for human beings in battle (ElMasry 2018; Kim et al. 2019). Whatever we make of such speculation, a move toward an increasingly AI-dependent professional environment will likely affect the importance placed on different physical and mental qualities (Winkler et al. 2019).

Advances in armed autonomous AI systems is another area that invites major ethical dilemmas, not to mention much public concern. Whether an autonomous system should make the kill decision on its own and whether and how to keep a "human in the loop" have been ongoing concerns in Western countries (West and Allen 2018). The ethical considerations are not only related to the AI's decision making power, but also to the reliability of data on which it is trained to make such decisions. As was demonstrated across a wide span of domains—from finance through education to law enforcement—datasets can easily contain biases (Wasilow and Thorpe 2019), most often to the disadvantages of minority groups (West and Allen 2018). Hence, the ethical deployment of military AI would have to take into account not only the what, when, and how of its use, but also how and with what data it should be trained on.

Some researchers suggest the use of AI also raises issues of responsibility and accountability because determining who is responsible for the actions of an autonomous AI can be a challenge (Fenwick and Edwards 2016; Wasilow and Thorpe

2019; West and Allen 2018). While these issues have been discussed in the civilian world, they are expected to have a significant effect also on the law of war and international humanitarian law. An often ignored topic that influences policy, media, public, and professional discussions of AI and the military is the impact of popular culture on understanding what AI is and how it might be used. For example, movies like the *Terminator* series may shape attitudes much more than a real understanding of the topic (West 2018).

All told, AI may affect armed forces as an institution and the military as a profession as much as the inventions of gunpowder or internal-combustion engines. The following sections will provide a preliminary assessment of the influence of AI on the profession. A brief review of the concept of the military profession will provide an analytical framework to assess the influence of AI on the various level-of-analysis and dimensions of the military profession.

Changes in Military Professionalism

Professions are distinguished from occupations[1] by a theoretical body of knowledge that informs the practical skills of professionals. Laymen, not commissioned as members of the profession, will find it difficult to acquire the knowledge and skills unique to it, creating a professional monopoly. Professional communities maintain their monopoly by controlling recruitment and selection and by establishing criteria for promotion. The state allows professional monopolies because they provide services the free market finds difficult to provide (Downes 1985; Harries-Jenkins 1990).

The end of the Cold War precipitated changes in armed forces and their relations with parent societies. First, Western militaries went from conscription to volunteer forces, beginning in the 1970s (Dandeker 1994; Sorensen 2000; Van der Meulen and Manigart 1998). Combined with pressures for quick peace dividends in the early 1990s, armed forces experienced dramatic downsizing and decreased defence budgets. This contraction was made possible by the armed forces' declining social status, which also led to the elimination of their immunity to social trends and outside scrutiny (Dandeker 1994). Beginning with the 1990s, Western militaries became subject to civilian rights legislation and oversight by civilian courts and regulatory bodies, which expected militaries to accommodate ethnic and gender diversity. This originated partially with the growing influence of international humanitarian law (Waters 2008).

As a result of their declining size and budget, and facing high operational tempo in the 2000s, Western armed forces had to increasingly rely on private security companies (Heinecken 2014). This unprecedented outsourcing in the military realm happened simultaneously with fundamental changes in Western armed forces' operations. More often than not, Western armed forces operated as part of multinational

---

[1]Parts of this section are taken/based on Libel's chapter in the current volume (see Chap. 2).

forces in a variety of diverse missions in which they played a secondary, supporting role under strict legal, political and ethical constraints (Dandeker 1994; Luttwak 1995). Being subject to constant media coverage and frequent political intervention and scrutiny, officers were not only pressed to ensure force protection and minimal collateral damage, but also to work closer than ever with governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations (Dandeker 1994). These new military missions, which incorporate diplomatic and economic objectives, blur the boundaries between the civil and military spheres and military and non-military actors (Dandeker 1994).

Naturally, armed forces have had to expand military education beyond the management of violence (Dandeker 1994). This move to broader training in what might be called security expertise points to the limitations of the traditional concept of military professionalism. The management of violence is becoming too narrow to account for the range of expectations placed on Western armed forces in their new operations (see Libel, this volume). The introduction of AI into operations seems poised to cause further changes to military professionalism.

AI and the Military Profession

Over the last couple of decades, the role of the military has changed from warfare to peacekeeping and to the stabilization of operations. The military will have to adapt to AI systems in the same way it has had to adapt to the new battlespace and security environment (Snider and Watkins 2002). What exactly AI will mean for the military profession and how the profession will adapt to those changes is difficult to determine at this early stage, but as Snider and Watkins (2002) observe, the military's success in maintaining itself as a profession will depend on training, education, and the quality of its members.

Although they focus on what the U.S. Army needs to meet these challenges, Snider and Watkins's (2002, p. 13) framework for social, institutional, and individual-level adaptation provides general lessons for other Western nations. At the individual level, military professionals will need new knowledge and technical skills (Chatham 2009), a strong foundation in the values and ethics of the profession to make the right ethical decisions (Crosbie and Kleykamp 2018), and the political and social skills suited to the military profession. Since individuals are the ultimate barrier to change, the key to responding to the emergence of AI in the military will be the attitudes of people within the profession (Snider and Watkins 2002).

At the institutional level, which comprises the internal context and systems that make up the military, Snider and Watkins (2002) suggests the main elements are systems that support overall technical capabilities; the moral and ethical aspects embedded in these elements, such as the established values and norms of the profession; and military systems that follow political and social actions. Key at the institutional level is "developing, educating, training, and managing" (Snider and Watkins 2002, p. 13) the human resources of the profession (Evans 2007; Libel

2016; Snider and Watkins 2002). In response to increasing demands to incorporate AI technologies, therefore, the military institution would be required to synchronize the different levels of knowledge required (i.e., systems of the profession; Snider and Watkins 2002).

Finally, at the societal level, the military profession is housed within a national and global context. Militaries adoption of AI technology must be in line with "national and international uses of military forces" (Snider and Watkins 2002, p. 13), their values, ethics and beliefs, as well as their political and societal systems. This would require militaries to be knowledgeable of the aspects of AI use from other nations to ensure they are competitive in the battlespace.

Directions for Future Research

Based on the review of the literature on the concept of military professionalism, as well as the current state of AI, several directions for future research can be considered:

People. People are the vector of transformation. When it comes to introducing AI and increasing diversity in the armed forces, people should be at the forefront of policies to clarify the roles, identity, and attitudes toward diversity and AI. Three areas should be of particular importance: recruitment, training, and education.

1. With respect to recruitment, NATO armed forces face a dual challenge in the AI age. On the one hand, the military has to recruit and retain tech-savvy and digitally literate personnel among millennials and Z-ers (i.e., generation after Millennials; Stafford and Griffis 2008). As these younger cohorts in Western societies tend to be openly more diverse and critical of the military and the use of force, armed forces have to consider investing much in educating the public on strategic affairs, alongside the wide adaptation of organizational culture and work practices (MacGregor 2016; Tanner 2010). In addition, in a world of consistently declining resources for defence, armed forces have to consider making great strides to maximize the insights from the mountains of data they have concerning recruitment and retention. Naturally, this will require the use of AI in support of not only recruitment and retention strategies, but in the overall lifecycle of military personnel management.

2. With respect to training and education, the military training and education system will have to adapt to AI becoming ubiquitous in all aspects of force development and employment (Evans 2007; Libel 2016). This has two implications. First, military educational institutions will have to equip officers with the scientific and technological knowledge required for understanding coding, algorithms, and their meanings and implications. A good curriculum reference in this context may be the Machine Learning for Social Sciences courses offered by elite graduate social sciences programs (Steenbergen 2019). At the same time, the more AI becomes central for the military, the higher the requirement to provide in-house,

life-long training and education opportunities for a variety of military special-
izations that will draw on AI. This in turn means that training and education
establishments will have to attract either personnel with the required education
to teach in them or have enough funding to outsource training—both of which
can be a challenge.

The limitations of AI. As Van Creveld (1985) suggested, research into the limita-
tions of AI in the professional military realm should not be neglected. AI is still limited
in its understanding of human dimensions (such as culture and values) and in its per-
formance of human processes, such as adaptability, judgement-making, and induc-
tive thought (i.e., generalizing from limited information; Layton 2018). Wasilow
and Thorpe (2019) present a comprehensive list of six limitations regarding AI in the
military, all of which were previously discussed in this chapter. First, machine AI
learning methods make hiding or deleting sensitive information extremely difficult,
which affects the privacy data AI has access to. Second, AI is limited by biases in the
data human beings collect for it. Third, AI systems are susceptible to hacking, which
may lead to safety and security consequences for soldiers and civilians. Fourth, it
can be difficult to determine accountability and assign responsibility for AI failures.
Fifth, AI may not respond the same way in lab settings and more complex situations,
inviting questions about its reliability. Finally, the broad trust conferred on AI in
the civilian sector might well have to be more limited in a military setting. These
limitations and other possible limitations should be considered when implementing
AI in the context of the military

Conclusion

This chapter explored the impact of AI on the military as a profession, including
how it might affect what it means to be a professional. The analytical framework
developed by Snider and Watkins (2002) provided a lens to view the impact of AI
on the military and insight into the impact of AI at different levels of the military. It
is suggested that future research should focus on (1) people in relation to the AI and
the military, such as recruitment, and training and education, and (2) the limitations
inherent within AI, as it relates to the military.

References

Bughin, J., Hazan, E., Lund, S., Dahlström, P., Wiesinger, A., & Subramaniam, A.
(2018). *Skill shift: Automation and the future of the workforce.* McKinsey Global Insti-
tute. Retrieved from https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/skill-shift-
automation-and-the-future-of-the-workforce.

Burmaoglu, S., & Sarıtas, O. (2017). Changing characteristics of warfare and the future of military R&D. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 116,* 151–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.10.062.

Caforio, G., & Nuciari, M. (2018). *Handbook of the sociology of the military*. Cham: Springer.

Chatham, R. E. (2009). The 20th century revolution in military training. In K. A. Ericcson (Ed.), *Development of Professional Expertise: Toward Measurement of Expert Performance and Design of Optimal Learning Environments*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Radio. (2019). *The military Google industrial complex: How Silicon Valley cashes in on war technology*. Retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1450731075609.

Clark, J. P. (2016). Organizational change and adaptation in the US Army. *Parameters, 46*(3), 23–39. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2016/6_Clark.pdf.

Cummings, M. L. (2018). Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare. In M. L. Cummings, H. M. Roff, K. Cukier, J. Parakilas, & B. Bryce (Eds.), *Artificial intelligence and international affairs* (pp. 7–18). London, UK: Chatham House.

Crosbie, T., & Kleykamp, M. (2018). Fault lines of the American military profession. *Armed Forces & Society, 44*(3), 521–543.

Dandeker, C. (1994). New times for the military: Some sociological remarks on the changing role and structure of the armed forces of the Advanced Societies. *British Journal of Sociology, 45*(4), 637–654. https://doi.org/10.2307/591887.

Downes, C. (1985). To be or not to be a profession: The military case. *Defense Analysis, 1*(3), 147–171. https://doi.org/10.1080/07430178508405201.

Eggers, W. D., O'Leary, J., & Datar, A. (2019). *The future of work in government: Navigating a shifting talent landscape*. Deloitte Insights. Retrieved from https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/insights/industry/public-sector/future-of-work-in-government.html.

ElMasry, A. (2018). *Army of the future: Artificial intelligence and its impact on army operations (JCSP 44—PCEMI 44)*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Forces College.

Evans, M. (2007). *From the long peace to the long war: Armed conflict and military education and training in the 21st century*. Australian Defence College.

Fenwick, T., & Edwards, R. (2016). Exploring the impact of digital technologies on professional responsibilities and education. *European Educational Research Journal, 15*(1), 117–131. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474904115608387.

Government of Canada. (n.d.). *Future of work*. Retrieved from http://canadabeyond150.ca/reports/future-of-work.html.

Gray, D. R. (2001). New age military progressives: U.S. officer professionalism in the information age. In M. Williamson (Ed.), *Army transformation: A view from the Army War College* (pp. 27–69). Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.

Harries-Jenkins, G. (1990). The concept of military professionalism. *Defense Analysis, 6*(2), 117–130.

Heinecken, L. (2014). Outsourcing public security: The unforeseen consequences for the military profession. *Armed Forces & Society, 40*(4), 625–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x13489974.

Hoffman, F. G. (2017). Will war's nature change in the seventh military revolution? *Parameters, 47*(4), 19–31. Retrieved from https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3554.pdf.

Horowitz, M. C. (2018). Artificial intelligence, international competition, and the balance of power. *Texas National Security Review, 1*(3), 37–57. https://doi.org/10.15781/t2639kp49. Retrieved from https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/.

Kim, S. K., Cheon, S. P., & Eom, J. H. (2019). A leading cyber warfare strategy according to the evolution of cyber technology after the fourth industrial revolution. *International Journal of Advanced Computer Research, 9*(40), 72–80. https://doi.org/10.19101/ijacr.soc6.

Kimmons, S. (2019). Army leaders discuss benefits, challenges with AI systems. *Army News Service*. Retrieved from https://www.army.mil/article/218595/army_leaders_discuss_benefits_challenges_with_ai_systems.

Layton, P. (2018). *Algorithmic warfare: Applying artificial intelligence to warfighting*. Canberra, Australia: Air Power Development Centre.

Levine, Y. (2018). *Surveillance valley: The secret military history of the internet*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.

Libel, T. (2016). *European military culture and security governance: Soldiers, scholars and national defence universities*. London, UK: Routledge.

Luttwak, E. D. (1995). Toward post-heroic warfare. *Foreign Affairs, 74*(3), 109–122. https://doi.org/10.2307/20047127.

MacGregor, J. (2016). *Leading Millennials Motivating and Leading Millennial Service Members*. Air War College, Air University AFB, United States.

Manyika, J., & Sneader, K. (2018). *AI, automation, and the future of work: Ten things to solve for.* McKinsey Global Institute (Briefing note prepared for the TECH4GOOD Summit). Retrieved from https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Future%20of%20Organizations/AI%20automation%20and%20the%20future%20of%20work%20Ten%20things%20to%20solve%20for/MGI-Briefing-Note-AI-automation-and-the-future-of-work_June2018.ashx.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2017). *Strong, secure, engaged: Canada's defence policy*. Retrieved from http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf.

Ryan, M. (2018). Intellectual preparation for future war: How artificial intelligence will change professional military education. *War on the Rocks*. Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/intellectual-preparation-for-future-war-how-artificial-intelligence-will-change-professional-military-education/.

Scharre, P. (2019). Killer apps: The real dangers of an AI arms race. *Foreign Affairs, 98*(3), 135–144.

Schubert, J., Brynielsson, J., Nilsson, M., & Svenmarck, P. (2018). *Artificial intelligence for decision support in command and control systems*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330638139_Artificial_Intelligence_for_Decision_Support_in_Command_and_Control_Systems/citation/download.

Singer, P. W. (2009). *Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the twenty-first century*. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Stanley-Mitchell, E. A. (2001). Technology's double-edged sword: The case of US Army battlefield digitization. *Defense Analysis, 17*(3), 267–288.

Snider, D. M., & Watkins, G. L. (2002). Introduction. In D. M. Snider, G. L. Watkins, & L. J. Mathews (Eds.), *The future of the army profession*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Sorensen, H. (2000). Conscription in Scandinavia during the last quarter century: Developments and arguments. *Armed Forces & Society, 26*(2), 313–334. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0002600207.

Stafford, D. E., & Griffis, H. (2008). A review of millennial generation characteristics and military workforce implications. *Center for Naval Analysis*. Retrieved from http://www.cna.org/documents.

Steenbergen, M. (2019). Machine learning for social scientists. Essex Summer School in Social Science and Data Analysis. Retrieved from https://essexsummerschool.com/summer-school-facts/courses/complete-2019-course-list/1k/.

Tanner, L. (2010). *Who are millennials? (DRDC-CORA-TM-2010-284)*. Ottawa, ON: Defence Research Development Canada.

Thorne, S. J. (2018) *Artificial intelligence: Transforming the battlefield.* Retrieved from https://legionmagazine.com/en/2018/10/artificial-intelligence-transforming-the-battlefield/.

Townsend, K., & Charles, M. B. (2008). Jarhead and deskilling in the military: Potential implications for the Australian labour market. *Australian Bulletin of Labour, 34*(1), 64–78.

UK Commission for Employment and Skills. (2014). *The future of work: Jobs and skills in 2030*. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jobs-and-skills-in-2030.

United States Government. (2019*). Artificial intelligence for the American people*. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/ai/.

Vallor, S. (2013). *The future of military virtue: Autonomous systems and the moral deskilling of the military*. In 2013 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON 2013), pp. 1–15.

Van Creveld, M. (1985). *Command in war*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Van Creveld, M. (1991). *Technology and war: From 2000 B.C. to the present (Rev. and expanded ed.)*. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Van der Meulen, J., & Manigart, P. (1998). Zero draft in the low Countries: The final shift to the all- volunteer force. *Armed Forces & Society, 24*(2), 315–332. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9702400206.

Verdugo, N. & Babin N. E. (1990). The impact of advanced technology on the U.S. military. *United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences*, 1–20.

Volini, E., Schwartz, J., & Roy, I. (2019). From jobs to superjobs: 2019 global human capital trends. *Deloitte Insights*. Retrieved from https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/insights/focus/human-capital-trends/2019/impact-of-ai-turning-jobs-into-superjobs.html.

Wasilow, S., & Thorpe, J. B. (2019). Artificial intelligence, robotics, ethics, and the military: A Canadian perspective. *AI Magazine, 40*(1), 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v40i1.2848.

Waters, C. P. M. (2008). Is the military legally encircled? *Defence Studies, 8*(1), 26–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430701812068.

West, D. (2018). *What is artificial intelligence*? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-is-artificial-intelligence/.

West, D. M., & Allen, J. R. (2018). *How artificial intelligence is transforming the world*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Winkler, J. D., Marler, T., Posard, M. N., Cohen, R. S., & Smith, M. L. (2019). *Reflections on the future of warfare and implications for personnel policies of the US Department of Defense.* RAND Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE324/RAND_PE324.pdf.

World Bank Group (2019a). *The future of work: Preparing for disruption*. Retrieved from https://olc.worldbank.org/content/future-work-preparing-disruption.

World Bank Group (2019b). *World development report 2019: The changing nature of work*. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2019.

World Economic Forum. (2018a). *The future of jobs report 2018*. Centre for the New Economy and Society. Retrieved from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2018.pdf.

World Economic Forum. (2018b). *Towards a reskilling revolution*. Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/reports/towards-a-reskilling-revolution.

World Economic Forum. (2019). *Strategies for the new economy: Skills as the currency of the labour market*. Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/strategies-for-the-new-economy-skills-as-the-currency-of-the-labour-market.

Chapter 14
Rethinking Military Professionalism for the Twenty-First Century

Tamir Libel and Krystal K. Hachey

Abstract The contributors to this volume sought to (1) re-examine the concept of military professionalism, (2) highlight research from different nations, and (3) present novel thinking and a re-examination on aspects related to military professionalism. This concluding chapter attempts to summarize and synthesize the research presented here and to provide suggestions on the usefulness of common theoretical frameworks and future directions in the study and implementation of military professionalism.

Keywords Military professionalism · Gender · Culture · Officer corps · NATO · Civil-military relations

Introduction

This volume of papers grew out of work by the recent NATO research task group (RTG-287) Developing a Culture and Gender Inclusive Model of Military Professionalism, which examined the gender and diversity implications for the concept of military professionalism. In this concluding chapter, we review the major findings from each chapter, build on the review, cross-case trends, and discuss the similarities and differences drawn by the contributors. We then offer suggestions regarding the utility of common theoretical frameworks for military professionalism, given the challenges posed to contemporary armed forces by gender, diversity, technological change, and the new types of peacekeeping and stabilization operations expected of NATO militaries. The chapter ends with suggestions for future directions in the study and implementation of military professionalism.

T. Libel (✉)
Postdoctoral Researcher, Chair of Comparative Politics, University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstraße 21, 96045 Bamberg, Bavaria, Germany
e-mail: tamirlibelphd@gmail.com

K. K. Hachey
Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, 101 Colonel by Drive, Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2, Canada
e-mail: krystal.hachey@forces.gc.ca

Frameworks and Models of Military Professionalism

Several frameworks of military professionalism have long dominated the literature, especially those of Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), and Sarkesian (1981), with the former two heavily influencing the development of military doctrine in the United States (Feaver 1996) and Canada (National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2009). Other models have focused on comparative analysis and change in military professionalism, including ones by Moskos (1977), Caforio (1988), Abbott (1988), and Nuciari (1994). The following section summarizes the historical evolution of key concepts in military professionalism, including the long-standing frameworks and models.

With a focus on the officer corps, Huntington (1957) defined a profession as "a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics" (p. 7), with professionalism comprising expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Expertise refers to the specialized skills of military personnel, including the education and training required to develop such skills. Huntington (1957) followed Harold Lasswell (1941) in defining the special skillset of the military professional as the "management of violence," meaning the main function of the military is to plan and direct combat operations and to organize, equip, and train the force that will carry them out. Responsibility refers to the officer corps' social obligation, which gives rise to civil–military relations: In return for performing a service "essential to the functioning of society" (p. 9), the officer corps is granted a professional monopoly. Additionally, specific customs, traditions, laws, and codes help guide the officer's behavior (Huntington 1957). Finally, based on Huntington's definition, corporateness denotes the shared sense of unity between officers within a hierarchical organization that includes non-professionals, such as non-combat officers and reservists. This led later scholars to criticize the Huntingtonian concept for ignoring the multiple non-combat officer specializations as non-professional (Harries-Jenkins 1990). Moreover, given the time period, Huntington's (1957) framework only looked at male officers and their experience as individual professionals (Butler and Budgell 2015).

Janowitz (1960) also focused on the officer corps and its transition to a profession, defining military professionalism as expertise through skill and performance, responsibility, group identity and cohesion, and education and training. He also described the future of the military profession as concerned with dilemmas that military leaders must contend with, including the influence of technological advances and the social environment. No longer is there a dichotomy of wartime and peacetime; instead, the military has also become a constabulary force focusing on enacting civilian control (Janowitz 1960). While more inclusive of the external influences on the military (e.g., societal pressures), Janowitz (1960), like Huntington (1957), focuses on a male officer corps (Butler and Budgell 2015).

Following Lasswell (1941) in defining the purpose of the military profession as the management of violence, Sarkesian (1981) situates the military profession within the broader political and societal environment, along with the institutional perspective (e.g., political military–civilian relations) and the individual perspective (i.e., as

shaped by institutional socialization). Core principles of professionalism, as outlined by Sarkesian (1981), include "honesty, integrity, loyalty, honour and gentlemanly conduct" (p. 11). Military professionalism encompasses civilian control, dignity and worth, justice, as well as special knowledge and skill, legitimacy, group identity, and professional ethos. When personal values, institutional requirements, and community perspectives are in disaccord, professionalism breaks down (Sarkesian 1981). Like Huntington's (1957) and Janowitz's (1960) frameworks, Sarkesian's (1981) focuses on the officer corps, with a broader focus on the intersections among the individual, the institution, and societal aspects (Butler and Budgell 2015).

Moskos's (1977, 1981) institutional/occupational (I/O) model is not focused on the officer corps but on all types of military personnel. In contrast with earlier frameworks, his model aims to explain the military's transition from a professional corps to an institutional and occupational one. Institutional refers to elements such as service to country (legitimacy), adjacency of work and where members reside (residence), and a primary commitment to the organization (role commitment). Occupational refers to aspects such as a marketplace economy (legitimacy), a separation of work and where a member resides (residence), and a secondary commitment to the organization (role commitment). In reality, both elements are present within the military (Moskos 1981). Many aspects of the institutional model are reflected in doctrinal field manuals and include values and norms, self-sacrifice, liability, military discipline (Moskos 1981); however, given where the military is structured (i.e., within a government organization), aspects of the occupational model are also present (e.g., supply and demand; Moskos 1981).

Building on the I/O model, Caforio (1988) proposed the bureaucratization/professionalization (B/P) model, which shows how aspects of both are present in the officer corps to measure processes of change within the profession. Key to this model are the "aim of the officers' activity, lines of action, prevailing normative ethical references prevailing sources of the direction of thinking, types of satisfaction sought, sociocultural references and reference group" (p. 64), all of which are similar to how the I/O model was broken down. As Nuciari (1994) states, "all scholars dealing with the military profession agree on one peculiarity: it is simultaneously a bureaucracy and a profession" (p. 15).

Taking a systems approach to understanding military professionalism that avoids a concrete definition, (Abbot 1988; Butler and Budgell 2015) described the military profession as an "exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases" (p. 8) and as including work, jurisdiction, and competition. Occupational groups control knowledge and skills, and abstraction distinguishes professionals from non-professionals. Work refers to the tasks inside the profession and the people who carry them out. In addition, tasks have subjective qualities (e.g., diagnosis and treatment) and objective qualities (e.g., impacts from technology). The power and prestige of the academic knowledge of the profession is very important to maintaining its jurisdiction. Thus, "diagnosis, treatment, inference, and academic work provide the cultural machinery to jurisdiction" (p. 59).

Operationalizing Military Professionalism

Beginning with Huntington's *Soldier and the State* (1957), researchers have identified several important constituents of military professionalism: competition, corporateness, education and training, expertise, group identity and cohesion, jurisdiction, responsibility, and work (Janowitz 1960; Sarkesian 1981). The male officer corps and gentlemanly conduct have also been part of the understanding of military professionalism (Abbott 1988; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Sarkesian 1981). The impact of the individual, the institution, and society (Sarkesian 1981) can be placed on the I/O and B/P continua.

Research on operationalizing military professionalism and the impacts associated with the profession have largely been quantitative.[1] As outlined by Sarkesian (1981), for example, key empirical studies at the time included the *Study on Military Professionalism* by the U.S. Army War College (1970) and those by Moellering (1973), Russett (1974), Bachman and Blair (1975), and Margiotta (1976), all of which conducted largely quantitative research to assess the professional climate or culture, civil–military relations, perspectives from military elites, values, and social status (Sarkesian 1981). They were also conducted in the context of Western countries, which invites the question as to whether there are other ways to conceptualize professionalism and how this might look in other cultures.

A recent study examining professionalism in the Thai military (Sirivunnabood and Ricks 2016) developed a survey using Huntington's hypothesis regarding professionalization, noting that it would not hold in the Thai military context. In particular, "professionalism is a poor predictor of an officer's support for an apolitical military" (p. 4). The survey measured respondents' opinions about military intervention in politics. Supporting the view of Feaver (1996), Sirivunnabood and Ricks (2016) posit that more needs to be investigated concerning the sociopolitical factors the impact the military and the link with politics.

One of the main aims of this book was to examine aspects of professionalism from different countries using a variety of data collection methods. Previous research had placed a higher significance on quantitative data, with qualitative data supporting the quantitative results. However, our goal is to demonstrate that qualitative data, as well as quantitative data, has a place in the operationalization of military professionalism.

Sources of Pressure

The drive to re-assess both data collection and analysis methods, as well as to examine the state of military professionalism among NATO armed forces, has come out of the tremendous pressure they have experienced since the end of the Cold War, which precipitated significant changes to almost all aspects of the Western military organization and civil-military relations. Dandeker (1994) defined the armed forces

---

[1]For an example of qualitative implementation see Libel 2013 and 2016.

as having "dual faces" (p. 639). On one hand, they need to react to a changing strategic context via an effective force development. On the other hand, they have to respond to changes in societal values that influence their relations with the parent society. Overall, they could be divided into sociopolitical and operational-technological pressures.

Sociopolitical Pressure

Since the 1970s, Western armed forces have gradually shifted from relying on conscription to all-volunteer forces (King 2006). Historically, extensive conscription was introduced in the early 19th century in European countries. Like the abolition of the draft in the United States at the end of the 1970s, the draft was re-evaluated throughout post-Cold War Europe and eventually eliminated in most countries for technological and social reasons (Dandeker 1994; Sorensen 2000; Van der Meulen and Manigart 1997). This resulted in a continuous decline in the social importance of the armed forces in Western societies (Booth et al. 2001).

A significant aspect of this process was the removal of the armed forces' immunity from democratization (Dandeker 1994; Wiegand and Paletz 2001). Cultural diversity also became a central, emotionally charged issue with far-reaching political implications. The adaptation of the armed forces to social demands for ethnic, gender, and sexual diversity among military personnel constituted a major part of the elimination of this immunity.

Women were the first group to break the glass ceiling. Historically, women were excluded from the military, except in rare cases, until the 1970s when the military moved from consolidating female soldiers in separate branches to full inclusion in the forces. Nowadays, women have the formal right to enter almost all ranks and roles in most Western countries. Despite this, the total number of women in the armed forces is relatively small, and they often do not enjoy equal opportunities (Carreirs 2006; Devilbiss 1990) or have the same experiences as their male counterparts (Archer 2013).

Similarly, ethnic and sexual minority groups demanded access to all roles in the military. Social pressure to implement a policy of social equality and civil rights among military personnel required armed forces to change not only procedures and regulations, but also the masculine military culture (Soeters and van der Meulen 2007).

The diminishing autonomy of the armed forces and their diminishing cultural differences from the parent society resulted from the increasing influence of domestic law and international humanitarian law. Although there are inter-relations between the two, they differed in the degree of their influences and their causes. The influence of domestic law on the armed forces resulted from the expansion of legalization and the application of legal accountability in more and more domains within the military (e.g., safety, health and sexual harassment). Before the 1990s, the military was exempted from much of the civil legislation in these domains. Due to these

changes, the authority of officers weakened and their exposure to civil suits and criminal prosecution increased (Forster 2012; Groves 2005; Rubin 2002; Waters 2008).

Simultaneously, armed forces found themselves under increasing scrutiny from a variety of international legal forums concerned with human rights and war crimes. Most important was the establishment of the International Criminal Court, following the 1988 Rome convention. Growing concerns over the prosecution of officers and soldiers by an international tribunal led to increasing reliance of armed forces on legal advice from the Judge Advocate General branch and the inclusion of legal implications in operational analysis and planning. This is especially due to low intensity conflict in civilian areas, often against terror and guerilla organizations that intentionally used civilians as cover (Waters 2008). Similarly, Western armed forces found themselves under increasing scrutiny by the media and non-governmental organizations beginning in the 1990s (King 2006).

In addition, Western armed forces have experienced declining defense budgets, with total NATO defense spending sinking from just over $1 trillion USD in 2011 to about $988 billion USD in 2018 (NATO 2019b), amounting to 3.39% of gross domestic product for the United States, an average of 1.51% for European militaries, and 1.23% for the Canadian military (NATO 2019b). In 2018, the 29 member countries' military personnel amounted to a total of roughly 3.2 million (NATO 2019b), though Western militaries have been outsourcing military activities since the end of the Cold War (King 2006).

Operational-Technological

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Western armed forces experienced a dramatic increase in the span of tasks, responsibilities, and challenges facing them (Evans 2004). In this period, the battlespace became a spectrum of conflict, encompassing simultaneously peace, conflict, and war, when Western military forces conducted joint operations. Military professionals are now required to think in joint rather than service terms within the framework of inter-service operations (Evans 2004). The combination of service components, each one of them based on specialized knowledge of its own operational environment (sea, land, air, space, special operations, etc.), required the development of a new, specialized body of knowledge. The latter could be defined as "joint operations" that must be able to evaluate the contribution of each service component and to assist in their combination in order to achieve the strategic aim (Evans 2004). Western armed forces thus adopted force structures of unified (joint) commands. These headquarters have the authority and capacities to coordinate air, land, and sea forces. The establishment of joint headquarters not only expanded the scope of command, but also involved flattening the command hierarchy. Paradoxically, while operational command became more centralized, tactical command was assigned to lower echelons—that is, consolidation of authority at the

strategic level was accompanied by increasing autonomy and creativity in the tactical one (King 2006). In addition to joint services, militaries are also partnering with other nations resulting in multinational operations (NATO 2019c).

The ability of NATO forces to adapt to these changes was challenged by a growing capability gap between NATO members (Dufour 2018; NATO 2018). As a result, the alliance's cohesion has come under pressure over the last two decades, and there are growing challenges with the level of interoperability between member countries (Dufour 2018). Rapid technological change and the increasing cost and complexity of contemporary military systems have made it challenging for smaller members of the alliances to keep pace with the bigger ones. Thus, unsurprisingly, there is an over-reliance by members on the United States for the provision of essential capabilities, including, for instance, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air-to-air refueling, ballistic missile defense, and airborne electronic warfare (NATO 2018).

The challenges of NATO members in the physical environment have been paralleled by similar difficulties in the emerging cyber environment. Over the last decade, cyber defense became part of NATO's core task of collective defense (NATO 2019a). Hence, in 2018, the alliance agreed to set up a new Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of NATO's strengthened command structure. The member states also agreed that NATO can draw on national cyber capabilities for its operations (NATO 2019a). In addition to their investments in cyber capabilities, several NATO entities have launched artificial intelligence (AI) related activities or included AI in their other activities in recent years (Tonin 2019). This could increase the existing AI asymmetries, as well technological advancements in general, among the various NATO allies, resulting in significant interoperability problems (Dufour 2018).

A Theoretical Discussion of Military Professionalism

Although many of the contemporary researchers and practitioners who discuss the significant pressures, challenges, and opportunities described above may not be aware of this, neither the developments nor the responses to them are new. As Libel (this volume) has shown, similar trends were identified by Van Doorn (1965) over forty years ago. Many developments labeled new have long histories or are markedly similar to ones discussed in the literature by former generations of academics writing about military professionalism.

Although Huntington defined the officer corps as a profession, others recognized early on that the officer corps never fully met the characteristics of a profession, as defined by the sociology of professions. Above all, the officer corps existed within the state bureaucracy, which led Van Doorn (1965), a prominent theorist of the first generation, to tackle the issue via the construct of the officer corps' dual nature, being a fusion of profession and bureaucracy. This approach contributed to the revival of military professionalism theory since the 1990s, but there are reasons to question whether defining the officer corps as a profession was appropriate to begin with. If

defining the officer corps as a profession is dubious, then the common practice of defining and referring to other ranks within the armed forces as professionals—as was advocated by Moskos (1977, 1981)—should certainly be avoided.

In light of this, Libel (this volume) suggested drawing on the sociology of expertise developed by Eyal (2013) and Eyal and Pok (2015), which offers a new, more comprehensive theoretical framework in a sociology of security expertise. While this direction shows promise (Libel 2019), more work is required in developing and experimenting with this and other alternatives.

Case Studies

The contributors to this volume investigated the concepts, frameworks, and models of military professionalism in light of the move toward diversity and inclusion. The case studies in this volume come from Bulgaria, Canada, France, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The following section will provide a review of key aspects of each case.

Bulgaria

Using survey data collected by the Defence Advanced Research Institute from 2013 to 2017, the study by Yanakiev analyzed the transformation of professionalism in the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) after the Cold War. The transition from a socialist to a democratic government after 1991 marked the beginning of the transformation of the BAF from a modern to a postmodern military. Results revealed increased participation in multinational peacekeeping and stabilization operations, along with an increase in the number of women in the forces, have transformed the traditional warfighter role. Military members have had to learn new skills (e.g., diplomacy) to perform their new roles, including learning new defense technologies (e.g., AI). Most importantly, the study identified that the BAF will have to outline a mission and vision to take into account the transformation and to increase public support for the new professionalism from policy-makers, military leadership, educational institutions, and the like.

Canada

Using interviews with diverse members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the study by Hachey explored members' understanding of professionalism and unprofessionalism. This qualitative approach, which is contrasted to the many quantitative studies in the literature, included a total of 125 participants. Results revealed that

leadership plays a key role in not only sustaining the profession, but also in conveying understanding and in the practice of professional behavior. Diverse members identified many of the same aspects of professionalism described in CAF doctrine, indicating the need for future research to understand how diversity contributes to and is integrated into traditional models of military professionalism.

France

Focusing on technical advances in the French military, Frank examines agile and adaptive organizations and provides suggestions on how the military can cope with multidimensional challenges and new capacities: strategic, managerial, operational, innovative, relational, reticular, structural, transferable, mimetism, resilience, and intercultural. Ultimately, Frank identified the institution itself as one of the main challenges to moving the military forward. Bureaucratic processes get in the way of progress, whether they are technological advances or advances in the makeup of the military (e.g., women). Therefore, militaries must focus on the institutional level being a barrier to cultural change.

Ireland

Using United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 as a lens, Segel examined doctrinal documents related to the Republic of Ireland Defence Forces. Overall, he found that programs and legislation have pushed the military to incorporate women into its ranks but that the move has ultimately not radically changed the Irish Defence Forces' conception of military professionalism.

Sweden

Using interviews with women from the Swedish Armed Forces, Linehagen explores the experiences of female military personnel and what they bring to the organization in order to be accepted by the military organization. Results identified several themes regarding the power resources used by women to be accepted into the military: (1) structural, such as career planning; (2) cultural and social, including aspects of adaptation; and (3) emotional, which included meaningfulness, positive emotional coping, and distancing. These strategies, identified by women in this study to advance and adapt to organizational requirements, could be used for future recruitment efforts for women in the Swedish Armed Forces.

The United Kingdom

Using the review of the literature on military professionalism provided by Butler and Budgell (2015), Hawkshaw and O'Neil examined the conceptualization and main tenents of professionalism for the British Army. In particular, the chapter includes a brief overview of the British Army's traditional understanding of military professionalism, including expertise, legitimacy, jurisdiction, within the context of identity and culture. With an emphasis on the continuing Professional Development (CPD) approach, they examine the Knowledge, Skills, Experience and Behavior (KSE-B) Framework and learning and development principles. Overall, this chapter provides a greater understanding of how military professionalism is currently conceptualized in the British Army.

The United States

Crosbie and Kleykamp present findings from the first phase of the Survey of American Military Experts (SAME), which is a biannual survey sent to experts in American military affairs. In particular, they examined the way in which expert communities conceptualize media coverage of the military, public interest in the military, as well as how this may relate to civilian leadership. Results revealed a distinct vision of the state of American military affairs, which is when there is too much media support, not a lot of oversight, and poorly informed leaders. After identifying this problem, Crosbie and Kleykamp are planning another survey in 2019 to further examine how the military is embedded in the political environment.

New Thoughts and Directions

In addition to the cases described above, several authors presented new thoughts and directions in the concepts of military professionalism. In particular, from Brænder and Vilhelm, and Brown and Okros. Brænder and Vilhelm's "new spirit of militarism" is the product of a research project undertaken by the Institute of Leadership and Organization, the Royal Danish Defense College, and the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, which studies the significance of the recent Danish officer education reform. The reform follows the Defense Agreement in 2012, which stipulated that at least 50% of the new cadets have a civilian bachelor's degree. This study contributes to understanding the values of the new cadets and whether they represent the officer corps the military needs as the backbone of the organization in the future. From a research perspective, this study enables us to test the explanatory strengths and weaknesses of the person–organization fit theory in a unique setting and

to conduct the first quantitative analysis using measures developed from Boltanski's pragmatic sociology.[2]

The chapter by Brown and Okros contributes to the understanding of military professionalism in three areas: conceptual, regulative, and educational. Conceptually, the presentation builds on the well-established Huntington–Janowitz debate regarding the nature of military culture by introducing the comparison of tight versus loose cultures, which are used to explain key facets of military identity and practice, including the construction of hegemonic masculinities, the use of compelling narratives, and the creation of internal social hierarchies. The presentation of regulative factors highlights the changes required by updates to legislation, doctrine, and direction, including the UN Security Council Resolutions that form the Women, Peace, and Security agenda; Government of Canada's policy on the use of Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+); and Canadian military initiatives to address sexual harassment and to increase diversity. The contributions with regard to professional military education (PME) present important recommendations on the ways in which pedagogy can be improved along with observations on the consequences of introducing complex gendered considerations into senior officer PME curricula.[3]

The research by Greco and von Hlatky seeks to assess how effectively the CAF addresses equality, diversity, and inclusivity in its concept of military professionalism. In doing so, it highlights areas where the CAF can improve its doctrine to maximize recruitment and retention, as well as operational effectiveness. The CAF's conceptualization of military professionalism can be found in its 2003 *Duty with Honour* manual. With the manual being under review, our research provides timely recommendations for how the CAF can optimally use military professionalism to foster a safe, diverse, and effective force for all service members. But more than pinpointing areas for improvement, our research also serves to highlight how the CAF has adapted to changing cultural and social societal norms. These adaptations are important also because they highlight the ways Canada's modifications to its armed forces have brought about positive change. They serve as a point of reference for other countries and allies, as a way for them to update their policies of military professionalism to better serve, reflect, and respect their service members.[4]

Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead

The research presented here offers several recommendations for the way ahead for the study of military professionalism.

The benefit of both qualitative and quantitative research. Both quantitative and qualitative methods have been used to study military professionalism and the military as a profession over the last five decades. Each approach has focused on different

---

[2]Cited by Brænder and Vilhelm.
[3]Cited by Brown and Okros.
[4]Cited by Greco and von Hlatky.

domains, with quantitative studies focusing on professional climate or culture, civil-military relations, perspectives from military elites, and values and social status. Qualitative studies, meanwhile, have focused on supporting the quantitative ones (Sarkesian 1981), beginning with Huntington's (1957) seminal study, which was oriented toward tracing the evolution and change of the institutional professional nature of the military.

While this approach has yielded a diverse and rich research literature, few efforts have sought to maximize the complementary aspects of the approaches by using mixed-methods research designs. Part of the reason for this is that rigorous training in both traditions is rare in academia and military education institutions alike. Building on the strengths of both approaches would require formal training and a willingness to integrate the two approaches.

The need for the mixed-methods approach and the challenges of integrating it into the study of military professionalism has increased with the rise of big data and computational research methods. The richness of data held by military organizations and the possibilities offered by data science methods for their aggregation and analysis should not be missed by military studies and civil–military relations researchers. To date, there has been little movement in this direction. Exploiting these possibilities will require that militaries provide access to their data to equip internal and external researchers. It will also require the academic community to make a tough adjustment. Establishing cooperation agreements with the military to gain access to data involves the provision of actionable output. In other words, the research will need to support the organization's needs. Whatever the insights provided by the post-positivist approaches common in academic research of the armed forces, research in support of the military must be accountable and actionable.

Collaboration. The ability of militaries to capitalize on the new methods and the research community to use big data depends on creating new multinational, civil–military, interdisciplinary, and military–academic collaborations. As the current volume has shown, the existence of a long-institutionalized framework for collaboration—the NATO Research Task Group (RTG) program—and assembling of interdisciplinary research teams with a diversity of academic and professional backgrounds are key to advancing both social science knowledge and policy-oriented output.

In order to realize the potential of the wealth of data held by armed forces, the growing in-house research capabilities of Western military colleges and the high interest of academic researchers of more formal frameworks for collaboration will be required. These should support initiation and management of multinational collaborations—regular access to data rights and protection—as well as post-project arrangements. If the history of the literature on military professionalism has taught us one thing, it is that it prospers and advances only when both military members and researchers contribute to the field.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach. As the current volume demonstrates, there are a variety of approaches to the definition, analysis, and implications of military professionalism, even among Western countries. As Libel (this volume) has shown, the concept is a contested one, with each generation in the literature suggesting a variety of approaches. Thus, we should talk perhaps about military *professionalisms*

rather than a univocal military professionalism. The concept is further limited by the fact that many of the world's militaries are not considered professional (e.g., the Israel Defense Forces; Libel 2010) or have not been considered professional in certain time periods (e.g., the United States Army in early post-Vietnam era; Neilsen 2010).

Moreover, the concept originated in Western countries. Hence, its applicability to non-Western societies is an open question, with few studies using the concept in other parts of the world. Further, some researchers, such as Libel (2019; this volume), have argued that due to changes in recent years, the concept has become obsolete and should be replaced by a modern conceptual framework. Thus, future studies should both explore its suitability to the study of non-Western societies as well as whether it is still relevant at all.

Implications for gender and diversity. Based on the case studies identified in the current volume, each country has its own cultural environment that influences the military profession. However, key elements to ensure that gender and diversity implications are integrated in the military profession include clear messages, policies, and procedures at all leadership levels. Yanakiev (Chap. 2) articulated the importance of streamlined policies and the bolstering of public support to help the BAF transition into a military profession that includes more diverse members. The study by Hachey (Chap. 3) revealed that diverse members perceive the same messages from CAF doctrine, but that further work must be done to understand the impact of traditional models of military professionalism on diversity. Additionally, Greco and von Hlatky, within the context of the CAF, found that most policies regarding equity, diversity, and inclusion are implemented in isolation and for specific military career points (e.g., recruitment). Instead, they argue, the military should consider policies and initiatives that link all aspects of a military career and are more inclusive of all aspects of gender and diversity (e.g., integrating diversity and inclusion policies together). Linehagen (Chap. 7), based on her qualitative study, found that women use certain power resources to make their way in the military. Key to her research are the specific resources identified (i.e., structural, cultural, emotional) that could be further studied and perhaps leveraged for future gender-specific recruitment efforts. Finally, Brown and Okros (Chap. 10) articulated the importance of introducing complex gender considerations into PME curricula, indicating the need for challenging thinking regarding gender and diversity in the military at the senior officer levels.

Conclusion

Contributors to this volume sought to rethink the concept of military professionalism by re-examining the theoretical underpinnings, highlighting case studies from different NATO nations, and presenting current research that introduces novel thinking and approaches to military professionalism. Most importantly, given the historical

nature of the military as a profession, the goal was to highlight gender and diversity implications for the concept of military professionalism. This chapter brought together the key points in these chapters and recommendations on the way ahead.

References

Abbott, A. (1988). *The systems of professions: An essay on the division of expert labour*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Archer, E. M. (2013). The power of gendered stereotypes in the US marine corps. *Armed Forces & Society, 39*(2), 359–391.

Bachman, J. G., & Blair, J. D. (1975). *Soldiers, sailors, and civilians: The "military mind" and the all-volunteer force*. Ann Arbour, MI: Institute for Social Research. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a035092.pdf.

Booth, B., Kestnbaum, M., & Segal, D. R. (2001). Are post-Cold War militaries postmodern? *Armed Forces & Society, 27*(3), 319–342.

Butler, A., & Budgell, G. (2015). *Study on army professionalism (Human Resource Systems Group, Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis Contract Report DRDC-RDDC-2015-C180)*. Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.

Caforio, G. (1988). The military profession: Theories of change. *Armed Forces & Society, 15*(1), 55–69.

Carreiras, H. (2006). *Gender and the military: Women in the armed forces of western democracies*. London, UK: Routledge.

Dandeker, C. (1994). New times for the military: Some sociological remarks on the changing role and structure of the armed forces of the advanced societies. *British Journal of Sociology, 45*(4), 637–654.

Der Meulem, J. V., & Manigart, P. (1997). Zero draft in the Low Countries: The final shift to the all-volunteer force. *Armed Forces & Society, 24*(2), 315–332.

Devilbiss, M. C. (1990). *Women and military service: A history, analysis, and overview of key issues*. DIANE publishing. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a229958.pdf.

Dufour, M. (2018). *Will artificial intelligence challenge NATO interoperability*? NDC Policy Brief No. 6. NATO Defense College.

Evans, M. (2004). *The continental school of strategy: The past, present and future of land warfare*. Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Center.

Eyal, G. (2013). For a sociology of expertise: The social origins of the autism epidemic. *American Journal of Sociology, 118*(4), 863–907.

Eyal, G., & Pok, G. (2015). What is security expertise? From the sociology of professions to the analysis of networks of expertise. In T. V. Berling & C. Bueger (Eds.), *Security expertise: Practice, power and responsibility* (pp. 37–58). New York, NY: Routledge.

Feaver, P. D. (1996). The civil-military problematique: Huntington Janowitz, and the question of civilian control. *Armed Forces & Society, 23*(2), 149–178.

Forster, A. (2012). British judicial engagement and juridification of the armed forces. *International Affairs, 88*(2), 283–300.

Groves, M. (2005). The civilianization of Australian military law. *University of New South Wales Law Journal, 28*(2), 364.

Harries-Jenkins, G. (1990). The concept of military professionalism. *Defence Analysis, 6*(2), 117–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/07430179008405441.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University.

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.

King, A. (2006). The post-Fordist military. *Journal of political and military sociology, 34*(2), 359–374.

Lasswell, H. D. (1941). The garrison state. *American Journal of Sociology, 46*(4), 455–468.

Libel, T. (2010). Teaching citizens to be professional soldiers: IDF responses and their implications. In S. A. Cohen (Ed.), *The new citizen armies: Israel's armed forces in comparative perspective*. London, UK: Routledge.

Libel, T. (2013). From the people's army to the Jewish people's army: The IDF's force structure between professionalization and militarization. *Defense & security analysis, 29*(4), 280–292.

Libel, T. (2016). *European military culture and security governance: Soldiers, scholars and national defence universities*. Routledge.

Libel, T. (2019). From the sociology of the (military) profession to the sociology of (security) expertise: The case of European national defence universities. *Defence Studies, 19*(1), 62–84.

Margiotta, F. D. (1976). A military elite in transition: Air force leaders in the 1980s. *Armed Forces & Society, 2*(2), 155–184.

Moellering, J. H. (1973). Future civil–military relations: The Army turns inward? *Military Review, 53*(7), 68–83.

Moskos, C. C. (1977). From institution to occupation: Trends in military organization. *Armed Forces & Society, 4*(1), 41–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7700400103.

Moskos, C. C. (1981). *Institution versus occupation: Contrasting models of military organization.* Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a096966.pdf.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. (2009). *Duty with honour: The profession of Arms in Canada*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy.

Nielsen, S. C. (2010). *An army transformed: The US Army's post-Vietnam recovery and the dynamics of change in military organizations*. No. 43. Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1020.pdf.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2018). *NATO agrees 2019 civil and military budgets for further adaptation*. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_161633.htm?selectedLocale=en.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2019a). *Cyber defence*. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2019b). *Defence expenditure of NATO countries (2011–2018). Public Diplomacy Division.* Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2019c). *Multinational capability cooperation*. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_163289.htm.

Nuciari, M. (1994). Rethinking the military profession: Models of change compared. *Current Sociology, 42*(3), 7–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/001139294042003003.

Rubin, G. R. (2002). United Kingdom military law: Autonomy, civilianization, juridification. *Modern Law Review, 65*(1), 36–57.

Russett, B. M. (1974). Political perspectives of U.S. military and business elites. *Armed Forces & Society, 1*(1), 79–108.

Sarkesian, S. C. (1981). *Beyond the battlefield: The new military professionalism*. New York, NY: Pergamon Press.

Sirivunnabood, P., & Ricks, J. (2016). Professionals and soldiers: Measuring professionalism in the Thai military. *Pacific Affairs, 89*(1), 7–30.

Soeters, J., & van der Meulen, J. (Eds.). (2007). *Cultural diversity in the armed forces: An international comparison*. London and New York: Routledge.

Sorensen, H. (2000). Conscription in Scandinavia during the last quarter century: Developments and arguments. *Armed Forces & Society, 26*(2), 313–334.

Tonin, M. (2019). *Artificial intelligence: Implications for NATO's armed forces*. Draft Report, Science and Technology Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Retrieved from https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-04/088%20STCTTS%2019%20E%20-%20ARTIFICIAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20-%20DRAFT%20REPORT%20TONIN.pdf.

US Army War College. (1970). *Study on military professionalism*. PA: Carlisle Barracks.

Van Doorn, J. (1965). The officer corps: A fusion of profession and organization. *European Journal of Sociology, 6*(2), 262–282.

Waters, C. P. M. (2008). Is the military legally encircled? *Defence Studies, 8*(1), 26–48.

Wilensky, H. L. (1964). The professionalization of everyone? *American Journal of Sociology, 70,* 137–158.

Wiegand, K. E., & Paletz, D. L. (2001). The elite media and the military-civilian culture gap. *Armed Forces & Society, 27*(2), 183–204.

Afterword: Toward a Culture and Gender-Inclusive Model of Military Professionalism: Theoretical Achievements and Practical Implications

This book grew out of the work of NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Research Task Group (RTG) HFM RTG-287 on Developing a Culture and Gender-Inclusive Model of Military Professionalism. As the mentor of the RTG on behalf of the STO HFM Panel, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the team, and to congratulate my colleagues for their valuable research and applied results.

The study contributes to filling the gaps in current research and provides innovative approaches for reconceptualizing military professionalism in light of the rapidly changing strategic security environment, operational contexts, and the broadening of the missions and the roles the military is expected to play—all while keeping up with the demographic trends and the increasing diversity of defense forces. Moreover, the authors formulate important guidance to policy-makers and military leaders regarding the relationship between military professionalism and conduct, performance, and operational effectiveness.

In my opinion, there are several significant results that deserve attention from both a theoretical and practical point of view. First, the research focuses on the postmodern trends in military organizations, such as the change in the traditional warrior culture, the internationalization of the military through participation in coalition operations and multinational formations, the abolition of conscription and the creation of an all-volunteer force, and the full integration of women into the services, along with their increasing ethnic and cultural diversity. There are two interconnected aspects of diversity in defense organizations: (1) The internal awareness of diversity and equal opportunity (or equal employment opportunity) issues in the national context and (2) the cross-cultural communication and cross-cultural cooperation needed in multinational operations. In both cases, diversity management is vital for military effectiveness, teamwork, cohesiveness, and performance. At the same time, little research has been conducted on how diversity and gender affect military

professionalism. Therefore, the team attempted to reconceptualize military professionalism in a way that accounted for different aspects of equity, diversity, and inclusion. In this way, the research findings support the process of building an inclusive defense organization. This is essential also for improving organizational effectiveness and readiness of defense forces.

Second, the research supports the process of building and sustaining democratic civil–military relations under the social and political transformations that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. As the research findings confirm, the traditional understanding of military professionalism significantly changed, new skills and new competences are expected from the military professional, many of them more closely related to civilian expertize because the military has been much more involved in civilian tasks since the end of the Cold War. In light of these developments, this volume opens a welcome discussion about the nature of contemporary military expertise inside and outside defense organizations. To date, little research has been done on military experts outside the military, such as policy-makers and those in academia, the media, and non-governmental organizations who are dealing with defense and security issues. Hence, the publication also contributes to filling this gap and opens new avenues for research.

Third, the theoretical findings and practical implications in the book may be valuable in the process of recruitment, retention, motivation, promotion, and career management of diverse military personnel. These findings could be instrumental for rethinking and reorganizing professional military education (PME) and training for today's and tomorrow's defense forces. The new skills and competences needed by the military professional call for new content and a reorganization of the PME and training. Some authors have stressed the importance of updating common understandings of military professionalism, in theory, and amending the way it is taught in practice. In this regard, an important recommendation in the book is to introduce complex gender, diversity, and inclusion considerations into PME curricula, particularly for senior military leaders.

Fourth, the outcomes of the study will be appreciated for rethinking and better understanding of the impact of traditional models of military professionalism on diversity and inclusion in defense organizations. Moreover, they may be valuable for updating the strategies, policies, action plans, and processes to build and sustain inclusive defense organizations. In addition, the results can support the process of institutionalizing diversity management and inclusion policies, which means several things: (1) building capacity by establishing specialized structures in defense organizations for policy development, coordination of the strategic action plans among the services, organizational climate assessment and monitoring, planning education and training activities, supporting and advising commanders on equality and diversity management issues; (2) making the diversity management and inclusion policy into an integral part of the whole process of identification, recruitment, selection, promotion, professional development, and retention of the cadre; (3) respecting diversity as a basic value of personnel in defense organizations; (4) cultivating the ability to manage diverse teams and organizations as a basic competence of military leaders at all levels in the organization; and (5) providing enough resources to implement

diversity and inclusion action plans. Last but not least, the book presents some best practices for removing institutional barriers and gender requirements in recruitment, retention, and PME and training that can be used as examples for other nations.

Fifth, the military profession will be strongly influenced by new defense technologies, particularly digitalization and artificial intelligence (AI)—a discussion the authors initiated in the book. There are many open questions regarding AI that need further research. Issues such as how to find the right balance in human–machine systems in defense and how to exercise meaningful human control over AI, particularly in decision making, will be of key importance in the years to come.

Sixth, the book raises a fundamental theoretical question about whether military professionalism, as we know it today, is outdated, and suggests that under the rapidly changing security environment, the pressure of greater efficiency of defense organizations, increasing role of civilian sector in guaranteeing security, demographic trends, new expectations and changing values of current and future military personnel might need profound rethinking and redefinition. Besides, the discussion about the need for achieving better agility of defense organizations in the context of rapidly changing environments also may be important for decision-makers and military leaders.

In conclusion, I would like to suggest the team members make use of the momentum created by this book and continue their joint research activities, focusing on the theoretical gaps identified in this study of military professionalism. The lesson learned by the team that stronger cooperation between scientists and military leaders to produce tangible and usable results to support defense organizations deserves attention. The NATO STO will be the perfect vehicle for collaborative research among allied member states and NATO partners.

The current publication focuses mostly on the experiences of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, though the experiences of East Europeans are also important to have in mind, especially the effect of the social and political transition from socialism to democracy on military professionalism. Having said that, I fully support the conclusion of my colleagues that the current concept of military professionalism originated in Western countries and that there are few studies about its applicability to non-Western societies. Therefore, I encourage the team to expand their research to incorporate the expertise of colleagues from non-Western societies in any future research and publications devoted to military professionalism.

In addition, it would be useful to undertake future research to operationalize the theoretical models of military professionalism explored here and to collect data for validating a unified model. Once more, it can be done within the framework of NATO STO, and I would strongly recommend initiating a new RTG to continue this successful endeavor.

Finally, and equally important, it would be valuable to plan some dissemination activities in the framework of NATO STO in Europe and North America. For example, this could be a lecture series that would provide an opportunity for defense policy-makers and military leaders from the Alliance and partner nations to discuss theoretical findings and practical implications with a broader audience. This book will be a very good basis for continuing expert discussions about the future of military professionalism.

Yantsislav Yanakiev
Bulgarian Defence Institute
2 Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov Blvd
1592, Sofia Bulgaria
email: y.yanakiev@di.mod.bg

Index